Karnataka High Court
Sri.L.C.Krishnaiah vs Sri.Krishna Joshi on 25 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
R
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO.54203/2017 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
SRI. L.C. KRISHNAIAH
SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS.
1. SMT. N. SUMANGALA
W/O LATE L.C. KRISHNAIAH
Digitally signed AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS.
by RUPA V
Location: High 2. SRI. K.V. GOPAL
Court of W/O LATE L.C. KRISHNAIAH
karnataka AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS.
3. SRI. K.C.B. GOWDA
S/O LATE L.C. KRISHNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS.
ALL ARE R/AT MANTANAKURCHI VILLAGE
KASABA HOBLI, NELAMANGALA TALUK
BNAGALORE RURAL DISTRICT-562130.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. T. SESHAGIRI RAO, ADV.,)
AND:
1. SRI. KRISHNA JOSHI
S/O LATE NARAYANA JOSHI
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
RESIDING AT D.NO.84/B
"SRIVATHSA", 2ND MAIN ROAD
GKW LAYOUT, BENGALURU-560040.
2. SMT. SUCHETHA RAJANNA
D/O L.C. KRISHNAIAH
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AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
R/AT. SAMRUDDHI NILAYA
FARM HOUSE, BYRAPURA ROAD
KAKOLU, KAKOLU POST
HESARAGHATTA HOBLI
YELAHANKA, BENGALURU-560089.
3. SMT. DEVIKA .K
D/O L.C. KRISHNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
R/AT. NO.76, 2ND 'A' CROSS
DEFENCE COLONY
NAGASANDRA POST, BAGALA GUNTE
BENGALURU-560073.
4. SMT. KASTURI .K
D/O L.C. KRISHNAIAH
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
R/AT. NO.36, SHIVA KRUPA
6TH MAIN, 7TH CROSS
MALLESWARAM, BENGALURU-560003.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RAMACHANDRA G. BHAT, ADV.,)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER WRIT OR ORDER FOR QUASHING THE
ORDER DATED 31.8.2017 ONE PASSED BY THE II ADDL. SR.CIVIL
JUDGE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT ON AN APPLICATION FILED BY
THE PETITIONERS HEREIN UNDER SEC. 28(1) OF THE SPECIFIC
RELIEF ACT IN O.S.259/2001 ON THE FILE OF ITS COURT FOUND AT
ANNEX-X TO THE WRIT PETITION AND FURTHER PASS APPROPRIATE
ORDER TO ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION & ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
23.07.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CAV ORDER
This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated
31.08.2017 passed by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge,
Bengaluru, on an application filed under Section 28(1) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, in O.S.No.259/2001.
2. Heard.
3. Sri.T.Seshagiri Rao, learned counsel for the
petitioners makes the following submissions:
(1) The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for specific
performance of the agreements of sale dated 28.03.1999 and
27.11.2000. The petitioner-defendant conceded the prayer for
passing of the decree. The defendant filed a memo to decree
the suit by directing the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed
within thirty days by paying the balance sale consideration.
The suit came to be decreed conditionally by directing the
defendant to execute the registered sale deed in respect of the
suit schedule property after receiving the balance amount of
sale consideration as per the agreements within two months
from the date of decree.
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(2) The plaintiff could not come forward to pay the
balance sale consideration as per the decree and did not get
the sale deed registered. The defendant issued a legal notice
on 02.09.2004 calling upon the plaintiff to perform his
obligation as per the decree. The plaintiff sent an untenable
reply stating that within two months of getting the copy of the
decree he would get the sale deed executed. The defendant
sent another notice on 04.11.2004 stating that the plaintiff,
with a sole intention to go behind the agreements and also the
terms of the decree, issued the reply notice and the defendant
is not liable to execute the sale deed since the plaintiff inspite
of the specific offer did not complete the sale transaction within
the stipulated time and the defendant is at liberty to deal with
the property in favour of anyone of his choice. The plaintiff
sent a reply to the said notice with untenable grounds and sent
a notice dated 20.01.2005 stating that the arm twisting
activities and threat of deploying muscle power, etc. would not
work to the advantage of the defendant.
(3) The plaintiff filed an execution petition in Ex. case
No.17/2005 along with an affidavit of the plaintiff narrating
incorrect facts. It is submitted that the defendant filed
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objections to the execution petition on 15.09.2005 stating that
the decree being a conditional one and due to non-performance
of the condition by the plaintiff-decree holder, the decree is not
executable. The Trial Court, vide order dated 11.03.2010
rejected the objections of the petitioners-judgment debtors.
The petitioners filed a miscellaneous appeal challenging the
order dated 11.03.2010. It is further submitted that in the
interregnum, considering the observations of the Trial Court,
the petitioners filed an application under Section 28(1) of the
Act, seeking to rescind the judgment and decree dated
25.08.2004 in O.S.No.259/2001. The Trial Court, under the
impugned order rejected the said application. It is also
submitted that in the interregnum, the plaintiff-decree holder
without seeking any extension of time, filed a memo to deposit
the balance sale consideration before the Executing Court. The
Executing Court accepted the said memo.
(4) It is contended that the plaintiff ought to have paid
the balance sale consideration within the time stipulated in the
decree and ought to have got the sale deed executed. He
deposited the sum before the Executing Court after a period of
one year eight months. The defendant sent first notice on
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02.09.2004 and within a period of two months from the said
date, the plaintiff ought to have paid the balance sale
consideration and got the sale deed executed. The plaintiff has
indulged in untenable replies to the notice and deposited some
amounts in the Execution Court and the said amount is not the
entire balance of sale consideration. It is further contended
that till date, the plaintiff has not filed any application seeking
for extension of time in the suit and any deposit made suo
motu in the execution proceedings does not amount to
extension of time in the decree.
