Karnataka High Court
Sri Narayan P M vs The Regional Transport Authority on 4 March, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
WRIT PETITION NO.34269 OF 2024 (MV)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.34320 OF 2024 (MV)
IN WP NO.34269/2024:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI RAJAVARMA BALLAL,
S/O K PANDYARAJA BALLAL,
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
"BALLAL MOTORS",
R/AT "SWAYARJITH",
KUNTIKAN, BEJAI, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575004.
2. SMT NAGALAKSHMI J ADYANTHAYA,
W/O JEEVANDAS ADYANTHAYA,
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
VISHAL MOTORS,
R/AT KRISHNA NEAR KMC HOSPITAL,
ATTAVAR, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001.
3. SMT SHILPASHREE SHETTY,
D/O H SANKAPPA SHETTY,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
PRADEEPTHA MOTORS,
NO.19-44, DEEPTHI MAIN ROAD,
HOSANGADI ARAMANE, MAROOR VILLAGE,
MAROOR POST, PERANJA BELTHANGADY,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-574227.
(NOTE: BENEFIT OF SENIOR CITIZEN NOT CLAIMED)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI ABHIJIT HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATE)
-2-
AND:
1. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE,
OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE,.
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.
2. THE SECRETARY,
REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE,
OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT-575001.
3. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, K
H ROAD,
SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE-560027
(MANGALORE DIVISION).
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI S H RAGHAVENDRA, AGA FOR R1 & R2,
SRI JAYAKUMAR S PATIL, SR. COUNSEL A/W
SRI HAREESH BHANDARY T, ADV. FOR C/R3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
QUASH THE ORDER / PROCEEDINGS PASSED BY THE R-2 IN
NO.KA.PRA.SA.PRA.D.K MNG/THA.PA/15/2024-25 DTD.
09.12.2024 IN GRANTING TEMPORARY PERMIT FAVOUR OF R-3
ON THE ROUTE MANGALORE TO KARKALA AND BACK VIA
VAMANJOOR, GURUPURA, KAIKAMBA AND MOODABIDRI FOR
THE PERIOD 09.12.2024 TO 08.04.2025 VIDE ANNX-A AND
CONSEQUENTLY QUASH THE TEMPORARY PERMITS IN
T.P.NO.39/2024-25 AND T.P.NO.40/2024-25 VIDE ANNX-A1
AND ANNX-A2 RESPECTIVELY.
IN WP NO.34320/2024:
BETWEEN:
1. SRI NARAYAN P M,
S/O LATE SUBBA POOJARY,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
-3-PROP NISMITHA MOTORS,
MISMITHA TOWERS, MAIN ROAD,
MOODABIDRI, MANGALORE-575001
(SENIOR CITIZENSHIP BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED).
2. SMT. PUSHPA,
W/O LATE MUDDU POOJARY,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
2-11-C (1) KADALAKERE ROAD,
NEAR DIVINE GRACE FLAT MARPADY,
MOODABIDRI, MANGALORE-574227
DAKSHINA KANNADA,
(SENIOR CITIZENSHIP BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED).
3. SRI SHEIKH MOHAMMED MATHEEN,
S/O LATE PACHA SAHEB,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
NO.6-100, ARIF MANZIL,
GOWRIKERE, BEHIND JAIN
JUNIOR COLLEGE, PRANTHYA VILLAGE, B.T.C.
MOODBIDRI POST, MOODBIDRI,
SUB DISTRICT MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA DISTRICT-574227.
4. SRI JEEVANDHAS ADHYANTHAYA,
S/O LATE SHANKAR ADHYANTHAYA,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
PROP VISHAL MOTORS,
SANOOR POST, KARKALA,
UDUPI DISTRICT-574104,
(SENIOR CITIZENSHIP BENEFIT NOT CLAIMED).
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI PUTTIGE R RAMESH, SR. COUNSEL A/W
SRI A S PARASARA KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE,
OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN.
