Jharkhand High Court
St. Joseph’S College vs Jharkhand State Information … on 20 June, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 358 of 2024
------
St. Joseph's College, situated at Torpa, P.O. and P.S. Torpa, District
Khunti, through its principal namely, through its principal namely,
Emmanuel Bage, aged about 68 years, son of Late Daniel Bage, Resident
of Torpa, P.O. & P.S. Torpa, District Khunti (Jharkhand).
... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
1. Jharkhand State Information Commission, through Chief Information
Commissioner, National Informatics Centre Jharkhand State Centre,
2nd Floor, Engg. Hostel-2, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi
PIN-834004, (Jharkhand).
2. Prof. Akshay Kumar Rai, Father's name not known to the petitioner,
resident of Village Shantinagar, P.O. and P.S. Torpa, District Khunti,
PIN- 835227 (Jharkhand)
3. The State of Jharkhand
... Respondents/Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
------
For the Appellant : Mr. Prakhar Harit, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-IA
For the J.S.I.C. : Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate
For the Resp. No. 2 : Mr. Vishal Kr. Rai, Advocate
------
Order No.
CAV on 11th June, 2025 Pronounced on 20th June, 2025
1
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. This appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against
the order dated 02.05.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 6689 of 2016 whereby and
whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed by declining to
interfere with the order dated 30.09.2016 passed in Appeal Case No.
334/16 contained in memo dated 07.10.2016 by the Jharkhand State
Information Commission.
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the petition
needs to be refer herein which reads as under:
The appellant college has been established under the aegis and
control of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act,
1860 and the respondent no.2 was a professor of the appellant
college who sought certain information vide his application dated
14.09.2015 from the college (writ petitioner/appellant herein).
The Respondent No. 2, Professor Akshay Kumar Rai made an
application before the Principal cum Public Information Officer
under the Right to Information Act, 2005 seeking information
regarding the appellant-college.
The Respondent No. 2 had sought some information under the
RTI Act, 2005 which reads as under:
(a) Copy of the Audit Report for the periods 2011-12 to 2014-15;
(b) Copy of the Utility Certificate for the periods 2011-12 to 2014-15;
2
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
(c) Proceedings of the Minutes of the Governing Body of St. Joseph’s
College for the periods 2011-12 to 2014-15;
(d) The concerned Rules which have been relied upon by the St.
Joseph’s College, Khunti for not making payment of the grant-in-
aid received from the State Government to the teachers working
under the said Government for the periods 2012-13 to 2014-15.
3. But the aforesaid required information was not provided, by the
college/writ petitioner. Thereafter, the Respondent No. 2 approached
the Chief Information Commissioner stating inter alia that the
information required by him with regard to the appellant-college has
not been provided to him and thus filed Second Appeal before the
Jharkhand State Information Commission on 01.02.2016 which was
registered as Appeal Case No. 334 of 2016.
4. The appellant-college was in receipt of a letter issued by the office of
the Respondent No. 1, Jharkhand State Information Commission,
wherein notice of hearing of appeal case was issued to the appellant.
5. In reply to the above notice, the appellant inter alia stated that the
appellant is neither a Public Authority as defined under Section 2(h)
of the Right to Information Act, 2005 nor the information sought for
by Resp. No. 2 is required to be furnished to him in view of the
Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005.
6. In continuation of the reply given to the Resp. No. 2, the appellant
reiterated its stand that the appellant is a not a Public Authority as
defined under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and
the information sought for by the Respondent No. 2 from the
3
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
appellant falls under the category of Exempted Information as
provided under Section 8 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and
hence the appellant college was not liable to furnish information to
the Respondent No. 2.
7. The respondent no.1 Jharkhand State Information Commission vide
order dated 30.09.2016 passed in Appeal Case No. 334 of 2016,
issued vide Memo No. 23354 dated 07.10.2016, while giving due
consideration to the provisions of RTI Act 2005 has held that since
the appellant college receives aid from the Government of Jharkhand,
the writ petitioner/appellant college is obligated to furnish the
information asked for it under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
8. Aggrieved by the order dated 30.09.2016 passed in Appeal Case No.
334 of 2016, the writ petitioner preferred writ petition W.P.(C) No.
