Orissa High Court
Sri Sugyan Choudhury vs State Of Odisha & Ors. ….. Opp. Parties on 25 August, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET NO. 234 OF 2012,
RVWPET NO. 264 OF 2012,
RVWPET NO. 275 OF 2012
AND
RVWPET NO. 276 OF 2012,
From judgment dated 31.07.2012 passed by a learned Single Judge of
this Court in FAO No. 177 of 2011.
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In RVWPET No. 234 of 2012
Sri Sugyan Choudhury ...... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. ..... Opp. Parties
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
____________________________________________________________
For Petitioner : Mr. Budhadev Routrary, Sr. Advocate
with M/s D.Routrary, P.K. Sahoo, S.
Das, S. Jena, S.K. Samal & S. Rout,
Advocates
For Opp. Parties : Mr. D. Lenka,
Addl. Government Advocate
[OP Nos.1 &2]
Mr. S. Ghosh, Advocate [OP No.3]
Mr. J.K. Rath, Sr. Advocate with
M/s S.N. Rath, P.K. Rout & D.N. Rath,
Advocates [OP Nos.4 to 7 & 10 to 14]
Mr. K. Mohanty, Advocate
[OP Nos.17 to 22]
____________________________________________________________
In RVWPET No. 264 of 2012
Sri Sachindra Dalei & Ors. ...... Petitioners
Page 1 of 18
-Versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. ..... Opp. Parties
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
____________________________________________________________
For Petitioner : M/s. S.K. Das & S.K. Mishra, Advocates
For Opp. Parties : Mr. D. Lenka,
Addl. Government Advocate
[OP Nos.1 &2]
M/s. S. Ghosh, Advocate [OP No.3]
Mr. J.K. Rath, Sr. Advocate with
M/s S.N. Rath, P.K. Rout & D.N. Rath,
Advocates [OP Nos.4 to 7 & 10 to 14]
____________________________________________________________
In RVWPET No. 275 of 2012
Sri Srustidhar Jena ...... Petitioner
-Versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. ..... Opp. Parties
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
____________________________________________________________
For Petitioner : M/s S.K. Das, S.K. Mishra &
P.K. Behera, Advocates
For Opp. Parties : Mr. D. Lenka,
Addl. Government Advocate
[OP Nos.1 &2]
Mr. S. Ghosh, Advocate [OP No.3]
____________________________________________________________
In RVWPET No. 276 of 2012
Natabara Behera ...... Petitioner
Page 2 of 18
-Versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. ..... Opp. Parties
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
____________________________________________________________
For Petitioner : M/s S.K. Das, S.K. Mishra &
P.K. Behera, Advocates
For Opp. Parties : Mr. D. Lenka,
Addl. Government Advocate
[OP Nos.1 &2]
Mr. S. Ghosh, Advocate [OP No.3]
____________________________________________________________
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD
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Date of Hearing: 22.08.2025 :: Date of Judgment : 25.08.2025
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PER DIXIT KRISHNA SHRIPAD,J.
All these Review Petitions seek to recall a
Coordinate Bench order dated 31.07.2012 whereby
petitioners’ FAO No.177 of 2011 filed under Section 24-C of
the Orissa Education Act, 1969 has been dismissed. In the
said FAO, a challenge was laid to the order dated 15.03.2011
passed by the State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in
their GIA Case No.36 of 2004 was negatived. In the said GIA
filed under Section 24B, they had sought for a direction to
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the official OPs to approve their appointment and to release
the necessary Grant-in-Aid in their favour from the dates of
their entitlement.
2. A brief fact matrix of the case:
2.1. Shantilata Mahavidyala, Uitikiri, in Balasore
district, having been founded in the year, 1980 vide
Registration Certificate dated 09.01.1981 under the
provisions of the Societies Registration Act 1860, secured
concurrence of the State Government and affiliation at the
hands of Utkal University for Intermediate Arts Course. The
CHSE affiliated the +2 college which received Grant-in-Aid
with effect from 01.06.1988 vide Government Orders dated
27.02.1999 & 12.03.1999. In the meanwhile, the Governing
Body of +3 Wing was registered separately on 25.04.1994
with one Mr. Satrughna Jena as the Secretary. It is claimed
that even this Institution received Grant-in-Aid.
