Karnataka High Court
Sri. M. Krishna Reddy vs Sri. N. R. Ramesh on 22 January, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.3549 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
SRI M. KRISHNA REDDY
S/O MUNIVENKATA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
OCC.:POLITICIAN (EX-MLA)
RESIDING AT SUNANDAMMA NILAYA
ANJANI LAYOUT, CHINTAMANI
CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT - 562 125.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.ARUNA SHYAM, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SMT.KEERTHANA NAGARAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
SRI N. R. RAMESH
S/O LATE NARAYAN RAJU
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
RESIDING AT: NO.2910,
14TH CROSS
BANASHANKARI II STAGE
BENGALURU - 560 070.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI MOHAN REDDY, ADVOCATE)
2
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.3478/2024 ARISING OUT OF PCR NO.17136/2022
REGISTERED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 499 AND 500 OF IPC
PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LD.42nd A.C.M.M (SPL.COURT FOR
TRIAL OF CASES AGAINST SITTING AS WELL AS FORMER MPs/MLAs
TRIABLE BY MAGISTRATE IN THE STATE OF KARNATAKA) AT
BENGALURU.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner is before this Court calling in question
proceedings in C.C.No.3478 of 2024 arising out of P.C.R.No.17136
of 2022 registered for offences punishable under Sections 499 and
500 of the IPC.
2. Heard Sri M. Aruna Shyam, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner and Sri Mohan Reddy, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent.
3
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
The petitioner is the accused and respondent is the
complainant. On 19-11-2019, it appears, the petitioner/accused
seeks to register a complaint before the Sampangiramnagar Police
Station which does not get registered but gets a non-cognizable
report in NCR No.189 of 2019. On 25-12-2019 the complainant
was called to the Police Station and he was explained the
ramification of such statements being made by him. A few days
thereafter, the complainant walks to the doors of the learned
Magistrate invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. and registers
P.C.R.No.17136 of 2022 for offences punishable under Sections 499
and 500 of the IPC. On 17-03-2023, three years after registration
of PCR, sworn statement of the complainant is recorded and on
05-12-2023 after about 9 months, remaining part of the sworn
statement is recorded. On 06-02-2024 the learned Magistrate takes
cognizance for offences punishable under Sections 499 and 500 of
the IPC and issues summons to the petitioner. Taking of cognizance
and issuance of summons is what has driven the petitioner to this
Court in the subject petition.
4
4. The learned senior counsel Sri M. Aruna Shyam appearing
for the petitioner would contend that the complaint is a counter-
blast to what the petitioner had already registered against the
complainant. It is registered only to wreak vengeance against the
petitioner. There is suppression of material facts in the complaint.
The complaint is cleverly drafted without the ingredients being met.
The learned senior counsel would further contend that in a public
life it is necessary for the people's representatives to be a little
thick-skinned and not too sensitive. Above all, he would contend
that the order of taking cognizance does not meet the law as laid
down by this Court as it suffers from non-application of mind. He
would contend that ingredients necessary for offences under
Sections 499 and 500 IPC are not met in the case at hand.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent would refute the submissions to contend that it was a
derogatory statement made by the petitioner against the
complainant. He calls him a mad cap, idiot and ignorant person. If
this cannot form the offence under Sections 49 and 500 of the IPC,
the learned counsel would submit, then what else it could be.
5
Therefore, he would submit that the Court having already taken
cognizance for the offence, it is for the petitioner to come out clean
in a full-blown trial.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. On 06-03-2018
the petitioner is said to have been elected as a Deputy Speaker of
the Karnataka Legislative Assembly. The respondent calls for a
press conference where it is alleged that he has made certain
derogatory or defamatory statements against the petitioner who
was then elected as a Deputy Speaker. Based upon those
statements, the petitioner registers a complaint before the
Sampangiramnagar Police Station alleging that on 14-11-2019 the
respondent calls for a press conference and makes defamatory
statements against the petitioner. On 25-12-2019 the respondent
was called to the Police Station and statements of both the
petitioner and the respondent were taken and an NCR was
6
rendered. The Police on 20-01-2020 closes the proceedings of a
complaint that was sought to be registered by the petitioner on
19-11-2019. Though an NCR is registered, I deem it appropriate to
notice the gist of the NCR. It reads as follows:
".... .... ....
5. ¸ÀAzÀ±Àð£ÀzÀ GzÉÝñÀ
F zÀÆj£À ¸ÁgÁA±ÀªÉãÉAzÀgÉ ¢-14/11/2019 gÀAzÀÄ ¨É½UÉÎ 11-00
UÀAmÉUÉ ºÉÆÃmÉ¯ï «.n.¥ÁågÀqÉʸï, ©©JA¦ PÉÃAzÀæ PÀbÉÃj »A¨sÁUÀ,
fAiÉÆà ºÉÆÃmɯï JzÀÄgÀÄ, ¸ÀA¥ÀAVgÁªÀÄ£ÀUÀgÀ, ¨ÉA. E°è
²æÃ.J£ï.Dgï.gÀªÉÄñï, ªÀPÁÛgÀgÀÄ ¨ÉA-£ÀUÀgÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¨ÉA-£ÀUÀgÀ f¯Éè,
©eɦ ºÀUÀÆ ªÀiÁf DqÀ½vÀ ¥ÀPÀëzÀ £ÁAiÀÄPÀgÀÄ ©©JA¦ gÀªÀgÀÄ
¥ÀwæPÁUÉÆÃ¶Ü PÀgÉzÀÄ ¥ÀwæPÁUÉÆöÜAiÀÄ°è £Á£ÀÄ ªÀiÁqÀzÉ EgÀĪÀ
C¥ÀgÁzsÀPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀ ¸ÀļÀÄî ¸ÀÄ¢ÝAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÆnÖzÄÀ Ý, ¸ÁA«zsÁ¤PÀ
ºÀÄzÉÝAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ PÀ£ÁðlPÀ «zsÁ£À¸À¨ÉsAiÀÄ G¥À ¸À¨Ás zsÁåPÀëgÀ ªÉÄïÉ
DzsÁgÀ gÀ»vÀ, ¸ÀļÀÄî ¸ÀÄ¢Ý ¤ÃrgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ, ¸ÀzÀj
²æÃ.J£ï.Dgï.gÀªÉÄñï gÀªÀgÀ «gÀÄzÀÝ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ jÃvÀå PÀæªÀÄ PÉÊUÉƼÀÄîªÀAvÉ
¤ÃrzÀ zÀÆgÀÄ, EvÁå¢.
6. Counter Party Details: Name: N.R.RAMESH, S/o
Address: VAKTARARU
BENGALURU CITY AND
DISTRICT,
BENGALURU CITY,
KARNATAKA"
After the closure of the case, the complainant registers a private
complaint in P.C.R.No.17136 of 2022 on 13-12-2019 for offences
punishable under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC. Three years
thereafter a partial sworn statement is recorded and nine months
thereafter complete sworn statement is recorded by marking
7
Exhibits C1 to C3. A little while thereafter, witnesses were
examined and then comes an order of cognizance on 06-02-2024
close to 5 years after registration of the complaint. The reason
rendered for taking of cognizance is as follows:
".... .... ....
10. The Complainant in the complaint and also in his
Sworn Statement has stated that the Accused has made a
defamatory statement against him in the above article. As
already stated, the Complainant has alleged the commission of
the offence under section 499 of I.PC., which is punishable
under section 500 of I.P.C. On going through the complaint
averments and the Sworn Statement of the Complainant, prima-
facie, it goes to show that the Complainant is defamed. The
Complainant in his Sworn Statement reiterated the complaint
averments.
11. In support of the said Sworn Statement, the
Complainant has produced Kannada Daily Newspaper
"Udayavani" dated 17-11-2019, which is marked as Ex.C.01,
Pen-Drive which is marked as Ex.C.02 and certificate under
Section 65-B of Indian Evidence Act, by way of Affidavit is
marked as Ex C.03. On going through the contents of the said
documents, it is found that they prima-facie support the version
of the Complainant. Moreover, the Complainant has examined
Two Witnesses on his behalf as CW-2 and CW-3. They have
also deposed in the lines of the Sworn Statement of the
Complainant. They have also deposed that the reputation of the
Complainant was lowered in their eyes and also the public in
general, when they heard and read the article published in the
Daily Newspaper which are already marked through the
Complainant
12. The offence of defamation is defined under section
499 of I.P.C., which reads as under:
"499. Defamation.- Whoever, by words either
spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by
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visible representations, makes or publishes any
imputation concerning any person intending to harm,
or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person,
is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to
defame that person.
Explanation 1.- It may amount to defamation to
impute anything to a deceased person, if the
imputation would harm the reputation of that person
if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings
of his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.- It may amount to defamation
to make an imputation concerning a company or an
association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3.- An imputation in the form of an
alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to
defamation.
Explanation 4.- No imputation is said to harm a
person's герutation, unless that imputation directly or
indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the
moral or intellectual character of that person, or
lowers the character of that person in respect of his
caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that
person, or causes it to be believed that the body of
that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state
generally considered as disgraceful".
13. A meaningful reading of the above provisions, along
with the complaint averments, Sworn Statement of the
Complainant and his Witnesses and the documents produced,
this stage, this Court is of the opinion that the complaint
discloses the ingredients of the offences alleged to have been
committed by the Accused and that the material brought on
record as a result of inquiry under section 200 of Cr.P.C., prima-
facie constitutes valid evidence which, if believed and un-
rebutted at the trial would result in conviction.
