Delhi High Court – Orders
State Nct Of Delhi vs Pratap Barik on 4 August, 2025
$~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.L.P. 255/2022
STATE NCT OF DELHI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam,
APP for the State with SI
Maya Shankar, PS Preet
Vihar.
versus
PRATAP BARIK .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Varun Dev Mishra,
Mr. Mrinmoi Chatterjee
and Ms. Kirti Lal, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
ORDER
% 04.08.2025
1. The present petition is filed under Section 378 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC‘) seeking grant of leave to
challenge the judgment dated 04.08.2020 (hereafter ‘impugned
judgment’), in Sessions Case No. 2298/2016 arising out of FIR
No. 335/2016, registered at Police Station Preet Vihar, whereby
the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent for the
offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(‘IPC‘).
2. The brief facts are that the accused/respondent was
introduced to the prosecutrix by one of her friends in the year
2010, whereafter, he started frequently meeting her on different
occasions.
3. It is alleged that on 12.09.2015 at around 10:00 p.m., the
accused/respondent along with his friend came to the house of
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the prosecutrix and asked her to meet them. Initially, the
prosecutrix objected due to late hours, however, upon their
insistence she agreed to meet them.
4. It is alleged that all of them went to a restaurant to have
dinner, whereafter, the accused/respondent told the prosecutrix
that he loves her and thereafter proposed her to get married.
5. It is alleged that thereafter the accused/respondent started
regularly visiting the house of the prosecutrix, however, the
prosecutrix asked the accused/respondent to not visit her house
before marriage.
6. It is alleged that on 08.11.2015, the accused/respondent
visited the house of the prosecutrix and established forceful
physical relations with her, whereafter, the accused/respondent
tried to convince the prosecutrix that nothing wrong has
undergone and they will be husband and wife after marriage.
7. It is alleged that the prosecutrix used to frequently ask the
accused/respondent regarding their marriage, however, he used to
avoid the same.
8. It is alleged that the accused/respondent repeatedly
established forceful sexual relations with the prosecutrix from
08.11.2015 to 13.04.2016, whereafter, the accused/respondent
stopped talking to the prosecutrix.
9. Pursuant to which on the basis of the compliant given by
the prosecutrix, the police registered FIR No. 335/2016 under
Sections 376/120B/34 of the IPC.
10. The police thereafter recorded the statement of the
prosecutrix under Section 164 of the CrPC and subsequently
arrested the accused/respondent.
CRL.L.P. 255/2022 Page 2 of 9
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11. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed
against the accused/respondent under Sections 376/376(2)(n) of
the IPC.
12. The learned Trial Court vide order dated 03.04.2018
framed charges under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC against the
accused/respondent to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed
trial.
13. The accused/respondent in his statement under Section 313
of the CrPC denied the entire evidence against him and stated
that he has been falsely implicated in the present case.
14. The learned Trial Court noting the inconsistencies in the
statement of the prosecutrix acquitted the accused/respondent by
the impugned judgment.
15. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State
submits that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the fact
that the accused/respondent had first assured her that he will
marry her and thereafter established sexual relations with the
prosecutrix.
16. He submits that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate
the fact that all though the prosecutrix has not mentioned the
specific dates on which the accused/respondent had established
sexual relations with her, however, in her testimony she had
deposed that the accused/respondent had repeatedly established
forceful sexual relations with her.
17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the accused/respondent
vehemently opposes the arguments raised by the learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and consequently
prays that the present petition be dismissed.
CRL.L.P. 255/2022 Page 3 of 9
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18. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.
Analysis
19. It is trite law that this Court must exercise caution and
should only interfere in an appeal against acquittal where there
are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. At the stage of
grant of leave to appeal, the High Court has to see whether a
prima facie case is made out in favour of the appellant or if such
arguable points have been raised which would merit interference.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maharashtra v. Sujay
Mangesh Poyarekar: (2008) 9 SCC 475 held as under:
“19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of
appeal by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3)
declares that no appeal “shall be entertained except with
the leave of the High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for
the State where it is aggrieved by an order of acquittal
recorded by a Court of Session to file an application for
leave to appeal as required by sub-section (3) of Section
378 of the Code. It is also true that an appeal can be
registered and heard on merits by the High Court only after
the High Court grants leave by allowing the application
filed under sub- section (3) of Section 378 of the Code.
20. In our opinion, however, in deciding the question
whether requisite leave should or should not be granted,
the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a
prima facie case has been made out or arguable points
have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal
would or would not be set aside.
21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of
law of universal application that each and every petition
seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of
acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the
appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and
decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that at
that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of
the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that
the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could
not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be
granted.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. The learned Trial Court vide the impugned judgment
CRL.L.P. 255/2022 Page 4 of 9
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acquitted the accused/respondent for the said offences on the
ground that there were material inconsistencies in the depositions
made by the prosecutrix.
21. PW-1, the prosecutrix in her cross-examination deposed
that the accused/respondent had allegedly proposed to her for the
first time in 2011 and she had accepted the said proposal.
However, she had not disclosed the same in her complaint and
had only stated that the accused/respondent had proposed to her
on 12.09.2015 while they were having dinner at a restaurant.
22. The prosecutrix further deposed that on 12.09.2015 the
accused/respondent had allegedly stayed with her for three hours
and kept on convicting her regarding their marriage, however, the
said fact has not been disclosed by the prosecutrix in her
complaint.
23. The learned Trial Court noted that the prosecutrix in her
compliant has only deposed regarding one alleged incident of
sexual intercourse that is on 08.11.2015 and had given a vague
statement that the accused/respondent had repeatedly established
sexual relations with her.