(5) It is also contended that the decree drawn by the
Court is based on the compromise and the decree is a
conditional one and based on the judgment which was available
with the plaintiff, he ought to have come forward and deposited
the balance sale consideration. However, an untenable stand is
taken that only the decree was drawn, he would pay the
balance sale consideration. It is submitted that the decree in
the suit came to be drawn on 24.09.2004 and even from that
date the respondent ought to have paid the balance sale
consideration within two months. However, he suo motu
deposits the same in the execution proceedings that too when
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the defendant has objected to the execution proceedings on the
ground that the conditional decree is not enforceable.
(6) It is further submitted that the objections filed by
the defendant in the execution proceedings amounts to
rescission of contract for sale as provided under Section 28(1)
of the Act. It is also submitted that if the decree is a
conditional one, the Court cannot extend the time at the
request of the decree holder, however it can rescind the
contract at the request of the judgment debtor if the conditions
are not fulfilled. In this case, the respondent-decree holder
had not filed any application seeking for extension of time and
unless extension is sought and granted, there cannot be any
sanctity for the deposit made by the respondent-decree holder
in the Execution Court. It is contended that the Trial Court,
under the impugned order rejected the application of the
defendant mainly on the ground that the application is filed
beyond the period of limitation. It is further contended that no
time is stipulated in Section 28 of the Act for rescission for sale
of immovable property. It is also contended that the decree in
question is only a preliminary decree and the proceedings
would come to an end only after the execution of the sale deed
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and delivery of possession in favour of the purchaser is
completed and from that date, the limitation is required to be
considered. However, the Trial Court, under the impugned
order applied Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and held
that the application is filed beyond a period of three years. In
support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the
following judgments:
1. RADHEY SHYAM & ORS. Vs. HARENDRA PAL RATHI1
2. BAKHTAWAR SINGH Vs. MST. INDER KAUR2
3. PREM JEEVAN Vs. K.S. VENKATA RAMAN & ANR.3
4. LAJPAT RAI MEHTA Vs. SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF
PUNJAB, DEPARTMENT OF IRRIGATION AND POWER,
CHANDIGARH4
4. Per contra, Sri.Ramachandra G. Bhat, learned
counsel for the respondent-plaintiff supports the impugned
order of the Execution Court and submits that the judgment is
dated 25.08.2004 and on the said day, the defendant was not
alive as he died on 19.08.2004 and as per the agreement of
sale dated 28.03.1999, the extent is shown as 3 acres 34
guntas. However, there was a dispute with regard to 19 guntas
1
AIR 2015 ALL 180
2
(2014) 1 RLW 544 (Raj)
3
(2017) 11 SCC 57
4
(2009) 3 SCC 260
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and a request was made to conduct the survey but no survey
was carried out. Hence, it was not known as to what was the
extent of land available for execution of sale deed free from
dispute and such information was not provided in the notices
issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff
was waiting for the dispute relating to 19 guntas of land to be
resolved and survey to be carried out. However, the defendant
could not complete the survey work and only in the year 2011,
the survey was completed. Hence, there cannot be any default
on the part of the plaintiff in not paying the balance sale
consideration and not getting the sale deed executed. It is
submitted that the plaintiff has sought permission to deposit
the balance sale consideration in the Execution Court which was
allowed and thereafter, the plaintiff deposited the balance
amount to the extent of 3 acres 15 guntas only, as the title in
respect of 19 guntas was in dispute. It is further submitted
that the defendant did not come forward within 60 days to
execute the sale deed as no survey was conducted and the
initial burden is on the defendant that the property was ready
for execution of sale deed and the same was not discharged.
Hence, the question of plaintiff seeking any extension of time
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would not arise. It is also submitted that the condition
stipulated in the decree is that the execution of the sale deed is
as per the agreements of sale and until the dispute is resolved
with regard to the extent referred in the agreements of sale,
the time stipulated in the decree would not run against the
plaintiff. It is contended that till the notice was issued, the
plaintiff was not aware as to who were the legal heirs of the
defendant and who would execute the sale deed. Hence, it was
difficult for him to make the payment to the legal heirs and to
what extent and the petitioners have not produced the
particulars of the legal heirs or the succession certificate to the
respondent-plaintiff and if they would have produced the same,
the plaintiff would have taken steps to pay the balance amount
and would have sought for registration of the sale deed. Due
to the delay of the petitioners, the respondent-plaintiff cannot
be held liable for not complying the conditions of the decree. It
is further contended that the respondent-plaintiff filed a memo
seeking permission to deposit the amount and the said memo is
not opposed by the petitioners and the order passed on such
memo has attained finality. It is also contended that after
deposit of the amount, the petitioners filed an application for
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rescission, beyond the period of limitation, which has been
rightly rejected by the Trial Court. It is submitted that till the
application for rescission of contract is filed, the decree in
question was enforceable and it was a valid decree and the
respondent has deposited the balance amount before the
Execution Court before the application for rescission of the
contract. The rescission application was filed by the petitioners
only after the respondent deposited the amount and the same
was accepted by the Execution Court. In view of the same, the
application for rescission was not maintainable. It is further
submitted that the application for rescission ought to have been
filed before filing of the memo by the respondents and before
any amount is deposited before the Execution Court. In
support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the following
decisions:
1. RAMANKUTTY GUPTAN VS, AVARA5
2. SARDAR MOHAR SINGH VS. MANGILAL @ MANGTYA6
3. CHITHAMBARAN PONNAPPAN VS. VISWAMBARAN
AND ANR.7
4. KUMAR DHIRENDRA MULLICK AND ORS. VS. TIVOLI
PARK APARTMENTS (P) LTD.8
5
(1994) 2 SCC 642
6
(1997) 9 SCC 217
7
AIR 2001 KERALA 205
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5. S.K.GUPTA AND ORS. Vs. KULDIP SINGH AND ORS.9
6. ASHOK K KHURANA Vs. M/s. STEELMAN INDUSTRIES
AND ANR.10
5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel
for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondent and
perused the material available on record. I have given my
anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on both the
sides.
6. The parties are referred to as per their rankings in
the suit. The respondent is the plaintiff and the petitioner is
the defendant.