14. It is well settled principle of law that before ordering
for issuance of process against the Accused, the Court has to
decide whether prima facie case is made out or not on the basis
of the materials placed before it. Before exercising power under
9
Section 204 Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the court to see that,
whether the Complainant has made out sufficient grounds for
issuance of process. In the decision reported in - AIR 2010
S.C.2261" (Shivjee Sing -Vs- Narendra Tiwari), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that - the expression "sufficient
ground" used in section 203, 204 and 209 of Cr.P.C., means
satisfaction that prima-facie case is made out against the person
Accused of committing an offence and not sufficient ground for
the purpose of conviction.
15. In another decision reported in AIR 2014 S.C. 957
(Fiona Shrikhande -Vs- State of Maharashtra), it is
observed that - at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely
concerned with the allegations made out in the complaint and
has only to prima-facie satisfy whether there are sufficient
grounds to proceed against the Accused and it is not the
province of the Magistrate of esquire into a detailed discussion
on the merits or demerits of the case.
16. Thus, in the light of the rulings referred supra, on an
overall appreciation of the facts of the case, material placed
before the court and also law applicable, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Complainant has made out sufficient
grounds for proceeding against the Accused for the offence
under section 499 of I.P.C., which is punishable under 500 of
I.P.C and thereby made out the grounds for issuance of
summons for attendance of the Accused before this court. In the
result, I answer Point No.1 in the AFFIRMATIVE.
17.Point No.2:- For the reasons assigned and the
findings given on Point No.1, I proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
Office to register Criminal case against the Accused for
the offence under section 499 of I.P.C., punishable under
section 500 of I.P.C., in Register No. III and issue summons to
the Accused, if Sub-section 3 and 4 of section 204 of Cr.P.C. are
complied.”
10
Summons is issued to the petitioner under Section 204 of the
Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, the petitioner is before this Court.
8. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under
Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC. They read as follows:
“499. Defamation.–Whoever, by words either spoken
or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations,
makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person
intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that
such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is
said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that
person.
Explanation 1.–It may amount to defamation to impute
anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm
the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be
hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.–It may amount to defamation to make an
imputation concerning a company or an association or collection
of persons as such.
Explanation 3.–An imputation in the form of an
alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation.
Explanation 4.–No imputation is said to harm a person’s
reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the
estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character
of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect
of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person,
or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a
loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as
disgraceful.
Illustrations
(a) A says–“Z is an honest man; he never stole B’s
watch”; intending to cause it to be believed that Z did steal B’s
11watch. This is defamation, unless it falls within one of the
exceptions.
(b) A is asked who stole B’s watch. A points to Z,
intending to cause it to be believed that Z stole B’s watch. This
is defamation, unless it falls within one of the exceptions.
(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B’s watch
intending it to be believed that Z stole B’s watch. This is
defamation, unless it falls within one of the exceptions.
First Exception–Imputation of truth which public
good requires to be made or published.–It is not
defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any
person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be
made or published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a
question of fact.
Second Exception–Public conduct of public
servants.–It is not defamation to express in good faith any
opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in
the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character,
so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.
Third Exception–Conduct of any person touching
any public question.–It is not defamation to express in good
faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person
touching any public question, and respecting his character, so
far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.
Illustration
It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any
opinion whatever respecting Z’s conduct in petitioning
Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a
meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending at such
meeting, in forming or joining any society which invites the
public support, in voting or canvassing for a particular candidate
for any situation in the efficient discharge of the duties of which
the public is interested.
Fourth Exception.–Publication of reports of
proceedings of courts.–It is not defamation to publish a
12
substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice,
or of the result of any such proceedings.
Explanation.–A Justice of the Peace or other officer
holding an enquiry in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court
of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above section.
Fifth Exception.–Merits of case decided in Court or
conduct of witnesses and others concerned.–It is not
defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever
respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has
been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of
any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or
respecting the character of such person, as far as his character
appears in that conduct, and no further.
Illustrations
(a) A says–“I think Z’s evidence on that trial is so
contradictory that he must be stupid or dishonest.” A is within
this exception if he says this in good faith, inasmuch as the
opinion which he expresses respects Z’s character as it appears
in Z’s conduct as a witness, and no further.
(b) But if A says–“I do not believe what Z asserted at
that trial because I know him to be a man without
veracity”; A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the
opinion which he expresses of Z’s character, is an opinion not
founded on Z’s conduct as a witness.
Sixth Exception.–Merits of public performance.–It
is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion
respecting the merits of any performance which its author has
submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the
character of the author so far as his character appears in such
performance, and no further.
Explanation.–A performance may be submitted to the
judgment of the public expressly or by acts on the part of the
author which imply such submission to the judgment of the
public.
Illustrations
13
(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to
the judgment of the public.
(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that
speech to the judgment of the public.
(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage,
submits his acting or singing to the judgment of the public.
(d) A says of a book published by Z–“Z’s book is
foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z’s book is indecent; Z must be
a man of impure mind”. A is within the exception, if he says this
in good faith, inasmuch as the opinion which he expresses
of Z respects Z’s character only so far as it appears in Z’s book,
and no further.
(e) But if A says–“I am not surprised that Z’s book is
foolish and indecent, for he is a weak man and a libertine.” A is
not within this exception, inasmuch as the opinion which he
expresses of Z’s character is an opinion not founded on Z’s
book.
Seventh Exception.–Censure passed in good faith
by person having lawful authority over another.–It is not
defamation in a person having over another any authority,
either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made
with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the
conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority
relates.
Illustration
A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness,
or of an officer of the Court; a head of a department censuring
in good faith those who are under his orders; a parent censuring
in good faith a child in the presence of other children; a
schoolmaster, whose authority is derived from a parent,
censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils; a
master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in
service; a banker censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank
for the conduct of such cashier as such cashier–are within this
exception.
Eighth Exception.–Accusation preferred in good
faith to authorised per-son.–It is not defamation to prefer in
14
good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who
have lawful authority over that person with respect to the
subject-matter of accusation.
Illustration
If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in
good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z’s
master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child,
to Z’s father–A is within this exception.
Ninth Exception.–Imputation made in good faith by
person for protection of his or other’s interests.–It is not
defamation to make an imputation on the character of another
provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the
protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any
other person, or for the public good.
Illustrations
(a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his
business–“Sell nothing to Z unless he pays you ready money,
for I have no opinion of his honesty.” A is within the exception,
if he has made this imputation on Z in good faith for the
protection of his own interests.
(b) A, a Magistrate, in making a report to his own
superior officer, casts an imputation on the character of Z. Here,
if the imputation is made in good faith, and for the public
good, A is within the exception.
Tenth Exception.–Caution intended for good of
person to whom conveyed or for public good.–It is not
defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one person
against another, provided that such caution be intended for the
good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in
whom that person is interested, or for the public good.
500. Punishment for defamation.–Whoever defames
another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
15
In the light of the offence being defamation, I deem it appropriate
to notice the allegation against this petitioner. It reads as follows:
“ºÀÄZÀÑ, ªÀÄÆRð, CeÁÕ¤; K£À£ÀߨÉÃPÀÄ? J£ï.Dgï.gÀªÄÉ Ã±ï DgÉÆÃ¥ÀzÀ «gÀÄzÀÞ
ªÁUÁݽ £ÀqɹzÀ G¥À ¸À¨Ás zsÀåPÀë PÀȵÁÚgÉrØ”
The petitioner is said to have uttered what should I call him (the
complainant) mad, an idiot or an ignorant man. This is the
allegation.
9. The High Court of Delhi in the case of NAVEEN JINDAL v.
ZEE MEDIA CORPORATION LIMITED1 has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
19. I am also of the considered opinion that the
view which has been taken by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice
Sultan Singh in S. Charanjit Singh’s case (supra) which is
based on the view of the Apex Court in Kartar
Singh’s case (supra), is a more balanced view on account
of the fact that a public person or a person holding a
public office should not be so ‘thin skinned’ or should be
rather ‘thick skinned’ so as to complain about the
allegations or the averments or the write ups which are
taking place against him in the media or are being
telecast unless and until they are grossly defamatory per
se. The publications may be inaccurate, not fully or
substantially true or may be distorted or may be
offending sensibilities of the person against whom such
allegations are made or may be to his annoyance but that
is not to be the ground to muzzle them altogether.
1
2014 SCC Online Del 1369
16
20. It is more so in a case when a person, holder of a
public office or aspiring to become a member of an elected body
is amidst the din of electioneering. It is a common knowledge
that while the elections are on, all kinds of accusations and
counter-accusations are bound to fly thick and fast in all
directions of which a person must not complain unless and until
the allegations against him are per se defamatory.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Long before the High Court of Delhi rendered its judgment
quoted supra, this Court in the case of S. BANGARAPPA v.
GANESH NARAYAN HEGDE2, has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
18. The third point for consideration is whether
prima facie case has been made out to charge the
accused to the offence punishable under Section 500
I.P.C. or the deserves to be discharged from the said
accusation. The Court has to consider the evidence
produced and its admissibility, circumstances under
which and the context to make such imputation including
the intention to make such imputation, whether the said
accusation can be believed to have harmed the
complainant’s reputation and, if the accusation is really
made, is not the accused entitled for discharge if the
intention and the context are alleviating factors.
To decide this, it is proper to refer here to the contents of
the Memorandum, Exhibit D.8, the reply notice issued by the
petitioner and some of the admissions made by the important
witnesses of the complaint.
