Telangana High Court
Sri M.R.Kumar vs A Srinivas Rao on 21 May, 2025
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
CONTEMPT APPEAL Nos.17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 of 2023
COMMON JUDGMENT:
(per the Hon’ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy)
Since the issue arising in the instant appeals is one and the
same, they are taken up for analogous hearing and are decided by
way of this common judgment.
2. Heard Mr. Pratap Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel
representing Mr. Avadesh Narayan Sanghi and Bathula Raj Kiran,
learned counsel for the appellants, and Mr. M. Surender Rao,
learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Aka Venkataramana,
learned counsel for the respondents.
3. The instant appeals are filed under Section 19 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).
The challenge is to the common order dated 13.10.2023 passed by
the Hon’ble Singh Bench of this High Court in a batch of contempt
cases decided analogously; lead case being C.C.No.1530 of 2019.
4. Vide the impugned common order, the Hon’ble Singh Bench
while hearing the batch of contempt petitions has held that the
Page 2 of 38
appellants herein have been found guilty of contempt and are
liable to be convicted for wilful violation of the order dated
18.07.2019 passed in W.P.No.10572 of 2012.
5. The relevant material necessary for adjudicating the instant
appeals are certain orders which need to be borne in mind before
we proceed to decide the matter itself. The order against which the
contempt petitions were filed before the Hon’ble Singh Bench was
one decided on 18.07.2019 in W.P.No.10572 of 2012. The
necessary operative part of the said writ petition is being
reproduced hereunder:
“The petitioners further contended that only after
disposal of the case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
respondents have finally filled up 193 posts in 2012 and
among 193 posts, 33 posts remained unfilled, and
subsequently, the respondent Corporation has filled up
another 200 posts, and in the second recruitment also 17
posts remained unfilled, thus, in all, 50 posts are lying vacant.
The petitioners contended that they are the next meritorious
candidates and the respondents must consider their cases
against the 50 non-joined vacant posts. Therefore, learned
counsel for the petitioners submits that appropriate orders be
passed in the writ petition directing the respondent
Corporation to consider the case of the petitioners for
appointment to the post of Sub-Staff (Peon) in 50 non-joined
vacancies in pursuance to the notification, dated 17.07.1996.
Page 3 of 38
On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for the
respondents had contended that the petitioners are not
coming within the zone of consideration and 400 candidates
were employed and that is the reason why the respondent
Corporation has not considered the case of the petitioners. He
further contended that if the petitioners are the next
meritorious candidates and submits a representation, the
respondent Corporation will consider the case of the
petitioners and appropriate orders will be passed on the
representation in accordance with law. Learned Standing
Counsel has informed that there are only 50 posts consequent
upon non-joining of selected candidates.
Having regard to the rival submissions made by the
parties, this Court is of the considered view that this Writ
Petition can be disposed of directing the petitioners to submit
a fresh representation to the respondents within two weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and upon such
representation being received, the respondent Corporation
shall consider the case of the petitioners for appointment in
the non-joined posts, if they are the next meritorious
candidates in the merit list, and pass appropriate orders in
eight weeks thereafter. It is needless to say that the
respondent Corporation shall consider the case of the
petitioners only against the 50 vacancies of non-joined posts.
With the above directions, the writ petition is disposed
of. No order as to costs.”
6. Pursuant to the disposal of the aforesaid writ petition by the
Hon’ble Singh Bench, the authority concerned passed an order on
Page 4 of 38
23.09.2019, the relevant portion of which is also reproduced
hereunder:
“As per the directions of the Honorable High Court dated
18.07.2019 in WP No. 10572/2012, the undersigned has
perused the records and observe as follows:
1. That the recruitment process for appointment of staff in
Class III & IV is government by LIC of India
Recruitment (of Class III and IV Staff) Instructions,
1993, as amended from time to time. As per the said
LIC of India Recruitment (of Class III and IV Staff)
Instructions, 1993 the recruitment shall be only against
the vacancies in the sanctioned posts and number of
persons to be empanelled shall be twice the number of
posts.
2. That LIC of India, Hyderabad Division, vide
employment notice dated 17.07.1996, has invited
applications from Indian Citizens for empanelment for
appointment to the post of Sub-staff (Peon), in the
offices under the jurisdiction of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad Divisions and Zonal Office, Hyderabad.
As per the employment notice, the number of
anticipated vacancies to be empanelled were 400 and
those who are empanelled will be offered permanent
appointment and when regular vacancies arise.
3. That as per the Honourable Supreme Court Order dated
18.01.2011 in Civil Appeal No. 953-968/2005, in case
of open market candidates vide notification dated
17.07.1996, a ranking list of 393 (7 short in OBC
category due to non availability of candidates)
Page 5 of 38candidates was drawn by a cut off mark based on the
written test/ interview.
4. That as per LIC of India Recruitment (of Class III and
IV Staff) Instructions, 1993, after offering appointment
to the first 200 candidates in the ranking list, the
remaining candidates in the empanelled list were to be
offered appointment as and when vacancies arise and
within a period of maximum two years from the date of
publication of the ranking list or till the next
recruitment notification whichever is earlier.