7. The pleading and material on record indicate that
the plaintiff filed O.S.No.259/2001 for the relief of specific
performance of the agreements of sale dated 28.03.1999 and
27.11.2000. The subject matter of the suit was a land
measuring 3 acres 34 guntas in Sy.No.170 of Mantanakurchi
Village, Kasaba Hobli, Nelamangala Taluk, Bangalore Rural
District or 3 acres 15 guntas of the same land. The defendant
8
(2005) 9 SCC 262
9
AIR 2011 DELHI 54
10
AIR 2000 DELHI 336
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filed a written statement. The prayer in the written statement
reads as under:
"Wherefore, the defendant humbly prays that this
Hon'ble Court be pleased to dismiss the suit one
presented by the plaintiff with exemplary cost in case
the plaintiff failed to purchase the property within
thirty days from the date of placing written statement
on record........"
8. The defendant also filed a memo dated 16.07.2004
which indicates that as on the date of the memo, survey
dispute as alleged in the plaint was settled and there was no
legal impediment for the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed
and a direction was sought to the plaintiff to get the sale deed
executed within 30 days from the date of placing the memo on
record, otherwise the defendant would forfeit the advance
amount received from the plaintiff under the agreement of sale.
9. The Trial Court considered the written statement as
well as the memo and passed the judgment on 25.08.2004
which reads as under:
"Suit of the plaintiff is decreed. The defendant shall
execute the registered sale deed in respect of the suit
property after receiving balance amount of sale
consideration payable to the defendant as per the terms
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of the agreement. The sale deed shall be executed and
registered by both the parties within two months from the
date of the decree. In case if the defendants fail to
execute the registered sale deed within that period, the
plaintiff is at liberty to apply to the Court and get
appointed a court commissioner for execution and
registration of the sale deed after depositing balance
amount of sale consideration."
10. The aforesaid judgment indicates that the suit of
the plaintiff was decreed, the defendant was directed to
execute the registered sale deed after receiving the balance
amount of the sale consideration as per the terms of agreement
within two months from the date of decree. In case, if the
defendant failed to execute the registered sale deed, the
plaintiff has liberty to apply to the Court and get the sale deed
executed after depositing the balance sale consideration.
11. The defendant died on 19.08.2004 and the legal
heirs of the defendant got issued legal notice dated 02.09.2004
to the plaintiff indicating that the legal heirs of the defendant
are ready and willing to execute the sale deed after receiving
the balance sale consideration and requested to inform as to
where and when they have to meet the plaintiff for completion
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of the sale transaction and for execution of the registered sale
deed in order to complete their obligation as per the judgment
dated 25.08.2004. The plaintiff's counsel sent a reply dated
17.09.2004 informing that upon going through the judgment
and within two months after getting the copy of the decree, the
plaintiff would get the sale deed executed in his favour. The
defendants got issued another notice on 4.11.2004 to the
plaintiff informing that the plaintiff, with a sole intention to go
behind the agreement and also the terms of the decree got
issued reply notice stating that he still wants to look into the
judgment and decree passed by the Court. Hence, the
defendants informed that they are not liable to execute the sale
deed since the plaintiff inspite of specific offer made by the
legal heirs of the deceased, did not complete the sale
transaction. As such, the defendants are at liberty to deal with
the property in favour of anybody of their choice. The plaintiff
sent a notice dated 27.11.2004 informing that the plaintiff has
applied for the certified copy of the decree and the plaintiff is
ready to scrupulously follow the terms of the decree and get
the property in question registered and as on that date, neither
the office of the Court had drawn the decree nor was it signed
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by the learned Civil Judge. The decree at Annexure-N indicates
that the said decree was drawn and signed by the learned Civil
Judge on 24.09.2004. Hence, the assertion of the plaintiff in
the notice dated 27.11.2004 that the decree was not drawn is
factually incorrect. The plaintiff got issued another notice dated
20.01.2005 stating that he has been furnished with the
certified copy of the decree and are wiling to get the sale deed
registered.
12. The plaintiff filed an execution petition in
Ex.P.No.17/2005 on 08.02.2005 seeking prayer to the
defendants-judgment debtors to execute the sale deed in
favour of plaintiff-decree holder. Along with the execution
petition, the plaintiff filed an affidavit. The affidavit indicates
that the plaintiff was ready for the registration of the sale deed
within the period and also ready to pay the balance sale
consideration but the judgment debtors were not ready to
execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Further, the
judgment debtors have not challenged the order dated
25.08.2004 till now. The order sheet in Ex.P.No.17/2005
indicates that the plaintiff-decree holder filed a memo wherein
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he seeks permission to deposit the balance sale consideration
of Rs.2,16,000/-. The Execution Court, on 29.06.2006
permitted the decree holder to deposit Rs.2,16,000/- and
ordered to issue RO to the said amount. On 07.07.2006, the
decree holder filed a memo along with a document for having
deposited the amount.
13. The defendants-judgment debtors filed objections
on 15.09.2005 in Ex.P.No.17/2005 contending that the
plaintiff-decree holder was supposed to have paid the balance
sale consideration within two months as per the conditional
judgment and decree and should have got the sale deed
registered. Hence, the agreements stood revoked by virtue of
the judgment dated 25.08.2004 passed in O.S.No.259/2001
and the judgment being a conditional judgment, the decree
holder is estopped from contending contrary to the same in the
execution petition and the decree is not executable. The
Execution Court, vide order dated 11.03.2010 rejected the
objections holding that the Execution Court cannot go beyond
the decree and cannot interpret the same in negative terms.
The said order was assailed by the petitioners in
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M.A.No.28/2010 which is pending consideration. In the
meanwhile, the petitioners filed an application under Section
28(1) of the Act seeking for rescinding the judgment and
decree dated 25.08.2004 and the agreement of sale dated
28.03.1999 which came to be rejected by the Trial Court under
the impugned order.
