Telangana High Court
Sri Y Pratap Reddy vs Shaik Gulam Hussain And Other on 10 June, 2025
Author: G. Radha Rani
Bench: G. Radha Rani
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.450, 451, 452, 455, 458, 463,
465 & 470 of 2021
COMMON ORDER:
C.R.P.No.450 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.6
aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2021 passed in I.A.No.569 of 2014 under
Order IX Rule 9 read with Section 151 of CPC by the learned Principal Senior
Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar, setting aside the dismissal order
dated 26.09.2008 and restoring L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004.
2. C.R.P.No.451 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.4
aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2021 passed in I.A.No.569 of 2014 in
O.P.No.143 of 2004 by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rangareddy
District at L.B.Nagar.
3. C.R.P.No.452 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.6
aggrieved by the common order dated 02.02.2021 passed in I.A.No.448 of 2015
by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar,
in allowing the petition filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963,
condoning the delay in filing an application under Order XXII Rule 3 of CPC
for setting aside the abatement order.
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4. C.R.P.No.455 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.6
aggrieved by the common order dated 02.02.2021 passed by the learned
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in I.A.No.151 of
2015 under Order XXII Rule 3 for allowing the petition in bringing the legal
representatives of claimant No.1.
5. C.R.P.No.458 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.4
aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2021 passed in I.A.No.151 of 2015 in
I.A.No.569 of 2014 in O.P.No.143 of 2004 by the learned Principal Junior Civil
Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.
6. C.R.P.No.463 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.6
aggrieved by the common order dated 02.02.2021 passed by the learned
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in I.A.No.447 of
2015 under Order XXII Rule 1 to 3 read with Section 151 of CPC for setting
aside the abatement order against claimant No.1.
7. C.R.P.No.465 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.4
aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2021 passed in I.A.No.448 of 2015 in
I.A.No.569 of 2014 in O.P.No.143 of 2004 by the learned Principal Junior Civil
Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.
8. C.R.P.No.470 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner – respondent No.4
aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2021 passed in I.A.No.447 of 2015 in
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I.A.No.569 of 2014 in O.P.No.143 of 2004 by the learned Principal Junior Civil
Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.
9. The facts of C.R.P.No.450 of 2021 are taken as reference to all the above
Civil Revision Petitions.
10. The respondents 1 to 5 – claimants filed I.A.No.569 of 2014 to restore
L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004. The respondent No.2 filed an affidavit in support of
the said petition submitting that his father late Gulam Hussain and his uncle late
Shaik Jahangir were claimants 1 and 2 along with others in L.A.O.P.No.143 of
2004. His father passed away after a prolonged battle with cancer on
29.09.2013. His late uncle Shaik Jahangir predeceased his late father with
multiple ailments. Neither his late uncle nor they had any knowledge about the
subject case. His late father could not properly take care of the litigation due to
his ill-health. All the other legal heirs of his late father also had no knowledge
of the existence of the above case and other litigations until their father’s death.
Few days before the death, his late father told about the subject litigation.
However, he could not communicate the entire particulars as to the case number
and the Court in which the said litigation was pending, as his memory was
affected to some extent due to his prolonged illness i.e. cancer. After the
demise of his father, he along with his other siblings tried to enquire about the
pending litigations before various forums. Since his late father was unable to
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communicate the entire particulars of the litigations and also about the counsels
on record, it has become very difficult to trace the advocates on record and also
the litigations. However, they engaged the present counsel to know the
particulars and the status of the litigation. His counsel could able to trace the
litigation with great difficulty by spending considerable time. His counsel had
communicated to them that the case was dismissed for default on 26.09.2008.
Immediately, after attaining knowledge of the dismissal, they filed necessary
applications for impleading all the legal heirs of his late father and also the
present application for restoration of the said case by setting aside the order of
dismissal for default dated 26.09.2008.