5. That the entire process of offering appointment to 393
candidates was completed by 30/11/2013 and the
notification dated 17.07.1996 was implemented in
totality.
6. That the petitioner’s name was not appearing in the
empaneled list and hence was not offered appointment.
7. Thus considering the facts as noted from the records
and the submissions of the petitioner in his
representation dated 01.08.2019, it is not found
possible to accede to his request to appoint him for the
post of Sub-staff(Peon) since there is no provision in
the rules to offer appointment beyond the published/
empaneled list.”
7. Pursuant to the rejection of the representation; the
employees preferred batch of contempt cases, the lead case being
C.C.No.1530 of 2019. The Hon’ble Singh Bench after hearing the
parties, vide its common order dated 13.10.2023, found the
Page 6 of 38
appellants herein guilty of contempt, the operative portion of
which is again reproduced hereunder:
“15. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the respondents
are guilty of Contempt and they are liable to be convicted for
wilful violation of the order, dated 18.07.2019 passed in
W.P.No.10572 of 2012. Hence, the respondents are directed
to be present in the Court on the next date of hearing, so as
to enable this Court to sentence the respondents, after
hearing them.”
8. It is this common order which is under challenge in the
instant appeals.
9. Broadly speaking, the instant appeals have been filed by the
appellants on the following substantial grounds:
a) The impugned common order of conviction is bad in law on
the technicalities of the contempt proceedings having been
initiated without framing of charge. Thus, the entire
proceedings initiated under the Act gets vitiated, as it is in
clear violation of the rules and guidelines framed under the
Act itself which mandates framing of charge.
b) The fact that the authority concerned has considered and
passed an order as directed by the High Court and reached
to the conclusion that benefit cannot be extended to the
Page 7 of 38appellants hereinby itself amounts to compliance of the
Court’s order, therefore, it is not a case of non-compliance of
the directives of the High Court.
c) Even otherwise since there was no specific mandamus or any
sort of writ issued, no contempt of Court proceedings could
be attracted, as the only direction was to consider the
representation / claim of the workers strictly in accordance
with law and pass appropriate decision on the said
representation. Hence, no contempt would be made out and
the impugned common order is therefore un-sustainable /
not maintainable, and the Hon’ble Singh Bench ought to have
rejected the contempt proceedings at the threshold itself.
d) Since the representation as directed by the High Court was
duly considered and decided, the decision so taken by the
Insurance Company becomes a fresh cause of action and it
ought to had been challenged by way of a fresh proceedings
rather than pursuing the contempt remedy.
10. According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellants, the direction given by the Hon’ble Single Bench while
disposing of the writ petition was not on merits, but was only to
“consider and thereafter pass appropriate orders” and the
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appellants did consider the same and have taken an appropriate
decision. Thus, the order stood complied with and the contempt
petitions ought not to have been entertained by the Hon’ble Single
Bench.
11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, in support of his
contentions, placed reliance on the following decisions:
b) Prof. Pannalal, Registrar, Osmania University, Hyd vs.
Holy Bharathi P.G. College, Hyd. And Others 2
c) C. Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining and
Another 3
e) Modi Telefibres Ltd. vs. Sujit Kumar Choudhary 5
g) Shriramsetty Saidulu vs. Dantala 7
i) Indian Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee
and Another 91
(2006) 3 Supreme Court Cases 674
2
2000(6) ALD 674 (DB)
3
(2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 115
4
AIR ONLINE 2000 SC 144
5
AIR ONLINE 2005 SC 54
6
AIR ONLINE 2017CHH 156 (FB)
7
2014 (4) ALD 200 (DB)
8
AIR 1197 SUPREME COURT 113
Page 9 of 38
j) Chhoturam vs. Urvashi Gulati and Another 10
l) Kamalakant Shrivasta vs vs. Smt. Ranu Sahu 12
m) Sahdeo Alias Sahdeo Singh vs. State of U.P. and
Others 13
12. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the respondents contended that the action on the part of the
appellants is nothing but a blatant defiance of the order passed by
the High Court. Learned Senior Counsel contended that a plain
reading of the order passed by the appellants while rejecting the
claim of the respondents is a clear indication of willful and
deliberate act on the part of the appellants not to decide the claim
of the respondents in terms of the directions given by the High
Court dated 18.07.2019, in W.P.No.10572 of 2019.
13. It was also contended that after the order in W.P.No.10572
of 2012 was passed on 18.07.2019, the Insurance Company had
also got the order tested in a Writ Appeal before the Hon’ble
Division Bench, and the said Writ Appeal also was dismissed with
9
AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 880
10
AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 3648
11
AIR ONLINE 2018 CHH 5
12
AIR ONLINE 2018 CHH 13
13
AIR 2011 SC (CRIMINAL) 1200
14
AIR 2021 SUPREME COURT 721
Page 10 of 38
heavy costs of Rs.50,000/-. Still the appellants did not think it
proper to comply with the order of the Hon’ble Single Bench in its
proper perspective.
14. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents,
plain reading of the impugned common order would go to show
that in fact there has been no consideration whatsoever made by
the appellants and they have in a mechanical manner without even
going through the contents of the directions given by the High
Court has passed the order.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents referring to
certain judicial precedents, strongly contended that the instant
appeals itself under Section 19 of the Act at this stage are not
maintainable, as the stage for preferring an appeal under Section
19 has not arisen. According to the learned Senior Counsel, in
order to prefer an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, there has to
be an order of punishment in the Contempt of Court proceedings
which in the instant case has not occurred and, therefore, the
appeals at the threshold itself are liable to be rejected as not
maintainable. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the
impugned common order is not an order of punishment, and since
Page 11 of 38
it is not an order of punishment, the instant appeals under Section
19 of the Act would not be sustainable.
16. So far as the maintainability part raised by the appellants by
not framing of charge before passing of the final order is
concerned, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents
contended that since it is a civil contempt, the matter has to be
proceeded as a summary proceedings and in the summary
proceedings if the charge is not framed it would not be fatal so far
as the contempt proceedings are concerned, as the petition for
initiating the contempt itself for non-compliance of the order
passed by the High Court is the charge. Further, the Form I notice
has been sent to the alleged contemnors itself requiring to reply to
the charge. Therefore, only because the charge has not been
framed by itself would not vitiate the proceedings under challenge
before this Court. According to the learned Senior Counsel,
framing of charge would be required in the event if the
proceedings would have been for a criminal contempt and not in a
case of civil contempt.
17. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, in support of his
contentions, placed reliance on the following decisions:
Page 12 of 38
a) Dolly Kapoor and Anothervs. Sher Singh Yadav and
Others 15
b) ECL Finance Limited vs. Harikiran Shankarji Gudipati
and Others 16
c) Sujitendra Nath Singh Roy vs. State of West Bengal
and Others 17
d) Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. and Others vs.
Chunilal Nanda and Others 18
e) State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and
Another 19
g) D.N. Taneja vs.Bhajan Lal 21
i) Purshotam Dass Goel vs. Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. S.
Dhillon and Others 23
j) Bai Malimabuand Others vs. State of Gujarat and
Others 24
k) Harish Kumar Kathuria and Another vs. Sanjay Gupta
and Others 2515
ILR (2012) III DELHI 151
16
(2018) 13 Supreme Court Cases 142
17
(2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases 514
18
(2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 399
19
(1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 411
20
(1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 416
21
(1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 26
22
(1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases 32
23
(1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 370
24
(1978) 2 Supreme Court Cases 373
25
2024 SCC OnLine Del 817
Page 13 of 38
18. Having heard the arguments advanced by the learned Senior
Counsel representing either side and on perusal of records, what is
be to decided in the instant appeals are, in fact, the following three
issues:
i. Whether the impugned common order is one which could be
challenged by way of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act?
ii. Whether the impugned common order is sustainable on the
ground that the order of conviction has been passed without
framing of charge, and as such, the impugned common order
would get vitiated?
iii. Whether passing of the order dated 23.09.2019 would
amount to compliance of the directives given by the Hon’ble
Singh Bench in W.P.No.10572 of 2012 or not?
19. So far as, whether an appeal under Section 19 of the Act is
maintainable, we need to consider the wordings of the provisions
of law, and first of all we need to appreciate the contents of
26
2024 SCC OnLineSC 1874
Page 14 of 38
Section 19 of the Act. For ready reference, Section 19 is
reproduced hereunder, viz.,
“19. Appeals.–
(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision
of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt–
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge,
to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the
Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the
Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union
territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that–
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed
against be suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on
bail; and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the
appellant has not purged his contempt.”
20. Upon a plain reading of the provisions of first part of Section
19, what was intended is that, an appeal can be filed against ‘any
order or a decision’. In common parlance, when we refer the
terminology’ any order or decision’ it simply gives only one
Page 15 of 38
conclusion that the provision refers to more than one stages when
an appeal can be filed i.e. it could be either an order or it could be
an decision. Secondly, what is also evident is that, Sub-Section (2)
of Section 19 indicates that any order or decision those which is
exercised by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to
punishfor contempt. This further indicates that Section 19 from its
very wordings itself gives a clear indication that an appeal under
Section 19 is not one which is filed challenging an order of
punishment, but it could be an order other than the order of
punishment also.
21. This view of the Bench gets fortified on further reading of
Sub-Section2 of Section 19. Particularly clause (a) of Sub-Section
2 refers to the powers on the Appellate Court in granting an order
of suspension of firstly; an execution of the punishment or an
order appealed against. This also clearly gives an indication that an
appeal would be maintainable even if it is not an order of
punishment alone. Another reason to reach to this conclusion is
that the law makers were not required using the term ‘any order of
decision’ in Sub-Section (1). It could have been easily worded as
an appeal to be maintainable only against an order of punishment
in contempt. Same would be the condition even if we read clause
Page 16 of 38
(a) of Sub-Section (2) i.e. to say, if an appeal were to be filed
under Section 19 only against an order of punishment, then under
clause (a) of Sub-Section (2) there would not been a necessity to
empower the Appellate Court to even suspend an order appealed
against, in addition to the wordings already put i.e. the execution
of punishment.