2.2. It was the case of petitioners that subsequently
Smt. Shantilata Jena became the Secretary of the Governing
Body and all they came to be appointed in teaching & non-
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teaching posts. However, OP Nos.4 to 14 (in REVWPET No.
234 of 2012), in connivance with a section of the
Management fabricated certain records to portray their
appointment to the posts in question. This, they did hand in
glove with OP Nos.1 to 3, as well. They had filed OJC
No.10891 of 2001 seeking a direction to the Director of High
Education for the approval of their appointments and release
of Grant-in-Aid. The Director having favoured their claim,
petitioners had filed GIA Case No.36 of 2004, which came to
be negatived by the Tribunal vide order dated 15.03.2011.
That was the subject matter of further challenge in FAO
No.177 of 2011. A Coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed
the said FAO by the order that is sought to be recalled in
these Review Petitions.
3. Contentions of the parties:
3.1. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Routray and the
Advocate-on- Record appearing for the petitioners contended
that both the Tribunal & the Coordinate Bench orders have
error apparent on their face; both they overlooked the fraud
& fabrication with which OP Nos. 4 to 14 hand in glove with
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the OP Nos.1 to 3 had perpetrated to the prejudice ofpetitioners and therefore, review of Coordinate Bench order is
eminently warranted for setting at naught the injustice meted
out to their clints.
3.2. Per contra, learned AGA Mr. Lenka appearing for
the official OPs and learned Advocates representing the
private OPs resist the review petitions contending that:
Firstly, this Court has no review jurisdiction; the issue
relating to appointment of staff members was the subject
matter in OJC No.347 of 1989 wherein a mandate was issued
to the Director of Higher Education to examine all questions;
accordingly, the Director, having accomplished the task,
submitted his report dated 24.06.1989 recommending, inter
alia, the case of OP Nos.4 to 14, who were working in the
college in teaching & non-teaching posts. The Director also
had mentioned about irregularities/ illegalities committed by
Sachidananda Jena. This resulted into Mr. Jena filing OJC
No.880 of 1991, which too was dismissed placing imprimatur
on the order of Tribunal.
Page 6 of 18
3.3. The Review Petitioners filed GIA Case No.36 of2004 seeking for approval of their appointment and for the
release of consequential Grant-in-Aid in Shantilata
Mahavidyalaya. They were duly selected and appointed by
the competent Governing Body. OP Nos.1 to 14 having
entered appearance through their counsel resisted the GIA
Case contending that the Review Petitioners were never
appointed and that they had no requisite qualification at all.
The matter relating to the dispute is liable to be res judicated
because of the lis having been attained finality in the earlier
rounds of litigations. The Tribunal upheld the contention of
OPs and dismissed the subject GIA Case vide order dated
15.03.2011. The challenge to said order has been negatived
by the Coordinate Bench by the order now put in review.
4. At the suggestion of learned counsel appearing for
the parties, all these Review Petitions were taken up for final
hearing together, since common questions of law and facts
are involved. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties. I have perused pleadings and the records. I have also
duly adverted to the provisions of law and to relevant of the
Page 7 of 18
rulings cited at the Bar. In fact, it was too long a hearing.
Since intricacies were involved, the petitions were reserved
for judgment. Having done on that, this Court declines
indulgence in the matter for the following reasons:
4.1. As to maintainability of Review Petitions:
(a) It has long been settled from the days of Privy
Council that Court, Tribunals & Quasi-judicial Authorities
ordinarily do not have power to review their decisions unless
the statute clothe them with such power. Rulings in this
regard galore in Law Reports. However, this is subject to a
very few exceptions like the cases of fraud/fabrication &
gross violation of principles of natural justice. Here again,
procedural constrains do obtain. The scope of review, where
law vests such power, is ordinarily very restrictive qua the
appeal. Of course, the extent of review power depends upon
the purpose and policy content of the statute in question and
then terminology of its provision that bestows such power.