11. The respondent No.4 to the said I.A. by name Y.Anthi Reddy filed
counter affidavit contending that the petition filed under Order IX Rule 9 read
with Section 151 of CPC for restoration of LAOP was not maintainable. The
petition was filed on 07.04.2014 seeking to restore LAOP.No.143 of 2004,
which was dismissed on 26.09.2008 i.e. more than 2000 days after the said
dismissal. The Collector referred the dispute to the Court under Section 30 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Once the petition was dismissed or disposed
of, the Court would become functus officio and has no power to restore the
original petition. The only remedy available to the petitioner was under Section
54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by filing an appeal before the High Court.
The Court by an order dated 10.02.2015 in I.A.No.570 of 2014 in
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L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004, dismissed the petition seeking to condone the delay in
restoring the petition. As per the petitioners, the claimants late Sri Gulam
Hussain died on 29.09.2013 i.e. almost five years after the dismissal of
L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004. The said fact would establish that the original
claimant late Sri Gulam Hussain abandoned his claim for his own reasons and
never pursued the case for about five years after the dismissal order dated
26.09.2008 before he died on 29.09.2013. The delay of more than 2000 days in
filing I.A.No.569 of 2014 was not explained by the petitioners on day to day
basis to restore L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004. The petitioners were guilty of
“suppresio vari suggestio falsi”. The predecessors in title of the petitioners who
were the original owners of the subject matter of property in Survey No.65 of
Madhapur Village, were allotted alternate land by the Special Officer and
Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceiling, Hyderabad, after verification of all
the documents and handed over physical possession of the property. The
petitioners were twisting the facts to suit their claim over the subject matter of
property. They were misleading the Court and were trying to get advantage of
those misleading facts. It was false to state that they could not trace the
previous counsel and had engaged Sri Palvai Jitender Reddy to enquire about
the status of the litigation, as the same learned counsel Sri Palvai Jithender
Reddy represented the claimants as well as the present petitioners before the
Court since 2004. The memos on record would establish the said fact. As such
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it was not open to the petitioners to make such misleading statement, seeking to
condone the delay of more than 2000 days and to revive the claim, which was
abandoned by the original claimant long back. In view of the suppression and
misrepresentation of the facts, they were not entitled for restoration of the main
L.A.O.P. In view of Article 122 of the Limitation Act, 1963, they had to seek
condonation of delay from the date of dismissal. There was no provision under
the Limitation Act, 1963 to seek the condonation of delay from the date of
knowledge about the dismissal. Order XXII Rule 2 of CPC and other rules
were applicable only if the party dies during the pendency of the main case. In
the present case, L.A.O.P. was dismissed on 26.09.2008 and the father of the
petitioners admittedly died on 29.09.2013. So, as on 29.09.2013, L.A.O.P. was
not pending and hence there was no question of bringing the legal
representatives on record. The LR petition has to be filed within 90 days from
the date of death of the party to the litigation and the petition to set aside the
abatement should be filed within 60 days from the expiry of the period of 90
days period as mentioned in Article 120. The Court by an order dated
10.02.2015 in I.A.No.570 of 2014 in L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004, dismissed the
petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, it was not open for
the Court to decide the above petition and prayed to dismiss the petition with
exemplary costs.
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12. The trial court on considering the contentions raised by the learned
counsel appearing for both the parties observed that I.A.No.570 of 2014 was
dismissed by the Court giving directions to the petitioners to take proper steps
to come on record. As such, the petitioners filed I.A.Nos.151 of 2015, 447 of
2015 and 448 of 2015 and the petitioners contended that as the original claimant
died, they were not having complete knowledge of the subject case, as such, lost
precious time to know about the dismissal of the petition. The Court further
observed that it was a settled principle of law that the Court could not dismiss
the reference case for default and the said order could be recalled in exercise of
the inherent powers of the Court. The approach of the Court should be liberal to
effectuate the intention of the Act. The reference in the main Land Acquisition
O.P. was made by respondent No.1 under Section 18 of the Act, hence allowed
the petition restoring L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004 to file.
13. Aggrieved by the said order dated 02.02.2021, the respondents 4 and 6
preferred these revisions.