-4-
2. THE SECRETARY
REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,
NEAR A B SHETTY CIRCLE,
OPP TO NEHRU MAIDAN, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA-575001.
3. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, K
H ROAD,
SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE-560027.
(MANGALORE DIVISION).
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SH RAGHAVENDRA, AGA FOR R1 & R2,
SRI JAYAKUMAR S PATIL, SR. COUNSEL A/W
SRI HAREESH BHANDARY T, ADV. FOR C/R3 )
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
CALL FOR RECORDS. QUASH THE ORDER/ PROCEEDINGS
PASSED BY THE R-2 IN NO.KA.PRA.SA.PRA.D.K.
MNG/THA.PA./15/2024-25 DTD. 09.12.2024 IN GRANTING
TEMPORARY PERMIT FAVOUR OF R-3 ON THE ROUTE
MANGALORE KSRTC BUS STAND AND BACK TO KARKALA AND
BACK VIA VAMANJOOR, GURUPURA, KAIKAMBA AND
MOODABIDRI FOR THE PERIOD 09.12.2024 TO 08.04.2025
VIDE ANNX-AE.
THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 14TH FEBRUARY, 2025 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
-5-
CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE
CAV ORDER
Writ Petition No.34269/2024 is filed by Private
Transport Operators who are having transport permits to ply
the bus on a particular route. The petitioners are aggrieved
by the temporary permit dated 09.12.2024 issued by 2nd
respondent in favour of 3rd respondent on a route from
Mangaluru to Karkala via Vamanjoor, Gurupura, Kaikamba
and Moodibidri for the period covering from 09.12.2024 to
08.04.2025. Writ petition No.34320/2024 is by some other
permit holders impugning the same permit named above.
2. Petitioners in both the petitions named above
have questioned the said permits on similar grounds. Thus,
both petitions have been heard together.
3. The petitions have been filed on the premise that
on the date of issuance of permits in favour of 3rd
respondent, petitioners were having the permits to ply the
vehicles on the said routes, and the impugned permits have
been issued in favour of 3rd respondent, though the pre
conditions required for issuing temporary permits did not
exist.
-6-
4. Sri Ashok Haranahalli and Sri Puttige Ramesh, the
learned Senior counsel representing the learned counsel for
the petitioners in the respective petition, urged in unison
that the impugned permits are issued under Section 87(2)(i)
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘Act, 1988’). It is
urged that the permits can be issued under Section 87(2)(i)
of the Act, 1988 only in a situation where the Competent
Authority was restrained from issuing the permit by any
Court or any other Authority, which is not the case here.
5. It is also contended that the application seeking
temporary permit can be filed only for 4 months. If the
application is not considered within 4 months, it would lapse.
Since 3rd respondent’s application dated 31.07.2023 seeking
temporary permit was not considered within 4 months, said
application should be deemed to have been rejected and if
the applicant needs a temporary permit, has to apply afresh
seeking temporary permit. However, the grounds for issuing
temporary permit without there being an application in the
prescribed format, the Authority could not have passed the
order granting permit in favour of 3rd respondent.
-7-
6. It is also contended that though impugned
permits can be assailed under Section 90 of the Act, 1988,
the Writ Petition is maintainable as the order is without
jurisdiction as there was no application seeking issuance of
permit, as the earlier application filed had spent its life.
7. It is also contended that the permit is granted by
changing the route mentioned in the earlier application and
on that count also, the order is liable to be set-aside.
8. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners would rely on the following judgments:
(b) S.Sridhar Raj vs. The Secretary, Regional
Transport Authority, Kolar and Others2
(c) Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation
vs. Pauli Govis3
(d) WHIRLPOOL Corporation vs. Registrar of
Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others41
AIR 1959 MYS 226 (DB)
2
AIR 1959 MYS 120 (DB)
3
ILR 1996 Kar 295
4
(1998) 1 SCC1
-8-
(e) Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation, Bangalore and Etc. vs.