14. The Allahabad High Court in the case of RADHEY
SHYAM AND OTHERS, referred supra at paragraphs 17 and
18 held as under:
"17. So far as the objection under section 47, C.P.C.
filed by the defendants is concerned, the
petitioners/judgment debtors had objected to the
execution of the decree on the ground that the balance
sale consideration was not paid by the decree holder.
The decree for specific performance is a preliminary
decree. The Court passing the decree did not cease to
have power after decreeing the suit for specific
performance rather final decree is to be passed only
after the conditions of the preliminary decree have been
complied with. The time specified in the decree for
specific performance of the conditions of the decree has
to be adhered to. In case of failure to deposit the
money, the Court has power to extend the time on the
application of the decree holder.
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18. The decree holder did not file any application
seeking extension of time. On the other hand, in the
objection-under section 47, C.P.C., the judgment debtor
had pleaded that the final decree could not be passed as
the decree holder did not pay the balance sale
consideration in compliance of the preliminary decree.
The Executing Court had adopted correct approach of
law in looking into the facts that whether the decree for
specific performance can be executed by giving
extension of time to the decree holder to deposit the
balance sale consideration. In its discretion, it has
refused to accept the deposits made beyond the period
of four years, without any explanation of delay by the
decree holder. The Revisional Court ought not to have
interfered in the matter in its limited jurisdiction. This
Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the impugned
judgment and orders dated 24.2.1996 and 30.9.2008
cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside. The
order of the Executing Court dated 9.5.2002 in
Execution Case No. 61 of 1996 is upheld. The writ
petition is allowed. The Execution application is
consigned to record."
15. In the aforesaid decision, it was held that the
decree for specific performance is a preliminary decree. The
Court passing the decree did not cease to have the power after
decreeing a suit for specific performance rather final decree is
to be passed only after the conditions of the preliminary decree
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have been complied with, and the conditions of the decree has
to be adhered to and the decree holder shall seek extension of
time to deposit the balance sale consideration and the Trial
Court, in its discretion has to refuse or accept the deposit
beyond the period.
16. In the case of BAKHTAWAR SINGH referred
supra, the Rajasthan High Court at paragraphs 17, 18, 20 and
21 held as under:
"17. This case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as
such a proposition cannot be applied to the facts of the
present case. Filing of application under Section 28 of the
Act by the defendant is in the circumstances where the
plaintiff fails to deposit the money as directed in the
decree. Here the plaintiff has filed only an application
under Section 148 C.P.C. for extension of time, which has
been refused upon a contest by the defendant and while
dismissing the said application under Section 148 C.P.C.,
the Court also invoked the Section 28 of the Act to
rescind the agreement in question itself without any
separate and specific application by the vendor -
defendant Mst. Inder Kaur. There was no need for any
separate application on behalf of the defendant to move
any such application, since the plaintiff only claimed
extension of time as a matter of right under Section 148
C.P.C. having not led any evidence in support of basis for
such extension, therefore, even if the contract was not
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rescinded, the learned trial court could very well refuse
the execution of the decree in question holding it to be a
in executable decree.
18. The other case relied upon by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, Mr. Hemant Dutt in the case of D.V.
Paul v. Manisha Lalwani, (2010) 8 SCC 546 is only about
exercise of discretion under Section 148 C.P.C. and the
Hon'ble Apex Court in para 26 clarified that such a
provision is only discretionary and is intended to be
exercised to meet the ends of justice. In para 32 of the
judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly observed
that the power to fix time for doing of an act must carry
with it the power to extend such period, depending upon
whether the party in default makes out a case to the
satisfaction of the Court who has fixed the time. In the
present case, the learned Counsel below has only refused
the said application and such rejection cannot be said to
be perverse in any manner requiring interference by this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
20. On the other hand, in the case of V.S.
Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan reported in
(1999) 4 SCC 702 relied upon by the learned counsel for
the respondents Mr. V.K. Agarwal, the Hon'ble Apex Court
in para 17 held that the provisions to grant specific
performance of an agreement are quite stringent.
Equitable considerations come into play and the Court has
to see all the attendant circumstances including if the
vendee has conducted himself in a reasonable manner
under the contract of sale. The Apex Court held that the
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court cannot as a matter of course, allow extension of
time for making payment of balance amount of
consideration in terms of a decree after 5 years of passing
of the decree by the trial Court and 3 years of its
confirmation by the appellate Court. Therefore, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the application of the
plaintiff and upheld the contention of the defendant that
the decree was in executable after long lapse of 5 years.
Para 17 of the said judgment as appearing in the head-
note of the SCC is extracted below for ready reference:
"Provisions to grant specific performance of an
agreement are quite stringent. Equitable
considerations come into play. Court has to see all
the attendant circumstances including if the vendee
has conducted himself in a reasonable manner
under the contract of sale. That being the position
of law for filing the suit for specific performance,
can the court as a matter of course allow extension
of time for making payment of balance amount of
consideration in terms of a decree after 5 years of
passing of the decree by the trial Court and 3 years
of its confirmation by the appellate Court? It is not
the case of the respondent-decree holder that on
account of any fault on the part of the vendor-
judgment-debtor, the amount could not be
deposited as per the decree. That being the
position, if now time is granted, that would be
going beyond the period of limitation prescribed for
filing of the suit for specific performance of the
agreement though this provision may not be
strictly applicable. It is nevertheless an important
circumstance to be considered by the Court. That
apart, no explanation whatsoever is coming from
the decree-holder-respondents as to why they did
not pay the balance amount of consideration as per
the decree except what the High Court itself though
fit to comment which is certainly not borne out
from the record. Equity demands that discretion be
not exercised in favour of the decree holder-
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respondents and no extension of time be granted
to them to comply with the decree."
21. The said judgment is clearly on all fours with the
present case and this Court is of the clear opinion that
learned Executing Court below was justified in refusing
the execution of decree of specific performance rejecting
the application filed under Section 148 C.P.C. and 3 and
½ years of the decree without any reason and without
any evidence. The learned trial Court, rightly found no
justification for execution of decree after 7 years of
decree dtd. 16.8.2003 and the learned court below was
justified in invoking Section 28 of the Act and rescind the
Agreement itself."