14. Heard Sri C.Raghu, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri Lingampally
Ravinder, learned counsel for the petitioner – respondent No.6 on record in
C.R.P.Nos.450, 452, 455 and 463 of 2021 and Sri D.Jaipal Reddy, learned
counsel representing Sri Lingampally Ravinder, learned counsel for petitioner –
respondent No.4 on record in C.R.P.Nos.451, 458, 465 and 470 of 2021 and Sri
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M.Bharath Chandra, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 5 – claimants in
all the above petitions.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner – respondent No.6 submitted
that L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004 was a reference made under Sections 18 and 30 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1864. Originally there were two claimants by name
Shaik Gulam Hussain and Shaik Jahangir. After filing the said claim petition,
the second claimant i.e. Shaik Jahangir expired on 08.07.2008. Therefore on
the death of the second claimant, the entire case would stand abated for the
reason that the first and second claimants were alleging themselves as joint
owners of the property by inheriting the same from their father. Their alleged
interest in the property was indivisible. The case was dismissed for default on
26.09.2008. By that time the claimant No.1 Shaik Gulam Hussain was alive.
However, no application was filed during his lifetime either for setting aside the
dismissal order or for setting aside the abatement order in relation to the entire
case or atleast in relation to claimant No.2. The claimant No.1 Shaik Gulam
Hussain expired on 29.09.2013. Thereafter, for the first time two applications
were filed by the respondents – claimants, which were numbered as I.A.No.570
of 2014 and 569 of 2014. I.A.No.570 of 2014 was filed for condoning the delay
of 14 days for filing the application to set aside the dismissal order dated
26.09.2008. It was stated in the affidavit that the counsel had communicated to
them on 16.03.2014 about the dismissal order dated 26.09.2008 and they
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calculated the 14 days delay from the date of knowledge i.e. 16.03.2014 and
filed the application for condoning the delay. Along with the said delay
petition, they also filed I.A.No.569 of 2014 under Order IX Rule 9 of CPC for
restoration of L.A.O.P. The Registry instead of numbering only the delay
petition erroneously numbered both the petitions together. The restoration
petition ought not to have been numbered without the delay being condoned.
The order in I.A.No.570 of 2014 would disclose that the I.A. was dismissed on
two grounds. One, there was no sufficient cause shown by the petitioner even to
condone the delay of 14 days and the other that the legal heirs could not directly
file the petition. The said order attained finality since it was not challenged.
I.A.No.569 of 2014 was a consequential petition to I.A.No.570 of 2014. The
respondents had later filed three other petitions I.A.No.447 of 2015 for setting
aside the abatement order under Order XXII Rule 3 of CPC, I.A.No.448 of 2015
for condoning the delay in filing such petition and I.A.No.151 of 2015 for
bringing the legal representatives on record of claimant No.1. No LR petition
was filed in respect of claimant No.2, who infact died prior to dismissal of the
LAOP. Therefore, there was no LR petition on record in respect of claimant
No.2. The Registry again erred in numbering the petition filed for abatement
without condoning the delay in filing such petition. The entire record would
show that there was no LR petition filed for claimant No.2 in relation to whom
the proceedings stood abated. The LR petitions were filed only in relation to
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claimant No.1. The lower court without appreciating the aforesaid
discrepancies, passed a common order dated 02.02.2021 in I.A.Nos.447, 448
and 151 of 2015. The lower court failed to appreciate that unless I.A.No.448 of
2015 was decided, the other two consequential petitions could not be
considered. Even I.A.No.448 of 2015 had to be dismissed since the delay
petition i.e. I.A.No.570 of 2014 was dismissed on the ground that there was no
satisfactory explanation for the delay and the same reasoning had to be applied
for I.A.No.448 of 2015. The lower court failed to appreciate that in the light of
dismissal of I.A.No.570 of 2014, I.A.No.569 of 2014 would not exist. The
reasons stated in the affidavit filed in I.A.No.448 of 2015 were vague and no
sufficient material particulars have been furnished warranting the condonation
of delay. It was not stated as to how the petitioners in the said I.A.s calculated
the delay as 100 days. The lower court failed to appreciate that the LRs of the
claimant No.2 were supposed to file a petition for setting aside the abatement
for the reason that he expired before the dismissal of suit for default, whereas
the LRs of claimant No.1 could not file an application for setting aside, since
the case was not abated as against claimant No.1, who expired after the
dismissal of suit for default. Therefore, the petition filed for condonation of