6689 of 2016.
9. Before the learned writ Court the ground has been taken by the
petitioner that the college has been established under the aegis and
control of Khunti Catholic Diocese which is a society registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is not a Public Authority as
defined under right to Information Act, 2005 and hence the appellant
does not fall under the provision of RTI Act, 2005 and is not obligated
under the law to provide information which has been sought by
Respondent No. 2.
10. Further ground has been taken that the appellant college is neither
4
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
controlled nor substantially financed by the funds provided by the
appropriate Government and is thus not a Public Authority in terms
of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005.The appellant college receives
grant in aid from the State Government for payment of salary to its
employees, but it is only a scanty fraction of the amount which is
spent by the college by giving salaries to the teachers and meeting
other expenses of the College.
11. It has been submitted that the appellant is a Minority Institution duly
recognized by the National Commission for Minority Educational
Institution, Government of Jharkhand and Articles 29 and 30 of the
Constitution of India recognizes the Right of the Minority to protect
its right and interest and to establish and administer its educational
institutions. The above Fundamental Right of the appellant college
has been sought to the infringed and violated by the Respondent No.
2, by seeking information from the appellant college which pertains
to day-to-day affairs of the appellant college/educational institution.
12. Per contra the learned counsel for respondent has submitted before
the writ Court that the writ petitioner college in question falls within
Section 2 (h) (i) of Right to Information Act; hence, it is liable to
furnish information sought by the respondent no.2 and further the
counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of the writ court
about grant in aid as received by the petitioner college under
Jharkhand State Unaided Educational Institution (Grant) Rule, 2004.
5
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
13. The writ petition of the writ petitioner/ appellant was taken up and
vide order dated 02.05.2024 the learned Single Judge dismissed the
writ petition on the ground that since the college is substantially
financed both directly and indirectly by the fund provided by the
appropriate government; hence, the writ petitioner college can be
termed as a public authority within the meaning of Section 2 (h) (i)of
Right to Information Act, 2005.
14. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 02.05.2024 the
present appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioner college.
15. It is evident from the factual aspect that the information seeker, the
respondent No. 2, has made an application for seeking information
from the petitioner college providing therein the details of the
expenditure incurred by the petitioner college which has been
received from the State Government by grant-in-aid.
16. The information has not furnished as such finally the second appeal
was preferred before the Jharkhand State Information Commissioner
under the provision of second appeal as provided under Section 19 of
the Right to Information Act, 2005.
17. The Jharkhand State Information Commission has passed an order
directing to provide information to information seeker, the said
direction has been challenged by the petitioner college by invoking
the jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
6
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
18. The ground has been taken that the petitioner college is a institution
having not come under the fold of Right to Information Act, 2005 and
as such the Commission has no jurisdiction to direct the appellant-
college to provide information to the information seeker.
19. The learned Single Judge has not agreed to the said ground on the
pretext that the college is coming under the fold of public authority
as defined under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005
particularly 2(h)(i) thereof. The said order is challenged by way of
the present appeal.
Arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant:
20. Mr. Prakhar Harit, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
assailed the impugned order by taking the following grounds:
i. The learned Single Judge has not appreciated that the college
in question is not a public authority having no control of the
State Government and hence is not coming under the fold of
Right to Information Act, 2005. Hence there cannot be any
direction by the Commission to provide information to the
information seeker.
ii. The providing of information by the college to the information
seeker will be continued to the statutory provision as
contained under Right to Information Act, 2005 due to the
reason that when the college is not government fold, there
7
2025:JHHC:16367-DBcannot be any control for providing details and to substantiate
his arguments, he has relied upon the judgment rendered in
the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited
and others V. State of Kerala and others (2013) 16 SCC 82.
21. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted
that there is no consideration of the aforesaid issue in right
perspective and as such, the impugned order needs interference.
Arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondents:
22. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2, the
information seeker, has taken the following grounds by defending the
impugned judgment.
i. It has been submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the
college to take the ground that the college in question is not
under the control of the State Government rather the college
in question will not come under the fold of the private
authority rather the college in question is a public authority,
by virtue of the reason that substantial fund is released by the
State Government by grant-in-aid.
ii. It has been contended that the moment, the aid is being given
by the State Government, the college in question will come
under the fold of Right to Information Act, 2005 in view of the
provision of Section 2 (h)(d)(i).
8
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
23. The learned Single Judge, by taking into consideration the aforesaid
statutory command has refused to interfere with the impugned order
as well as it cannot be said that the order impugned suffers from an
error.
24. Mr. Sanjay Piprawall, learned counsel appearing for the Jharkhand
State Information Commission has adopted the argument advanced
by the learned counsel appearing for information seeker.
Analysis
25. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleading made in the memo of appeal and also the
finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.
26. The core question which requires consideration as to whether the
college in question, the appellant-petitioner herein will come under
the fold of Right to Information Act, 2005 requiring to provide
information to the information seeker?
27. This Court, before answering the aforesaid issue and appreciating the
argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner, deems it fit and
proper to refer the object and intent of the Act, 2005.
28. The said Act came into effect on 15th June, 2005, and is hereby
published for general information. The Right to Information Act is an
Act to provide for setting out the practical regime of right to
information for citizens to secure access to information under the
control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and
9
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
accountability in the working of every public authority, the
constitution of a Central Information Commission and State
Information Commissions and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto.
29. In the case of Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain
Abbas Rizwi, (2012) 13 SCC 61 the Hon’ble Apex Court while
considering the object and intent of the Act 2005 has observed that
the scheme of the Act contemplates for setting out the practical
regime of the right to information for citizens to secure access to
information under the control of public authorities, in order to
promote transparency and accountability in the working of every
public authority. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
aforesaid order is being quoted as under:
10. The scheme of the Act contemplates for setting
out the practical regime of the right to information
for citizens to secure access to information under the
control of public authorities, in order to promote
transparency and accountability in the working of
every public authority. It was aimed at providing free
access to information with the object of making
governance more transparent and accountable.
Another right of a citizen protected under the
Constitution is the right to privacy. This right is
enshrined within the spirit of Article 21 of the
Constitution. Thus, the right to information has to be
balanced with the right to privacy within the
framework of law.
10
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
30. Further an applicant under RTI Act can seek information from bodies
established under the Constitution, any statute, rules or notifications
as provided by Section 2(h)(a) to Section 2 (h)(d), Act 2005.
Information can also be sought from non-statutory bodies/NGOs if
they are owned, controlled or substantially financed by appropriate
Government as proved by Section 2(h)(d)(i) and Section 2(h)(d)(ii)
though they need not qualify the test of “State” or “instrumentality of
State” under Article 12 of Constitution. The definition of ‘public
authority’ under Section 2(1)(h) RTI Act does not talk of ‘deep and
pervasive’ control. It is enough if it is shown that the authority is
‘controlled’ by the central government.
31. This Court, in order to answer the aforesaid issue, needs to refer
herein the definition of public authority as defined in Section 2(h) in
entirety which is being referred herein.
2(h) “public authority” means any authority or body
or institution of selfgovernment established or
constituted– (a) by or under the Constitution; (b) by
any other law made by Parliament; (c) by any other
law made by State Legislature; (d) by notification
issued or order made by the appropriate Government,
and includes any– (i) body owned, controlled or
substantially financed; (ii) non-Government
organisation substantially financed, directly or
indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate
Government;
32. It is evident from the definition of public authority as contained in
11
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
Section 2 (h)(d)(i), any authority or body or institution of self-
government established or constituted, and by notification issued or
order made by state legislature, if owned, controlled or substantially
financed, such institution will come under the fold of public authority
and thereby it comes under the purview of Right to Information Act,
2005.