The grand rule is, the adjudicatory bodies become functus
officio once the cause brought before them is resolved finally,
subject to all just exceptions. Existence per se is no ground
Page 8 of 18
for exercise. There are frugal case laws wherein the review is
undertaken in the exercise of inherent power, if such power
is granted or recognized by the statute. Added, the existence
of review power is one thing and its exercise is another. All
this is a prelude to the discussion infra.
(b) The vehement submission of learned Senior
Advocate Mr. Routray and learned counsel Mr. Das that this
Court has, as of necessity, the power of review in matters like
this, is bit difficult to countenance and reasons for this are
not far to seek:
(i) Section 24-A of the 1969 Act provides for
establishment of Education Tribunal(s) by the State
Government. Sub-section (3) of this section empowers the
Tribunal to call for the records of all proceedings relating to
the dispute and dispose of ‘the appeals preferred to it’. Thus,
what Tribunal entertains is ‘appeal’ and therefore, it is not an
original proceeding like suit. This has some relevance which
will be discussed hereinafter. Sub-section (5) makes decision
of the Tribunal final. Sub-section (6) provides for enforcement
of Tribunal’s order under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
as if it were a decree of the Civil Court. That would not make
the proceedings before the Tribunal either a suit or an
original proceeding. It is always open to the legislature toPage 9 of 18
treat the end product of adjudication as a decree as
distinguished from order, if it so desires. Learned AGA Mr.
Lenka is right in telling that this sub-section selectively
makes provisions of CPC applicable and it is for the limited
purpose of enforcement of Tribunal’s decision. Therefore,
what is selective cannot be made an all-pervasive invocation
of CPC in a wholesale way.
(ii) Learned AGA & Advocates representing the
OPs are justified in drawing attention of the Court to Sub-
section (5) of Section 24-B of the 1969, Act which reads as
under:
“(5) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure
laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but
shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and,
subject to any rules made by the Government, shall
have power to regulate its own procedure.”
This provision excludes the application of CPC and enables
the Tribunal to have its own procedure subject to the Rules
that may be promulgated by the Government, for regulating
the procedure. The text & context makes the legislative intent
as clear as Gangetic waters that the CPC is not applicable
and as a corollary of this the provisions of Order XLVII of
CPC are also not applicable. The contention of Mr. Das that
the application of CPC is excluded for the proceedings before
the Tribunal only and therefore, such statutory exclusion is
not intended by the legislature largely accords with the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (r). This
Page 10 of 18
contention is difficult to countenance. The very maxim
involves too broad a generalization and therefore, cannot be
readily invoked when intent of the legislature runs counter to
it. ‘Legal Maxims’ by Herbert Broom, 10th Edition at page 444
says as under:
“Great caution is necessary in dealing with the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (r),
for, as Lord Campbell observed in Saunders v.
Evans (s), 8 H.L. Cas. 721, at p.729, it is not of
universal application, but depends upon the
intention of the party as discoverable upon the
face of the instrument or of the transaction;…”
(c) Petitioners’ counsel vehemently submitted that under
Article 225 of Constitution of India read with Letters Patent,
a set of Rules have been promulgated. Under Part-II of the
Rules of High Court of Orissa, 1948, Chapters-VII & VIII
appear; they inter alia provide for review; the text of Clause-
11 speaks of review in so many words. This submission does
not merit acceptance and reasons are obvious: Whatever be
their genesis, these Rules are of general character/nature
qua the provisions of 1969 Act and the Orissa Education
(Tribunal) Rules, 1977 which are a piece of special law. Mr.
