Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
State Of A.P., vs Kilari Nageswara Rao on 6 August, 2025
1
APHC010502952009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T
T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1564/2009
Between:
1. STATE OF A.P., REP.BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF
A.P., HYDERABAD.
...APELLANT
AND
1. KILARI NAGESWARA RAO, S/O.KILARI SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM
VILLAGE.
2. KILARI SESHAIAH, S/O.SUBBAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE.
3. KILARI RANGAMMA, W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE.
(CASE AGAINST A-3
3 IS ABATED AS PER DOCKET ORDER DT.11
DT.11-1-
2001 AS SHE REPORTED DEAD)
4. KILARI SUBBA RAO, S/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE.
5. KILARI CHINNAKKA, W/O.SUBBA RAO SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE.
6. KILARI SUBBULU, W/O.SESHAIAH SIDDAVARAM VILLAGE.
...RESPODENT(S):
Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr. P.C., praying that the
High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal
against the Judgment in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of the Asst.Sessions
Judge, Darsi dated 14th day of December 2004, and to set aside the order of
acquittal and convict the accused (respondents) for the offence with which
they were charged.
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IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLAMP 1768 OF 2009
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
condone the delay of 1396 days in representing the above Crl.A.Sr.No.13177
of 2005 presented against the Judgment in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of
the Asst.Sessions Judge, Darsi dated 14th day of December, 2004.
IA NO: 2 OF 2009(CRLAMP 1950 OF 2009
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
condone the delay of (151) days in presenting the appeal against the order of
acquittal of the accused / respondents in S.C.No.233 of 2001 on the file of the
Asst.Sessions Judge, Darsi dated 14.12.2004
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Counsel for the Respodent(S):
1. P NAGENDRA REDDY
The court made the following J U D G M E N T:
1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.233 of 2001 on
the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Darsi (for short, ‘the Sessions Court’) by
its judgment dated 14.12.2004, acquitted the accused for the offences
punishable under section 376 and 498-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short, ‘IPC‘).
2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions
Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of
PWs.1 to 11 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.11 and contradictory
statements i.e., Exs.D.1 to D.8 which were elicited during the cross-
examination of PWs.1, 2, 3 and 6, were marked.
3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as
follows:
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(a) On 15.02.1999 at around 12:00 noon, while the victim (PW.1)
was returning from Guntaka Chenu after delivering food to her father,
A1, noticing her alone, forcibly dragged her into the Japanbabul
bushes in the fields of Pedda Subbaiah and gagged her mouth and
had sexual intercourse without her, will, and that she informed the
same to her parents. She was taken to the Government Hospital for
medical examination. Meanwhile, village elders, including PWs 6 to 8,
mediated a compromise between A1 and PW.1, resulting in their
marriage on 16.02.1999. PW.1 began living with A1, but their marital
life lasted only five days. Thereafter, all the accused started harassing
and ill-treating her, demanding Rs.50,000/- as dowry. A1 also
physically assaulted her, frequently picking quarrels without any fault
on her part.
(b) On 25.03.1999, PW.1 lodged a report at the K.K. Mitla Police
Station, which was registered as Crime No.09/1999 under Sections
323 and 498-A IPC by the Sub-Inspector (LW.5). During the ongoing
investigation, on 27.03.1999, PW.1 filed a complaint before the court
alleging rape by A1 and dowry-related harassment by all the accused.
The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Podili, forwarded the complaint to
the police. The Sub-Inspector (LW.15) registered the case on
01.04.1999 under Section 376 IPC and issued an express FIR to the
concerned authorities. As PW.1 was below 15 years of age at the
time, A1 is liable for punishment under Section 376 IPC for rape, and
all the accused are liable under Section 498-A IPC for dowry
harassment and ill-treatment.
4. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Podili vide his order dated
19.06.2001 in PRC No.16 of 2000 on his file has committed the accused
persons to the court of Sessions, Prakasam Division, to take up their trial for
the offences punishable under Sec.498-A IPC and sec. 376 IPC, against A.1,
and under Section 498(A) r/w.34 of IPC against A.1 to A.6.
