Telangana High Court
Sri.Madhavaneni Raghunandan Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 26 June, 2025
Author: K. Lakshman
Bench: K. Lakshman
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 5030 of 2025
ORAL ORDER:
Heard Mr.G.Bhaskar Reddy, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused No.1 and Smt.Shalini Saxena, learned
counsel representing Mr.Palle Nageswara Rao, learned
Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 – State.
2. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 528 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), to
quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.1
in C.C.No.431 of 2024 on the file of the learned Special
Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Trial of Cases
relating to MPs and MLAs, Hyderabad.
3. Petitioner herein is accused No.1 in the aforesaid
C.C. The offences alleged against the petitioner are under
Sections 341, 291, 186 and 188 read with Section 149 of
IPC.
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4. On the complaint dated 10.09.2023 of respondent
No.2, Police, Dubbak Police Station, registered a case in
Crime No.226 of 2023 against the petitioner and other
accused for the aforesaid offences.
5. In the complaint dated 10.09.2023, the allegations
leveled against the petitioner and other accused are that on
10.09.2023 respondent No.2 along with I.Srinivas, HG-
486 (LW.2) were in Blue Colt duties. At about 11.30 A.M.
on 10.09.2023 they have information that the petitioner
and other party activists conducting Dharna at main road
Siddipet to Medak, near petrol bunk of Habsipur Village.
On coming to know that respondent No.2 and LW.2 went
to the said spot and observed that the petitioner and other
party activists sitting on the road, conducting dharana and
stopping on-going vehicles. They have raised slogans and
demanded the Government has to provide BC bandhu to
poor people. Thus, they have violated the Government
orders.
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6. During the course of investigation, the Investigating
Officer recorded the statements of 2nd respondent as
L.W.1, Home Guard as LW.2 and Police Constables as
L.Ws.3 and 4. LWs.5 and 6 are Panch witnesses. LW.7 is
the Investigating Officer. On consideration of the said
statements, the Investigating Officer has laid charge sheet
against the petitioner herein and other accused and the
same was taken on file as C.C.No.431 of 2024 for the
aforesaid offences.
7. Petitioner filed the present petition to quash the
proceedings in the said C.C. contending as follows:
i) The contents of the complaint dated 10.09.2023
and statements of LWs.1, 2 and 4 lack ingredients of the
aforesaid offences;
ii) The Investigating Officer did not record the
statement of any independent witness to show that the
petitioner and other accused restrained them illegally.
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Therefore, the contents of the charge sheet lack ingredients
of the aforesaid offences; and
iii) Petitioner herein is a Member of Legislative
Assembly then and presently, Member of Parliament (Lok
Sabha) from Medak Parliamentary Constituency. He was
falsely implicated in the present case due to political
rivalry.
8. Whereas, learned counsel appearing for learned
Public Prosecutor would contend that the aforesaid
contentions of the petitioner are defences which he has to
take before the trial Court. There are photographs to show
that the petitioner and other accused conducted dharana
and obstructed the free-flow of traffic, etc. Therefore,
quashing of the proceedings against the petitioner in the
said C.C. is not permissible.
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9. In view of the above submissions, it is apt to note
that Section 339 of IPC deals with wrongful restrain and
the same is extracted as under:
“339. Wrongful restraint: Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person
from proceeding in any direction in which that
person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to
restrain that person.”
As per the said provision, there should be voluntary
obstruction of any person as to prevent the said person to
proceed with any direction as the person has right. In the
present case, there is no such allegation against the
petitioner.
10. Section 291 of IPC deals with continuous of nuisance
after injunction to discontinue and public nuisance is
defined in Section 268 of IPC and the same are extracted
as under:
“291. Continuance of nuisance after injunction to
discontinue – Whoever repeats or continues a public
nuisance, having been enjoined by any public
6servant who has lawful authority to issue such
injunction not to repeat or continue such nuisance,
shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine,
or with both.
268. Public nuisance – A person is guilty of a
public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an
illegal omission which causes any common injury,
danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in
general who dwell or occupy the property in the
vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury,
obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who
may have occasion to use any public right.
A common nuisance is not excused on the
ground that it causes some convenience or
advantage.”
There is no allegation with regard to public nuisance.
Therefore, the contents of the complaint dated 10.09.2023
and statements of LWs.1 to 4 lack ingredients of the said
offence. There is no public nuisance and therefore, the
question of repetition or continuation of public nuisance
does not arise.
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11. Section 186 of IPC deals with obstructing the public
servant in discharging the public function and the same is
extracted as under:
Section 186:- Obstructing public servant in
discharge of public functions – Whoever
voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the
discharge of his public functions, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three months, or with fine
which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with
both.
In the complaint dated 10.09.2023 and in the statements of
LWs.1 to 4 there is no mention with regard to the
obstruction by the petitioner. Therefore, this Court is of the
view that the contents of the complaint dated 10.09.2023
and statements of LWs.1 to 4 lack ingredients of Section
186 of IPC.
