Karnataka High Court
Sri Vinod R Tanti vs State Of Karnataka on 31 July, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024
C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024
CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12976 OF 2024
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12612 OF 2024
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 13002 OF 2024
IN CRL.P No. 12976/2024
BETWEEN:
1. SRI VINOD R TANTI
S/O RANCHHODBHAI RAMJIBHAI TANTI,
AGED 62 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BUNGLOW NO. 94,
FLORIDA ESTATE,
KESHAV NAGAR,
MUNDHWA PUNE - 411 036
Digitally signed
by NAGAVENI ...PETITIONER
Location: High (BY SMT. VARSHA HITTINHALLI, ADVOCATE)
Court of
Karnataka
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF FOREST
ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001,
BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
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2. THE RANGE FOREST OFFICER
TERRITORIAL RANGE
CHITRADURGA,
DAVANGERE - 577 501
3. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS
CHITRADURGA FOREST-DIVISION,
CHITRADURGA - 577 501
4. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS
(HEAD OF THE FOREST FORCE)
ARANYA BHAVAN,
MALLESHWARAM,
BANGALORE - 560 003
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RASHMI PATEL, HCGP)
THIS CRL.P. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C.
(FILED UNDER SECTION 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE
FIR REGISTERED IN FOC NO.05/2022-23 BY RESPONDENT
NO.2 DATED 13.01.2023 AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS
ARISING FROM FOC NO.05/2022-23 CHITHRADURGA RANGE
REGISTERED AS AGAINST PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 24(gg), 82A, 82B
AND 114 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST ACT, 1963 AND
SECTION 2 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST CONVERSATION ACT,
1980
IN CRL.P NO. 12612/2024
BETWEEN:
1. SRI VINOD R TANTI
S/O RANCHHODBHAI RAMJIBHAI TANTI,
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HC-KAR
AGED 62 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BUNGLOW NO.80 AND 80A,
FLORIDA ESTATE, KESHAV NAGAR,
MUNDHWA PUNE - 411 036.
...PETITIONER
(BY SMT. VARSHA HITTINHALLI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF FOREST,
ECOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT,
M S BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.
2. THE RANGE FOREST OFFICER
TERRITORIAL RANGE,
CHITRADURGA
DAVANAGERE - 577 501.
3. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS
CHITRADURGA FOREST DIVISION,
CHITRADURGA - 577 501.
4. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS
(HEAD OF THE FOREST FORCE)
ARANYA BHAVAN,
MALLESHWARAM,
BANGALORE - 560 003.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RASHMI PATEL, HCGP)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C
(UNDER SECTION 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR
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HC-KAR
REGISTERED IN FOC NO.3/2022-23 BY RESPONDENT NO.2
AND THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM FOC
NO.03/2022-23 REGISTERED AT CHITRADURGA RANGE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 24(gg),82(A),82(B) AND
114 OF THE KARNATAKA FOREST ACT, 1963 AND SEC.2 OF
THE KARNATAKA FOREST CONSERVATION ACT, 1980,
PENDING ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND
JMFC, CHITRADURGA.
IN CRL.P NO. 13002/2024
BETWEEN:
1. SRI VINOD R TANTI
S/O RANCHHODBHAI RAMJIBHAI TANTI,
AGED 62 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BUNGLOW NO.80 AND 80A
FLORIDA ESTATE, KESHAV NAGAR,
MUNDHWA PUNE - 411 036
MAHARASTRA
...PETITIONER
(BY SMT. VARSHA HITTINHALLI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF FOREST ECOLOGY
AND ENVIRONMENT,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE - 560 001
BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
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2. THE RANGE FOREST OFFICER
TERRITORIAL RANGE,
CHITRADURGA
DAVANGERE - 577 501
3. DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS
CHITRADURGA FOREST DIVISION
CHITRADURGA - 577 501
4. THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS
(HEAD OF THE FOREST FORCE)
ARANYA BHAVAN
MALLESHWARAM
BANGALORE - 560 003
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RASHMI PATEL, HCGP)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C.
(FILED UNDER SECTION 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH
THE FIR REGISTERED IN FOC NO.06/2022-23 BY
RESPONDENT NO.2 DATED 13.01.2023 AND THE ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM FOC NO.06/2022-23
CHITHRADURGA RANGE REGISTERED AS AGAINST
PETITIONER FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTIONS 24(gg), 82A, 82B AND 114 OF THE
KARNATAKA FOREST ACT, 1963 AND SEC. 12 OF THE
KARNATAKA FOREST CONSERVATION ACT, 1980.
THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The conglomeration of these petitions call in question
registration of FIRs in FOC.Nos.05/2022-23, 03/2022-23 and
06/2022-23, dated 12.01.2023 and 13.01.2023 respectively,
for offences under Sections 24(gg), 82A, 82B and 114 of the
Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 and Section 2 of the Karnataka
Forest Conservation Act, 1980, registered by second
respondent. The petitioner and the respondents are common in
all the petitions.
2. Smt. Varsha Hittinhalli, learned counsel for petitioner
and Smt. Rashmi Patel, learned High Court Government Pleader
for the respondents.
3. As the issue at the hand in all these petitions are
common, the facts in brief as obtaining in Crl.P.No.12976/2024
are narrated:
A company – Suzlon Energy Limited enters into a lease
deed with Karnataka Renewable Energy Development Limited
on 05.01.2007. A work order is also issued in favour of the
company on the same day. The petitioner is said to be
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HC-KARappointed as the Chairman and Managing Director on
07.10.2022, of the said company which provides sustainable
energy solutions and practices of utilizing renewable energy for
power supply. The company then comes into legal possession
of the forest land measuring 27.63 ha in Survey No.20 of
Yelakurnahalli Village of Hiriyur Taluk, Chitradurga District,
Jogimatti Forest Range. Pursuant to the work order, the
company is said to have undertaken execution of the work. It
transpires that respondent No.2 – the Range Forest Officer
conducted survey of the land on which the company had put up
Wind Power Project and noted that forest land of upto 2.40 ha
is encroached beyond the approved forest land of 27.63 ha. by
the Company. After the survey, the second respondent
registers a FIR in FOC.No.05/2022-23 for the offences
punishable under Sections 24(gg), 82A, 82B and 114 of the
Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 and Section 2 of the Karnataka
Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The registration of the FIRs
impugned in all these petitions has driven the petitioner to this
Court.
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4. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterating the
grounds made in the petitions would submit that the FIR is
registered against the petitioner, who was appointed as the
Chairman and Managing Director of the Company, long after
the Company was issued with the work order. Learned Counsel
for the petitioner submits that the FIR has been registered
without making the company as an accused and therefore, is in
violation of Section 82B of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963.
She further submits that although the officials of the Company
have cooperated and provided all the documents for survey of
the forest land to the second respondent, a series of FIRs have
been registered against the petitioner when the unintentional
encroachment of the forest land is sought to be regularized by
the company through an application to the concerned
Authority. On these grounds, she seeks to allow the petitions.
To buttress her submissions, she would rely upon various
judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court.
5. The Learned High Court Government Pleader appearing
for the respondents though refutes the submissions of the
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learned counsel for petitioner, is not in a position to dispute the
proposition of law.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective
parties and have perused the material on record.
7. This Court on 17.12.2024 had granted an interim
protection by directing the respondents not to take any
coercive steps against the petitioner in all these petitions.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The issue
lies in a narrow compass, whether the petitioner could be
arraigned as an accused, without making the Company as an
accused would sustain under the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963.
9. The issue need not detain this Court for long or delve
deep into the matter as this Court and other coordinate
benches of this Court, in plethora of cases, by following the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ANEETA HADA v.
GODFATHER TRAVELS AND TOURS PRIVATE LIMITED
reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661, have held that a Crime / FIR
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cannot sustain under the Act. This Court in one such case in
Crl.P.Nos.101295/2019 and connected matter disposed
on 23.02.2022, has held as follows:
“12. The Apex Court made it clear that at no
stage the measures adopted should be considered to
be indicative of the fact that the prosecution shall not
be initiated against those who have violated penal
provisions of law and therefore, FIR that was
registered was sought to be taken to its logical end
by the State. While doing so, it cannot be considered
that there can be proceedings initiated in violation of
law. Section 82(B) of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963
reads as follows:
“82B. Offence by Companies etc.–(1) If the
person committing an offence under this Act is a
company, the company as well as every person in
charge of, and responsible to the company for the
conduct of its business at the time of the commission
of the offence shall be liable to be proceeded against
and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-
section shall render any such person liable to any
punishment if he proves that the offence was
committed without his knowledge or that he
exercised all due diligence to prevent the
commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub- section (1) where an offence under this
section has been committed by a company and it is
proved that the offence has been committed with
the consent or connivance of, or that the
commission of the offence is attributable to any
neglect on the part of any director, manager,
secretary or other officer of the Company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall
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also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly.