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5. As per the Sessions Court’s docket order dated 11.06.2001, the case
against A.3 is abated.
6. The learned Sessions Judge, Prakasam Division at Ongole by its order
dated 02.07.2001 has taken up the case on file under Section 376 of IPC
against A.1, and under Section 498-A r/w. Section 34 of IPC against A1, A.2,
A.4 to A.6 and made over the case to the Court of Asst. Session’s Judge,
Darsi, for disposal according to law. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case
No.233 of 2001 has been numbered. After hearing the charges presented by
the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the Sessions court framed
charges against the accused, punishable under Section 376 of IPC against
A.1 and under Section 498-A of IPC against A.1, A.2 and A.4 to A.6, which
were read over and explained to them in Telugu, as required under sub
section (2) of section 228 of Cr.P.C. The accused did not plead guilty and
claimed to be tried.
7. The learned Sessions Judge examined A.1, A.2, A.4 to A.6 as required
under Section 313 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence
that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against
them. However, the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and the contradictory portions of Exs.D1 to D.8, as per section
161 Cr.P.C. Statements were marked during the cross-examination of P.Ws.1,
2, 3 and 6.
8. After considering the available material on record, the learned Sessions
Judge found A.1 not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and
498-A of IPC and also found A.2, A.4 to A.6 not guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 498-A of IPC and acquitted them.
9. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State contends
that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have seen that the ingredients to
constitute offences punishable under sections 498-A and 376 of IPC are made
out by the prosecution against the accused; the learned Sessions Judge ought
5
to have seen the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5 coupled with the evidence of P.Ws.9
and 10is sufficient to base conviction; the learned sessions judge has not
considered the evidence of prosecution witnesses in its correct prospective;
the other reasons assigned by the learned judge in acquitting the accused are
unsustainable.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the accused
supported the findings and conclusions recorded by the Sessions Court.
11. I have heard learned counsel on either side and perused the material on
record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the
prosecution before the Sessions Court.
12. The point for determination is:
Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused?
P O I N T:
13. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to
mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1 , at
paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows:
“26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the
appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the
judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the
court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court
below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in
dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to
miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate
court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and
further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his
innocence.”
1
(2011) 6 SCC 279
6
14. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. 2, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal
against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has
concluded as under:
“16…..while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal
the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal
unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as
perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal
would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the
court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is
perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored
the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in
such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any
of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged
with.”
15. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering
the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate
court to re-appreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the
order of acquittal, this court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above
decisions and further held that:
“42…..The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”,
“good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted
conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such2
(2007) 3 SCC 755
3
(2007) 4 SCC 415
7phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to
emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to
its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to
be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”
16. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity
in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted.
However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of
fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review
the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe
any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the
appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal
provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of
innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every
person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two
reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no
limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate
court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the Sessions Court
concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal
preferred by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence
on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the
judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
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there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is
“clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.
17. With the above principles in mind, this court analyse the reasoning and
ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of
acquittal.
18. As seen from the record, the prosecution examined the victim as PW.1.
Based on the report dated 25.03.1999 (Ex.P.1), a case was registered in
Crime No.9 of 1999 at K.K. Mitla Police Station by the Sub-Inspector of Police.
Subsequently, the victim (PW.1) filed another complaint dated 27.03.1999
(Ex.P.2) before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Podili, which was
forwarded to the Station House Officer, K.K. Mitla Police Station, and
registered as Crime No.10 of 1999. The concerned Station House Officer
thereafter filed a consolidated charge sheet by clubbing both cases together.
19. As seen from the Ex.P.1 report, and as rightly observed by the Sessions
Court, the victim (PW.1) did not mention any allegation of rape. However, the
accusation of rape appears for the first time in the Ex.P.2 complaint. Notably,
within two days of submitting Ex.P.1, she filed a private complaint (Ex.P.2)
against the accused, wherein the allegation of rape was included.