Karnataka State Transport Authority and
Others5
(g) Raghavendra Bhat vs. The Secretary,
Regional Transport Authority and Another7
(h) M/s. Basant Roadways vs. State Transport
Appellate Tribunal and Others8
9. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the respondent-Corporation though raised a
preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the
Writ Petitions, in view of the alternative remedy under the
Act, 1988 being available to the petitioners, has also
addressed his arguments on the merits of the matter and
would contend that the Writ Petition is not maintainable on
5
AIR 2005 Kar 205
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 127
7
WP No.9433/2024
8
(1986) 4 SCC 504
9
(1987) 4 SCC 131
-9-
the premise that the petitioners have no locus to question
the impugned order.
10. Elaborating his stand on the locus standi of the
petitioners, it is urged that no averment is found in the
petition stating that the petitioners are prejudicially affected
by the impugned permits granted in favour of 3rd
respondent.
11. In addition, it is also urged on behalf of the
respondent-Corporation that the respondents do not have
any exclusive claim over the route and the temporary route
permit for 4 months issued in favour of 3rd respondent does
not affect the petitioners’ right to operate under the existing
permits in their favour. On this count, it is submitted that
there is no cause of action for the petitioners.
12. It is further urged by the learned Senior counsel
for the respondents that the application once submitted does
not lapse on expiry of the tenure of the permit in case, the
application is not considered within the period for which the
application for temporary permit is filed. The application can
be considered for the subsequent period and the same has
– 10 –
been considered based on the subsequent application filed by
3rd respondent on payment of additional fees for seeking
temporary permit.
13. It is also his contention that public interest is to
be considered while granting or refusing the permit and
there was a public demand to ply the bus in that route. And
keeping in mind, the larger public interest, the Authority has
issued temporary permit in favour of 3rd respondent and
same cannot be interfered in exercise of discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. Learned Senior counsel would also contend that
on earlier occasion, permanent permit was issued in favour
of 3rd respondent in respect of the same route and the said
order was called in question by the petitioners and the
Appellate Authority has remanded the matter to the
Competent Authority under the Act, 1988 and the Competent
Authority is yet to take a decision on the application seeking
permanent permit. Pending the said decision, the
respondent-Corporation has requested the Authority to
consider issuing temporary permit to meet the public
– 11 –
demand in the said route and the same has been considered
and no fault can be found in the impugned order.
15. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the
respondents would rely on the following judgments:
(a) G.V.Chandrashekar & Others vs. State
Transport Authority in Karnataka &
Another10
(b) G.V.Chandrashekar & Others vs. State
Transport Authority in Karnataka &
Another 11
(c) Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation vs. Karnataka State
Transport Authority & Others12
(d) L.Sathish & Others vs. Regional
Transport Authority & Others13
(e) Parbbhani Transport Co-operative
Society Ltd vs. The Regional Transport
Authority, Aurangabad 14
(f) The Madhya Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation, Bairagarh,
Bhopal vs. (M.P.) vs B.P. Upadhyaya10
WP No.16763-765/99, Dated 02.07.1999
11
W.A.No.4813-15/1999, Dated 24.07.1999
12
W.P.No.52894-52897/2013, Dated 24.03.2014
13
W.P. No.10121-124/2014, Dated 11.03.2014
14
AIR 1960 SC 801
– 12 –
Regional Transport Authority, Raipur
and Others15
(g) Rajasthan in Jairamdas vs. Regional
Transport Authority and Another.16
(h) M.Sai Venkata Ramana vs. Regional
Transport Authority, Kakinada17
(i) J.V.Shivaganesh vs. Regional Transport
Authority, Bengaluru Rural & Others18
16. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners by way
of reply would dispute the stand that second application is
filed. It is urged that the law requires the application to be
filed in a specific format and if it does not meet the
requirement of the prescribed format, it is not an application
in the eye of law. It is also urged that the requirement of
temporary permit if pleaded in earlier application, and if
anything pleaded in the alleged second application, filed are
different. Thus, it is urged that the second application cannot
be construed as an application for revival of earlier
application. It is further urged that the temporary need
cannot be equated with the permanent need and reasons, if
15
AIR 1966 SC 156
16
AIR 1957 Rajasthan 162
17
1999 (5) ALD 523
18
W.P.No.56/2025, Dated 07.01.2025
– 13 –
any, assigned in the impugned permit are not supported by
governing law.