The Memorandum submitted to the petitioner reads thus:
2
ILR 1992 KAR 2091
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ಅವರ Mಲು(ಗಳ0 ಜನವ8Oಂದ ಹಗಲು ಾ ಕುಚುಗಲು ಅ)5 ಾQ ಅವ$ಗಳನು<
ೇರಳ 2ಾಗೂ ೋRಾ ಾಜ ಗ3 ೆ ಕಳ0-!ರುವ ೆಲಸ Iಾ ರಂL!”ಾ# ೆ. !”ಾ#ಪ$ರದ ಎKಾ(
ಬತ/ವ$ ತಮ> @ರA ೆ ಬರ ೇ ೆಂಬ ಉ”ೆ#ೕಶGಂದ ೈತ8 ೆ ಆಕಶ ಕ ೆKೆ (2ೆVW ೆ ಹಣ) ೊಟು* ಭತ/
ಪEೆದು. M4(ಂY ಾQ! 2ೊರ ಾಜ ಗ3 ೆ ಕಳ0-ಸುವ ಸುG# ಇ4( ಮ ೆ ಾ%ಾ@”ೆ.
Zಾ ಾನ ಜನ8 ೆ ಅ)5 350 ರೂIಾOಗೂ ಸಹ ಒಂದು )\ಂ]ಾ^ !ಗುವ$Gಲ(. ಈ
ವ ವ2ಾರದ4( !”ಾ#ಪ$ರದ ಒಬ_ “ೊಡ` ) ಾA Rಾ Iಾ8 2ಾಗೂ !”ಾ#ಪ$ರದ %ಾಹ!ೕ^”ಾರರ
aಾb ಾವ ಸಹ ಾ@ೕ”ಾರ8″ಾ# ೆ.
ಈ cKೆ(ಯ ಉಸು/Rಾ8 ಮಂ ಯೂ ಆ@ರುವ ಾಜ ದ ಆ2ಾರ ಮಂ ಯವರ ಪ ೋ
ೆಂಬಲವ$ ಈ ಜನ8 ೆ ಇ”ೆ ಎಂದು 3ಯಲ d*”ೆ. %ಾವ$ ಈ bಷಯವನು< b”ಾನ ಸaೆಯ4(
ಪ Zಾ/ಪ ಾQ, ಆಗುವ ಅವ ವ2ಾರ ೆಳ) ೆ ತರ ೇಕು 2ಾಗೂ ಾನ ಮುಖ ಮಂ ಗ3 ೆ 3!,
2ೆಗEೆಯವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವ8ಂದ ಆಗುವ ಈ ಹಗಲು ದ ೋEೆ e4(ಸುವಂ%ೆ ಅವರ ಗಮನ ೆ5
ತರ ೇ ೆಂದು Iಾ f ಸು%ೆ/ೕRೆ.
!”ಾ#ಪ$ರ ನಗರ -ತVಂತಕ ಮಂಡ3ಯ ಪರRಾ@
¢£ÁAPÀ: 15-4-83
Sd/- T.D. Hulekal
Sd/- ರgೕಶ
Sd/- QæµÀÚ
18Sd/- Kismar
ನಕಲು:
ೕ ೋIಾಲ ಾನEೆ, hಾಸಕರು, !”ಾ#ಪ$ರ
ೕ bೕರಪ iO4, b ೋಧ ಪ ದ ಾಯಕರು, ೆಂಗಳ ರು.”
In the reply sent on behalf of the petitioner to the notice
issued on behalf of the Complainant, it is mentioned as
follows:
“ಕ ಾ ಟಕ Iಾ ಂತ blಾನ ಸaೆಯ ಸದಸ ಾ@ 4 ೇ ಾ8 ಸತತRಾ@
ಚು ಾOತ ಾ@ ಆ8! ಬಂGರುವ ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರ8 ೆ ಾಜ ದ ಾಜ)ೕಯ cೕವನದ4( ಒಂದು
b ಷ* Zಾoನ ಾನb”ೆ. ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರು ಜನ Zಾ ಾನ ರ ಆದರಲೂ( ಕಡು ಬಡವರ
-ಂದು3ದವರ 2ಾಗೂ ಅಲ ಸಂqಾ ತರ 2ಾಗೂ -ತರ ಣ ಾಡಲು ಸತತ 2ೋ ಾಟ ನEೆ!”ಾ# ೆ.
2ಾಗೂ ನEೆಸು /”ಾ# ೆ. ಅವರು ಆ ಾ ೆH ಪ ಾ ೋrsಗಳನು< ಕ ೆದು ಜನರ ಸಮZೆ ಗಳನು< ಪತ
ಕತ ೊಡ ೆ ಚV ! ಜನರ ಸಮZೆ ಗ3 ೆ ಅಗತ Rಾದ – ಪ uಾರ ಒದ@! ೊಳ0vವ ಪ ಯತ<
ಾಡು /”ಾ# ೆ. ಇಂತಹ ಒಂದು ಪ ಾ ೋrs 28-4-1983 ರ4( ನEೆದುದು eಜ. ಈ ಪ ಾ
ೋrsಯ4( ಪ ಮುಖRಾ@ ಪ Zಾ/ವ ೆ ಾQದ bಷಯ “ಅ ೈ ಕ ಾಜ)ೕಯ ಪ}ಾಂತರ”ದ ಬ ೆH.
ಇ”ೇ ಸಂದಭ ದ4( ಾಜ ದ ಗQ ಪ “ೇಶಗಳ4( ಅ)5 ಅಕ ಮRಾ@ ೋRಾ ಮತು/ ೇರಳ
ಾಜ ಗ3 ೆ Zಾ ಾA ೆ•ಾಗು /”ೆ ಎಂಬ ಅಂಶ ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರ ಗಮನ ೆ5 ಬಂGತು/ ಇಂತಹ ಕಷ*
Zಾ ಾA ೆಯ ಪ8€ಾಮRಾ@ ಜನZಾ ಾನ ರ ಆ2ಾರ ವಸು/ಗಳ ೆKೆ bಪ8ೕತRಾ@ ಏ8ದು#
ಜನcೕವನ ದುಸ/ರRಾ@”ೆ ಎಂಬ ಅಂಶ ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರ ಗಮನ ೆ5 ಬಂGತು/. ಇ”ೇ ಸಂದಭ ದ4(
ವiಗH ಮತು/ ಉತ/ರ ಕನ<ಡ cKೆ(ಗಳ4( ಜನ ಒಂದು ಆಂ”ೋಳನವನು< Iಾ ರಂLಸುವ ಬ ೆHಯೂ
ಕೂಡ ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರ8 ೆ ಸುG# ಸ ಾuಾರಗಳ0 ಬಂGದ#ವ$. ಈ ಬ ೆH ಅ ೇಕ 4‚ತ ದೂರುಗಳ0
ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರ8 ೆ ಬಂGದು# ಅಂತಹ ಒಂದು ದೂ8ನ4( ಕಳvZಾಗA ೆ ವ ವ2ಾರದ4( ೕ ಾಮಕೃಷD
2ೆಗEೆಯವರ ಸ2ೋದರ ಾದ eಮ> ಕn”ಾರರ Iಾತ b”ೆ ಎಂಬ ಒಂದು ದೂರು ಇತು/. ಈ ಎKಾ(
ದೂರುಗಳನು< ಮುಖ ಮಂ ಗಳವ8 ೆ ರRಾe! ಈ ಬ ೆH eಷ IಾತRಾದ buಾರ€ೆಯನು<
ನEೆO! Cw ƒ@•ಾದ ಕ ಮಗಳನು< ೈ ೊಳv ೇ ೆಂದು ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರು
ಮುಖ ಮಂ ಗಳವ8 ೆ ಮನb ಾQದ#ರು. -ೕ ೆ ಬ ೆಯುRಾಗ ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರು
ಮುಖ ಮಂ ಗ3 ೆ ಈ jÃw CAzÀgÉ ” ೆಲ„g> ಇಂತಹ ದೂರುಗಳ0 ಾಜ ಾರ€ೆಗಳ gೕKೆ
ಬರುವ$ದು ಸಹಜ ಆದರಲೂ( ಅJ ಾರದ4(ರುವವರ gೕKೆ 2ೇರಳ, ಆದುದ8ಂದ
ಸ%ಾ ಸತ %ೆಯನು< ಕಂಡು-Qಯಲು ಪ†ಣ ಪ ಾಣ ºÁUÀÆ ಜgÀÆ ಾದ ತeqೆ CUÀvÀå
ಎಂಬು”ಾ@ ಬ ೆGದ#ರು. ಈ ಬ ೆH ಮುಖ ಮಂ ಗಳ0 •ಾವ ಒಂದು ಕ ಮವನೂ< %ೆ ೆದು ೊಂQಲ(
2ಾಗೂ ಈ ಮನbಗಳ0 ತಮ ೆ ಬಂGರುವ ಬ ೆH !o8ೕಕರಣ ಾಡGದ#ರ ಬ ೆH ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರ8 ೆ
19ಮುಖ ಮಂ ಗಳ ಬ ೆH ಅಸ ಾlಾನbತು/. Zಾವ ಜeಕರ -ತ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ* ಈ bಷಯವನು<
ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( ಪ Zಾ/‡ಸುವ$”ೇ 2ೊರತು eಮ> ಕn”ಾರರ ಬ ೆH ಪ ೆಗಳ4(
ವರG•ಾ@ರುವ 8ೕ ಯ4( ೇರRಾದ ಆ ೋಪವನು< ಾಡ4ಲ( ಎಂಬ ಅಂಶವನು< ನಮ>
ಕn”ಾರರು ಸ\ಚˆಪQಸಬಯಸು%ಾ/ ೆ. ಈ ಒಂದು 2ೇ3 ೆಯನು< ಪ ೆಗಳ0 ತಮ>”ೇ ಆದ
8ೕ ಯ4( ಪ ಕd! ಾಜ)ೕಯ ೊಂದಲ ೆ5 ಅವ ಾಶ ಾQದ ೆ ಅದ ೆ5 ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರು •ಾವ
8ೕ ಯಲೂ( ಜRಾ ಾ#ರರಲ(. ನಮ> ಕn”ಾರರು •ಾವ ಸುಳvನೂ< ಸೃr* ಾQಲ(. Zಾವ ಜeಕ
cೕವನ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ* ಅವರ ಗಮನ ೆ5 ಬಂದು ಒಂದುಅಂಶವನು< Zಾವ ಜeಕರ ಗಮನ ೆ5 ತರುವ
ಮೂ®PÀ ಸಮZೆ ಯನು< ಬ ೆಹ8ಸುವ ಒಂದು Iಾ ಾAಕ ಪ ಯತ<ವನು< ಾQ”ಾ# ೆ‰ೕ 2ೊರತು
eಮ> ಕn”ಾರರ ಮನ ೋOಸುವ ಒಂದು ಉ”ೆ#ೕಶ ಅವರ”ಾ@ರ4ಲ(. ಎಂಬ ಅಂಶವನು<
ಮ%ೊ/g> 3ಸಬಯಸು%ಾ/ ೆ.