20. The prosecution examined PWs.6 to 8; however, they did not support
the prosecution’s case. During cross-examination conducted by the Public
Prosecutor, PWs.6 to 8 denied having made the statements attributed to them
in Exs.P.4 to P.6, respectively.
21. As seen from the record, A.3 passed away during the pendency of the
case. According to the evidence of PW.2, the father of PW.1, A.1, is his son-in-
law. It is not in dispute that A.2 and A.3 are the parents of A.1, A.4 is the
brother of A.1, A.5 is the wife of A.4, and A.6 is the daughter of A.2. Thus, all
the accused are closely related and interlinked by familial ties.
9
22. PW.1/victim, testified that the incident occurred approximately five years
ago at around 1:00 PM. She stated that she had taken lunch to her father, who
was ploughing in their Guntathota fields; after handing over the meals, while
returning home, and upon reaching a point about half a kilometer from the
fields, A.1 approached her from the opposite direction and held her hand;
when she objected and warned that she would inform her father, A.1 allegedly
snatched her apparel (voni), gagged her mouth, dragged her into a cluster of
Japanbabul trees, and attempted to rape her; despite her resistance, A.1
allegedly forced himself upon her, slapped her, and then raped her; following
the incident, she returned home weeping and informed her mother and father;
subsequently, her parents (PWs.2 and 3), her brother Mannamu
Venkateswarlu (LW.4), and her aunt (PW.4) took her to the Government
Hospital at Podili, where the police recorded her statement.
23. In this regard, PWs.2 to 4 also corroborated the version of events in
their evidence. According to the testimony of PWs.1 to 3, PW.8 visited the
hospital and made a proposal to PW.1’s father that A.1 would marry PW.1,
and requested that no criminal case be registered against A.1; initially, PW.2
was reluctant to accept the proposal; however, on the following day, under the
influence of elders, PW.2 agreed to the marriage; subsequently, A.1 and PW.1
exchanged garlands at the R & B bungalow in the presence of A.2, A.4, and
PWs.2, 6, and 8; photographs were also taken at the time of the garland
exchange.
24. In this regard, the Sessions Court considered the evidence of PWs.6
and 7. PW.6, Chappidi Ramalingaiah, deposed that he acted as a mediator in
the case and facilitated the marriage discussions between A.1 and PW.1 at
the R&B bungalow in Podili, after which he returned to his village. PW.7,
Jastavati Jayanarasimha, stated that he was unaware whether A.1 had
married PW.1. PW.8, Karravula Bala Ankaiah, testified that about three or four
years ago, he went to the R&B bungalow in Podili, where a quarrel took place
between the groups of the accused and PW.1. He further stated that he came
10
to know that the altercation was related to the proposed marriage between A.1
and PW.1. The evidence of PWs.6 to 8, however, does not support the
prosecution’s case regarding the alleged marriage ceremony said to have
taken place at the R&B bungalow, Podili.
25. The prosecution examined PW.11, Shaik Abdul Rasheed, to establish
the investigation conducted in the case. The Sessions Court, after considering
the evidence of the witnesses, particularly at paragraph No.29 of its judgment,
noted that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged marriage between A.1
and PW.1. Although PWs.1 to 5 categorically deposed that the marriage was
performed at the R&B bungalow by way of exchanging garlands and taking
photographs, the prosecution did not produce any such photographs or its
negatives as evidence before the court. The testimonies of PWs.1 to 5, who
are close relatives, are not corroborated by any independent witnesses. When
it is claimed that photographs were taken at the time of the marriage, there
appears to be no justifiable reason for their non-production before the court.
