Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
State Of A.P., Rep. By The Dist. … vs Polagalla Pedda Ramasubbaiah on 8 January, 2025
1
APHC010334112003
[3369]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY
TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 80/2003
Between:
State Of A.P.,
., Rep. By The Dist. Collector and Others ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
Polagalla Pedda Ramasubbaiah and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. GP FOR ARBITRATION
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
1. This Second Appeal, under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (for short, ‘C.P.C‘), has been filed by the Appellants / Respondents 1 to 4
/ Defendants against the Decree
De and Judgment dated 12.11.2001,
12.1 in
A.S.No.13 of 1997, on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nandikotkur,, (for short,
‘the First Appellate Court’) reversing the Decree and Judgment dated
16.07.1997, in O.S.No.114
114 of 1
1994, on the file of Principal District Munsif,
Nandikotkur, (for short, ‘the Trial Court’).
2. Respondents 1 to 3 are the Plaintiffs, who filed the suit in O.S.No.114
O.S.No. of
1994 for recovery of Rs.23,140/-
Rs.23,140/ towards compensation amount of plaint ‘B’
Schedule properties with subsequent interest and for costs.
TMR, J 2
S.A.No.80 of 2003
3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is practical
to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the
contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
The plaint ‘B’ schedule properties originally belonged to Polagalla
Chinna Naganna, the absolute owner. The Plaintiffs (Nos.1 to 3), his
children, and Nagamma, his wife, inherited the properties after his
death on 20.01.1979. Following Nagamma’s death on 05.06.1980,
the Plaintiffs became the sole heirs and continued to enjoy the
properties. The Plaintiffs later learned that Defendants 2 and 3 had
acquired the plaint ‘B’ schedule land for the Srisailam Right Branch
Canal without notifying the Plaintiffs, as required by the Land
Acquisition Act. During the inquiry, the Plaintiffs learned that the land
was acquired under Award No.4/86-87, and compensation of
Rs.23,140/- was paid to Nagamma in 1986. However, as Nagamma
had passed away in 1980, the payment was invalid. The Plaintiffs,
being the rightful heirs, should have received the compensation. The
Plaintiffs issued a legal notice to Defendants 1 and 2 on 19.01.1991,
and 3rd Defendant responded on 26.02.1991. The Plaintiffs assert
that the 3rd Defendant made the compensation payment to an
unrelated individual without proper investigation. Despite issuing a
Section 80 C.P.C., notice on 26.10.1993, the Defendants took no
action. The Plaintiffs are entitled to the compensation, as they are
the rightful owners of the plaint ‘B’ schedule properties.
5. The 3rd Defendant filed a written statement, adopted by Defendants 1, 2
and 4, refuting the plaint’s allegations, contended that the acquisition of the
plaint ‘B’ Schedule property began in February 1986 after a requisition from
the Executive Engineer, Srisailam Right Branch Canal, Nandikotkur. The
property in question, measuring Ac.1.74 cents in Survey No.519/1A1, was
TMR, J 3
S.A.No.80 of 2003
under the possession of K. Nagamma, according to survey and revenue
records. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and a
draft declaration under Section 6 were issued in her favour on 27.08.1986 and
published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette and other newspapers. The
Plaintiffs did not raise any objections regarding ownership at the time of
acquisition. The Defendants asserted that the Plaintiffs were neither owners
nor possessors of the property and were not listed in the revenue records. The
Land Acquisition Officer issued notices to interested parties, conducted
inquiries, and passed the award in favour of Nagamma, who confirmed the
property devolved to her after her husband’s death. The Defendants further
asserted that the suit is bad for the non-joinder of necessary parties. The
Plaintiffs have no right to file the suit and request for dismissal, and this Court
had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following
issues:
i. Whether the Plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 are the heirs of late P.Chinna
Naganna?
ii. Whether the Plaintiffs have been in possession and enjoying
the plaint ‘B’ schedule property after the death of Nagamma,
W/o late P.Chinna Naganna?
iii. Whether the Land Acquisition Authority has conduct proper
enquiry under Land Acquisition Act?
iv. Whether the Government paid compensation amount to
Nagamma?
v. Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled for suit claim as prayed for?
vi. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
vii. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit?
viii. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
ix. Whether this Court has got jurisdiction to try the suit?
x. To what relief?
TMR, J 4
S.A.No.80 of 2003
7. During the trial, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to
A.8 on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Conversely, DWs.1 and 2 were examined on
behalf of the Defendants, and Exs.B.1 to B.5 were marked.
8. After completing the trial and hearing both parties’ arguments, the trial
Court returned the plaint for presentation before the appropriate authority, as
per the Law, to address the Plaintiffs’ claim.