[Emphasis supplied]
17. In the case of PREM JEEVAN, referred supra, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraphs 8 to 12 held as under:
"8. Reference to Order 20 Rule 12-A CPC shows that
in every decree of specific performance of a contract, the
court has to specify the period within which the payment
has to be made. In the present case, the said period was
two months from the date of the decree.
9. In absence of the said time being extended, the
decree-holder could execute the decree only by making
the payment of the decretal amount to the judgment-
debtor or making the deposit in the court in terms of the
said decree. In the present case, neither the said deposit
was made within the stipulated time nor extension of time
was sought or granted and also no explanation has been
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furnished for the delay in the making of the deposit. No
doubt, as contended by the learned counsel for the
decree-holders, relying on the judgment of this Court
in Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara [Ramankutty
Guptan v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642] , in an appropriate
case the court which passed the decree could extend the
time as envisaged in the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In the
present case no such steps have been taken by the
decree-holders.
10. In the above circumstances, the contention
advanced on behalf of the decree-holders, respondents
herein, that unless the judgment-debtor seeks rescission
of the contract in terms of Section 28 of the Specific
Relief Act, the decree remains executable in spite of
expiry of the period for deposit, with the only obligation
on the part of the decree-holders to pay interest, cannot
be accepted.
11. Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act is as follows:
"28. Rescission in certain circumstances of
contracts for the sale or lease of immovable
property, the specific performance of which has
been decreed.--(1) Where in any suit a decree for
specific performance of a contract for the sale or
lease of immovable property has been made and
the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period
allowed by the decree or such further period as the
court may allow, pay the purchase money or other
sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the
vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in
which the decree is made, to have the contract
rescinded and on such application the court may,
by order, rescind the contract either so far as
regards the party in default or altogether, as the
justice of the case may require.
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(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-
section (1), the court--
(a) shall direct the purchaser or the
lessee, if he has obtained possession of the
property under the contract, to restore such
possession to the vendor or lessor, and
(b) may direct payment to the vendor or
lessor of all the rents and profits which have
accrued in respect of the property from the
date on which possession was so obtained by
the purchaser or lessee until restoration of
possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if
the justice of the case so requires, the
refund of any sum paid by the vendee or
lessee as earnest money or deposit in
connection with the contract.
(3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase
money or other sum which he is ordered to pay
under the decree within the period referred to in
sub-section (1), the court may, on application
made in the same suit, award the purchaser or
lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to,
including in appropriate cases all or any of the
following reliefs, namely--
(a) the execution of a proper conveyance
or lease by the vendor or lessor;
(b) the delivery of possession, or partition
and separate possession, of the property on
the execution of such conveyance or lease.
(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief
which may be claimed under this section shall lie at
the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or
lessee, as the case may be.
(5) The costs of any proceedings under this
section shall be in the discretion of the court."
12. There is no doubt that the above provision permits
the judgment-debtor to seek rescission of a contract and
also permits extension of time by the court but merely
because rescission of contract is not sought by the
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judgment-debtor, does not automatically result in
extension of time."
[Emphasis supplied]
18. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that Section 28 of the Act permits the party to the
contract to seek extension of time and merely because the
rescission of contract is not sought by one party, it does not
automatically result in the extension of time.
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
RAMANKUTTY GUPTAN referred supra, at paragraphs 8 and 9
held as under:
"8. Section 37 CPC enumerates that:
"37. Definition of Court which passed a
decree.-- The expression 'Court which passed a
decree', or words to that effect, shall, in relation to
the execution of decrees, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to
include,--
(a) where the decree to be executed has been
passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the
Court of first instance, and
***
Therefore, it is clear that the decree of the appellate court
would be construed to be the decree passed by the court
of first instance. It is settled law that an appeal is a
continuation of the suit. Therefore, when a decree for
specific performance has been dismissed by the trial
court, but decreed by the appellate court, it should be
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construed to be in the same suit. When the decree
specifies the time for performance of the conditions of the
decree, on its failure to deposit the money, Section 28(1)
itself gives power to the court to extend the time on such
terms as the court may allow to pay the purchase money
or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay.
In K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundaram
Chettiar [(1980) 1 SCC 630 : (1980) 2 SCR 293] this
Court held that on an oral prayer made by the counsel for
the plaintiff for permission to deposit the entire amount
as directed by the trial court this Court directed the
appellant to deposit the amount within six months from
that date together with interest and other conditions
mentioned therein. An application for extension of time
for payment of balance consideration may be filed even in
the court of first instance or in the appellate court in the
same suit as the decree of the trial court stands merged
with that of the appellate court which decree is under
execution. It is to be seen that the procedure is the
handmaid for justice and unless the procedure touches
upon jurisdictional issue, it should be moulded to
subserve substantial justice. Therefore technicalities
would not stand in the way to subserve substantive
justice. Take a case where the decree is transferred for
execution to a transferee executing court, then certainly
the transferee court is not the original court and
execution court is not the "same court" within the
meaning of Section 28 of the Act. But when an application
has been made in the court in which the original suit was
filed and the execution is being proceeded with, then
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certainly an application under Section 28 is maintainable
in the same court.
9. The question then emerges is whether it should be
on the original side or execution side. Section indicates
that it should be "in the same suit". It would obviously
mean in the suit itself and not in the execution
proceedings. It is equally settled law that after passing
the decree for specific performance, the court does not
cease to have any jurisdiction. The court retains control
over the decree even after the decree has been passed. It
was open to the court to exercise the power under
Section 28(1) of the Act either for extension of time or for
rescinding the contract as claimed for. Since the
execution application has been filed in the same court in
which the original suit was filed, namely the court of first
instance, instead of treating the application on the
execution side, it should have as well been numbered as
an interlocutory application on the original side and
disposed of according to law. In this view, we feel that
the judgment of the Bombay High Court laid down the law
correctly and that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not
correct. The High Court, therefore, is not right in
dismissing the application treating it to be on execution
side, instead of transferring it on the original side for
dealing with it according to law."