Explanation.–For the purpose of this
section,–
(a) “Company” means anybody corporate
and includes a firm or other association
of individuals; and
(b) “Director” in relation to a firm, means
a partner in the firm.”
13. Section 82B deals with offences by
companies and fixes vicarious liability on the officers
of the Company Board. Therefore the Company
ought to have been made an accused to these
proceedings. Non-arraigning of the Company as an
accused is fatal to the proceedings. The law in this
regard is no longer res integra as the Apex Court in
the case of ANEETHA HADA v. GOT FATHER
TOURS AND TRAVELS has while interpreting
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which
is in pari materia with Section 82B of the Forest Act
has held as follows:
“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section
141 of the Act is concerned with the offences by
the company. It makes the other persons
vicariously liable for commission of an offence on
the part of the company. As has been stated by us
earlier, the vicarious liability gets attracted when
the condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of
the Act stands satisfied. There can be no dispute
that as the liability is penal in nature, a strict
construction of the provision would be necessitous
and, in a way, the warrant.
56. We have referred to the aforesaid
passages only to highlight that there has to be
strict observance of the provisions regard being
had to the legislative intendment because it deals
with penal provisions and a penalty is not to be
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HC-KARimposed affecting the rights of persons whether
juristic entities or individuals, unless they are
arrayed as accused. It is to be kept in mind that
the power of punishment is vested in the
legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of
the Act which clearly speaks of commission of
offence by the company. The learned counsel for
the respondents have vehemently urged that the
use of the term “as well as” in the Section is of
immense significance and, in its tentacle, it brings
in the company as well as the director and/or other
officers who are responsible for the acts of the
company and, therefore, a prosecution against the
directors or other officers is tenable even if the
company is not arraigned as an accused. The words
“as well as” have to be understood in the context.
Xxx
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we
arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for
maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of
the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is
imperative. The other categories of offenders can
only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of
vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated
in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the
ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh (supra) which is a
three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view
expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) does not
correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada (supra)
is overruled with the qualifier as stated in
paragraph 51. The decision in Modi Distilleries
(supra) has to be treated to be restricted to its own
facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”
14. The said judgment is followed by a Bench
of three Judges of the Apex Court in Sunil Bharti
Mittal (supra) where in it is held as follows:
“42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an
artificial person which acts through its officers,
Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If
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HC-KARsuch a company commits an offence involving
mens rea, it would normally be the intent and
action of that individual who would act on behalf of
the company. It would be more so, when the
criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the
same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability
unless the statute specifically provides so.
43. Thus, an individual who has perpetrated
the commission of an offence on behalf of a
company can be made an accused, along with the
company, if there is sufficient evidence of his active
role coupled with criminal intent. Second situation
in which he can be implicated is in those cases
where the statutory regime itself attracts the
doctrine of vicarious liability, by specifically
incorporating such a provision.
44. When the company is the offender,
vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be
imputed automatically, in the absence of any
statutory provision to this effect. One such example
is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881. In Aneeta Hada [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather
Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] ,
the Court noted that if a group of persons that
guide the business of the company have the
criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body
corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be
understood. Such a position is, therefore, because
of statutory intendment making it a deeming
fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was
applied only in one direction, namely, where a
group of persons that guide the business had
criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body
corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there
has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or
any other person allegedly in control and
management of the company, to the effect that
such a person was responsible for the acts
committed by or on behalf of the company.
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15. In the light of the judgments rendered by
the Apex Court as afore-quoted and the facts
obtaining being undisputed, the Company not being
made a party, the proceedings do get vitiated as it is
in violation of Section 82B of the Act. The other
submission that is made by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners is that when the FIR as
registered against the petitioners in the year 2017
what transpires in the interregnum assumes
significance and merits consideration. While filing the
charge sheet on the FIR the observation insofar as
the Company is concerned reads as follows:
“ªÉÄ: JAJ¸ï¦J¯ï UÀtÂUÀÄwÛUÉ ¸ÀASÉå: 2416
UÀtÂUÀÄwÛUÉzÁgÀgÀÄ PÀæªÀħzÀÝ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀıÀ® vÁAwæPÀvɬÄAzÀ
PÁ£ÀÆ£ÁvÀäPÀªÁV CgÀtå ¥ÀæzÉñÀzÀ°è UÀtÂUÀÄwÛUÉAiÀÄ°è survey and
demarcation £ÀPÉëAiÀÄ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ UÀtÂUÁgÀjPÉ ªÀiÁrzÁÝgÉ.”