33. The issue of substantially financed has taken into consideration by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.A.V. College Trust and
Management Society and Others v. Director of Public Instructions
and others (supra) wherein it has been held that the substantial
finance does not mean finance involved is more than 50 per cent of
the institution, the material consideration which requires to be
considered is that the amount is more if the finance is less than 50
per cent, such finance can be turned as substantial finance, the
relevant para is being referred herein which reads as under:
27. Whether an NGO or body is substantially financed
by the Government is a question of fact which has to
be determined on the facts of each case. There may be
cases where the finance is more than 50% but still
may not be called substantially financed. Supposing a
small NGO which has a total capital of Rs 10,000 gets
a grant of Rs 5000 from the Government, though this
grant may be 50%, it cannot be termed to be
substantial contribution. On the other hand, if a body
or an NGO gets hundreds of crores of rupees as grant
but that amount is less than 50%, the same can still
be termed to be substantially financed.
12
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
34. This Court has found from the material available on record and also
from the order impugned that the grant in aid has been received by
the college in question under the Jharkhand State Unaided
Educational Institution (Grant) Rules 2004.
35. The grant in aid which has been received by the college in question
under the Jharkhand State Unaided Educational Institution (Grant)
Rules 2004, the same is being reproduced by the tabular chart:
Sessions Amount (in Rupees)
2009-10 3,15,685
2010-11 7,77,778
2011-12 10,80,000
2012-13 10,80,000
2013-14 14,40,000
2014-15 14,40,000
2015-2016 40,00,000
36. The factum of release of grant in aid in pursuance to the statutory
command as contained under Jharkhand State Unaided Educational
Institution (Grant) Rules 2004 has not been disputed by the
petitioner college.
37. However, the dispute has been made by relying upon the judgment in
13
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited and
others V. State of Kerala and others(supra).
38. For proper appreciation of the aforesaid contention, it would be apt
to refer herein the factual aspect of the aforesaid case. In the said
case the seminal question was put before the Hon’ble Apex Court that
whether a cooperative society registered under the Kerala
Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (for short “the Societies Act“) will fall
within the definition of “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the
Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short “the RTI Act“) and be bound
by the obligations to provide information sought for by a citizen
under the RTI Act.
39. As per the fact of the aforesaid case a Full Bench of the Kerala High
Court, in its judgment in Mulloor Rural Coop. Society Ltd. v. State
of Kerala [AIR 2012 Ker 124] , answered the question in the
affirmative and upheld Circular No. 23 of 2006 dated 1-6-2006,
issued by the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Kerala stating
that all the cooperative institutions coming under the administrative
control of the Registrar, are “public authorities” within the meaning
of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act and obliged to provide information as
sought for. The question was answered by the Full Bench in view of
the conflicting views expressed [Mulloor Rural Coop. Society
Ltd. v. State of Kerala, Writ Appeal No. 1688 of 2009, order dated
24-3-2011 (Ker)] by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in
Writ Appeal No. 1688 of 2009, with an earlier judgment of the
14
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
Division Bench in Thalapalam Service Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Union of
India [AIR 2010 Ker 6] , wherein the Bench took the view that the
question as to whether a cooperative society will fall under Section
2(h) of the RTI Act is a question of fact, which will depend upon the
question whether it is substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by
the funds provided by the State Government which, the Court held,
has to be decided depending upon the fact situation of each case.
40. The Hon’ble Apex Court while taking in to consideration the core of
the Act 2005 particularly the term substantially financed has
observed that the Cooperative Societies registered under the Kerala
Cooperative Societies Act will not fall within the definition of “public
authority” as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.
41. It is evident that the fact of the aforesaid case is quite different from
the present one, since the said case is of co-operative society
registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act which is under
the control of Registrar of Co-operative Society would be falling
within the definition of public authority under Section 2(h) of the
Right to Information Act, 2005 and while answering the same, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has pleased to hold that the co-operative society
registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act will not fall
within the definition of public authority as defined under Section
2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. In absence of material to
show that their own control on such consideration of such
substantially finance by the appropriate Government, the relevant
15
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
para needs to refer herein:
69. We, therefore, hold that the Cooperative Societies
registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act
will not fall within the definition of “public authority”
as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act and the
State Government Letter dated 5-5-2006 and the
Circular dated 1-6-2006 issued by the Registrar of
Cooperative Societies, Kerala, to the extent, made
applicable to societies registered under the Kerala
Cooperative Societies Act would stand quashed in the
absence of materials to show that they are owned,
controlled or substantially financed by the
appropriate Government. The appeals are, therefore,
allowed as above, however, with no order as to costs.