22. Thus, from plain reading of Section 19 and also clause (a) of
Sub-Section (2) of Section 19, it will clearly force us to reach to
the conclusion that since in the aforesaid two provisions of law
under Section 19, the lawmakers have used the words ‘any order
or decision’ they both have to be given a distinctive meaning.
23. The full Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of
Anil Kumar Dubey (supra) held at paragraph No.5 as under:
“5. Section 19 give a right to a party to appeal against “any
order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt.” Section 19(1) of the Act,
1971 clearly shows that the legislature in its wisdom
conferred the right of appeal not only against a decision but
also against an order. When two words are used in a statute,
they both have to be given separate meaning. They may be
read ejusdem generis but normally they cannot be treated to
have the same meaning.”
Page 17 of 38
24. The full Bench further in paragraph Nos.39, 40, 41, 44 and
45 has held as under, viz.,
“39. A close analysis of the law laid down by the Apex Court
and the High Courts as well as the provisions of Section 19 of
the Act, 1971, we are clearly of the view that any order which
is not an interlocutory order but by which the High Court
proceeds to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, would be
appellable.
40. The language of Section 19 of the Act, 1971 is clear and
unambiguous. As held by the Apex Court that when the
language of an Act is unambiguous, the Court must follow the
same. The issue in question is what interpretation has to be
given to the phrases “any order or decision” and “in exercise
of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt”. As far as the words,
“order” and “decision” are concerned, though they may have
to be read ejusdem generis, we cannot presume that the
language used by the legislature is superfluous. When the
legislature has used the word ‘order and decision’, it must be
presumed that the legislature was aware that these are two
different words having two different meaning. It may be true,
asheld by the Apex Court that the word ‘order’ will have to be
interpreted and take its colour from the word ‘decision’ but
can we assume or presume that the order must only be a final
order imposing punishment. We do not think so because then
there would be no difference between “order” and “decision”.
41. Another recognized principle of statutory interpretation is
that an effort should be made to give a meaning to each and
every word used by thelegislature. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v.
Arabinda Bose {AIR 1952 SC 369}, Chief Justice, Patanjali
Shastry, speaking for the Apex Court held “it is not a sound
Page 18 of 38
principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as
being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate
application in circumstances conceivably within the
contemplation of the statute”.
44. In view of the above principles of statutory interpretation,
normally an attempt has to be made to give all the words
used in the statute a meaning in the context of the Act. In our
view, the words “any order or decision” are wide enough to
include and take within their ambit all orders passed in the
direction and in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for
contempt.
45. Similarly, the phrase “in exercise of the jurisdiction to
punish for contempt” not only includes an order actually
imposing any punishment but also any order or direction
which may be prejudicial to the contemnor and which, if not
passed, may terminate the proceedings. As held by the
Bombay High Court, these may not be actually orders
punishing the contemnor for contempt but may be a direction
prejudicial to the contemnor and passed in exercise of
contempt jurisdiction.”
25. Keeping the aforesaid legal precedents and statutory
provisions in mind, we need to appreciate as to what is the order
under challenge in the instant appeals. Admittedly, all these batch
of contempt appeals have been filed against an order of conviction
whereby the Hon’ble Singh Bench has already reached to the
conclusion that on the basis of submissions and explanations so
provided by the appellants herein, the order passed by the
Page 19 of 38
authority concerned on 23.09.2019 is an act of wilful disobedience
of the order passed by the High Court in W.P.No.10572 of 2012.
Upon holding the appellants guilty of having committed contempt
and having been convicted them for the said act of contempt, what
is now left is only, what is the appropriate sentence that could be
awarded on the appellants? This in other words means that the
contempt proceedings, as such, have reached to its conclusion and
the appellants have already been found guilty and they have also
been found to have wilfully committed act of contempt and as a
consequence been convicted for the said act. Thus, the impugned
common order passed by the Hon’ble Single Bench, in the opinion
of this Bench, would squarely fall within the ambit of Section 19(1)
of the Act wherein the statute permits an appeal to be filed against
an order or decision whereby the High Court has exercised its
jurisdiction and reached to the conclusion to punish the appellants
for contempt.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, this Bench is of the considered
opinion that the appeals in the instant case under Section 19 of
the Act are maintainable even though the appellants have till date
not been punished. Though they are not punished, admittedly the
appellants have been held guilty and also stand convicted. The
Page 20 of 38
objection so raised by the respondents so far as the aspect of
maintainability under Section 19 is concerned, stands decided in
favour of the appellants and the objection raised by the
respondents stands overruled.
27. We now proceed to decide the second issue involved in the
instant batch of appeals, that of, whether the impugned common
order of conviction is sustainable in the absence of entire
proceedings having been drawn without framing of charge.