17. This Court has considered the contentions raised
at the bar and perused the records.
18. Though the impugned order can be questioned
under Section 88 of the Act, 1988, because the impugned
permits expire in the month of April, 2025, this Court is of
the view that notwithstanding the statutory remedy available
to the petitioners, and also given the fact that the case is
heard on merits, the petitions require to be decided on
merits.
19. Sofar as the first contention relating to the
situation contemplated under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act,
1988 is concerned, it is noticed from the said provision that
temporary permit may be granted under the said provision
where no permit can be issued under Sections 72 or 74 or 76
or 79 of the Act, 1988 because of restraint order of the Court
or other Competent Authority restraining issue of permit.
Admittedly, in this case, no Court or Competent Authority
has restrained the Authority from passing orders granting
permit. Thus, there is no hesitation in holding that the case
– 14 –
is not made out to grant the permit under Section 87(2)(i) of
the Act, 1988.
20. However the question is whether the impugned
permits are issued on the sole ground under Section 87(2)(i)
of the Act, 1988 or whether it also takes into account, the
situation contemplated in Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988
is the point for consideration as admittedly, the first
application dated 31.07.2023 is filed under Section 87(1)(c).
21. In the application dated 31.07.2023 under
Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988, the respondent-
Corporation claimed that the permit is required to be issued
to meet the particular temporary need. Later in December
2024, referring to the application dated 31.07.2023,
temporary permit is sought citing reasons mentioned therein.
22. The impugned order assigns two reasons for
issuing permit.
(a) Considering the demand from the students from rural
area and the public, it is felt necessary to provide bus
service from rural area to urban area. (Unnumbered
– 15 –
last but one paragraph in page No.2 of the impugned
order).
(b) In the public interest, in exercise of power under
Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988.
As already noticed, the second reason is not justified as the
pre-condition contemplated under the said provision was not
there. Thus, the Court is required to consider whether the
situation contemplated under Section 87(1)(c) of the Act,
1988 is made out.
23. As rightly contended by the learned Senior counsel
for the respondent-Corporation, Constitution bench of the
Apex Court in The Madhya Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation, Bairagarh, Bhopal case supra
has held that contention that whenever there is a permanent
need, there cannot be a temporary need is an erroneous
view. The Apex Court has held that both temporary need and
permanent need may co-exist.
24. It is also relevant to note that respondent-
Corporation had applied for permanent permits. Same were
granted in favour of the corporation and in the Revision
Petitions filed by the private operators, the orders issued
– 16 –
granting pakka permits were set aside and the matter is
remitted to the Authority under the Act, 1988 and the
applications are pending consideration.
25. In this background, the respondent-Corporation
which had also sought temporary permit on 31.07.2023, filed
application in December 2024, to grant temporary permit,
pending consideration of the application for grant of
permanent permit. There, the reference is also made to the
application dated 31.07.2023. The application also cited
certain festivals as the reason to assume that there will be
more travelers during the period commencing from
December 2024 to March 2025.
26. It is required to be noticed in the first instance,
the petitioners who have the permits to ply the vehicles in a
particular route do not have the exclusive right to exclusively
operate on the said routes. Under the existing law, the
permit can be issued only to the State Road Transport
Corporation, provided the conditions for issuing the permits
are met.
27. It is further noticed that while issuing the
temporary permit, the law does not mandate the opportunity
– 17 –
of hearing to the person who is already having the permit.