XX XX XX
ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( ಈ ಪ Zಾ/ವ ೆ ಾQದ ಉ"ೆ#ೕಶ ಈ ತತ\ವನು< ಎ / -Qಯುವ$"ೇ
2ೊರತು, eಮ> ಕn"ಾರ8 ೆ 2ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವ8 ೆ ಮನ ೋOಸುವ 8ೕ ಯ4(
ಆ ೋಪ ಾಡುವ$ದಲ( ಎಂಬ ಅಂಶವನು< ಮ%ೊ/g> !o8ೕಕ8ಸಬಯಸು%ಾ/ ೆ.
eಮ> ೋdೕ!ನ4( ಈ ಒಂದು 2ೇ3 ೆಯ ಉ"ೆ#ೕಶ ಕನಕಪ$ರದ ಮತ"ಾರ8 ೆ ತಪ$
ಕಲ ೆ ೊಡುವ ಉ”ೆ#ೕಶGಂದ ಎನು<ವ e ಾlಾರದ ಆಸಂಗ ಆ ೋಪವನು< ಾQG#ೕ8. ನಮ>
ಕn”ಾರರು ತಮ> ಪ ದ ಅಭ f ಯ ಪರRಾ@ ಕನಕಪ$ರ blಾನಸaಾ }ೇತ ದ ಅ ೇಕ ಕEೆಗಳ4(
aಾಷಣ ಾQರು%ಾ/ ೆ. ಆದ ೆ ಈ bಷಯವನು< •ಾವ aಾಷಣದಲೂ( ಪ Zಾ/ಪ ಾQಲ(Rೆಂದು
ಸ ಷ*ಪQ!ರು%ಾ/ ೆ.
XX XX XX
Let me examine now the evidence of complainant’s
witnesses. In the cross-examination of PW-2 Ramachandra, the
Editor of Samyuktha Karnataka of Hubli Edition, it is elicited as
follows:
ೆಂಗಳ 8ನ ಕuೇ8Oಂದ ಹುಬ_3vಯ ಕuೇ8 ೆ ವರGಯನು< •ಾರು ಮುd*!ದರು
ಎನು<ವ$ದು 2ೇಳ4 ೆ5 ಾರದು 2ಾಗೂ ಆ ಸುG#ಯನು< ಹುಬ_3vಯ4( •ಾರು !\ೕಕ8!”ಾ# ೆ ಅಂ%ಾ
2ೇಳ4 ೆ5 ಾರದು.
20
ನಮ> ಕuೇ8ಯ4( ಬಂದಂತಹ ಎKಾ( ಸುG# bಷಯಗಳ ನನ< ಗಮನ ೆ5 ಬರುವ$GKಾ(.
ಸುG#ಯನು< bhೆ(ೕಷ€ೆ ಾQದವರು ಅದ ೆ5 ೕr ೆಯನು< ೊಡು%ಾ/ ೆ. ೕr ೆಯನು< ೊಡುವ$ದು
ಅವರ ಸ\ಂತ ಅLIಾ ಯ ಅಂ%ಾ ಅನು<ವ$ದು ಸ8.
XX XX XX
ಪ ಕಟ€ೆ ಾಡುವ$ದ)5ಂತ ಪ†ವ ದ4( ಸುG#ಯ "ೋಷಪ†8ತ ಅಂ%ಾ ನಮ ೆ ಕಂಡು
ಬಂದ ೆ ಅದನು< ಾವ$ ಧೃQೕಕರಣ ಾQ ೊಳ0v%ೆ/ೕRೆ. (ಸ\ಯಂ 2ೇ3 ೆ: ಅದನು< ನಮ> ಸ\ಂತ
bRೇಚ ೆOಂ"ಾ ಧೃQೕಕರಣ ಾಡು%ೆ/ೕRೆ. ಆದ ೆ 2ೊರ ೆ 2ೋ@ ಅಲ() ಈ ೇ!ನ4( ಅಡಕRಾದ
ಸುG#ಯ ಬ ೆH ದೃŽೕಕರಣ ಾಡKಾ@"ೆ•ೕ 2ೇ ೆ ಅನು<ವ$ದು ನನ ೆ ೊ /ಲ(.
XX XX XX
ಪ ೆಯು ಾ ಾಟRಾಗುವ ಸಲುRಾ@ ಆಕಷ AಯRಾದ ೕr ೆಗಳನು< ಮತು/
ಉvÉàçà ಕಗಳನು< ಾವ$ ಪ !G# ಾಡು%ೆ/ೕRೆ ಅಂ%ಾ ಅನು<ವ$ದು ಸ8ಯಲ(
XX XX XX
Zಾವ ಜeಕ ಪ ಮುಖRಾದದು# ಮತು/ ಅಡ ತ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ*ಂ%ೆ ಅLIಾ ಯವನು<
ೇ3″ಾಗ ಅದು ನಮ> ದೃr*ಯ4( ಪ ಮುಖRಾದದು# ಮತು/ Zಾವ ಜeಕ ದೃr*Oಂ”ಾ ಇದ#4( ಅದನು<
ಾವ$ ಬರಹದ4( ೊಡಬಹುದು.
P.W.-5 M.K. Vidyaranya, the P.T.I., Reporter has deposed
as under:
1983ರ4( ಾನು ‡.d.ಐ. ನ4( ವರG ಾರ ೆಂದು ೆಲಸ ಾಡು /”ೆ#ನು. 1983 ೇ ಏ‡ ^
ಾ2ೆಯ4( ಅಂದ ೆ ಕನಕಪ$ರ blಾನಸaಾ ಚು ಾವ€ೆಯ ಪ†ವ ದ4( ೇ ಆ ೋ‡ತ ಾದ ೕ
ಬಂ ಾರಪ ಇವರು ಕ ೆದ ಪ ಾ ೋrs ೆ 2ೋ@”ೆ#ನು. ನಮ> ಸಂZೆo ೆ ಅವ8ಂದ ಅ2ಾ\ನ ಬಂGತು. ಆ
ಆಮಂತ ಣದ gೕ ೆ ೆ ನಮ> ಕuೇ8Oಂದ ನನ<ನು< ಕ3! ೊd*ದ#ರು. ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯನು< ಅವರು
ತಮ> ಮ ೆಯ4( ಕ ೆGದ#ರು. ಅವರ ಮ ೆಯು ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಕು ಾರ Iಾ’ ದ4( ಇರುವ ಾಂJ
ಭವನದ ಹ /ರ ಇರುತ/”ೆ. ಸದ8 ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( ಅವರು ಮುಖ Rಾ@ ಾಜ ದ4( ಇದ# ದು ಾಡ3ತದ
ಬ ೆH 2ಾಗೂ ಸ ಷ*Rಾ@ ೕ ಾಮಕೃಷD 2ೆಗEೆ ಇವರ Zೋದರ ಸಂಬಂJ•ಾದ ೕ ಗ€ೇಶ 2ೆಗEೆ
ಇವರು ೋRಾ ೆ5 ಅ)5 ಕಳv Zಾಗ€ೆ ಾಡು /ರುವ$”ಾ@ಯೂ 2ಾಗೂ ಅವರು ಾಮಕೃಷD 2ೆಗEೆ ಇವರ
Zೋದರ ಸಂಬಂJ•ಾದ#8ಂದ ‘ೕ4ೕ ಅJ ಾ8ಗಳ0 ಅವರ bರುದ” ಕ ಮ %ೆ ೆದು ೊಳvಲು
21
-ಂಜ8ಯು /ದು# ಅದ8ಂದ ನಮ> ಾಜ ೆ5 ೋ]ಾ ಂತರ ರೂIಾOಗಳ 2ಾe•ಾ@”ೆ ಎಂದು
ಆIಾG!ದ#ರು. ಸದ8 ೋrsಯ4( ಸು ಾರು 25 ಜನ ೇ ೆ ೇ ೆ ಪ ೆಗಳ ಪ eJಗಳ
aಾಗವ-!ದ#ರು. ೆಂಗಳ ರು ಸಂಯುಕ/ ಕ ಾ ಟಕGಂದ ಪ 2ಾ(ದ ಕುಳ4, ೕ ಹ8ಶWಂದ ಭ•,
ಕುಸು ಾಕರ (]ೈಂ ಆ- ಇಂQ•ಾ), ಇನೂ< ಅ ೇಕರ aಾಗವ-!ದ#ರು ಅವರು 2ೇ3ದ ಸುG#ಯನು<
ಾವ$ ನಮ> ಪ$ಸ/ಕದ4( ಬರವA ೆಯ ರೂಪದ4( %ೆ ೆದು ೊಂEೆನು. ಅಂದ ೆ ಅವರು 2ೇ3ದ ಸುG#ಗಳ4(
ಮುಖ Rಾದ ಅಂಶಗಳನು< ಅ ರಶಹ ಬ ೆದು ೊಂQ”ೆ#ೕ ೆ. ಾಮಕೃಷD 2ೆಗEೆ ಇವರ Zೋದರ ಸಂಬಂJ
ಇ%ಾ G – ಇ%ಾ G ಇವ$ಗಳನು< ಅ ರಶಹ ಬ ೆದು ೊಂQರು%ೆ/ೕ ೆ. ಗ€ೇಶ 2ೆಗEೆ ಇವರು ಅ)5
ಕಳvZಾ ಾ€ೆಯ4( aಾಗವ-!”ಾ# ೆಂದು ಾನು ಅ ರಶಹ ಬ ೆದು ೊಂQ”ೆ#ೕ ೆ. ಾನು ಅ”ೇ 8ೕ –
ಯ4( ನಮ> PÀbÉÃjUÉ ವರG ಾQ"ೆ#ೕ ೆ.