16. The report of investigating agency filed
before the Court discloses that at the time when the
lease was granted the operations were carried out by
the petitioners strictly in accordance with the survey
and demarcation sketch. The boundaries in the forest
area were changed in terms of the CEC report and
the direction of the Apex Court. It is here they find
that there is violation and encroachment coming
within 10% and is categorized as Category-B. The
final report having been filed before the Court, the
learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the
offences punishable as noted supra. The FIR which
was registered on 19-11-2012 had resulted in
opining that the petitioners had not committed
violation of the sketch. The charge sheet is filed for
offences basing the observations upon re-
investigation of the CEC as there was alteration in
the boundaries. The order taking cognizance by the
learned Magistrate on the Forest Act reads as
follows:
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HC-KAR“This charge sheet is filed by the IO for the
offence punishable under Section 24(a), (d), (f),
(g), (gg), (h), 80, 82, 82B and 109 of the
Karnataka Forest Act r/w Rules 144 and 165 and
Section 4(1), 4(1A) and 21 of MMDR Act.
As per the judgment of the Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka in Crl.P.No.679 of 2017
between Vivek and another v. The State of
Karnataka and another, it is held that –
“when final report is filed for the offence
under the MMRD Act and penal laws, the
magistrate has to take cognizance of the offences
under the IPC except the offence under MMRD
Act and KMMC Rules.”
In view of the said order, this Court can
take cognizance only for the offence punishable
under the Forest Act.
Accordingly cognizance is taken only for the
offence punishable under Section 24(a), (d),(f),
(g),(gg), (h), 80, 82, 82B and 109 of the Karnataka
Forest Act r/w Rules 144 and 165.
Issue summons to A1 to A8 and for
appearance of A9 to A11.”
17. Therefore, the trial that has to be
conducted is for the offences punishable under the
Forest Act. If the trial has to be conducted, the
Company has to be an accused. The Company not
being an accused is fatal to the proceedings is what
the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgment has
held. Therefore, the offences under the Forest Act
cannot be tried without the Company being made a
party. There are no allegations against the directors
or officers of the company individually made in the
case at hand, these are offences against the
company. Wherefore, the complaint, FIR or the
charge sheet that is filed in the absence of the
Company as a party cannot be sustained in law.”
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10. It becomes apposite to refer to the latest judgment of
the Apex Court rendered in the case of SANJAY DUTT V.
STATE OF HARYANA, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 32,
which has reiterated the proposition laid down in the case of
ANEETA HADA (supra):
“10. We take notice of the fact that having regard to the
Scheme of the Act, 1900, there is no vicarious liability that
can be attached to any of the directors or any office bearers
of the company. It is the individual liability or the act that
would make the person concerned liable for being
prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 19 of
the Act, 1900. Having regard to the nature of the
allegations, it is difficult for us to take the view that the
appellants herein are responsible for the alleged offence.
There are no allegations worth the name in the complaint
that the three appellants before us are directly responsible
for uprooting of the trees with the aid of Bulldozers or JCB
machines or causing damage to the environment. The
persons who were actually found at the site felling the trees
have not been arrayed as accused in the complaint.
Although the license/necessary permission for development
of the land in the specified area had been granted in favour
of the company, yet for the reasons best known to the
complainant the company has not been arrayed as an
accused in the complaint.
11. It appears that the Courts below proceeded on the
erroneous assumption that the three appellants herein
being responsible officers of the company are liable for the
alleged offence. While a company may be held liable for
the wrongful acts of its employees, the liability of its
directors is not automatic. It depends on specific
circumstances, particularly the interplay between the
director’s personal actions and the company’s
responsibilities. A director may be vicariously liable
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HC-KARonly if the company itself is liable in the first place
and if such director personally acted in a manner that
directly connects their conduct to the company’s
liability. Mere authorization of an act at the behest of
the company or the exercise of a supervisory role
over certain actions or activities of the company is
not enough to render a director vicariously liable.