The requirement is, the person seeking permit should apply
for it. No doubt, the law prescribes the application in a
particular form. Admittedly, the application dated
31.07.2023 is in a prescribed form. However, no orders are
passed on the said application. Technically one can say that
the application has become infructuous as 4 months period
specified in the application seeking temporary permit has
expired. However, as already noticed, for the same route,
the permanent permits were issued in favor of respondent-
Corporation and later in a revision filed by private operators
the permits were set aside and the matter is remitted to the
Authority and the matter is still pending consideration before
the Authority.
28. In this factual context, the application dated
31.07.2023, which is in a prescribed format, and not
considered on merit, can be said to be revived/modified
pursuant to application dated 07.12.2024 for the period
specified in the application dated 07.12.2204. In other
words, again in the context of the peculiar facts of the case,
the application dated 07.12.2024 can be construed as an
– 18 –
application for modification of the permit period mentioned in
application dated 31.07.2023. The view taken by the
coordinate bench in W.P.No.51756/2012 though in a slightly
different scenario, seems to support the above said view.
29. This Court is also of the view that the second
application dated 07.12.2023, not being in prescribed format
cannot be a ground for the petitioners to raise an objection
in this behalf given the fact that the petitioners do not have
a right of hearing when an application seeking temporary
permit is being considered. Merely because 2nd application is
not in prescribed format, it cannot be considered that the
petitioners’ interest if any, is prejudiced on account of 2nd
application not being in a prescribed format. What is required
to be noticed is that there must be an application seeking a
permit for certain period for a certain route. There must be
payment of prescribed fees. The application discloses the
reason. These basic requirements have been taken care of in
the subsequent application dated 07.12.2024 as well.
30. For the reasons recorded above, the contention
that no application was pending consideration seeking
temporary permit does not appear to be correct and the said
– 19 –
contention is too technical to merit consideration, particularly
in a situation when the petitioners and the like have no say
under law, when the applications seeking temporary permit
are to be considered by the Authority in the first instance.
31. In addition, it is also contended on behalf of the
petitioners that the application seeking permanent
permit/pakka permit was pending consideration in terms of
the remand order passed by the Appellate Authority, as such
the present application for temporary permit could not have
been issued. Under the scheme of the Act, 1988, there is no
bar to consider the application seeking temporary permit
when the application seeking permanent permit is pending
consideration.
32. It is further relevant to note that the petitioners
have not raised a grievance that the petitioners are going to
be affected by the impugned permits on the ground that
under impugned permits, the timings permitted, clash with
the timings permitted under the petitioners’ permit.
33. Section 80 of the Act, 1988 deals with the
procedure for applying the permits. The very nature of the
permit under Section 87 is temporary permit and at the
– 20 –
most, it can be for a period of more than 4 months and not
beyond that period. The conditions enumerated for issuance
of the temporary permits are referred to in Section 87
Clauses (a) to (d). In the instant case, it is noticed that the
applicant-respondent-Corporation has sought permit to meet
a particular temporary need.
34. As can be seen from the impugned permit, the
Authority which issued the permit, in addition to referring to
Section 87(2)(i) has also observed as under:
“PÀ£ÁðlPÀ gÁdå ¸ÀªÀÄUÀæ AiÉÆÃd£É C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£É ¢:07.03.2019gÀ C£ÀéAiÀÄ
PÉ.J¸ï.Dgï.n.¹.AiÀĪÀjUÉ ªÀiÁvÀæ ¥Àgª
À Á¤UÉ ¤ÃqÀ®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«zÀÄÝ UÁæ«ÄÃt
¨sÁUÀzÀ «zÁåyðUÀ¼À ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀgÀ ¨ÉÃrPÉAiÀÄAvÉ UÁæ«ÄÃt ¨sÁUÀ¢AzÀ
£ÀUg
À À ¥Àz
æ ÃÉ ±À §¸ÀÄì ¸Ë®¨sÀå MzÀV¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ CªÀ±ÀåPÀªA
É zÀÄ PÀAqÀħA¢gÀÄvÀz
Û “É
35. Though in the above said paragraph, the Authority
has not observed that the permit issued is in recognition of
the temporary need, this Court is of the view that the order
which is more of an administrative order has to be construed
as the order has recognised the temporary requirement
envisaged in Section 87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988 since the
permit is valid only for 4 months. In addition, in the
application dated 07.12.2024, 3rd respondent has explained
– 21 –
the demand for the period December 2024 to March 2025.