Lenka is right in telling the Court that the law enacted in
Sections 24-A, 24-B & 24-C in 1969 Act creates a special
Page 11 of 18
machinery for adjudication of peculiar disputes and
therefore, the legislature in its wisdom has prescribed a
special procedure to be adopted in the adjudicatory process.
The maxim “generalibus specialibus non derogant” is as old as
mountains. Law reports are replete with the proposition that
the special law overrides the general law. Contention of
petitioners, if countenanced, would run counter to the
jurisprudential principle of centuries.
(d) The last contention of the petitioners as to
maintainability of Review Petitions is that the Tribunal has
inherent power under Rule 26 of 1977 Rules and that would
include power of review. The said Rule reads as under:
“26. Inherent Powers- The Tribunal may exercise
inherent powers for the ends of justice as contemplated
under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.”
True it is, that in seldom cases that involve fraud/fabrication,
Courts & Tribunals recall their orders in their inherent
power. However, there is a subtle difference between ‘power
to recall’ and the ‘power to review’, although arguably they
are not poles apart. It was Lord Edward Coke who roared
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centuries ago that “Fraud avoids all judicial
acts, ecclesiastical or temporal,” establishing that any
judgment or decree obtained through fraudulent means is a
nullity, or legally nonexistent, and can be challenged in any
court. He also noted the concept of six “marks” or
“presumptions” of fraud, drawn from Roman law. It is on that
premise, Courts & Tribunals recall orders that are snatched
by fraud/fabrication essentially perpetrated on them. It is on
the principle of ex debito justitiae. However, that is not the
case here.
(e) Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Routray drew
attention of the Court to the following rulings in support of
his contention that review is admissible at the hands of
Tribunal and therefore, the appeal proceedings being
continuation of the same, the review power should avail to
this Court as a corollary of that. In support of said
proposition he pressed into service the following decisions:
(i) Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation
Ltd. V. Grapco Industries Ltd., Reported in
(1999) 4 SCC 710:
Page 13 of 18
(ii) Allahabad Bank, Calcutta v. Radha Krishna
Maity, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 755:
(iii) Standard Chartered Bank v. India Glycols Ltd.,
Reported in (2014) SCC Online Delhi 3859.
The first two rulings do not discuss the power of review
under the provisions of 1969 Act or a pari materia statute. It
hardly needs to be stated that a decision is an authority for
the proposition laid down in a given fact matrix, and not for
all that which logically follows from what has been so laid
down vide Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem,1. The third
decision arose under the provisions of law relating to debt
recovery, that is, popularly known as DRT Act. The purpose
& policy content of this Act and of the 1969 Act are miles
away from each other. Merely because certain provisions
relating to dispute resolution machinery have textual
resemblance, that per se would not make the Rule of pari
materia readily applicable.
4.2. As to merits of the matter:
(a) I have very carefully turned the pages of review
petitions and the related material on record. Fraud &
1
[1901] UKHL 2Page 14 of 18
fabrication within the parameters of S.P. ChengalvarayaNaidu v. Jagannath,2 has not been there, as rightly
contended by learned Advocates representing the private
OPs. As already mentioned above, the proceedings at the
hands of the Tribunal are treated by the legislature as one of
appeal vide Sub-section (3) of Section 24-A of 1969 Act.
Ordinarily, the First Appeal as the one at the hands of
Tribunal has wide scope of examination both on law and
facts. Though Section 24-C does not in so many words say of
Second Appeal, it is indisputable that it is a Second Appeal.
Ordinarily, the scope of Second Appeal is not as wide as the
First Appeal. This position does not change merely because
the provision does not say about substantial question of law
as enacted in Section 100 of CPC or question of law, either.
Therefore, appeal is both on law & facts, though the
examination is comparatively restrictive.