XX XX XX
1983ರ4( ಸು ಾರು ಾಲು5 ಜನ ‡.d.ಐ. ವರG ಾರರು ಇ”ೆ#ವ$. ಇದುವ ೆbಗೂ ಾವ$ ೊಟ*
ವರGಯ4(, ೇ ೊಂದು ಚಂದ”ಾರರು ಪ ಕd!”ಾಗ •ಾವ$”ೇ ಒಂದು bಪ•ಾ ಸ ಕಂಡು ಬಂGಲ(
2ಾಗೂ ಮೂಲ ಸುG# ೊಟ*ವರು ಈವ ೆಗೂ ಅಲ(ಗ–ೆದಂತಹ ಪ ಸಂಗ ಬಂGರುವ$Gಲ(. ೆಂಗಳ ರು
2ಾಗೂ ಹುಬ_3v ಸಂಯುಕ/ ಕ ಾ ಟಕದ ಪ ಾಶಕರು ಇಬ_ರೂ ನಮ> ಚಂದ”ಾರ8ರು%ಾ/ ೆ.
ೕ ಬಂ ಾರಪ ನವರು ೊಟ* ವರGಯ ೆ<ೕ ಾನು ಬ ೆದು ೊಂಡು ನಮ> ಕuೇ8ಯ4(
ೊd*ರು%ೆ/ೕ ೆ.
XX XX XX
ಪ ೆ ೋrsಯ4( 2ೇ3 ೆ eೕಡುವವರ 2ೇ3 ೆಯನು< ನಮ> ಗ- ೆ ಪ ಾರ
ಬ ೆದು ೊಳ0v%ೆ/ೕRೆ.
XX XX XX
ನನ ೆ ಕನ<ಡ 2ಾಗೂ ಆಂಗ( aಾ˜ೆಯ4( ೕಘ 4‡ ಬರುವ$Gಲ(. ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( 2ೇ3ದ
bಷಯವನು< ಾವ$ ಎšಾ 8ೕ ಬ ೆದು ೊಂQರು%ೆ/ೕRೆ. ಈ iಕದ#g ೆ ಸಂಬಂJ!ದ bಷಯದ ಬ ೆH
ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ bವರವನು< ಾನು ಇd*ರುವ$Gಲ(.
XX XX XX
22
1 ೇ ಆ ೋ‡ತ ಾದ ಬಂ ಾರಪ ಇವರು Zಾವ ಜeಕ ಪ eGಗಳ0 ಇರು%ಾ/ ೆ. ಅವರು
Zಾವ ಜeಕ -%ಾದೃr*Oಂದ 2ಾಗೂ ಾಜ ದ4( ಇರುವ ಆಡ3ತ ನೂ ನ%ೆಗಳ ಬ ೆH
ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯನು< ಕ ೆಯು%ಾ/ ೆ. ಈ ದೃr*Oಂದ ಾನು ಅವರ ಪ ಾ ೋrs ೆ 2ೋ@”ೆ#. ಅಂGನ
ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( Zಾವ ಜeಕ -%ಾದೃr*Oಂದ 2ೇ3ದ#ರು.
ಪ •ಬ_ ವ )/ಯೂ ತಮ> ಗ – ೆಯ ಅನುZಾರRಾ@ bಷಯಗಳನು< ಬ ೆದು ೊಳ0v%ಾ/ ೆ.
ಅ ೕ ಮುಖ Rಾದದು# ಇದ#4( aಾಗವ-!ದ ಎಲ( ಪ eJಗಳ0 ಒಂ”ೇ 8ೕ ಯ4( ಬ ೆದು ೊಳ0v%ಾ/ ೆ.
XX XX XX
ಪ •ಂದು ಪ ೆಗಳ4( ಾವ$ ೊಟ* ವರGಯೂ ಅ ರಶಹ ವರG•ಾ@ರುವ$Gಲ(. ಆದ ೆ
Zಾ ಾಂಶ ಒಂ”ೇ ಇರುತ/”ೆ ಅಂ%ಾ Zಾnಯೂ 2ೇಳ0%ಾ/ ೆ.
ಈ iಕದ#g ೆ ಸಂಬಂJ!ದಂ%ೆ ಪ ಾ ೋrs ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ* •ಾವ “ಾಖKೆಗಳ0 ನನ<
ಹ /ರ ಇಲ(.
ೆಲ„ಂದು ಪ ೆಗಳ0 ತಮ>”ೇ ಆದಂತಹ ಾಜ)ೕಯ lೋರ€ೆ 2ೊಂGರುತ/Rೆ.
XX XX XX
ೆಲ„g> ೆಲವ$ ಪ ೆಗಳ4( ಬರುವ bಷಯ ಸ8•ಾ@ ಇರುವ$Gಲ(. ೆಲ„g>
ಪ ೆಗಳ4( ಬರುವ bಷಯಗಳ0 ಅಧ ಸತ Rಾ@ರುತ/”ೆ. ಅಂತಹ bಷಯಗಳ0 ಪ†ಣ ಸುಳ0v ಅಂ%ಾ
2ೇಳಲು ಆಗುವ$Gಲ( 2ಾ ೆ‰ೕ ಪ†ಣ ಸತ bರುತ/”ೆ ಅಂ%ಾಲೂ 2ೇಳಲು ಆಗುವ$GKಾ(.
XX XX XX
P.W. 6 PrahladKolali, the Chief Reporter of the daily in
question has deposed to the effect that:
29.4.83ರಂದು ಪ ಕಟRಾದ bಷಯದ ವರG ನನ<“ಾ@ರುವ$Gಲ(. ಪ$ನಃ ºÉüÀÄvÉÛãÉ. 28.4.83
ರಂದು ಾನು ಪ ಾ ೋrs ೆ 2ೋ@”ೆ#ನು. ಾನು ಪ ಾ ೋrs ೆ 2ೋ”ಾಗ bಷಯವನು< ೕ
ಬಂ ಾರಪ ನವರು 2ೇ3 ಮು@!ದ#ರು. ಾನು ಮರ3 ಕuೇ8 ೆ ಬಂದು ಇತರ ವರG ಾರರು eೕQದ
23ವರGಯ gೕ ೆ ೆ ಾನು ವರGಯನು< ತ•ಾರು ಾQರು%ೆ/ೕ ೆ. ‡.d.ಐ. ನವರು ೊಟ* ವರG ಪ ಾಟ
ಾನು ೊಟ* ವರGಯಂ%ೆ ಪ ೆಯ4( ಪ ಕಟ€ೆ ಆ@ರುತ/”ೆ.
Zಾ ಾನ Rಾ@ ಅಂದ ೆ ಕ ಾ ಟಕ ಾಜ ದ4( ಆಡ3ತ Rೈಖ8ಯ ƒನ<%ೆ 2ಾಗೂ
Zಾವ ಜeಕ -ತದೃrsOಂದ bಷಯಗಳ0 ಅಂದ ೆ ದೂರುಗಳ0 ಇವ$ಗಳ ಬ ೆH ಬಂ ಾರಪ ನವರು
ಪ ಾ ೋrs ಕ ೆಯು /ದ#ರು. ಪ ಾ ೋrsಗಳನು< Zಾವ ಜeಕ -ತದೃr*Oಂದ ಕ ೆಯುವ$ದು
ಪದ” .