delay in I.A.No.448 of 2014 in filing an application under Order XXII Rule 3
for setting aside the abatement was mis-conceived and the same was liable to be
dismissed. The entire order was silent with regard to the scope of
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maintainability of the petition filed by the legal heirs of claimant No.1 after
dismissal of the L.A.O.P. for default and the L.A.O.P. stood abated due to the
death claimant No.2 and none of the LRs of claimant No.2 had filed any petition
for bringing on record or for setting aside the abatement order. The lower court
failed to see that the delay was not 100 days, but it was more than 6 years. In
order to circumvent the said delay, the petitioners ingeniously filed the LR
petition for claimant No.1 in the year 2015. The Court ought not to have
invoked the inherent power in view of the above facts and as there was an
abnormal delay in filing the petitions. The claimants had suppressed the
material facts that during their lifetime, they had executed a registered
agreement of sale – cum – General Power of Attorney vide document No.6631
of 1996 dated 01.08.1996 in favor of Sri Y.Rajireddy. The claimants who were
the legal representatives of Gudasaheb had seized to be the owners of the land.
The claim of the claimants was adjudicated by the Special Grade Deputy
Collector and Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella, when the claimants
challenged the mutation orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer vide order
No.C/3595/2007, dated 28.11.2007. The said facts were suppressed by the
claimants. The entire payments were made to the claimants and possession was
delivered to the revision petitioners. The lower court ought to have seen that
when the application was dismissed as against respondent No.9 Sri K.Sridhar
Reddy, in whose name, a joint sale deed was registered in exchange of the land,
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the entire petition ought to have been dismissed and prayed to set aside the
orders dated 02.02.2021 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy
District at L.B.Nagar in I.A.Nos.569 of 2014 and 447, 448 and 151 of 2015.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner – respondent No.4 contended that the
Government initiated land acquisition proceedings to acquire land admeasuring
Ac.2-27 guntas in Survey No.65 and Ac.0-01 guntas in Survey No.66 situated at
Madhapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Rangareddy District by Gazette
Publication dated 28.11.1996. On the claim made by the revision petitioner Sri
Y.Anthi Reddy, the Government allotted alternate land to him for the land
acquired by the respondent towards compensation payable. On an application
made by the claimant in L.A.O.P.No.143 of 2004, the dispute was referred to
Civil Court for proper adjudication of land acquired in Survey No.65 of
Madhapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal, Rangareddy District. Hence, the
matter was referred to the Principal Senior Civil Judge Court and the claim
petition was numbered as O.P.No.143 of 2004. As the claim petitioners did not
evince any interest in prosecuting their case, O.P.No.143 of 2004 was dismissed
for default on 26.09.2008. The trial court on an erroneous application of law
and facts, passed the impugned order on 02.02.2021. The trial court failed to
see that the claimant No.1 died on 28.09.2013, but the O.P. was dismissed on
26.09.2008 and for five years during his lifetime the claimant kept quiet and did
not initiate any steps to restore O.P.No.143 of 2004. When the claimant died
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five years after dismissal of O.P.No.143 of 2004, there would be no question of
abatement as alleged by the respondents – claimants. The trial court after
dismissal of O.P.No.143 of 2004, would become functus officio. The Court
below failed to appreciate that limitation would start to run from the dismissal
of the main O.P., but not from the date of knowledge, as the petitioners in the
I.A. sought to step into the shoes of the original claimants in the O.P. The trial
court failed to appreciate that the Government was disinterested in the matter as
application was filed under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and as
there were rival claims between the claimants and respondents 4 to 10. The trial
court failed to address itself whether allowing application would cause prejudice
to the respondents 5 to 10 in the I.A. The trial court failed to observe that
without issuing any notice to the revision petitioners, the Court allowed the
applications filed by the respondents – claimants for condonation of delay,
setting aside abatement and for bringing the legal representatives of claimant
No.1 on record. The trial court entertaining I.A.No.569 of 2014 when
I.A.No.570 of 2014 was dismissed, was wholly erroneous. Allowing such
petitions without issuing notice to the contesting respondents was also an
illegality and prayed to set aside the impugned orders passed by the learned
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar, dated
02.02.2021.