28. For deciding this question, we need to consider: 1) as to
whether the appellants have ever been apprised of the charge
leveled against them? 2) without framing of charge, could the
Court hearing the contempt proceedings have proceeded to
conclude the trial of contempt? 3) whether the Form I notice
issued to the appellants by itself be not construed as if it were the
charge framed against the appellants? and 4) as to what would be
the consequence in the event if the aforesaid three situations are
decided in favour of the appellants / contemnors or otherwise.
29. For answering the aforesaid issues, as is reflected in the
preceding paragraph, it is appropriate at this juncture to refer to
the Andhra Pradesh High Court Rules wherein the Rules to regulate
proceedings for contempt of Subordinate Courts and of the High
Page 21 of 38
Court under the Act has been enacted. Rule 7 and Rule 18 are the
relevant provisions for deciding the second issue. For ready
reference, Rule 7 and Rule 18 are reproduced hereunder:
“7. (1) Every petition under Rule 5 (b) and (c) shall contain :
(a) the name, description and place of residence of the
petitioner of petitioners and of the person charged;
(b) the nature and details of the contempt alleged, and such
material facts, including the date or dates of commission
of the alleged contempt, as may be necessary for the
proper determination of the case;
(c) the details of the petition previously made by the
petitioner on the same facts, if any, and the result
thereof.
(2) Where the petitioner relies upon a document or
documents in his possession or power and refers to them in
the petition in support thereof, he shall file such document or
documents or true copies thereof duly authenticated along
with the petition.
(3) No Court-fee shall be payable on the petition or any
documents filed in the contempt proceedings.
18. Notice of every contempt case, if ordered by Court for
service on the Contemnor, shall be in Form I and shall be
accompanied by one set of all papers filed in the case and the
said notice with all-enclosures shall be served personally on
the alleged Contemnor, unless the Court otherwise directs for
reasons to be recorded, requiring him to appear in person,
unless otherwise ordered, on a day fixed, which shall be not
Page 22 of 38
less than four weeks from the date of the order or as fixed by
the Court, for hearing of the proceeding and to show cause
why hemay not be suitably punished under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 and he shall continue to remain present
during the hearing till the proceeding is finally disposed of by
order of the Court, unless otherwise directed:
Provided that the Court, on an application made by the
Contemnor, before the date fixed for his appearance in the
notice, to dispense with the personal appearance in Court,
may, for sufficient cause, dispense with his personal
appearance and permit him to appear by his pleader.”
30. Rule 7 prescribes the requirements of a petition or complaint
that is filed under the Act by the aggrieved person. In other words,
Rule 7 prescribes the mode in which a contempt petition is to be
prepared; and Rule 18 deals with the manner in which the
contempt proceedings have to be drawn. After the contempt
petition if being filed, as per Rule 18, the first thing that is required
is for issuance of Form I.
31. At this juncture, it would also be relevant to take note of the
contents of Form I, which again for ready reference is reproduced
hereunder:
Page 23 of 38
FORM I
NOTICE TO A PERSON CHARGED WITH
CONTEMPT OF COURTIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD[Original Jurisdiction]
Contempt Case No. …… of ……
............... ......... Petitioner
Versus
............... ......... Respondent
To
Whereas your attendance is necessary to answer a charge of
Contempt of Court, viz :
(here briefly state the nature of the Contempt)
You, Sri ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
are hereby required to appear in person (or byAdvocate if the Court has
soordered) before this Court at Hyderabad on the …………………… day of
………… 19 ……… at ……… a.m. and show cause why you shall not be punished
or other appropriate order be not passed against you for contempt of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh/Subordinate Court (Name of Court).
You shall attend this Court at Hyderabad in person on the …………………………
day of ………………… 19 …… at a.m. and shall continue to attend the Court on
all days thereafter to which the case against you stands adjourned and until
final orders are passed on the charge against you.
Herein fail not.
Dated this ………………………… day of …………… 19 ………
(Seal)
Registrar_____
Page 24 of 38A plain reading of the contents of Form I by itself gives an
indication that the contents of Form I and the enclosures attached
thereto are the allegations which have been made for initiation of
contempt and that has to be accepted as the charge leveled
against the contemnor(s). Further, a reading of the contents of the
annexures enclosed along with Form I and annexures of contempt
petition and thereafter reading contents of Form I, will clearly
reflect that Form I is in fact the charge leveled against the
contemnor(s) and Form I is nothing other than an explanation
called from the alleged contemnor(s) to answer the charge of
contempt and also to show cause why the contemnor(s) should not
be punished for contempt of Court.
32. In the said circumstances, we are of the considered opinion
that in the instant case, when admittedly Form I was issued and
the entire contents of the contempt petition also were enclosed
along with Form I, the appellants were disclosed of the nature of
allegations leveled against them and were also well aware of the
charge of contempt. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion
that once when the appellants were well appraised of the nature of
charge leveled on the very issuance of Form I at the behest of the
Court itself, there was no necessity for framing of further charge.