24. In her examination-in-chief the prosecutrix stated that the
accused/respondent had allegedly established forceful sexual
relations with her on four occasions being 08.11.2015, December
2015, January 2016 and April 2016.
25. It is trite law that the accused can be convicted solely on
the basis of evidence of the prosecutrix as long as same inspires
confidence and corroboration is not necessary for the same [Ref.
Moti Lal v. State of M.P. : (2008) 11 SCC 20]. However, as
noted above, the testimony of the prosecutrix is full of
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inconsistencies and the same does not inspire confidence. The
benefit of the same has to go to the accused/respondent.
26. In the present case, the prosecutrix had deposed that the
accused/respondent had allegedly established forceful sexual
relations with her on many occasions. However, neither in her
compliant, statement under Section 164 of the CrPC nor her
testimony before the learned Trial Court has, she deposed that
she resisted or raised an alarm while the accused/respondent was
committing the alleged offence.
27. The learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment noted
that the prosecutrix had deposed that the accused/respondent used
to visit her house after confirming from her whether she was
alone or not.
28. If the accused/respondent had allegedly established
forceful sexual relations with her on 08.11.2015, then she should
have not allowed the accused/respondent to enter her house again
and commit the alleged offence yet again.
29. Further, the allegations levelled against the
accused/respondent were not supported by any other
corroborative evidence either in the form of the evidence given
by any of the prosecution witnesses or any medical evidence.
30. In the present case, it is not denied that the prosecutrix had
known the accused/respondent for a long time. The alleged
incident is stated to have taken place for the first time in the
month of November, 2015 however no complaint was made at
the time.
31. Thereafter, the prosecutrix alleges that she succumbed to
the entreaties of the accused/respondent to have sexual relations
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with him, on account of the promise to marry, and therefore
continued to have sex on several occasions and even then, no
complaint was made by her.
32. The prosecutrix further alleged that the last alleged
incident took place on 13.04.2016 and subsequently, the FIR was
registered on 06.10.2016, that is, almost one year from the first
alleged incident.
33. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Meharaj Singh
(L/Nk.) v. State of U.P. : (1994) 5 SCC 188, held as under:
“12. …Delay in lodging the FIR often results in
embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On
account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the
advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the
introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story…”
34. It is not disputed that the prosecutrix was a major at the
time of the alleged incident. Further, the prosecutrix and the
accused/respondent were in a relationship and enjoyed each
other’s company.
35. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of
Maharashtra : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471, the Hon’ble Apex
Court reiterated the legal principles concerning consensual
relationships and the initiation of criminal proceedings on
allegations of sexual relationship on the false promise of
marriage. The Hon’ble Apex Court quashed the FIR against the
appellant therein and held as under :
“22…… Thus, in a situation where physical
relationship is maintained for a prolonged period
knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with
certainty that the said physical relationship was purely
because of the alleged promise made by the appellant
to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown that the
physical relationship was purely because of the
promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexusCRL.L.P. 255/2022 Page 7 of 9
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with the physical relationship without being influenced
by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there
was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.
xxxx xxxx
xxxx
27…… In our opinion, the longer the duration of the
physical relationship between the partners without
protest and insistence by the female partner for
marriage would be indicative of a consensual
relationship rather than a relationship based on false
promise of marriage by the male partner and thus,
based on misconception of fact.”
28. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise
of marriage was made to the complainant initially by
the appellant, even though no such cogent evidence has
been brought on record before us to that effect, the fact
that the relationship continued for nine long years,
would render the plea of the complainant that her
consent for all these years was under misconception of
fact that the Appellant would marry her implausible.
Consequently, the criminal liability attached to such
false promise would be diluted after such a long
passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest
was registered by the complainant during all those
years. Such a prolonged continuation of physical
relationship without demurral or remonstration by the
female partner, in effect takes out the sting of criminal
culpability and neutralises it.
29. It will be very difficult to assume that the
complainant who is otherwise a mature person with
two grown up children, was unable to discover the
deceitful behaviour of the appellant who continued to
have sexual relationship with her for such a long
period on the promise of marriage. Any such
mendacious act of the appellant would have been
exposed sooner without having to wait for nine years.
The inference one can draw under the circumstances is
that there was no such false promise made to the
complainant by the appellant of marriage by
continuing to have physical relationship so as to bring
this act within the province of Section 376 IPC and
therefore, there was no vitiation of consent under
misconception of fact.
xxxx xxxx
xxxx
31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such
prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage,
it can lead to serious consequences. It will open the
CRL.L.P. 255/2022 Page 8 of 9
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scope for imputing criminality to such long term
relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation
can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person
in the juggernaut of stringent criminal process. There
is always a danger of attributing criminal intent to an
otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the
Court must also be mindful.
36. It is not disputed that the prosecutrix and the
accused/respondent met for the first time in 2010 and thereafter
on several occasions.
37. From a perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix and the
materials on record, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix entered
into a physical relationship with the accused/respondent solely on
account of the alleged promise to marry made by the
accused/respondent.
38. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court the learned Trial
Court has rightly acquitted the accused/respondent for the said
offence.
39. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
opinion that there is no infirmity with the impugned judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court and the State has not been able
to establish a prima facie case in its favour and no credible
ground has been raised to accede to the State’s request to grant
leave to appeal in the present case.
40. The leave petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
AUGUST 4, 2025
CRL.L.P. 255/2022 Page 9 of 9
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