9. Aggrieved by the same, Plaintiff Nos.1 to 3 filed an Appeal in A.S.No.13
of 1997 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, after
scrutinizing both parties’ oral and documentary evidence, allowed the Appeal
with costs and set aside the trial Court’s decree and Judgment dated
16.07.1997, passed in O.S.No.114 and 1994. The 1st Appellate Court decreed
the suit for Rs.23,140/- together with interest at 12½ % per annum on
Rs.23,140/- from 26.02.1991 till the date of realization.
10. I heard Ms.Anusha, who was an assistant government leader for
arbitration. No representation is made on behalf of the Respondents /
Plaintiffs.
11. Based on the Appellants’ contentions, the following substantial question
of Law is involved in this Second Appeal:
i. Whether the trial Court has the right to entertain the suit
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act?
ii. Whether the suit barred by limitation under the Limitation
Act as acquisition proceedings commenced in 1986 and the
suit was filed in 1994?
iii. Whether the suit be decreed for non-joinder of proper and
necessary parties under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C?
12. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100
CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.
TMR, J 5
S.A.No.80 of 2003
13. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others 1, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of
the Courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions
of Law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is
not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see
Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC
713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar
Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)……
14. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C., arise only when there is a
substantial question of Law and not merely such questions of Law or one
based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of
misapplication of Law and improper appreciation of evidence on record,
particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High
Court sitting in Second Appeal to consider such questions which are
substantial in terms of Law.
15. From the reading of judgments by both the Trial Court as well as the 1st
Appellate Court, along with the evidence presented, it is clear that the
following facts are either acknowledged or undisputed:
The property in question, shown as the ‘B’ schedule in the plaint, is
in Sy.No.519/1A1, to the extent of Ac.1.74 cents. Originally, this land
was owned by one Polagalla Chinna Naganna. The Defendants 2
and 3 acquired the ‘B’ schedule property to excavate the Srisailam
right branch canal, under Award No.4/86-87, with the compensation
amount set at Rs.23,140/-. A copy of the award has been relied on
Ex.B.1. According to Ex.B.1, it is indicated that Nagamma is shown
as the awardee for the land in the ‘B’ schedule. The award further
confirms that, as per the 10(1) account during the acquisition
proceedings, the property belonged to Polagalla Chinna Naganna.
1 2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC) TMR, J 6 S.A.No.80 of 2003
The award mandates that the 2nd Defendant is liable to pay
compensation exclusively to Nagamma, the wife of Chinna
Naganna. Chinna Naganna passed away intestate on 20.01.1979,
leaving behind his wife, Nagamma, and the Plaintiffs as his legal
heirs. Nagamma, too, died on 05.06.1980, leaving the Plaintiffs as
her sole legal heirs.
16. The Trial Court, in its determination of Issue No.1, whether Plaintiffs 1 to
3 are the legal heirs of the late P. Chinna Naganna, clearly observed that the
evidence on record substantiates the claim that Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are indeed the
legitimate heirs of Chinna Naganna. The First Appellate Court upheld this
finding. Both Courts relied heavily on Ex.A.4, the legal heir certificate, which
the 4th Defendant issued. It is established beyond doubt that the Plaintiffs are
the children of P. Chinna Naganna and his wife, Nagamma.
17. It is undisputed that Nagamma, the wife of Chinna Naganna, passed
away on 05.06.1980, as per Ex.A.1 (her death certificate), while Chinna
Naganna himself died on 20.01.1979, as per Ex.A.2. The Trial Court noted
that Exs.A.1, A.2, and A.4 were issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer of
Midthur, who is the 4th Defendant in the suit. The Trial Court concluded that,
since the 4th Defendant issued these documents, it can be regarded as a fact
that the Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of both Chinna Naganna and Nagamma.
Both Courts, after thoroughly examining the evidence presented, have come
to the same conclusion, and the documentary evidence on record
substantiates their findings. No opposing evidence was presented, and no
arguments were raised during the Appeal that would challenge the
correctness of these findings. Therefore, the concurrent findings of both
Courts stand confirmed.
18. It is the Defendants’ stand that they paid the compensation amount to
Nagamma, the wife of Chinna Naganna. It is also undisputed that before filing
the suit, Defendants 1 and 2 issued a lawyer’s notice on 19.01.1991, and 3 rd
TMR, J 7
S.A.No.80 of 2003
Defendant sent a reply notice on 26.02.1991. The exchange of these notices,
marked as Exs.A.5 to A.8, is not in contention. The stand taken by both
parties in the suit and within the notices align. In light of the Defendants’
stand, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court addressed whether
the compensation was indeed paid to Nagamma, the wife of Chinna Naganna.