Though permit extends for a week in April as well, said fact
cannot be a ground to invalidate the permit as the permit is
valid only for 4 months commencing from 09.12.2024.
Though the impugned order/permit does not specifically refer
to the application dated 07.12.2024, on overall consideration
of the materials on record, one can conclude that grounds
urged in the second application must have formed the basis
to grant the permit.
36. Learned Senior counsel would rely on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babu
Vergheese supra to contend that when the law mandates
on particular thing to be done in a particular manner, either
it should be done in the same manner or should not be done
at all. Said ratio cannot be stretched too far to hold that the
order granting temporary permit, based on an application
which is in a proper format, post one more application dated
07.12.2024, though not in the prescribed format. For this
reason, this Court is of the view that the order on the
application cannot be construed as one without jurisdiction.
– 22 –
37. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Babu
Vergheese supra cannot be read as a Statue and it is to be
read in the context. The factual background of the present
cases do not enable the petitioners to take shelter under the
said judgment.
38. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is of
the view that the impugned permits do not give a cause of
action for the petitioners to raise a contention relating to
application dated 07.12.2024 not being in a format
prescribed.
39. It should also be borne in mind that the
petitioners’ permit to ply the vehicles in the permitted route
has remained intact. As already noticed, the petitioners do
not have the monopoly over the route covered by the permit.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
petitioners’ are prejudiced so as to invoke the extraordinary
writ jurisdiction.
40. In a situation where the Authority has given a
finding that there is a demand from the students and the
public from the rural area, for providing the bus services by
the State Road Transport Corporation, this Court does not
– 23 –
find valid reasons to interfere in the order issuing temporary
permits in favour of respondent-Corporation, that too in
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and
227 of Constitution of India when the issuing Authority has
concluded that the bus services are to be provided in the
public interest. The larger public interest appears to have
weighed in the mind of competent authority while granting
the permission. It is relevant to note that it is note that the
petitioners during the hearing have not contended that there
is no demand.
41. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel
for the petitioners to substantiate his contention relating to
the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the writ petition
despite alternative remedy need not be discussed elaborately
as this Court has decided the case on merits.
42. Learned Senior counsel has relied upon the
judgments of this Court in Sharanappa Basappa Gole, as
well as S. Sridhar Raj supra to contend that the permits
granted without application is without jurisdiction and same
has to be se-aside.
– 24 –
43. This Court has already recorded the reasons as to
why in the present cases, the grant of permit cannot be
construed as one without application.
44. Likewise the judgment in the case of Kanchan vs.
State Transport Appellate Tribunal and Others19,
holding that the grant of permit without application is
unsustainable as already noticed, in the factual background
of this case, it cannot be considered as one without
application.
45. It is also relevant to note that in the impugned
order, the authority has assigned reasons for issuing the
permit and those reasons have been already discussed.
Thus, the contention that the order is without assigning
reasons has no substance.
46. To sum up the facts obtained in the case, one
cannot hold that the permits are issued without application.
It cannot be concluded that the permits are issued only in
exercise of power under Section 87(2)(i) of the Act, 1988.
Considering the contents of application dated 31.07.2023
and the application dated 07.12.2024, this Court is of the
19
(AIR, 2006 SC 3444)
– 25 –
view that the impugned permits are issued under Section
87(1)(c) of the Act, 1988.
47. Accordingly, the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
48. It is made clear that the observations made in this
order are only confined to the questions raised in
connections with the temporary permits and shall not be
treated as observations on the applications seeking
permanent permits.
Sd/-
(ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE)
JUDGE
BRN/GVP
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