Page 25 of 38
That Form I itself has to be construed as the charge leveled
against the appellants. Lastly, only because there have been no
separate proceedings like framing of charge, the manner in which
the Hon’ble Single Bench has proceeded cannot be found fault
with. Neither would the impugned common order get vitiated only
because the charge, as such, was not framed independently other
than that which was narrated in Form I. As such, the second issue
of non-framing of charge stands decided against the appellants.
33. Now we proceed to decide the third issue involved, that is,
whether the order dated 23.09.2019, passed by the Insurance
Company be construed as substantial compliance of the order of
the Hon’ble Singh Bench or not.
34. For this purpose, what is necessary to be appreciated at the
first instance is, as to what exactly were the directions given by
the Hon’ble Singh Bench. For convenience, the operative portion of
the order passed by the Hon’ble Singh Bench on 18.07.2019 is
again reproduced hereunder:
Having regard to the rival submissions made by the
parties, this Court is of the considered view that this Writ
Petition can be disposed of directing the petitioners to
submit a fresh representation to the respondents within two
weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and
Page 26 of 38upon such representation being received, the respondent
Corporation shall consider the case of the petitioners for
appointment in the non-joined posts, if they are the next
meritorious candidates in the merit list, and pass appropriate
orders in eight weeks thereafter. It is needless to say that the
respondent Corporation shall consider the case of the
petitioners only against the 50 vacancies of non-joined posts.
35. Thus, from the aforesaid operative paragraph of the order
passed by the Hon’ble Single Bench, we need to scrutinize as to
what is the nature of direction as such given by the Hon’ble Single
Bench. Upon reading the same, we find that the Single Bench had
only disposed of the writ petition on a consensus that was arrived
at between the parties. The consensus that was arrived at is that
which is reflected in bold in the operative part reproduced above,
which in other words means, it was agreed between the parties
that the respondents shall make an appropriate representation to
the employer and the employer in turn shall consider the case of
the claimants for appointment against 50 vacancies that have
arisen on account of the selected candidates having not joined.
The Single Bench directed the Insurance Company to take an
appropriate suitable decision strictly in accordance with law. It
could also be said that the Single Bench while disposing of the writ
petition had ordered the respondents to make an appropriate
Page 27 of 38
representation with a direction to the appellants / Insurance
Company to pass appropriate orders.
36. Two things that need to be considered are: 1) there had to
be consideration of the representation first and 2) passing of
appropriate orders. Both the words used i.e as regards the
consideration of representation, firstly the respondents were
required to make a fresh representation and upon filing of the
fresh representation, the appellants in turn were to pass an
appropriate order. Thus, initially, there has to be consideration and
subsequently there has to be an appropriate order passed.
Nowhere does the operative part of the order of the Singh Bench
depicts issuance of mandamus, and there was no specific direction
given as to how the case of each of the respondents was to be
decided inasmuch as the order was silent so far as whether the
writ petition needs to be allowed or whether the writ petition was
intending anything else. The only thing that is revealing from the
order was firstly the respondents herein had to make a
representation; secondly the appellants had to duly consider the
same, and lastly, the appellants had to pass an appropriate order.
37. What is meant by considering the representation is to
evaluate the contents of the representation, find out merits of the
Page 28 of 38
case and also find out the legal position as regards their claim.
Likewise, when we also consider the term ‘appropriate order’ it
means that an order which could either allow or reject the claim.
Once when the term ‘appropriate order’ was used in the course of
disposal of the writ petition, under no circumstances can it be
construed to be one which has been issued indicating allowing the
representation. So reading of the operative part and comparing the
facts of the instant case, what we can safely derive of is, three
aspects referred earlier that of a) respondents making
representation afresh b) the appellants considering the
representation and c) appellants passing an appropriate order on
considering the representation.
38. Now what we need to look into is the order that was passed
by the appellants after the writ petition was disposed of. The
contents of the order dated 23.09.2019 is already reproduced in
the preceding paragraphs. A plain reading of the order dated
23.09.2019 would show that the appellants herein had in fact, in
the course of considering the representation, taken note of the
ground realities such as the employment notice being that of the
year 1996. The recruitment process was challenged and travelled
up till the stage of Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the Hon’ble
Page 29 of 38
Supreme Court finally passed the order in the year 2011. The
recruitment was thereafter completed in accordance with the
directions given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by which time, the
entire recruitment process had been concluded, all the selected
candidates totaling 393 were offered with appointment and the
names of the respondents were not found in the empanelled list.
The appellants also found that even if the respondents were found
in the empanelled list, but by efflux of time, the validity of the
selected list or the empanelled list got lapsed and, for the
aforesaid reasons, found it not possible to give appointment to the
respondents herein and the representation so filed pursuant to the
disposal of the writ petition on 18.07.2019 stood disposed of.
39. As has been referred to in the preceding paragraphs, the fact
which has already been discussed by this Bench holding that, of all
the directions given by the Hon’ble Single Bench in the course of
disposal of W.P.No.10572 of 2012, was firstly permitting the
respondents to make a detailed representation to the appellants;
secondly the appellants were commanded for duly considering the
same and, lastly whether the order passed by the appellants
claiming it to be compliance of the order be construed as if they
have passed an appropriate order as indicated by the writ Court.