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20. In the case of SARDAR MOHAR SINGH referred
supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 4 held as
under:
"4. From the language of sub-section (1) of Section
28, it could be seen that the court does not lose its
jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific
performance nor it becomes functus officio. The very fact
that Section 28 itself gives power to grant order of
rescission of the decree would indicate that till the sale
deed is executed in execution of the decree, the trial
court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal with the
decree of specific performance. It would also be clear that
the court has power to enlarge the time in favour of the
judgment-debtor to pay the amount or to perform the
conditions mentioned in the decree for specific
performance, in spite of an application for rescission of
the decree having been filed by the judgment-debtor and
rejected. In other words, the court has the discretion to
extend time for compliance of the conditional decree as
mentioned in the decree for specific performance. It is
true that the respondent has not given satisfactory
explanation of every day's delay. It is not, unlike Section
5 of the Limitation Act, an application for condonation of
delay. It is one for extension of time. Under these
circumstances, the executing court as well as the High
Court had exercised discretion and extended the time to
comply with the conditional decree. Accordingly, we do
not find any valid and justifiable reason to interfere with
the order passed by the High Court confirming the order
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of the executing court when in particular, the High Court
has further enhanced a sum of Rs 16,000 to compensate
the petitioner for loss of enjoyment of the money. The
said amount is given to the respondent in a sum of Rs
16,000 rightly for the reason that parties contracted for
non-performance of the contract. They quantified the
damages at Rs 2000 for 8 years. The Court has given Rs
16,000 obviously in terms of the contract."
21. The Kerala High Court in the case of
CHITHAMBARAN PONNAPPAN referred supra at paragraph 6
observed as under:
"6. What remains to be considered is whether a
written application is necessary for extension of time.
Here is a case where, even in the decree the Court below
allowed the decree-holder time to make the deposit. Mere
failure on the part of the decree-holder to deposit the
amount does not render the decree ineffective or release
the judgment-debtor from the decree ineffective or
release the judgment-debtor from his liability to satisfy
the decree. It is only when there is wilful default on the
part of the decree-holder to make the deposit, that the
Court would be justified in refusing extension of time.
There is no such wilful default evident in the present case
and as such the Court below has the authority and power,
under Section 148 of the C.P.C. to extend the time and to
proceed with the execution albeit the deposit was belated.
That there exists power on the part of the execution
Court to extend the time even without application is clear
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from the decision in K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S.S.
Chettiar (AIR 1980 SC 512) also."
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KUMAR
DHIRENDRA MULLICK AND ORS. referred supra at
paragraphs 27 to 32 held as under:
"27. In the case of Hungerford Investment Trust
Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra [(1972) 3 SCC 684] it has been
held that when the court passes the decree for specific
performance, the contract between the parties is not
extinguished. That the decree for specific performance is
in the nature of preliminary decree and the suit is deemed
to be pending even after the decree. Hence, the court
retains control over the entire matter even after the
decree. Since the court retains control over the matter,
despite the decree, it is open to the court to order
rescission of the agreement, when it is found that the
decree-holder is not ready and willing to abide by his
obligations under the decree.
28. In the case of M. Sakuntala Devi v. V.
Sakuntala [AIR 1978 AP 337] it has been held that
though Section 28 does not confer power on the court to
extend time, it recognises its power to do so in cases of
default in payment.
29. In the case of K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S.
Somasundaram Chettiar [(1980) 1 SCC 630 : AIR 1980
SC 512] it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 633, para 4)
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"4. It is perfectly open to the court in control of
a suit for specific performance to extend the time
for deposit, and this Court may do so even now to
enable the plaintiff to get the advantage of the
agreement to sell in her favour. The disentitling
circumstances relied upon by the defendant-
respondent are offset by the false pleas raised in
the course of the suit by him and rightly negatived.
Nor are we convinced that the application for
consideration and extension of time cannot be
read, as in substance it is, as a petition for more
time to deposit. Even so, specific performance is an
equitable relief and he who seeks equity can be put
on terms to ensure that equity is done to the
opposite party even while granting the relief. The
final end of law is justice, and so the means to it
too should be informed by equity. That is why he
who seeks equity shall do equity. Here, the
assignment of the mortgage is not a guileless
discharge of the vendor's debt as implied in the
agreement to sell but a disingenuous disguise to
arm herself with a mortgage decree to swallow up
the property in case the specific performance
litigation misfires. To sterilise this decree is
necessary equity to which the appellant must
submit herself before she can enjoy the fruits of
specific performance."
30. In the case of Sardar Mohar
Singh v. Mangilal [(1997) 9 SCC 217] it has been held
that Section 28(1) postulates that the court does not lose
its jurisdiction after the grant of the decree for specific
performance nor it becomes functus officio. Section 28
gives power to grant order of rescission of the agreement
which itself indicates that till the sale deed is executed,
the trial court retains its power and jurisdiction to deal
with the decree of specific performance. Therefore, it was
held, the court has the power to enlarge the time in
favour of the judgment-debtor [Ed. : In Sardar Mohar
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Singh case on failure of the defendant seller to perform
his part of the contract, the trial court passed a decree for
specific performance directing him to execute the sale
deed or in the alternative to refund the earnest money
and also pay damages. Thereupon he (judgment-debtor
in the decree for specific performance) viz. the vendor
filed applications to rescind the decree in execution and
sought extension of time to refund the earnest money
and pay the damages. The peculiar situation of a
judgment-debtor praying for extension of time to "pay"
seems to have arisen in Sardar Mohar Singh case due to
the fact that the trial court had granted the decree of
specific performance against the judgment-debtor only
conditionally, that is, the decree would be enforced only if
he failed to refund the earnest money and pay the
damages to the decree-holder in the time specified. In
light of such a decree having been passed against him,
the judgment-debtor in Sardar Mohar Singh case, both
sought for a rescission of the said (conditional) decree for
specific performance and sought for extension of time to
refund ("pay") the earnest money and the damages. Both
the executing court and the High Court having allowed
both his applications, that is for rescission and for
extension of time for making the refund, the question
before the Supreme Court in Sardar Mohar Singh
case was whether the courts below had the power to
grant the extension of time to the judgment-debtor in
respect of the refund and payment of damages, which it
answered in the affirmative, in the terms quoted in this
judgment. Ordinarily, however, and as obtaining in this
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case as well, it is the purchaser-decree-holder who would
be before the court seeking an extension of time to pay
(the remainder of) the consideration amount so as to
execute the decree of specific performance, in the face of
the vendor-judgment-debtor's attempt to have the
contract rescinded. Interestingly, the above conditional
decree of specific performance may be viewed as a
conditional decree for rescission, inasmuch as if the
judgment-debtor made the refund of earnest money and
payment of damages on time then the contract would be
rescinded. On the other hand if he did not make the said
refund and payment on time, then the contract would be
enforced and a sale deed would have to be executed.] to
pay the amount or to perform the conditions mentioned in
the decree for specific performance, despite the
application for rescission of the agreement/decree.