The Investigating Officer also failed to explain why the photographs allegedly
taken at the time of the marriage were neither collected nor submitted. In the
absence of any documentary or photographic evidence, and with no
supporting testimony from independent witnesses, the oral evidence of PWs.1
to 5 alone is insufficient to prove the solemnization of the alleged marriage
between PW.1 and A.1.
26. The Sessions Court further observed that, under Hindu customs and
rites, three essential ingredients are required to establish a valid marriage.
However, there is no evidence on record to show that mangalasutram was tied
or that saptapadi (seven steps around the sacred fire) was performed. Upon a
thorough appreciation of the evidence on record, the Sessions Court rightly
concluded that the alleged marriage between PW.1 and A.1 has not been
proved.
11
27. The prosecution examined PW.9, A. Sarojini Devi, to establish that
PW.1 had undergone a medical examination. PW.9 deposed that she
examined PW.1 on 01.04.1999 at 08:40 PM, with the assistance of Civil
Surgeon Dr. K. Madhusudana Rao. According to the prosecution, the earlier
report marked as Ex.P.1 mentions that the marriage between PW.1 and A.1
took place on 16.02.1999. However, as previously noted, Ex.P.1 contains no
reference to any allegation of rape. In that report, PW.1 stated that she and
A.1 were in a love relationship, and upon learning of the same, their marriage
was solemnized as per caste customs on 16.02.1999 at the R&B bungalow,
Podili. Conversely, in the private complaint marked as Ex.P.2, PW.1 alleged
that A.1 committed rape on her on 15.02.1999. The Sessions Court observed
that there is no mention of rape in Ex.P.1, but the allegation was subsequently
introduced in the private complaint, Ex.P.2.
28. It is well settled through judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that the victim of a sexual assault is the most competent
witness, and her testimony is entitled to great weight. In the absence of any
infirmity, a conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix,
even without corroboration from medical evidence, provided her testimony
inspires confidence.
29. The Sessions Court noted that if PW.1’s allegation were true, she would
have mentioned in Ex.P.1 that A.1 had committed rape on her prior to their
alleged marriage. In her cross-examination, PW.1 admitted that the contents
of Ex.P.1 were recorded by the police based on her narration. The Sessions
Court observed that Ex.P.1 is a typed complaint and pointed out a material
discrepancy, namely, the omission of any reference to the alleged incident of
rape in the initial report. No plausible explanation has been offered for this
omission.
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30. In Shashidhar Purandhar Hegde V. State of Karnataka4, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
12. The word “contradiction” is of a wide connotation which takes within its
ambit all material omissions and under the circumstances of a case, a court
can decide whether there is one such omission as to amount to
contradiction.
31. It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence,
the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions
were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. In S. Govidaraju
vs. State of Karnataka 5 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the
omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the
truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material
improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it
would not be safe to rely upon such evidence.
32. Upon a careful and comprehensive examination of the material
available on record, this court finds sufficient justification to concur with the
finding of the learned Sessions Court. The omission in question, which
amounts to a material contradiction, casts a grave shadow of doubt on the
veracity and reliability of the testimony given by the witness, particularly that of
the victim (PW.1). PW.1 proceeded to file a private complaint two days after
the lodging of Ex.P.1 report, wherein significant improvements were made in
comparison to her earlier report. What is particularly striking, and remains
unexplained, is why, if the accused had indeed committed the grave offence of
rape, such a crucial allegation was not mentioned in the initial report. No
plausible or satisfactory explanation has been offered by the victim for this
omission, nor is there any indication of the circumstances that prompted her to
file a private complaint incorporating those serious allegations at a later stage.
In the considered opinion of this court, if the allegations made by the victim
were indeed truthful and genuine, it is inconceivable that such a serious
4
(2004) 12 SCC 492
5
MANU/SC/0839/2013
13
accusation would have been omitted from the earlier version of the Ex.P.1
report. The absence of such a critical detail in the initial report raises serious
concerns about the credibility of the prosecution’s case.