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17. Both the learned counsel representing the petitioners – respondents 4 and
6 relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajmani v.
Collector, Raipur 1 , Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai and Others 2 ,
Pathapati Subba Reddy (dead) by LRs. And Others v. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA)3 and of the Division Bench of this Court in Land Acquisition
Officer, Deputy Collector, Pochampad v. Gonda Chinna Rajanna 4.
18. Learned counsel for the respondents – claimants on the other hand
contended that as per the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, once a reference under
Section 18 was made, the reference Court was under legal obligation to answer
the same on merits on the basis of evidence on record and such reference could
not be dismissed for default. The reference Court had no power to dismiss the
O.P. for default. The same was not valid as per law. The petitioners in the
CRPs were raising an issue that the claimant No.1 was alive as on the date of
dismissal and died five years after the dismissal. The claimant No.1 was
suffering with cancer and was under treatment and his brother Shaik Jahangir
also died much prior to the dismissal of O.P. due to health issues. As such, the
petition for restoration was filed afterwards. Hearing all the grounds for filing
petitions for restoration, abatement and others, the lower court had allowed all
the I.A.s. The lower court also clearly mentioned that it had no power to
1
(1996) 5 SCC 701
2
(1997) 9 SCC 710
3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 513
4
1999 (3) ALD 481 (DB)
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dismiss the case for non-appearance of claimant. The father of the petitioners in
the I.A., i.e. the claimant No.1 filed an application before the Land Acquisition
Officer that the land acquired pertained to him and without issuing notice to
him, a paper publication was made in three newspapers, which were not having
wide circulation. As the said petition filed by claimant No.1 was rejected, the
petitioners approached the High Court by filing Writ Petitions. The fraud
played by Y.Anthi Reddy and others was clearly enumerated in W.P.No.2516 of
2016 and W.P.No.18772 of 2017. I.A.No.570 of 2014 was dismissed giving a
direction to file proper applications and to take further steps. Though
I.A.Nos.569 and 570 were numbered in a reverse manner, the condonation of
delay petition was heard first and as per the directions given by the Court,
proper applications vide I.A.Nos.447, 448 and 151 of 2015 were filed for setting
aside abatement against claimant No.1, for bringing the LRs of claimant No.1
on record and to condone the delay of 100 days in filing the said petitions. In
Land Acquisition cases, Limitation Act could not be applied strictly as a hard
and fast rule. The Land Acquisition O.P.s. could not be dismissed for default
for non-prosecution and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Khazan Singh (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India 5 and K.Rudrappa v.
5
(2002) 2 SCC 242
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Shivappa 6 and of the judgment of High Court of Punjab and Haryana in
Gagandeep Singh and Others v. Parkash Singh and Others 7.
19. Now the point for consideration is whether the impugned orders passed
by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in
the above I.A.s. were in accordance with law or the same were liable to be set
aside?
20. A perusal of the record would disclose that O.P.No.143 of 2004 was a
reference made under Sections 18 & 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Originally, there were two claimants by name Shaik Gulam Hussain and Shaik
Jahangir. After filing the claim petition, the second claimant i.e. Shaik Jahangir
expired on 08.07.2008. The case was dismissed for default on 26.09.2008. The
claimant No.1 Shaik Gulam Hussain expired on 29.09.2013. Thereafter, the
legal representatives of claimant No.1 filed two applications vide I.A.No.569
and 570 of 2014. I.A.No.570 of 2014 is filed for condoning the delay of 14
days in filing the application to set aside the dismissal order dated 26.09.2008
and I.A.No.570 of 2014 is filed under Order IX Rule 9 of CPC for restoration of
the O.P. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the revision
petitioners, the restoration petition ought not to have been numbered, without
the delay being condoned. Admittedly I.A.No.570 of 2014 filed by the
6
AIR 2004 SC 4346
7
2014 LawSuit (P&H) 5543
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respondents – claimants for condonation of delay of 14 days was dismissed by
the lower court vide order dated 10.02.2015. The said order was not challenged
before any higher Court and the said order attained finality. The petition in
I.A.No.569 of 2014 filed under Order IX Rule 9 of CPC for restoration of O.P.