31. In the case of Vaiyapuri Reddy v. Sivalinga
Reddiar [(1970) 1 MLJ 92] it has been held that since the
court has, under Section 28, the power to extend the
period in cases where it has already fixed a period of
deposit, it should be deemed to have the power to either
fix a period or grant a fresh period to deposit, particularly
in cases where no such period is fixed by the decree. In
that case, the Court found that there were laches on the
part of the plaintiff in depositing the amount and yet the
Court gave thirty days' time to the plaintiff to deposit the
amount on the application made by the defendants for
rescission of the contract.
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32. In the case of Ouseph v. Devassy [AIR 2001 Ker
104 : (2001) 1 KLJ 59] the decree was silent as to the
date by which the decree-holder was to pay the balance
of the price. Possession was with the decree-holder. The
purchaser deposited the balance before filing of the
petition for rescission of the agreement but after expiry of
the period fixed by the decree. The decree-holder applied
for condonation of the delay. The same was granted. In
doing so, the Court observed that Section 28 enables the
court to extend the time which by itself implies that mere
failure to deposit the balance need not result in the
rescission of the contract. On facts, it was found that the
decree was silent as to the date by which the decree-
holder was to deposit the balance of the sale
consideration. On facts, it was found that the decree-
holder was in possession for 18 years. On facts, it was
found that the vendor did not take any steps to get the
balance of the sale consideration. That the vendor failed
to seek rescission for 18 years. In the circumstances, the
Court allowed the decree-holder condonation of delay in
depositing the balance consideration."
23. Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the other High Courts, I am of
the considered view that the Trial Court has committed a grave
error in rejecting the application filed by the petitioners under
Section 28(1) of the Act. The judgment in O.S.No.259/2001 is
dated 25.08.2004 wherein two months' time was granted to the
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plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration and get the sale
deed executed. The plaintiff did not pay the balance sale
consideration within the stipulated time and did not get the sale
deed executed despite the defendants issuing legal notice dated
02.09.2004. On 02.09.2004, the defendants have expressed
their willingness to execute the registered sale deed in favour
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in his reply contended that he
would get the decree and thereafter, perform his part of
obligation as per the judgment dated 25.08.2004. The records
indicate that the decree is drawn and signed by the learned
Judge on 24.09.2004 and from the said date, the plaintiff failed
to comply his part of obligation as per the judgment within the
stipulated time of two months.
24. The plaintiff filed an execution petition on
08.02.2005 falsely contending that he was ready and willing to
get the sale deed registered by paying the balance amount.
The affidavit filed along with the execution proceedings is
nothing but false assertion of readiness and willingness.
Nothing had prevented the plaintiff to send a Cheque / Demand
Draft to the defendants if he was ready and willing when the
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first notice was issued by the defendants on 02.09.2004 and
later also. Even at the time of filing of the execution petition,
the plaintiff has not deposited the balance amount which clearly
demonstrates the intent of the plaintiff. The order sheet of the
Execution Court clearly indicates that nearly after 1 year 4
months of filing of the execution petition, the plaintiff files a
memo seeking permission to deposit the amount of
Rs.2,16,000/-. On the said date, the defendants had already
filed objections in the execution proceedings contending that
the judgment and decree is unenforceable beyond the period
stipulated in the judgment and decree in the absence of any
extension of time sought by the plaintiff. The objections filed
by the defendants in the execution proceedings clearly
indicates that the defendants intended to rescind the
agreement of sale in question and in categorical terms, stated
that there is willful refusal on the part of the plaintiff in paying
the balance sale consideration and getting the sale deed
registered.
25. In my considered view, the objections filed by the
defendants dated 15.09.2005 is required to be considered as a
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prayer for rescinding the contract before the Court. However,
the Execution Court, rejected the objections by recording an
incorrect finding that the original defendant has died on
19.08.2004 and a dead person cannot execute the sale deed
and the legal heirs of the original defendant can execute the
sale deed only after getting the title in their names by
succession. In my considered view, the approach of the Court
is perverse and contrary to the settled principle of law. The
succession opens immediately after the death of the original
defendant and the legal heirs become the owners of the
property and the very same legal heirs have issued notices to
the plaintiff on 02.09.2004 and 04.11.2004 expressing their
readiness and willingness to execute the sale deed and
requested the plaintiff to pay the balance sale consideration.