33. The Sessions Court further taken note of the fact that the medical officer
who examined PW.1 (on 01.04.1999 at 08:40 PM) deposed that there were no
external or internal injuries on her body and no semen was detected on the
articles (Items No.1 to 4) sent for forensic analysis. According to PW.1’s
testimony, she lived with A.1 as husband and wife in his house for about one
week following their alleged marriage on 16.02.1999, before A.2, A.4, and A.6
allegedly forced A.1 to leave the village. Hence, even by PW.1’s version, they
cohabited as a married couple for one week. In light of this, the medical
evidence fails to support the prosecution’s case.
34. Upon appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the Sessions Court
found the testimony of the PW.1, who is the prime witness to the alleged
incident of rape, to be unreliable and accordingly disbelieved her version.
35. The Sessions Court took note of several contradictions and omissions
in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and marked documents Exs.D.1
to D.8 in support of the defence case. The Investigating Officer confirmed that
Exs. P.1 and P.2 are typed complaints, whereas PW.1, in her testimony,
claimed to have written Ex.P.1 in her own handwriting to the police.
Furthermore, the medical officer deposed that there were no external or
internal injuries on the body of PW.1, and no semen was detected on Items
No.1 to 4, which were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). In view
of these inconsistencies and the lack of medical or corroborative evidence, the
Sessions Court disbelieved the version of the prosecution witnesses. Upon a
comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence on record, the Sessions
Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
for the offences under Sections 376 and 498-A IPC beyond a reasonable
doubt.
14
36. In a criminal case, degree of proof is the dictum than that what is
required in a civil proceedings and if there is slightest doubt in the mind of the
court regarding involvement of the accused person, then the court should not
go for convicting the accused person with such a doubt. Rather it would be
proper for the court to pass a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused.
When Sessions Court after proper appreciation of the evidence of witnesses
passed a judgment of the acquittal, it would not be appropriate for the
appellate court to disturb the said judgment, unless the said judgment of
acquittal is unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the
appellate court should not disturb the said judgment, instead, the court should
upheld the view favoured the accused.
37. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal
appeal, if another view is possible, then also the appellate court cannot
substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into a conviction unless the
findings of the Sessions Court are perverse, contrary to the material on
record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable.
38. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of
Karnataka6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section
378 of the Code as under:
“Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order
of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be
exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision
by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength
before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution
becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence.
Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its
verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The
Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of
not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether
the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When
two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal
is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having
seen the witnesses.
6
2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184
15
39. In State of Gujarat V. Thanabhai Ganeshbhai Rajput7, the High Court
of Gujarat held that as per the settled legal position when two views are
possible, the judgment and order of the acquittal passed by the trial Court
should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for special
reasons. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of
Rajasthan V. Ram Niwas8 can be relied on in this regard.
40. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is
well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated
time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh
V. Sheeshpal 9 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that
another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to
reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the
acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of
decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not
made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide
powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is
reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on
the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with
specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been
rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is
reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of
the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of
the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein
after:
“10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of
judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a
comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136
of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of
the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or
mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could7
2022 Latest Caselaw 3827 Guj
8
(2010) 15 SCC 463
9
(2017) CriLJ 169
16also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for
reversing an order of acquittal.
11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of
proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and
it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the
accused should be adopted.
41. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the
conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on
record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out
no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondents / accused.
42. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it
should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by
the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, this court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court’s
finding.
43. The Sessions Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and
justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks
merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or
misinterpretation by the Sessions Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is
no flaw in the findings of fact by the Sessions Court. Therefore, the acquittal of
the respondents cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the
acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no
reason to interfere with the judgment of the Sessions Court. Accordingly, the
point is answered.
44. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
Criminal Appeal No.1564 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed
and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by
17
the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Darsi, in Sessions Case No.233 of
2001, dated 14.12.2004, stands confirmed.
Miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall stand closed.
____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 06.08.2025
MS / SAK
18
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1564 of 2009
Date: 06.08.2025
SAK