ೆಲ„g> ವರG ಾರರು ತಮ>”ೇ ಆದ aಾ˜ೆಗಳ4( 3ದು ೊಳ0vವ$ದು ಉಂಟು
ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( Zಾ ಾಂಶವನು< ಬ ೆದು ೊಳvKಾಗುತ/”ೆ. Zಾ ಾಂಶ ೆ5 ಅವರವರ aಾ˜ೆಯನು<
ಅಳವQ! ೊಳ0v%ಾ/ ೆ. ಾನು ೋQದ ಪ ಾರ 28.4.83 ರಂದು ಬಂ ಾರಪ ನವರು ಕ ೆದ
ಪ ಾ ೋrs ಆಡ3%ಾತ>ಕ bಷಯ ೆ5 ಸಂಬಂJ!ದು# ಇರುತ/”ೆ. ೆಂಗಳ 8eಂದ ಾವ$ ವರGಗಳನು<
Jšಾವ%ಾ/@ ಹುಬ3v ೆ ರRಾeಸು%ೆ/ೕRೆ. ಸo–ಾವ ಾಶವನು< ೋQ ೊಂಡು ಹುಬ_3vಯ4(ಯೂ ಸಹ
ತಮ>”ೆ ಆದ 8ೕ ಯ4( ಸಂnಪ/Rಾ@ ಅಳವQಸುವ$ದು ಉಂಟು. ನನ< œಾಪಕ ಶ)/ಯ ಪ ಾರ ”ಕಳv
Zಾ ಾA ೆ” ಅನು<ವ ಪದ ಇದ#ಂ%ೆ %ೋರು /ತು/ ಅನು<ವ$ದು ೆನಪ$ ಇಲ(. ೆಲವ$ ಾ8 ವರGಗಳನು<
ಪ ೆಯವರು ತಮ> lೋರ€ೆ ೆ ಅನುZಾರRಾ@ ಅಳವQಸುವ$ದು ಉಂಟು. ಒg> ವರG ಕ3!ದ4(
ಅದರ ಎQdಂY ಾಡುವ$ದು ಸ2ಾ ಇರುತ/”ೆ. ೕ ಬಂ ಾರಪ ಇವರು ತಮ ೆ ೇ ೆಯವ8ಂದ 3ದ
bಷಯವನು< ಪ ಾ ೋrsಯ4( 2ೇ3ರುವ$ದು ೇ ೆಯವರ ಮೂಲಕ 3ದು ಬಂGತು. ಅಂದ ೆ ೇ ೆ
ವರG ಾರರ ವರGOಂದ 3ದು ಬಂGತು.
ಈ ವರGಯ ಪದ ಾg ಅಥRಾ ೕr ೆ ಾನು eೕQದು# ಇರುವ$Gಲ(.”
From the above evidence, it is clear that on the date of Press
Conference, the accused was a leader of ‘Kranthi Ranga’ a
Political Party of the State. He received a copy of the
Memorandum wherein certain lapses on the part of the then
Ruling Party in the State including Rice smuggling was high-
lighted. In his reply notice accused petitioner stated that the so-
called meeting that was convened was only in the public interest
and to Ventilate the grievances of the public including
communicating the feelings of the public to the Government
about its lapses and mal-administration. The rice deal was just
an incidental one. It is further stated that at no time he had any
intention either to defame the complainant or the members of
his family or to wound their feelings. It is also mentioned in the
24
reply notice that at the relevant time, Election to Kanakapura
Assembly was going on from where Shri Ramakrishna Hegde
had contested and the petitioner was touring the entire
constituency in favour of one of his Party’s candidate. He
addressed voters of the constituency at different places. But he
never said anything aboutjthe Rice deal.
It has come in the evidence of P.W. 5 that the petitioner
was in the public field. In the public interest and to expose the
lapses on the administration, the Press Conference was
convened. It is also in the evidence of P.W. 6 that each reporter
will take down in his way. They will use their own style of
language while giving captions to the news item and narrating
the contents. The Conference dated 28-4-1983 was in respect of
State’s Administration. He admitted that he cannot remember
whether the word ‘smuggling’ was mentioned in the report.
…. …. ….
20. While considering the evidence to ascertain whether
prima facie case has been made out or not, it is also the duty of
the Court to see the statement as a whole and also the contents
of the documents are read fully and not by way of dissecting it
or in isolation. Because, if the entire document and the
statements are read as a whole, the same will give the real
picture or the intention. In this connection, it is proper to bear in
mind the news appeared in Ex. P. 1 at Ex. P. 1(a), the portion
extracted above from the reply notice of the petitioner preceded
by the Memorandum at Ex. D-8 dated 15-4-1983 received by
the petitioner with copies marked to other Legislators, the then
Leader of Opposition including the Government and also to
some portions of the statement of the complainant and the
statement of his witnesses as extracted above.
21. In order to know whether the complaint made by the
1st respondent is true and the petitioner and Respondents 2 and
3 are liable to be punished under Section 500 I.P.C. or not, it is
proper to bear in mind the circumstances under which the
imputations are made. It can be said that an offence under
Section 499 I.P.C. has been committed when any one of the
acts specified in Explanations 1 to 4 to Section 499 I.P.C. is not
existing. For the purpose of the case on hand, Explanation 4 is
relevant and the same has been extracted above. To attract
25
Section 499 I.P.C. the imputations shall be made intentionally
and there shall be reason to believe that the same would harm
the reputation of the person against whom it is made. When can
a person be charged for an offence punishable under Section
500 I.P.C. has been clearly explained in Prem Pal
Singh v. Mohan Lal [Prempal Singh v. Mohanlal.] . The relevant
portion reads thus:
“the essential ingredients for an offence falling under
Section 500 I.P.C. are (i) the making or publishing of an
imputation concerning any person; (ii) such imputation
must have been made (a) by words either spoken or
intended to be read; or (b) by signs: (c) or by visible
representations and (iii) such imputations must have been
made with the intention of harming or knowing or having
reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the
person concerning whom it is made. Imputation means
accusation against a person and it implies an allegation of
fact and not merely a term of abuse.”
22. The material produced viz., Ex. P. 1(a), the reply
given to the notice, the Memorandum Ex. D-8 and the evidence
of the complainant and the witnesses, relevant portions of which
have been extracted above, if compared to the above
ingredients for an offence under Section 499, falsify the theory
put forth of the complainant for the following reasons:
Firstly, the Courts below placed reliance on the material,
namely, the news item, without noticing the same as hearsay
and inadmissible in evidence, as held by the Supreme Court and
other High Courts. Some of the Decisions are:
(a) Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 1988 SC
1274.] , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
“Judicial notice cannot be taken of the facts stated in
a news item being in the nature of hearsay secondary
evidence, unless proved by evidence aliunde. A report in a
newspaper is only hearsay evidence. A newspaper is not
one of the documents referred to in Section 78(2) of the
Evidence Act by which an allegation of fact can be proved.
The presumption of genuineness attached under Section 81
of the Evidence Act to a newspaper report cannot be treated
as proof of the facts reported therein. A statement of fact
26contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore
inadmissible in evidence in the absence of the maker of the
statement appearing in Court and deposing to have
perceived the fact reported.”
(b)In KhilumalTopandas v. ArjundasTulsidas [KhilumalThopanda
s v. ArjundasTulsidas.], the Rajasthan High Court held as under:
“A report of a speech made in the newspaper is not
admissible in evidence to prove the speeches. The party
must produce the person who had made the speeches or
the persons in whose presence such speeches were made or
the reporter of the newspaper in whose presence the
speeches were made and who had sent the report to be
published in the paper.”
(c) The Allahabad High Court in Shib Singh v. Sridhar [Shib
Singh v. Sridhar.] dealing with a report of the Commissioner
which is inadmissible in evidence, held as follows:
“Since the report of the Commissioner played a very
important role in enabling the Magistrate in arriving at his
finding and since this report was inadmissible in evidence,
the learned Magistrate’s finding cannot stand.
In the circumstances the reference is accepted. The
learned Magistrate’s order is set aside. The case shall be
sent back to the learned Magistrate. The commissioner shall
be summoned and shall be examined and cross-examined in
Court. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate shall record his
finding on the disputed point and dispose of the case'”
(d) In Harbhajan Singh v. The State of Punjab [(1990) 4 SCC 76
: AIR 1990 SC 1962.] , the Punjab High Court held thus:
“The presumption of genuineness attached under
Section 81, Evidence Act to a newspaper cannot be treated
as proof of the facts reported therein, as a statement of a
fact contained in a newspaper is merely hearsay and
therefore inadmissible in evidence, in the absence of the
maker of the statement appearing in Court and deposing to
have perceived the fact reported.”