26. The Execution Court further committed an error in
coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff has deposited the
balance sale consideration of Rs.2,16,000/- in the execution
proceedings and therefore, the Execution Court has extended
the time to the decree holder to deposit the balance sale
consideration. The said order of the Execution Court is beyond
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its order dated 29.06.2006. The Execution Court has only
permitted the decree holder to deposit the amount. It is
admitted fact that the plaintiff-decree holder has not sought
any extension of time by filing an application in the original
proceedings or before the Execution Court rather he has
voluntarily filed a memo seeking permission to deposit the
amount and the said memo has been accepted by the
Execution Court which cannot be construed as extension of
time under Section 28 of the Act. I am saying so for the reason
that the amount sought to be deposited by the plaintiff was on
29.06.2006 as whereas he was required to deposit within 60
days from 25.08.2004 i.e. two months from the date of
judgment or from the date of decree i.e. 24.09.2004 from the
said date to two months i.e. 23.12.2004. However, he filed a
memo after a period of more than 1 year 8 months and there is
no explanation whatsoever for the delay in the memo and there
is no prayer seeking for extension of time provided in the
judgment dated 25.08.2004. Hence, I am of the considered
view that the part sale consideration deposited by the
petitioners is not as per the judgment and decree passed in the
aforesaid suit.
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27. The defendants have seriously disputed the
quantum of amount deposited by the plaintiff in the Execution
Court and the learned counsel for the defendants has also
admitted that the balance sale consideration of Rs.2,16,000/- is
towards the extent of 3 acres 15 guntas and not to the full
extent. The records indicate that there is no dispute with
regard to 19 guntas as orally contended by the learned counsel
for the plaintiff. None of the reply notices sent by the plaintiff
indicate that there is a dispute with regard to 19 guntas as
argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. Hence, on this
count also, I am of the considered view that the deposit made
by the plaintiff-decree holder in the execution proceedings is
not the entire balance sale consideration as per the agreement
of sale in question. In the absence of any extension of time for
deposit of the amount and mere deposit of some part amount
in the execution proceedings by the plaintiff-decree holder
amounts to willful refusal to perform his part of the obligation
as per the judgment and decree in O.S.No.259/2001. Hence,
the judgment and decree is unenforceable and the defendants
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have categorically sought for rescinding the contract by way of
objections in the execution proceedings.
28. Learned counsel for the defendants-petitioners have
contended that as an abundant caution, they have filed an
application under Section 28 of the Act in a rural Court at
Bengaluru though the execution proceedings are transferred to
Nelamangala Court. The Trial Court rejected the application
filed by the petitioners under Section 28(1) of the Act, solely on
the ground that the application is filed beyond the period of
limitation. In my considered view, the approach of the Trial
Court is perverse and contrary to the settled principles of law.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has
categorically held that the decree for specific performance is
only a preliminary decree and in the instant case, no final
decree is passed. The passing of the final decree in the case of
specific performance would be only after executing the sale
deed and delivery of possession to the decree holder by the
defendants-judgment debtors or by the process of the Court.
Hence, in my considered view, applying Article 59 of the
Limitation Act to the case on hand is perverse and incorrect.
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Article 59 of the Limitation Act provides 3 year period of
limitation to cancel or set aside an instrument or a decree or for
rescission of contract. In the case on hand, the execution
proceedings are pending which is a continuation of the suit
proceedings and the preliminary decree of specific performance
has not attained finality by executing the sale deed and
delivery of possession in favour of the decree holder. Hence,
the question of limitation would not arise and the impugned
order is liable to be set aside.
29. The chronology of events referred supra clearly
demonstrates that the original defendant was in need of money
in the year 2001. Hence, conceded by filing a memo for
passing of the decree for specific performance. However, the
plaintiff by willful refusal and conduct defeated the intent of the
defendant. The material on record makes it very clear that
without any justifiable reason, the plaintiff dodged the payment
of balance sale consideration. Wrong doers cannot be allowed
to make profit of their own wrongs. A party may not derive an
advantage from its own unlawful acts. 'Nullus Commodum
Capere Potest de injuria sua propria'. The aforesaid latin
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maxim indicates that a person who manipulates the process,
frustrates the legal rights of others, should not be permitted to
take advantage of his wrong or manipulation. In the case on
hand, the plaintiff has manipulated the process by defeating
the right to enjoy the property by the defendant from 2001 to
this day by indulging in the litigation. If the plaintiff was
honest in his approach, he would have deposited the balance
amount immediately atleast after the drawing of the decree or
after issuing of the first notice. The deposit of some amount
before the Execution Court without seeking any extension in
O.S.No.259/2001 is an abuse of process of law and amounts to
willful refusal to comply the judgment and decree of the Trial
Court in O.S.No.259/2001.
30. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, I am of
the considered view that the agreements of sale in question are
required to be rescinded and considering the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the
plaintiff is entitled for the refund of advance sale consideration
paid to the original defendant along with interest and also the
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plaintiff-decree holder is entitled to seek refund of amount
deposited by him in the Execution Court.
31. The contention of the respondents that the
conditional decree is enforceable till the order of rescinding
contract is passed, has no merit. The conditional decree would
become inoperative once the conditions are not fulfilled within
the time stipulated or time extended by the Court under
Section 28 of the Act. In the instant case, after the period
stipulated in the conditional decree, the conditional decree
becomes inoperative unless the said condition is modified by
extension of time by the Court. In the case on hand, the
plaintiff has not made any application for seeking extension of
time till day. Hence, the decree becomes unenforceable under
the law.
32. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass
the following:
ORDER
(i) The writ petition is allowed.
(ii) The impugned order dated 31.08.2017 passed by the
II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bengaluru, on an application
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W.P. No.54203/2017
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filed by the petitioner-defendant under Section 28(1) of the
Act, in O.S.No.259/2001 is set aside.
(iii) The application filed by the petitioners under
Section 28(1) of the Act is allowed, the agreements of sale
entered into between the plaintiff and the original defendant
dated 28.03.1999 and 27.11.2000 are rescinded.
(iv) The petitioners-defendants are directed to refund the
advance sale consideration received under the aforesaid
agreements of sale from the plaintiff along with interest at the
rate of 8% p.a. from the date of receipt till the payment is
made within a period of four months from today.
(v) The respondent-plaintiff-decree holder is permitted to
withdraw the amount in deposit before the Execution Court.
No order as to costs.
33. In view of the disposal of the petition, the pending
interlocutory application does not survive for consideration and
is accordingly disposed of.
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)
JUDGE
RV
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