The Defendants’ witness, DW1 (Special Deputy Collector), asserted that the
compensation was indeed paid to Nagamma in the presence of Rajasekhar
Reddy and Abdul Sattar and that her thumb impression was obtained at the
time of payment. This payment acknowledgement is marked as Ex.B.2. Abdul
Sattar testified as DW2. The Plaintiffs contested this claim, asserting that the
person who received the compensation could not have been their mother
since she had died in 1980 and, therefore, could not have received any
compensation in 1986. The Trial Court accepted the Plaintiffs’ case that the
compensation was not paid to Nagamma. Both Courts noted that Nagamma
passed away on 05.06.1980, while the Defendants claim to have paid the
compensation to her through cheque on 26.05.1986. Both the Trial Court and
the First Appellate Court concurrently concluded that the compensation
couldn’t have been paid to Nagamma in 1986, given that she had already
passed away six years earlier.
19. The Trial Court, after thoroughly evaluating the evidence on record,
concluded that the Defendants’ authorities paid the compensation amount to
one K. Nagamma, who was not the wife of Polagalla Chinna Naganna.
Consequently, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court arrived at the
same conclusion that the compensation was paid to a person named K.
Nagamma, who was neither the mother of the Plaintiffs nor the awardee as
per Ex.B.1. The First Appellate Court, too, upheld this finding. Since these
findings were based on the evidence presented, and no counter-evidence has
been provided to challenge them, this Court sees no valid reason to disagree
with the conclusions reached by both Courts. The findings of both the Trial
and First Appellate Courts are therefore affirmed.
TMR, J 8
S.A.No.80 of 2003
20. Based on the grounds of Appeal and the submissions made by both
parties, the Appellants sought to persuade the Court that the statute of
limitations bars the claim in question and that the Civil Court lacks the
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.
21. The Plaintiffs assert that no notice was served to them concerning the
acquisition proceedings of the ‘B’ schedule property. In support of their claim,
the Plaintiffs refer to Ex.A.7, a notice dated 19.01.1991, contending that they
were never informed about the acquisition of the schedule land and were
unaware of the proceedings until construction work commenced on the site. In
response, Ex.A.8, the 3rd Defendant’s reply, asserts that compensation was
paid to the deceased’s wife, and the Defendants rejected the claim on
26.02.1991. It remains undisputed that the Plaintiffs initiated the suit before
the Civil Court within three years of the refusal. In their notice, the Defendants
claim to have served notice to the original Claimants, and DW.1 testified to the
service of such notice. To substantiate this, the Defendants relied on Ex.B.3,
an office copy of the notice, which shows that only a public notice was issued
by the Collector.
22. The Trial Court duly considered the provisions of Section 9 and Section
12(2) in Form-9 of the Land Acquisition Act, observing that it is the explicit
responsibility of the Land Acquisition Officer to serve notice to the original
Claimants. The Trial Court noted that the Defendants had failed to provide any
evidence of having served notice to the original Claimants under Section 9 or
Section 12(2) of the Act. In its judgment, the Trial Court correctly emphasized
that the service of notice by the Collector under these provisions is not
discretionary but mandatory. The Trial Court further rightly concluded that, in
the absence of such notice, the limitation period for the Claimants to challenge
the acquisition commences once the original Claimants or their legal
representatives become aware of the acquisition proceedings.
TMR, J 9
S.A.No.80 of 2003
23. The Trial Court observed that the Plaintiffs had filed the suit on
18.01.1994, within three years from the date of the reply notice dated
26.02.1991. Based on this, the Trial Court concluded that the suit had been
filed within the prescribed limitation period. The same contentions were raised
before the First Appellate Court, which concurred with the Trial Court’s
reasoning and upheld its findings. Both Courts have consistently determined
that the suit was filed within the statutory limitation period. This Court finds no
justifiable grounds to deviate from or interfere with these concurrent findings.
24. The central point raised by the Appellants was that the Plaintiffs should
have filed the suit to recover the compensation amount from the fictitious
individual who allegedly received the compensation rather than holding the
Government liable for the payment. However, both Courts found this
submission to be without merit. Both the Courts correctly determined that it
was not the Plaintiffs’ responsibility to initiate legal proceedings against the
person who allegedly received the compensation. Instead, both the Courts
rightly pointed out that the onus of pursuing remedies against the individual in
question falls on the Defendants, who are the ones that made the payment to
the alleged fictitious person. In this case, the Government, as the party
responsible for the disbursement of the compensation, should have taken
appropriate action to recover the amounts from the recipient. In light of these
considerations, both Courts found the Appellants’ contention legally
untenable. By rejecting the Appellants’ contention, this Court views that it is
the Defendants’ duty, not the Plaintiffs, to take action against any wrongful
recipient of the compensation. Consequently, both Courts maintained that the
Plaintiffs had the right to pursue their claim against the Government, which
had disbursed the compensation amount in question to the wrong person.