(e) In NARAYAN CHOUDHURY v. RADHA GOBINDA DUTTA [AIR
1971 Calcutta 53.] the Calcutta High Court held thus:
27
“These are not however the only defects in the order
impugned. The two publications which form the sheet
anchor of the prosecution case viz., the publication dated
the 9th April, 1965 and the publication dated the 23rd July,
1965, marked as exhibits 1 and 2 respectively have not
been properly admitted in evidence. Objection to the
admissibility of the two exhibits 1 and 2 was taken at the
time of the evidence of P.W. 1 who sought to prove the
same. A specific ground has also been taken in the
memorandum of appeal as well as in the Petition for special
leave. The findings arrived at in this context by the learned
Magistrate are contradictory. While appreciating the view-
point of the learned defence lawyer in this context, the
learned trying Magistrate nonetheless disagreed with his
submission that the prosecution case must entirely fall on
this ground alone. It is difficult to appreciate the ratio
decidendi of the learned Magistrate and also to follow the
case-law referred to by him. In short, the learned trying
Magistrate has erred in law in his finding on this point,
which goes to the root of the case. The position in law is
quite clear. A reference in this context may be made to the
case of Joy Engineering Works v. State of West Bengal,
reported in AIR 1968 Cal. 407 (SB), wherein Mr. Justice
Banerjee observed at page 445 that “the learned Advocate
General objected to any reliance being placed on the press
reports set out above because according to him they were
not admissible in evidence in the absence of affidavits by
the correspondents or the reporters. He is right in his
contention and the stand taken by him finds support from
the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 1376.” I
will now refer to the Supreme Court case mentioned above,
in the case of GullappalliNageswararao (In C.A. No. 198 of
1959) Chennupati Satyanarayana (In C.A. No. 199 of 1959)
and V. Somasankara Sastry (In C.A. No. 200 of 1959),
Appellants v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1959
SC 1376, Mr. Justice K. Subbarao (as his Lordship then
was), observed at page 1382 that ‘no attempt was made by
the appellants to file any affidavit in the High Court, sworn
to by persons who had attended the meetings addressed by
the Chief Minister and heard him making the said
statements. In the circumstances it must be held that it has
not been established by the appellants that the Chief
Minister made the speeches indicating his closed mind on
the subject of nationalization of bus transport in Krishna
District, Hooghly. If these newspaper cuttings are excluded
from evidence, factual basis for the appellant’s arguments
28disappears’. A reference may also be made to the case
of Hanbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR
1961 Punj. 215 wherein Mr. Justice Tek Chand observed at
page 221 that the presumption of genuineness attached
under this Section (Section 81 of the Indian Evidence Act)
to a newspaper cannot be treated as proof of the facts
reported therein, as a statement of a fact contained in
newspaper is merely hearsay and therefore inadmissible in
evidence, in the absence of the maker of the statement
appearing in Court and deposing to have perceived the fact
reported’. I respectfully agree with the principles laid down
in the aforesaid cases and hold that the publications
impugned have not been legally proved. The publications
impugned should have been properly proved by the
complainant by producing an attested copy of a declaration
by the accused in his capacity as an editor of the fortnighly
under Section 5 of Act XXV of 1867 to establish that he was
the editor of the newspaper concerned. The result is that
there has been a non-conformance to the procedure
established by law in disposing of the case by the Court
below. In the well-known case of Taylor v. Taylor reported
in (1876) 1 Ch. D. 426 Jessel M.R. observed at page 431
that ‘when a statutory power is conferred for the first time
upon a Court, and the mode of exercising it is pointed out,
it means that no other mode is to be adopted…..’ The said
principles were approved of and applied by their Lordships
of the Judicial Committee in the case of Nazir Ahmed v. The
King Emperor reported in 63 Ind. App. 372 : AIR 1936 PC
253(2), Lord Roche, delivering the judgment of the Judicial
Committee, observed at pages 381 and 382 (of Ind. App.) :
(at page 257 of AIR) that ‘the rule which applies is a
different and not less well recognized rule viz., that where a
power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the
thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods
of performance are necessarily forbidden’. In a later
decision the Supreme Court again reiterated the said
principles when in the case of State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Singhara Singh reported in AIR 1964 SC 358,
A.K. Sarkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) delivering the
judgment of the Court observed at P. 361 that ‘the rule
adopted in (1876) 1 Ch. D. 426 is well recognized and is
founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has
conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the
method in which that power is to be exercised, it necessarily
prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that
which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is
that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as
29well not have been enacted’. I respectfully agree with the
said observations and I hold in the facts and circumstances
of the present case that there has been a mistrial due to the
reception and consideration of inadmissible evidence and
the resultant non-conformance to the procedure established
by law, vitiating the ultimate order of acquittal. The same is
accordingly liable to be set aside and the case should go
back to the Court below for a proper trial in accordance with
law.”
Secondly, while considering whether an offence under
Section 499 punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. is made out or
not, one shall take into consideration the entire contents of the
documents instead of picking out only that portion which is
favourable to the complainant, as I held by the Supreme Court
as well as the Orissa High Court, viz.,
(1) Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya v. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya [AIR
1979 SC 154.] wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
It is well settled that an admission unless it is
separable has to be taken as a whole or not at all. (1952) 2
SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343, (1952) 2 SCC 177 : AIR 1952
SC 354 and AIR 1974 SC 388, Rel. on.
Held in the facts and circumstances that the only
evidence from which the Court can find that the appellant,
(the returned candidate) had committed a corrupt practice
as contemplated by Section 123(3A) of the Act is the
evidence of the appellant containing the explanation and the
ramifications of his speech which being an admission had to
be taken as a whole or not at all. Moreover, as the offending
extract of the speech was an integral part of the speech of
the appellant it could not be dissected. In other words, a
corrupt practice must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
and applying this standard it must be held that the
petitioner had failed to prove that the speech given by the
appellant promoted or attempted to promote hatred or
enmity between two classes of citizens.”
and (2) Chaitan Charan Das v. Raghunath Singh [S.N.
Balakrishna v. George Fenandez.] wherein the Orissa High court
held as follows:
30
“It is well settled that where some passages in a
petition are alleged to be defamatory, the document should
be read as a whole, with a view to find out the main
purport, and too much importance should not be attached
to a few isolated passages here and there. I may refer
to CassemKurrim v. Jonas HadjeeSeedick, 9 Cal WN 195
where though some passages in a circular letter issued by
the accused were found to be objectionable, yet the Court
held that it was not a fit case for a criminal court to take
action under Section 500 I.P.C. I may quote the following
observations (at page 198):
‘Then, with reference to the point which has been
strongly insisted on behalf of the respondent, that the letter
goes beyond the limits or ordinary privilege, we feel that we
must look upon the letter as a whole. If it is looked upon as
a whole the particular passage which is objected to really
appears as a statement of the reason which induced the
writer to make the request that he does.’In the present case also the allegations of profligacy
and mismanagement against the petitioner were made by
way of a historical summing up of the administration of the
religious endowment in question, ever since it was founded
during the time of the grandfather of the petitioner. The
opposite party was keen on impressing on the Minister the
public nature of the endowment and the urgent necessity
for the speedy disposal of the proceeding before the
Assistant Endowments Commissioner, so that it may come
under the control of the Endowments Department for the
purpose of better management.”
Thirdly, it is to be seen that whether such imputations
have been made by a person with the knowledge of causing
harm or made with good faith in order to serve either his
interest or the interest of the public. The legal position on this
point has been clearly explained in Prem Pal Singh’s case,
[Prempal Singh v. Mohanlal.] extracted above. Further, if
imputation is made in good faith, the consequences that may
follow has been explained in the following authorities also:
In P. BalasubramaniaMudaliar v. C. Rajagopalachariar [P.
Balasubramaniam v. C. Rajagopalachariar.] it is held thus:
‘It is open to the accused to raise different and
inconsistent pleas. In a defamation case the accused can
31plead that the passage was not defamatory because it bore
a different significance or meaning from the one attributed
to it by the complainant, and also in the alternative that if it
was defamatory because it bore the meaning given to it by
the prosecution, it was an honest expression of opinion
made in good faith and for the good of the public.”
In Chaitan Charan Das’ case [C.C. Das v. Raghunath
Singh.] , the Orissa High Court was of the same view, as seen
from the portion extracted below:
“It is true that by virtue of S. 105 of the Evidence
Act the Court is bound to presume the absence of
circumstances which would bring the offence within any of
the special Exceptions contained in S. 499 I.P.C. and the
burden would primarily rest on the accused to show that
Exception applied. But it is well known that the burden cast
on the accused in a criminal case, by virtue of S. 105 of the
Evidence Act, is not so onerous as the primary burden cast
on the prosecution to prove the offence beyond reasonable
doubt.
If, therefore, on a careful review of the
circumstances under which the complaint was made
and the other events which have come to light it
appears to the Court that one of the Exceptions to
Section 499 I.P.C. may possibly apply, the accused
may be held to have discharged his burden. Moreover
the essence of the offence of defamation, as given in
Section 499 I.P.C. is that the imputation must have
been made either with the intention of causing harm,
or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation would cause harm to a person. In judging
whether the applicant (opposite party) had such
intention or knowledge, the circumstances under
which the main object with which the application was
sent including the prayer asked for from the Minister,
and the background of the dispute between the
parties before the Endowment Department, should all
be considered. If, after a careful consideration of all
these facts it does not appear that the accused had
the necessary intention or knowledge it will not be
proper to place him on trial for an offence under
Section 500 I.P.C.”
32
Fourthly, before giving a finding on the allegations made,
it is also proper for the Court to take into consideration the
context in which such imputations have been made, because in
a democratic society and where the freedom of speech and
expression is made one of the fundamental rights of a citizen, it
is not uncommon that there will be criticism particularly against
those who are in public field and at whose instance lapses
occurred or wrong has been caused to the society. It is true that
merely because freedom of speech and expression is made as a
fundamental right, that does not mean that the same can be
used in any manner. Such expression or speech shall not aim at
defaming another person either knowingly or with an intention
or knowledge to harm or lower the reputation of a person in the
estimation of general public. Further, where it is not shown any
deliberate or calculated attempt or intention to defame a
person, such a statement, though in the first instance looks as
defamation, the context in which it was made is taken into
consideration, speaks otherwise, in such cases it is proper to
ignore such a statement. The Courts have emphatically held the
above proposition in the following Decisions:
(i) In BalasubramaniaMudaliar‘s case [P. Balasubramaniam v. C.
Rajagopalachariar.] the Madras High Court held thus:
“Though the defamatory imputations made
against the complainant are baseless and incorrect,
still if they are made by the accused only as a matter
of opinion in good faith and for public good after
taking due care and caution they are protected by
Excep. 9 to S. 499.”
(ii) In L.S. Jayappa v. N.S. Shamegowda [L.S. Jayappa v. N.S.