Page 30 of 38
So far as the first part of the order is concerned, admittedly a
representation was made on behalf of the respondents. Therefore,
what is really to be tested is that of the remaining two aspects, as
to whether there was due consideration by the appellants while
passing the order dated 23.09.2019 and whether the said order
can be considered to be an appropriate order.
40. As has been discussed above, we need to first appreciate the
contents of the order passed by the appellants pursuant to the
directions given by the writ Court. In the course of honoring the
directives given by the Hon’ble Single Bench, we would find that
the appellants have been able to process the claim of the
respondents, and in the process of scrutiny so far as entitlement is
concerned, they found that since for all the reasons mentioned in
the impugned order dated 23.09.2019, the respondents were not
entitled for any relief sought for.
41. Now the next thing to be considered is, whether the said
order passed by the appellants herein can be brought within the
purview of an act of disobedience or a wilful non-compliance, or for
that matter, whether the act on the part of appellants can be held
to be flagrant violation of the directions given by the writ Court
while disposing of W.P.No.10572 of 2012. The Hon’ble Single
Page 31 of 38
Bench, as such, did not give any command for deciding the
representation which the respondents were to make in any
particular format. Further, what is also revealing is the fact that it
was for this reason that the Hon’ble Single Bench while disposing
of the W.P. had ordered the authority concerned, after due
consideration, to pass appropriate orders. One more aspect which
needs to be borne in mind at this juncture is that the authority
concerned have been consistently taking the view that as the
notification which was issued in 1996 of the posts i.e. 393 out of
400 stood filled up and, as such, there would be no sanctioned
vacant post. Further, what would also reveal is the fact that there
does not seem to be an outright refusal by the appellants, but
having explored the merits of the case, they found it to be not
feasible in granting employment to the respondents.
42. Another aspect which needs to be considered is, once when
they have applied their mind and upon due consideration does not
find the respondents herein suitable for employment and
expressed their regret in so far as all the respondents are
concerned, there is a clear indication that the appellants herein
were not in a position to take back their stand for the reason of
non-availability of vacant post and also on the ground that the
Page 32 of 38
recruitment had already got completed for a long time back, and
also for the reason that the respondents were not the next most
meritorious candidates, and also for the reason that the names of
the respondents were not reflected in the empanelled list. Thus,
these very facts would amount to due consideration of the
contents of representation that the respondents herein have made
and the order also would fit in the ambit of ‘an appropriate order’
as directed by the Hon’ble Single Bench.
43. It would be relevant at this juncture to take note of a
decision passed the Hon’ble Supreme Court so far as what is
meant by ‘an appropriate order’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Chaduranga Kanthraj URS and Another vs. P. Ravi
Kumar and Others 27, in paragraph Nos.1.10, 1.11 and 1.12 has
held as under:
“1.10. In order to punish a contemnor, it has to be established
that disobedience of the order is ‘wilful’. It means knowingly-
intentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with full
knowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It would
exclude casual, accidental, bonafide or unintentional acts or
genuine inability and would also not include involuntary or
negligent actions. The deliberate conduct of a person means
that he knows what he is doing and intends to do the same. It
is too well settled that if two interpretations are possible, and if27
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3681
Page 33 of 38the action is not contumacious, a contempt proceeding would
not be maintainable.
1.11. The weapon of contempt will not be used for execution of
the decree or implementation of an order for which alternative
remedy in law is provided for. The paramount consideration is
given to maintain court’s dignity and majesty of law. In Sudhir
Vasudeva v. George Ravishekeran1 this Court has observed
that a Court exercising jurisdiction under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 must not travel beyond the four corners of
the orders in relation to which contempt has been alleged. That
the Court hearing a contempt petition ought to restrict the
scope of its enquiry to such directions which are explicit in the
judgment or orders of which contempt has been alleged.
1.12. The civil contempt would mean a wilful disobedience of a
decision of this Court. What would be relevant is the “wilful
disobedience”. Hence, knowledge of having acted in disregard
to an order is sine qua non for being proceeded with if there is
a deliberate, conscience and intentional act then the
jurisdiction can be clutched.”
44. Keeping the aforesaid aspect, if we take into consideration
the very definition of contempt, it would really glaringly be visible
that the appellants did consider the case of the respondents and
thus have not committed any wilful disobedience or deliberate
malafide or non-compliance; and for all these are met, the
question would be ‘whether it would amount to contempt of Court
or not?’
Page 34 of 38
45. The Hon’ble Supreme Court so far as what would amount to
wilful disobedience, in the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. vs. A.J.