was consequential to I.A.No.570 of 2014. The said petition also ought to have
been dismissed when I.A.No.570 of 2014 was dismissed on merits. Keeping the
said petition pending and allowing the said petition on 02.02.2021 after a period
of six years by the lower court is erroneous. The learned Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar observing that I.A.Nos.447, 448 and
151 of 2015 were filed by the petitioners as per the directions of this Court
while dismissing I.A.No.570 of 2014, was not in accordance with law.
21. Filing of the petition for setting aside abatement order under Order XXII
Rule 3 by the legal representatives of claimant No.1 alone was also not
maintainable. As the property was a joint property, if one of the claimants dies
and no LRs were substituted within the prescribed time, the suit abates as
against him. When the rights and liabilities of the deceased claimant were
indivisible or joint along with claimant No.1, the abatement against the claimant
No.2 also would affect the entire proceedings, unless the claimant No.1 could
show that his rights were severable. As the claimants claimed compensation
jointly as coparceners, the right to claim was also joint and indivisible. In such
circumstances, the death of one claimant and not bringing his LRs on record
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would result in abatement of the whole O.P. Abatement was a consequence of
non-substitution of LRs of the deceased claimant after his death. Since the
property is claimed as joint family property, the right to compensation arises
from a common joint title. The death of one brother without substitution leads
to the abatement of the claim as to that person and abatement against one affects
the entire O.P. Restoration at the instance of the legal representatives of only
claimant No.1 cannot revive the entire O.P. unless they also bring on record the
legal representatives of the deceased claimant No.2. The trial court erred in
proceeding with the case as if the legal representatives of both the claimants
were before the Court. The claimant No.1 was alive for a period of five years
even after the death of claimant No.2 in the year 2008. No steps were taken by
him for bringing the legal representatives of claimant No.2 on record. He
abandoned the claim completely.
22. Even in I.A.No.448 of 2015 filed by the petitioners to condone the delay
in filing the petition for setting aside the abatement order under Order XXII
Rule 3 of CPC for bringing them on record as legal representatives of claimant
No.1, no satisfactory explanation was given by them. The legal representatives
of claimant No.1 had only stated that their father could not properly take care of
the litigation due to his ill-health, but had not filed any record to show as to
since when he was suffering with ill-health or the nature of cancer or that his
death was due to the said illness or he was confined to bed or unable to contact
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his counsel during the entire period. Though, they stated that due to prolonged
illness, it also affected his memory to some extent, no documentary evidence
was filed in proof of the same. They contended that their father was unable to
communicate the entire particulars of the litigation and about the counsel on
record and that it became very difficult to trace the advocates on record and also
the litigation. Only after engaging the present counsel, they could able to trace
the litigation. However, the counter filed by the respondents in the said I.A.
would disclose that they had engaged the same counsel Sri Palvai Jithender
Reddy, who was also the previous counsel to their late father. Though the delay
was more than 2000 days (of about 6 years), the LRs of claimant No.1 had not
calculated the delay properly and had shown it as 100 days, which was not
proper. Allowing the petition only on the ground that the Court could not
dismiss the reference case for default, is not a proper approach.