(b) The Tribunal was invoked by the review petitioners
in GIA Case No.36 of 2004 under Section 24-B of 1969 Act
seeking a direction for approval of their appointment and
2
AIR 1994 SC 853
Page 15 of 18
consequential release of Grant-in-Aid. The Tribunal, having
considered rival contentions of the parties, negatived the GIA
Case vide order dated 15.03.2012. At paragraph 6 of the
order, it is observed as under:
“Regarding the actual staff position of Shantilata
Mahavidyalaya in pursuance to the direction of the
Hon’ble High Court in O.J.C. 347 of 1989, the Director,
Higher Education, Orissa on 24.6.1989 verified the
same and found the O.P. Nos. 4 to 14 were the real
staff of the College. Challenging the same, when the
then Secretary Sri Satrughana Jena filed O.J.C. No.880
of 1991, the Hon’ble High Court accepted the report of
the Director basing upon his verification on 24.6.1989
as correct. The said report of the Director does not
reveal the names of the petitioners. Thus, there is no
scope for this Tribunal to reopen the matter, other than
to accept the report of the Director, Higher Education,
Orissa submitted in pursuance to the order passed by
the Hon’ble High Court in O.J.C. No.347 of 1989 and
accepted in O.J.C. No.880 of 1991. Since the names of
the petitioners do not find place in the said report
submitted by the Director, Higher Education, Orissa in
pursuance to the Writ Application O.J.C. No.347 of
1989 there is no scope to accept them as the staff of
the college and their consequential claim for approval of
appointment and release of grant in aid.”
(c) The above order of the Tribunal was put in challenge by
the petitioners in FAO No.177 of 2011 and the Coordinate
Bench having examined all aspects of the matter penned the
order dated 31.07.2012 running into 8½ pages. A perusal of
the same shows that learned Judge treated the matter more
Page 16 of 18
than the usual, though the Second Appeal has its own
limitations. At paragraph 7 what was the prayer in OJC
No.880 of 1991 filed by Mr. Satrughna Jena is stated and it
reads as under:
“(a) That a Rule Nisi in the nature of a writ of
Mandamus and/or any other writ or writs and/or
order or orders and/or direction may be issued calling
upon the opposite parties to show cause why the list of
names of the members of the staff of Shantilata
Mahavidyalaya at Utikiri submitted by the opposite
party no.1 to the opposite party no.3 and eligible to get
their pay shall not be quashed and the names
submitted by the Governing Body shall not be
accepted.
(b) That if the opposite parties fail to show cause or
show insufficient cause the Rule Nisi may be made
absolute.”
(d) The Division Bench while dismissing the said OJC vide
order dated 02.02.1996 observed as under:
“We have given the matter our anxious consideration
and are of the view that the relief claimed cannot be
granted to the petitioner. In compliance of the orders
passed by this Court in the earlier writ petitions, an
enquiry was conducted by the Director, who is a
responsible officer in the Education Department. The
enquiry report indicates that all possible efforts were
made by the Director to notice and hear all who appear
to be in some manner or the other connected with the
dispute. Members of the staff, Sarpanch and the
Headmaster of another institution were heard. But
neither the petitioner nor his brother RabindranathPage 17 of 18
Jena appeared in spite of repeated notice and even
though Mr. A.K. Roy, the Deputy Director had
personally approached the petitioner and tried to
persuade him to participate in the enquiry. Request
was also made to the members of the Governing Body
and villagers to attend the inquiry and to make
statements if they so desire. The fact that a Magistrate
and the police had to be requisitioned gives an
indication of the atmosphere which was prevailing at
that time.”
As long as the above findings which are decades old remain
on record, this Court is at a loss to know, what purpose
would be served by keeping these Review Petitions of 2012
pending any longer. In any circumstance, as rightly
contended by Mr. Lenka, this Court cannot treat the Review
Petitions as if they are appeals.
In the above circumstances, these Review Petitions
being devoid of merits and also lacking maintainability are
liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are, costs having
been reluctantly made easy.
………………………………
Dixit Krishna Shripad,
Judge
Signature Not Verified
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Digitally Signed
Signed by:ThePRASANT KUMAR2025/Prasant
25th August, SAHOO
Reason: Authentication
Location: Orissa High Court
Date: 25-Aug-2025 20:31:30
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