Rana 28, held in paragraph Nos.14 and 15 as under:
“14. The words “considers it necessary” postulate that the
authority concerned has thought over the matter deliberately
and with care and it has been found necessary as a result of
such thinking to pass the order. The dictionary meaning of the
word “consider” is “to view attentively, to survey, examine,
inspect (arch), to look attentively, to contemplate mentally, to
think over, meditate on, give heed to, take note of, to think
deliberately, bethink oneself, to reflect” (vide Shorter Oxford
Dictionary). According to Words and Phrases — Permanent
Edition Vol. 8-A “to consider” means to think with care. It is
also mentioned that to “consider” is to fix the mind upon with a
view to careful examination; to ponder; study; meditate upon,
think or reflect with care. It is therefore, manifest that careful
thinking or due application of the mind regarding the necessity
to obtain and examine the documents in question is sine qua
non for the making of the order. If the impugned order were to
show that there has been no careful thinking or proper
application of the mind as to the necessity of obtaining and
examining the documents specified in the order, the essential
requisite to the making of the order would be held to be non-
existent.
15. A necessary corollary of what has been observed above is
that mind has to be applied with regard to the necessity to
obtain and examine all the documents mentioned in the order.
An application of the mind with regard to the necessity to
obtain and examine only a few of the many documents28
(1972) 1 SCC 240
Page 35 of 38mentioned in the order, while there has been no such
application of mind in respect of the remaining documents,
would not be sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
statute. If, however, there has been consideration of the
matter regarding the necessity to obtain and examine all the
documents and an order is passed thereafter, the Court would
stay its hand in the matter and would not substitute its own
opinion for that of the authority concerned regarding the
necessity to obtain the documents in question.”
46. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also in the case of Sarbananda
Sonowal (II) vs. Union of India 29, in paragraph Nos.34, 35 and
57 has held as under:
“34. The said principle has been reiterated in Kaiser-I-Hind (P)
Ltd. v. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North)
Ltd. [(2002) 8 SCC 182] in the following terms: (SCC p. 197,
para 14)
“14. In view of the aforesaid requirements, before
obtaining the assent of the President, the State
Government has to point out that the law made by
the State Legislature is in respect of one of the
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List by
mentioning entry/entries of the Concurrent List and
that it contains provision or provisions repugnant to
the law made by Parliament or existing law. Further,
the words ‘reserved for consideration’ would
definitely indicate that there should be active
application of mind by the President to the
repugnancy pointed out between the proposed State29
(2007) 1 SCC 174
Page 36 of 38law and the earlier law made by Parliament and the
necessity of having such a law, in the facts and
circumstances of the matter, which is repugnant to a
law enacted by Parliament prevailing in a State. The
word ‘consideration’ would manifest that after careful
thinking over and due application of mind regarding
the necessity of having State law which is repugnant
to the law made by Parliament, the President may
grant assent.”
35. Yet again in State (Anti-Corruption Branch), Govt. of NCT
of Delhi v. Dr. R.C. Anand [(2004) 4 SCC 615 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1380] as regards necessity for application of mind for grant of
sanction, this Court opined: (SCC p. 621, para 13)
“13. The validity of the sanction would, therefore,
depend upon the material placed before the
sanctioning authority and the fact that all the
relevant facts, material and evidence including the
transcript of the tape record have been considered
by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies
application of mind. The order of sanction must ex
facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had
considered the evidence and other material placed
before it. This fact can also be established by
extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before
the Court to show that all relevant facts were
considered by the sanctioning authority.
(See JaswantSingh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC
124 : 1958 Cri LJ 265] and State of Bihar v. P.P.
Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
192] .)”
Page 37 of 38
57. In Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee [(2001) 6 SCC
16 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 960] this Court categorically opined: (SCC
pp. 24-25, paras 22-23)
“22. … Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not
conflict with the presumption of innocence, because
by the latter, all that is meant is that the prosecution
is obliged to prove the case against the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the
prosecution may be discharged with the help of
presumptions of law or fact unless the accused
adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility
of the non-existence of the presumed fact.
23. In other words, provided the facts required to
form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no
discretion is left with the court but to draw the
statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the
person against whom the presumption is drawn from
rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to
be proved when, ‘after considering the matters
before it, the court either believes it to exist, or
considers its existence so probable that a prudent
man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists’.
Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively
established but such evidence must be adduced before the
court in support of the defence that the court must either
believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be
reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of
the ‘prudent man’.”
47. Once when the authority concerned has duly considered the
contents of the representation and passed an appropriate order
Page 38 of 38
either allowing the representation or rejecting the same, by itself,
becomes a fresh cause of action which needs to be put to test in
exercise of writ jurisdiction and under no circumstances can the
contempt jurisdiction be invoked.
48. In the instant case, for the aforementioned reasons and
more particularly, the appellants having applied their mind in
considering the representation submitted by the respondents and
passed an appropriate order as directed by the Hon’ble Single
Bench, as such, we are of the considered opinion that the
impugned common order of conviction passed by the Hon’ble
Single Bench against the appellants herein is bad in law and
unsustainable. Accordingly, the impugned common order is set
aside / quashed and the instant batch of contempt appeals are
allowed.
49. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall
stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
_____________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
_________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 21.05.2025
GSD