23. The Division Bench of the High Court in Land Acquisition Officer,
Deputy Collector, Pochampad v. Gonda Chinna Rajanna (cited supra),
wherein petitions were filed for restoration of reference by the petitioners after a
delay ranging from 17 years to 22 years to set aside the ex-parte decree and the
learned counsel for the respondents therein also submitted that the reference
made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, cannot be dismissed
for default of the claimant or it cannot be closed for non-appearance of the
claimant, the Division Bench observed that:
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crp_450_2021 & batch“In the Land Acquisition proceedings, when the Land
Acquisition Officer awards compensation and which was not
agreeable to the claimant, he has to request the Land
Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to the Civil Court for
deciding the market value of the land acquired. The Land
Acquisition Officer gives the proposal of the price which the
Government is going to offer to the claimant. If the proposal
was not acceptable to the claimant, then the reference has to be
made to the Civil Court by the Land Acquisition Officer. In the
reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, the claimant was required to lead oral as well as
documentary evidence to establish as to what was the correct
market value of the land acquired. In the absence of any
evidence on that point, the Civil Court cannot answer the
reference. Under such circumstances, the Civil Court has to set
the claimant ex-parte and to dismiss or close the reference for
non-prosecution by the claimant and it has to be interpreted that
the order passed by the Land Acquisition Officer has become
final. Whatever the word used by the Civil Court in closing the
reference or dismissing the reference, it has to be interpreted
that the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer is made
final.”
24. There cannot be any other interpretation than this. Thus, it cannot be
contended that when the claimants failed to prosecute the matter, the O.P.
cannot be dismissed for default.
25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (dead) by LRs.
and Others v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) (cited supra), wherein no
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steps were taken to substitute the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased
claimant in land acquisition matters, held that:
“13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts
should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with
the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals
and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial
justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one
hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed
liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act,
being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be
interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and
Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. [(2007) 11 SCC
285], it has been observed that different provisions of
Limitation Act may require different construction, as for
example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally
in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while
construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore,
follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in
construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying
Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed
strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of
limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and
the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section
5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a
balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act
in the matters of condoning the delay.
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16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach
in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the
courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors. vs. Katiji and Ors.
[(1987) 2 SCC 107], this Court in advocating the liberal
approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that
ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an
appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day’s delay in
filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay
may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary
in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should
be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the
delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned.
Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is
adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’
for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for
exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The
phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice oriented approach’ and
cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be
employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale
matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-
opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing
‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the
Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for
filing an appeal, substantive rights in favour of a decree-holder
accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The
decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of
time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.”
—
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23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81], this Court held that the discretion
to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon
the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression
‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation
Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even
though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it
has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the
statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it
stands and they have no power to condone the delay on
equitable grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the
aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in
which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting
liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands.
Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The Court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what
it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.” The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party
but the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim
dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard
but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a
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crp_450_2021 & batchsituation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision
vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarized to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide
on his part in the facts and circumstances of the
case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate delay
by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach
the court on time condoning the delay without
any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
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26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law,
as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident
that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a
fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial
justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of
the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise
of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such
as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due
diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if
the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in
filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning
the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
26. The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at
L.B.Nagar allowing the applications without any sufficient cause shown by the
LRs of claimant No.1, in condoning the inordinate delay of almost six years in
filing the petitions without properly counting the delay and without any
documentary evidence filed by the LRs of claimant No.1, only on the ground
that the Court could not dismiss the reference case for default, is considered as
erroneous.
27. Article 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes 30 days period for filing
restoration application against dismissal for default and states that the same has
to be calculated from the date of dismissal. The said mandate was not followed
by the petitioners in the above I.A.s while calculating the delay.
28. The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge had also not considered that
I.A.No.569 of 2014 is consequential to I.A.No.570 of 2014 and if I.A.No.570 of
2014 is dismissed, I.A.No.569 of 2014 could not be restored. The learned
Principal Senior Civil Judge also failed to observe that the LRs of claimant No.2
were not brought on record and the O.P. would not be maintainable without
bringing the LRs on record in respect of claimant No.2. In view of all these
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errors committed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy
District at L.B.Nagar, the orders in these above I.A.s are liable to be set aside.
29. In the result, all the above Civil Revision Petitions are allowed setting
aside the orders dated 02.02.2021 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in all the I.A.s. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in these petitions, if any,
shall stand closed.
_____________________
Dr. G.RADHA RANI, J
Date: 10.06.2025
Nsk.