Shamgouda.] , this Court held as follows:
“The essence of the offence of defamation
consists in its tendency to cause that description of
pain which is felt by a person who knows himself to
be the object of the unfavourable sentiments of his
fellow creatures and those inconveniences to which
that person is exposed. It is not necessary that actual
harm should be caused. It is sufficient if the harm to
the reputation of the person to whom the imputation
is directed was intended. Thus, before a person is
found guilty of the offence of defamation under S.
33500, the prosecution has to prove not only the
imputations made by the accused but also that the
accused made such imputations with intention of
defaming, ridiculing or undermining the reputation of
the complainant. The background and the
circumstances under which such imputations were
made are relevant to arrive at a conclusion whether
the imputations were intended to be literally
conveyed or they were only hurled as abuses. There
must be something more than mere abuses from
which it could be possible to infer that the
imputations were made with such intention of
defaming directly or indirectly the complainant. In the
absence of any such proof or material, howsoever
vituperative the abuses may be, the abuses by
themselves may not be sufficient to constitute the
offence of defamation.”
Thus, the Courts held that the abuses themselves may not be
sufficient to constitute the offence of defamation. Intention,
circumstances, context and other factors shall weigh.
Fifthly, though the learned Sessions Judge accepted the
contention of the petitioner/accused-1 that the order of the trial
Court can be interfered with for the reason that the learned
Magistrate has not stated in the order that he sifted the
evidence of the witnesses for the limited purpose of ascertaining
whether prima facie case has been made out against the
accused, yet he committed a mistake in giving a finding to the
effect extracted in page 22 at para 3(o)(vi) supra.
22A. From a perusal of the material available on record
and the above discussion, it is clear that the Courts below
without taking into consideration the intention of the
petitioner/accused-1, the circumstances and the context in
which the statement was made and without applying their mind
as to whether the news item which made the basis for the
complaint was admissible in evidence but acting upon the same
have held that the offence alleged has been prima facie
established and that the petitioner and the other two accused
are liable to be charged and tried for an offence under Section
500 I.P.C. Such an approach of the Courts below is wholly
erroneous and incorrect.
… … …
34
29. From the above discussion it is clear that when it is
shown that there is abuse of the process of the Court or justice
demands interference, this Court can definitely under Section
482 Cr. P.C. interfere with the orders of the Court below.
Secondly, when grounds made out do not suggest any offence,
it is proper to discharge an accused as otherwise it leads to
unnecessary litigation and waste of public time and money.
Further, the consideration of evidence reveals that neither prima
facie case made out not the petitioner had any intention to
defame or wound the feelings of the complainant or his family
members. Whatever the petitioner had stated was in the public
interest. If the Courts below had made a judicious and
dispassionate approach to some of the portions of the
statements and other relevant material including admissibility or
otherwise of such evidence, the finding would have been that no
grounds exist in the complaint to suggest that the petitioner had
committed an offence punishable under Section 500 I.P.C. After
all in a democratic set up criticism of one’s style of functioning is
a powerful weapon to make aware the public about one’s lapses
and to caution and correct acts of such persons. Thus in a
democratic set up a person who is in public field shall not be too
sensitive and touchy to such criticisms as no one will take such
criticisms very seriously or attach any importance to such
statement.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. A learned single Judge of this Court in the case of MRS.
TARA AJAI SINGH v. R.P. SHARMA3, has held as follows:
“…. …. …
8. The word ‘defamation’ is defined under Section 499
IPC and the same reads as under:
“Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be
read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or
publishes any imputation concerning any person intending
to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such3
ILR 2012 KAR 5691
35imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said,
except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that
person.”
A reading of the above definition manifestly makes it
clear that the following essentials are necessary to constitute
defamation.
i. making or publishing any imputation concerning any
person;
ii. such imputation must have been made by words either
spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visual
representations;
iii the said imputation must have been made with an
intention to harm or with knowledge or having reason to
believe that it will harm the reputation of the person
concerned.
From the above it is clear that there must be false
statement made without lawful justification. The
intention to cause harm is the most essential ‘sine qua
non’ to constitute an offence. Further the person against
whom the allegations are made must have a reputation
and that a damage is caused to it on account of false
allegations.
9. In the instant case a reading of the averments
made in the letter dated 09.02.2007 do not constitute
defamation. Even if the entire remarks made in the letter
are taken as true, the same are not made with an
intention to cause harm to the reputation of the
respondent; they are not false and no damage is caused
to the reputation of respondent. From the averments
made in the complaint it is seen that the respondent has
read too much into the averments made in the letter. The
petitioner imagined for himself something which is not
contained in the letter. Therefore the petition filed by the
respondent is nothing but abuse of process of law.
10. The character of a person is what a person
actually is, while reputation is what neighbours and
36
others say what he is. Section 499 IPC specifies damage
to the reputation of a person. A reading of the averments
made in the complaint do not specify what is the
reputation of the petitioner in the estimation of his
neighbours and others. Further the complaint do not
specify as to how the reputation of the respondent is
damaged in the estimation of others. Therefore, the
proceedings are liable to be quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In yet another judgment, a learned single Judge in the
case of S.P. BOBATI v. MAHADEV VIRUPAXAPPA LATTI4, has
held as follows:
“…. …. ….
11. POINT No. 2:”Defamation” is defined under Section
499 of I PC. It reads as under:
“499. Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be
read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or
publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to
harm, or knowing, or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm the reputation of such person. is said,
except in the case hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
Explanation 1
Explanation 2Explanation 3. — No Imputation is said to harm a
person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or
indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or
intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of
that person in respect of his caste, or of his calling, or lowers
the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the
body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state
generally considered as disgraceful.
First Exception to Tenth Exceptions”
4
2004 SCC OnLine Kar 670
37
12. So, to constitute defamation under Section 499,
there must be imputation(s) and such imputation(s) must
have been made with the intention of harming or
knowing, or having reason to believe that it will harm the
reputation of the person about whom it is made.
13. But, in view of Explanation-3 referred to above,
unless such imputation directly or indirectly, in the
estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual
character of that person, or lowers the character of that
person in respect of his caste, or of his calling, or lowers
the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that
the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in the
state generally considered as disgraceful, it does not
amount to imputation under Section 499 of I. P. C.
14. The word ‘imputation’ is not defined, but it means an
accusation against a person. It implies an allegation of fact and
not merely a term of abuse.
15. In the case on hand, there is no allegation or
imputation about the moral or intellectual character of the
complainant. So also, in respect of his caste or body. According
to the complainant, as stated by him in the last para of his
complaint that, because of the illegal acts of the accused, his
feelings as a Senior Advocate have been much hurted and his
reputation has also been effected to a considerable extent and
in fact, he having felt much because of the false and baseless
allegations made against him by the accused, resigned the post
of Official Receiver for Belgaum district and thus, all the
accused, except accused Nos. 1 to 3, have committed an
offence punishable under Section 500 of IPC by publishing a
false and baseless imputation concerning him intending to harm
him, knowing full well that such false and baseless imputation if
made will harm his reputation and, by abetting or instigating
said accused to commit said offence, accused Nos. 1 to 3 have
committed an offence punishable u/S. 109 of IPC.”
16. Defamatory words or imputation made may
affect a man’s character or reputation in respect of his
business or calling. But, the mere fact that the words
38
tend to injure the man in the way of his trade or
profession is insufficient and would not give rise to an
action for defamation. So, it is not defamatory to write
and publish about a tradesman that he has ceased to
carry on his business, or that his business has been, or is
about to be acquired by another firm. Such a statement
though likely to injure him in his business, does not
reflect either on his private or in his business character or
reputation.
17. However, it is defamatory to impute that a man is
unfit for his profession or calling owing to want of ability or
learning. So, to say about an actor that he or she cannot act, or
to say about a person in respect of his profession or calling that
he is incompetent or unfit for the purpose are defamatory.
Similarly, a statement made against an Advocate that certain
persons had engaged and reposed their confidence in him but
he, after accepting the brief, betrayed their confidence and let
his clients down is highly defamatory. So also if an allegation or
imputation is made touching his honesty, or integrity, or ability
to conduct case, or knowledge of law, it amounts to defamation.
Thus, to say that the words are defamatory in respect of his
profession or calling, such words must call attention to some
quality in the man that would be detrimental, or the absence of
some quality that would be essential to the successful carrying
out of the business or calling in which he is engaged. Keeping
these things in mind, let me consider whether the allegations or
imputations found in the complaint amount to defamation within
the meaning of Section 499, constituting an offence u/S. 500 of
IPC or not.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. What would unmistakably emerge from the afore-quoted
judgments of the High Court of Delhi or the judgments of learned
single Judges of this Court is that political representatives must
become a little thick skinned with regard to making of statements
39
by others or hurling certain abuses. It is more so in a case where if
those persons would hold public office, unless the allegations are
per se defamatory. The allegation against the complainant is what
is quoted hereinabove. It is such identical statements that are
noticed by this Court in the afore-quoted judgments. Therefore,
they would not meet the ingredients as necessary under Section
499 of the IPC for them to become an offence under Section 500
IPC. In that light, permitting further proceedings against the
petitioner would become an abuse of the process of law and result
in miscarriage of justice.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceedings in C.C.No.3478 of 2024 arising out of
P.C.R.No.17136 of 2022 pending before the 42nd
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Special Court
40for trial of cases against sitting as well as former
MPs/MLAs triable by Magistrate in the State of
Karnataka), Bangalore stand quashed.
Sd/-
______________________
JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
Bkp/CT:MJ
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