25. The Defendants asserted before both the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.
The Trial Court, however, noted that irregularities in the award marred the
compensation paid by the Defendants and that the Plaintiffs’ right to claim
TMR, J 10
S.A.No.80 of 2003
compensation could only be asserted under Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act. In contrast, the First Appellate Court reversed this finding,
concluding that the Land Acquisition Officer had disbursed a compensation
amount of Rs.23,140.60 ps., by cheque to a fictitious person, Nagamma, who
was impersonated by DW.2 and Rajasekhar Reddy at the time of the cheque
delivery. The First Appellate Court ruled that the Plaintiffs were entitled to
compensation from the Government for the acquired land, further observing
that the village elders had misled the Land Acquisition Officer.
26. As correctly pointed out by the First Appellate Court, it is the
Government’s responsibility to initiate civil and criminal actions against the
fictitious person, Nagamma, who fraudulently received compensation through
cheque. After examining the relevant provisions, the First Appellate Court
concluded that Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act does not apply in this
case, as the Plaintiffs are not seeking an enhancement of compensation after
receiving the amount as per the award. This finding by the First Appellate
Court is accurate concerning Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In
contrast, without thoroughly considering the provisions of Section 18, the Trial
Court erroneously concluded that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.
27. As already noted, it is not the Appellants’ case that the Plaintiffs /
Respondents had received notice of land acquisition proceedings. The
prevailing judicial consensus holds that when a compensation claim is not
addressed in the land acquisition proceedings, the affected person is entitled
to file a separate suit to recover their rightful share. The record shows that
even the land acquisition officer failed to trace the individual to whom the
compensation was disbursed. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the
Plaintiffs are obligated to file a suit against the person who wrongfully received
the payment. The mishandling or misdirection of compensation is not the
Plaintiffs’ responsibility; the fault lies entirely with the land acquisition officer’s
failure to process it properly. Had the Appellants bothered to perform an
TMR, J 11
S.A.No.80 of 2003
adequate inquiry with the revenue department, they would have easily
discovered that the Plaintiffs were the legitimate heirs of Chinna Naganna and
his wife, Nagamma. The Plaintiffs should not be held accountable for an error
beyond their control, nor should they suffer repercussions due to
administrative negligence. They were unaware of the acquisition proceedings
before the disbursement and should not bear the consequences of a mistake
they were not involved in. Holding them accountable for this oversight would
impose an unfair burden, as the fault rests solely with the officer’s actions or
lack thereof.
28. Reference may be made to the decision of the Privy Council in T.B.
Ramchandra Rao and Anr. V. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao and Ors 2. It was
held that the Land Acquisition Act contemplated two separate and distinct
forms of procedure, one for fixing the amount of compensation described in
the award and the other for determining, in case of dispute, the relative rights
of persons entitled to receive compensation money. This Court views that any
dispute about the relative rights of persons entitled to receive compensation
may be settled by litigation in the ordinary way. This is the effect of the Act’s
third proviso to S.31(2). The claim made by the Appellants have not been
determined or adjudicated per the Land Acquisition Act. The Appellants
possess the right to initiate a suit to recover the compensation amount, which
was mistakenly disbursed to a fraudulent individual by the Appellants, and this
was done without the required proper investigation. Consequently, this Court
concurs with the First Appellate Court’s ruling, which rightly asserts that the
Civil Court holds the jurisdiction to entertain the recovery suit, as the nature of
the Plaintiffs’ action falls outside the scope of Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act.
29. The findings of the fact recorded by the First Appellate Court are based
on the appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence unless the
2
AIR 1922 PC 90
TMR, J 12
S.A.No.80 of 2003
Appellants demonstrate that substantial question of Law involved in the
Second Appeal, interference of this Court with the judgments rendered by the
Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court in the exercise of jurisdiction
under section 100 of C.P.C., is not warranted.
30. For the reasons outlined above, this Court discerns no infirmity, much
less perversity or illegality, in the judgment rendered by the learned First
Appellate Court. The findings and reasoning provided by the First Appellate
Court align with established legal principles. The First Appellate Court
meticulously reviewed all the evidence on record, omitting nothing pertinent,
nor did it consider any extraneous material.
31. In these circumstances, upon consideration of the decree and judgment
of the First Appellate Court, this Court is satisfied that the arguments
presented do not involve any substantial questions of Law. The Appellants
have not raised any legal issues in this Second Appeal that warrant
consideration. There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the Judgment of
the First Appellate Court. Therefore, this Second Appeal must inevitably fail.
32. As a consequence, the Second Appeal is dismissed without costs.
The judgment dated 12.11.2001 of learned Senior Civil Judge Nandikotkur, in
A.S.No.13 of 1997, stands confirmed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 08.01.2025
SAK
TMR, J 13
S.A.No.80 of 2003
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO. 80 OF 2003
Date: 08.01.2025
SAK