There must exist something to show that such
actions of the director stemmed from their personal
involvement and arose from actions or conduct falling
outside the scope of its routine corporate duties.
Thus, where the company is the offender, vicarious
liability of the Directors cannot be imputed
automatically, in the absence of any statutory
provision to this effect. There has to be a specific act
attributed to the director or any other person
allegedly in control and management of the company,
to the effect that such a person was responsible for
the acts committed by or on behalf of the company.
12. At the same time, wherever by a legal fiction the
principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a
person who is otherwise not personally involved in
the commission of an offence is made liable for the
same, it has to be specifically provided in the statute
concerned. When it comes to penal provisions,
vicarious liability of the managing director and
director would arise provided any provision exists in
that behalf in the statute. Even where such provision
for fastening vicarious liability exists, it does not
mean that any and all directors of the company would
be automatically liable for any contravention of such
statute. Vicarious Liability would arise only if there
are specific and substantiated allegations attributing
a particular role or conduct to such director,
sufficient enough to attract the provisions
constituting vicarious liability and by extension the
offence itself.
13. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability
unless the statute specifically provides so. Thus, an
individual who has perpetrated the commission of an
offence on behalf of a company can be made an
accused, if the statute provides for such liability and
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HC-KARif there is sufficient evidence of his active role
coupled with criminal intent. The primary
responsibility is on the complainant to make specific
averments as are required under the law in the
complaint so as to make the accused vicariously
liable. For fastening criminal liability on an officer of
a company, there is no presumption that every officer
of a company knows about the transaction in
question.
14. The allegations which find place against the
appellants herein in their personal capacity seem to be
absolutely vague. When a complainant intends to rope
in a Managing Director or any officer of a company, it
is essential to make requisite allegations to
constitute the various liability.
15. When jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint
petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of
the CrPC, the Court concerned should remain vigilant &
apply its mind carefully before taking cognizance of a
complaint of the present nature.
16. The High Court failed to pose unto itself the correct
question i.e., as to whether the complaint even if given face
value and taken to be correct in its entirety would lead to
the conclusion that the appellants herein were personally
liable for the offence under Section 4 of the Act, 1900 made
punishable under Section 19 of the Act, 1900.
17. In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
Company Limited v. Datar Switchgear Limited, as reported
in (2010) 10 SCC 479, wherein, the Chairman of the
Maharashtra State Electricity Board was made an accused
for the offence under Sections 192 and 199 respectively
read with Section 34 of the IPC, this Court observed thus:
“30. It is trite law that wherever by a legal fiction the
principle of vicarious liability is attracted and a person who
is otherwise not personally involved in the commission of an
offence is made liable for the same, it has to be specifically
provided in the statute concerned. In our opinion, neither
Section 192 IPC nor Section 199 IPC incorporate the
principle of vicarious liability, and therefore, it was
incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver the role
of each of the accused in the complaint. It would be
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CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024
C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024
CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024
HC-KARprofitable to extract the following observations made in S.K.
Alagh : (SCC p.667, para 19)“19. As, admittedly, drafts were drawn in the name of
the company, even if the appellant was its Managing
Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence
under Section 406 of the Penal Code. If and when a statute
contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides
specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down
under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee
cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence
committed by the company itself.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. In such circumstances, referred to above, no case
could be said to have been made out for putting the three
appellants to trial for the alleged offence. The Court
concerned could not have issued process for the alleged
offence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In light of the afore-quoted judgments of the Apex Court
and of this Court and the facts obtaining in the cases at hand,
which covers the issue on all its fours, the impugned FIRs
would not sustain.
11. In the light of the observations made hereinabove,
the offences alleged against the petitioner would not sustain
and such unsustainability would lead to quashment of the FIRs
registered against the petitioner. Therefore, I deem it
appropriate to quash the FIRs and pass the following:
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NC: 2025:KHC:29638
CRL.P No. 12976 of 2024
C/W CRL.P No. 12612 of 2024
CRL.P No. 13002 of 2024
HC-KARORDER
a. The criminal petitions are allowed.
b. The FIR Nos.05/2022-23, 03/2022-23 and 06/2022-
23, registered by the second respondent, pending
before the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC,
Chitradurga, stand quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGENVJ
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 102