Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Stanzin Lakpa Son Of Nawang Khatup … vs Ut Of Jammu And Kashmir And Another on 7 April, 2025
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND
LADAKHAT JAMMU
CRM(M) No. 77/2025
Stanzin Lakpa son of Nawang Khatup resident of Surley Skisherak
Zanskar ...petitioners
Through: -Mr.Shray Bakshi Advocate
Vs.
UT of Jammu and Kashmir and another
...respondents
Through: - Mr Eishan Dadeechi CGSC.
Mr. Rajit Raina Advocate
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1 Instant petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking
quashment of FIR bearing No.0085/2024 dated 23.05.2024 for offences
under Sections 294, 336 & 506 IPC registered with Police Station, Leh
2 Briefly stated, the allegations in the impugned FIR are that
on 23.05.2024, the Police of Police Station, Leh received a written
complaint from Sh. Jamyang Tsering Namgyal, Member of Parliament,
Union Territory of Ladakh, requesting registration of an FIR on the
ground that the petitioner herein entered the house of the complainant,
pelted stones at the house, and gave life threats to his family members
while they were sleeping. These events occurred in the presence of
police guards posted at the complainant’s residence at the relevant time
and were captured on CCTV. Based on the said complaint, the
impugned FIR came to be registered against the petitioner.
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2
3. It seems that a compromise has been arrived at between
the petitioner and respondent No.2, a copy whereof is annexed with the
petition.
4 As per the compromise deed, which has been executed on
24.12.2024, the petitioner and respondent No.2 have settled their
disputes amicably. It is further stated in the compromise deed that the
complainant-respondent No.2 has undertaken not to pursue the
impugned FIR.
5 In order to verify the execution of the compromise arrived
at between the parties, this Court, vide order dated 17.03.2025, directed
the parties to appear before the Principal District Judge, Leh, for
recording their statements. Ordinarily, such statements are recorded
before the Registrar Judicial. However, since the parties were unable to
appear physically before this Court as both of them are residing in Leh,
they were directed to appear before the Principal District Judge, Leh,
for the purpose.
6 Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the Principal District
Judge, Leh has recorded the statements of the parties, copies whereof
have been sent to the Registry of this Court and have been placed on
record. In their statements, the parties have admitted the contents of the
compromise deed as well as its execution.
3
7 Learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed that the
impugned FIR may be quashed on the basis of the compromise arrived
at between the parties.
8 I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record.
9 So far as the facts pertaining to the compromise arrived at
between the parties, in terms of compromise deed dated 17.03.2025 are
concerned, the same are not disputed. However, some of the offences
alleged to have been committed by the petitioners are
non-compoundable in nature. In the backdrop of this position, the
question arises as to whether this Court has power to quash the
proceedings, particularly when some of the offences alleged to have
been committed by the petitioners are non-compoundable in nature.
The Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh. v. State of Punjab &
another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, while considering this
aspect, has observed as under:
“57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can
be summarised thus:
The power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with
the guideline engrafted in such power viz;
(i) to secure the ends of justice or;
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(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what
cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the
offender and victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and
the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are
not private in nature and have serious impact on
society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim
and offender in relation to the offences under special
statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the
wrong is basically private or personal in nature and
the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, High Court may quash criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
criminal case would put accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise with the
victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest
of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
5continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and
if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative,
the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding..”
10 Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case titled Narinder
Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & anr, reported in (2014) 6 SCC
466, has laid down guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings.
The guidelines are reproduced as under:
“31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would
be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement
between c/w CRM(M) No.614/2021 the parties and exercising
its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept
the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
proceedings:
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in
those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties
have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed,
the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
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(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. (III) Such a
power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve
heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for
offences alleged to have been committed under special statute
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity
are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising
out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the
parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine
as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak
and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be
generally treated as crime against the society and not against
the individual alone. However, the High Court c/w CRM(M)
No.614/2021 would not rest its decision merely because there
is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report
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in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be
the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis,
the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the
later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept
the plea compounding the offence based on complete
settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can
also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship. (VII) While deciding whether
to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not,
timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It
is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is
still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise,
those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet
to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court
can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution
evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the
High Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and
to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section
307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the
matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a c/w CRM(M)
No.614/2021 ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal
of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and
conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and,
8
therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty
of such a crime.”
11 From a perusal of the aforesaid observations of the
Supreme Court, it is clear that in the cases or disputes which have
predominantly civil flavour and where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute, the
High Court would be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceedings if it is known that because of the compromise arrived at
between the parties, there is remote possibility of securing conviction
of the accused. In fact, in such cases, the Supreme Court has clearly
observed that it would amount to extreme injustice if despite settlement
having been arrived at by the parties, the criminal proceedings are
allowed to continue.
12 Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the
parties to the dispute, i.e., petitioner and respondent No.2, have entered
into a compromise, whereby respondent No.2 has decided not to pursue
the prosecution against the petitioner in the impugned FIR. Therefore,
once the rival groups have arrived at a settlement as regards the basis of
the dispute, allowing the prosecutions to continue merely because some
of the offences alleged against the accused are non-compoundable in
nature would amount to great injustice to both the parties and, in fact, it
will amount to frittering away the fruits of compromise that has been
arrived at between the parties. The continuance of criminal proceedings
against the petitioners, in these circumstances, will be nothing, but an
abuse of process of law.
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13 For the foregoing reasons, this is a fit case where this
Court must exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS, which
corresponds to Section 482 of the J&K Cr.P.C to quash the impugned
FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom so as to secure the ends
of justice.
14 Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the impugned FIR
and the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
Jammu
07.04.2025
Whether the order is speaking: Yes/No
Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No