42. The judgment rendered in the case of Thalappalam Service
Cooperative Bank Limited and others V. State of Kerala and others
(supra) although is not applicable, but even in the said judgment, it
has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the applicability
of Section 2(h) will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
and every case to be assessed independently with the facts involved
therein. It has also been observed in the said judgment that in a case
if the materials to show that they are owned, controlled or
substantially financed by the appropriate Government, then Section
2(h) of the RTI Act 2005, will be applicable.
43. Further, the consideration which is to be given by the Court that the
financial aid is substantial or not. If the financial aid by the State is
substantial, then certainly Section 2(h) of the Act, 2005 will be
16
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
applicable.
44. Substantial financed has also been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex
court in the case of Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited
and others V. State of Kerala and others (supra). For ready
reference, the relevant para of the said judgment is being referred
herein which reads as under:
Substantially financed
46. The words “substantially financed” have been used in
Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii), while defining the expression
public authority as well as in Section 2(a) of the Act,
while defining the expression “appropriate Government”.
A body can be substantially financed, directly or indirectly
by funds provided by the appropriate Government. The
expression “substantially financed”, as such, has not been
defined under the Act. “Substantial” means “in a
substantial manner so as to be substantial”.
In Palser v. Grinling [1948 AC 291 : (1948) 1 All ER 1
(HL)] , while interpreting the provisions of Section 10(1)
of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923,
the House of Lords held that “substantial” is not the same
as “not unsubstantial” i.e. just enough to avoid the de
minimis principle. The word “substantial” literally means
solid, massive, etc. The legislature has used the expression
“substantially financed” in Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii)
indicating that the degree of financing must be actual,
existing, positive and real to a substantial extent, not
moderate, ordinary, tolerable, etc.
45. The issue of substantial financial aid whether available or not is
evident from the admitted fact as has been reproduced by way of
17
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
tabular chart as available in Para 19 hereinabove that the State is
aiding under the Jharkhand State Unaided Educational Institution
(Grant) Rules 2004, the amount to the tune of Rs. 3,15,000 in the year
2009-10, Rs. 7,77,778 in the year 2010-11, Rs. 10,80,000 in the 2011-
12, Rs. 10,80,000 in the 2012-13, Rs. 14,40,000 in the year 2013-14,
Rs. 14,40,000 in the year 2014-15 which has been enhanced later to
Rs. 40,00,000 in the financial year 2015-16.
46. This Court, therefore is of the view that the aforesaid financial aid is
substantial and hence applying the ratio in the case of Thalappalam
Service Cooperative Bank Limited and others V. State of Kerala
and others (supra) or the D.A.V. College Trust and Management
Society and Others v. Director of Public Instructions and others
(supra), the college in question will come under the fold of Section
2(h) of the Act 2005.
47. The issue accordingly is being answered.
48. This Court, after having answered the issue, has gone through the
order passed by the learned Single Judge, has found therefrom that
the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the implication
of Section 2(h) as also the receiving of grant in aid by the State
Government under the provision of 2(h)(d)(i) and therefore has
came to the conclusion of applicability of the judgment rendered in
the case of D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society and
Others v. Director of Public Instructions and others (supra) holding
18
2025:JHHC:16367-DB
further that since the writ petitioner college (appellant herein) is
substantially financed both directly and indirectly by the fund
provided by the appropriate government; hence, the writ petitioner
college can be termed as a public authority within the meaning of
Section 2 (h) (i)of Right to Information Act, 2005.
49. This Court based upon the discussion made hereinabove, is of the
view that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore,
suffers from no error as requires no interference.
50. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed.
51. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Samarth/A.F.R.
19