12. Section 188 of IPC deals with ‘disobedience to order
duly promulgated by a public servant’ and the same is
extracted as under:
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“188. Disobedience to order duly promulgated
by public servant.–Whoever, knowing that, by an
order promulgated by a public servant lawfully
empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed
to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order
with certain property in his possession or under his
management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such
disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction,
annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction,
annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully
employed, be punished with simple imprisonment
for a term which may extend to one month or with
fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or
with both; and if such disobedience causes or trends
to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or
causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or
with both.
Explanation.–It is not necessary that the
offender should intend to produce harm, or
contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce
harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order
which he disobeys, and that his disobedience
produces, or is likely to produce, harm.
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Illustration An order is promulgated by a
public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate
such order, directing that a religious procession
shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly
disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of
riot. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.”
13. It is also apt to note that in N.T. Rama Rao v. The
State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor 1, while dealing
with the offences under Sections 188 and 283 of IPC, the
learned Single Judge of erstwhile High Court of Andhra
Pradesh held as under:
“5) Even if the allegation that the petitioner
conducted public meetings at three road junctions
contrary to the permission accorded for conducting
of a public meeting only at one specified place is
true, such a direction under Section 30 of the Police
Act, 1861 could have been given only by the
Superintendent or the Assistant Superintendent of
Police of the District but not by any of their
subordinates. If such a permission is granted under
Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861 and is violated,
Section 195 (1) (a) of Code of Criminal Procedure1
. Criminal Petition No.5323 of 2009, decided on 17.09.2009
10mandates that the complaint in this regard has to be
made by the public servant concerned or some other
person to whom such a public servant is
administratively subordinate to enable any Court to
take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 of
Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case,
the charge sheet was filed by the Sub Inspector of
Police, who could not have been the authority to
grant permission for the public meeting and
therefore, the complaint/charge sheet is in violation
of the mandatory provision of Section 195(1)(a) of
Code of Criminal Procedure.
6) That apart, the offence alleged to have been
committed under Section 283 of the Indian Penal
Code by the petitioners and others is obviously in
consequence to the alleged offence under Section
188 of Indian Penal Code and is not an independent
of the same. Even otherwise, the conduct of public
meeting at three road junctions or obstruction to the
traffic could not have been considered as causing
any danger or injury to any person. In so far as the
obstruction in any public way is concerned, which
can also be covered by Section 283 of the Indian
Penal Code, the charge sheet cites only one witness
to speak about the traffic jam caused by the road
show. But, when the conduct of the public meeting
at least at one place has been permitted and if the
gathering for that public meeting resulted in any
11inconvenience by way of obstructing the traffic, the
same cannot be considered to be with necessary
guilty mens rea to construe the existence of an
offence punishable under Indian Penal Code. Under
the circumstances, none of the offences alleged can
be said to have any reasonable basis and in any
view, the complaint/charge sheet being in violation
of Section 195 (1) (a) of Code of Criminal
Procedure, has to fail.
7) As the complaint has failed due to its un-
sustainability, the proceedings in their entirety have
to fail, though the 1st accused alone approached this
Court by way of this Criminal Petition.”
14. In Thota Chandra Sekhar v. The State of Andhra
Pradesh, through S.H.O., P.S. Eluru Rural, West
Godavari District 2, relying on various judgments
including N.T. Rama Rao (supra) and the guidelines laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal 3, more particularly, guideline No.6, which
says that where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
2
. Criminal Petition No.15248 of 2016, decided on 26.10.2016
3
. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
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(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious remedy to redress the
grievance of the party, the learned Single Judge of High
Court of Judicature for the States of Telangana and Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad quashed the proceedings in the C.C.
mentioned therein by exercising power under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. It is further held that the proceedings shall not
be continued due to technical defect of obtaining prior
permission under Section 155(2) of Cr.P.C. and taking
cognizance on the complaint filed by V.R.O. and it is
against the purport of Section 195(1)(a) of Cr.P.C.
15. In Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court cautioned
that power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly
and circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
While examining a complaint, quashing of which is
sought, Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
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reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the complaint or in FIR. In the said judgment, the
Apex Court laid down certain guidelines/parameters for
exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The same
read as under:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
14permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.”
The said principle was reiterated by the Apex Court in a
catena of decisions.
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16. As discussed supra, in the present case, the petitioner
was Member of Legislative Assembly at the relevant point
of time and presently he is a Member of Parliament, and as
such, continuation of the proceedings in the aforesaid C.C.
against the petitioner is an abuse of process of law.
Therefore, the proceedings in the aforesaid C.C. against
the petitioner are liable to be quashed.
17. In the result, proceedings in C.C.No.431 of 2024 on
the file of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First
Class for Trial of Cases relating to MPs and MLAs,
Hyderabad, are hereby quashed in respect of the
petitioner/accused No.1 only.
18. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall
stand closed.
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K. LAKSHMAN, J
26th JUNE, 2025.
Ynk
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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 5030 of 2025
26th JUNE, 2025.
Ynk