Supreme Court – Daily Orders
State Of Lokayuktha Police vs C B Nagaraj on 19 May, 2025
REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 732
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1157 OF 2015
STATE OF LOKAYUKTHA POLICE, DAVANAGERE1 ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
C B NAGARAJ ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
This appeal assails the Final Judgment and Order of a learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘High Court’) dated 09.07.2013 rendered in Criminal Appeal
No.12/2012 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’)
[2013 SCC OnLine Kar 5293], whereby the High Court set aside the
Judgment and Order of conviction dated 23.12.2011 passed by the
learned Special Judge, Davanagere (hereinafter referred to as the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ARJUN BISHT
Date: 2025.05.19
18:26:16 IST
Reason:
1
Be read as ‘State by Lokayuktha Police’.
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‘Trial Court’) in Spl. C. (Lokayuktha) No.8/2007. Vide this Order, the
Trial Court convicted the sole Respondent under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)
read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Act’). The Respondent was sentenced to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay fine of Rs.
2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the Act, and simple imprisonment for a period of 2 years
and pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees Three Thousand) for the
offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act.
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Respondent was working as an Extension Officer, in the
office of the Taluka Panchayath, Davanagere. The Complainant, one
Mr. E R Krishnamurthy (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Complainant’)
was appointed to the post of Primary School Teacher in Yadgir
Academic District, under Category-II A. A letter was sent to the BCM
Office, Davanagere from the DDPI Office, Yadgir for the certified copy
of Validity Certificate of the Complainant’s claim under Category-II A.
This file was put up to the Respondent to enquire and report. The
Complainant alleged that the Respondent on 07.02.2007 at about
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12:30 PM demanded illegal gratification of Rs.1,500/- (Rupees One
Thousand Five Hundred) from him to submit the spot inspection report
prepared by the Respondent.
3. On this allegation, a complaint was registered against the
Respondent by the Davanagere Lokayuktha Police Station under
Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act.
4. It is further alleged that on the same day between 5:30 PM and
5:45 PM, the Respondent received said illegal gratification from the
Complainant.
5. Pursuant thereto, a trap was conducted by the Lokayuktha
Police team on 07.02.2007. Through this trap, phenolphthalein-
smeared currency notes amounting to Rs.1,500/- (Rupees One
Thousand Five Hundred) received by the Respondent, were seized by
the trap team. Thereafter, the Respondent’s fingers were dipped in
sodium carbonate solution which turned pink due to the presence of
phenolphthalein on the fingers of the respondent as they had come in
contact with the currency notes smeared with phenolphthalein.
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6. In this backdrop, the Trial Court framed two questions:
Whether on 07.02.2007, the Respondent demanded illegal
gratification of a sum of Rs.1,500/- (Rupees One Thousand Five
Hundred) from the Complainant as motive or reward for performing
the above-mentioned official act/favour? And, whether the
Respondent, on the same date between 5:30 PM and 5:45 PM in his
office, obtained the said sum from the Complainant for showing the
above-mentioned act/favour, and thereby committed misconduct in
the discharge of his duties?
7. Answering both questions in the affirmative, the Trial Court
convicted the Respondent under the charged provisions of the Act.
The High Court, vide the Impugned Judgment, allowed the
Respondent’s appeal and set aside the order of conviction by the Trial
Court.
8. Against the Impugned Judgment of the High Court, the State
through the Lokayuktha Police is in appeal before this Court.
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
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9. The learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act, comes into play once
demand and acceptance of a sum of money is proved. Learned
counsel submitted that, this presumption, though being rebuttable at
the option of the accused, the Respondent herein did not adduce any
material evidence, and also did not cross-examine the prosecution
witness on this point. Further, it was submitted that the prosecution on
the other hand, had proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the
recovery of the tainted currency notes amounting to Rs.1,500/-
(Rupees One Thousand Five Hundred) from the possession of the
Respondent, was a bribe.
10. To support this contention, learned counsel placed reliance on
the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v Chandrasha, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3469 wherein it has been held that ‘… Section 20
gets attracted when it is proved that the public servant has accepted
or agreed to accept any gratification other than legal remuneration
and in that case, presumption is that it is the motive or reward for any
of the acts covered under Section 7, 11, or 13(1)(b) of the Act. …’
The Court also held that the presumption under Section 20 of the Act
is similar to the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable
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Instruments Act, 1881, where the onus is on the accused to prove
that he is not guilty of the offences charged.
11. Thus, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that once
the recovery of bribe amount from the Respondent is proved, the
explanation offered by the Respondent – that the money received by
him was repayment of money lent by the Respondent to the
Complainant on an earlier occasion, is clearly not worthy of being
accepted. Therefore, upon the aspects of ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’
of the bribe amount being established beyond doubt, no two views are
possible in the matter. It was urged that the appeal should be allowed.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS:
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent based his
submissions on three points. Firstly, learned counsel submitted that
the evidence of the Complainant is not credible and shows mala fide
conduct. Learned counsel submitted that the Complainant with
oblique intentions denied the spot inspection report though he had
signed it. However, when he was confronted with the said spot
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inspection report, he conceded thereto, stating that it was signed by
him and his father.
13. Secondly, it was urged that the Complainant was aware that
the spot inspection report had already been sent to the concerned
department, and there was no work pending with the Respondent, at
the time of the alleged demand.
14. Thirdly, learned counsel contended that the Respondent has
been consistently stating, right from the time of seizure, without any
afterthought, that the alleged bribe recovered from the Respondent,
was only repayment of amount that was given to the Complainant at
the time of the spot inspection.
15. Learned counsel summing up his arguments submitted that the
Respondent is a 67-year-old, award-receiving serviceman with an
impeccable service record, and suffers from permanent visual
disability and old age ailments. It was urged that the appeal be
dismissed in the interest of justice.
ANALYSIS, REASONING, AND CONCLUSION:
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16. We have gone through the pleadings, materials on record and
considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties.
17. The admitted facts are that the Respondent, at the relevant
point in time, was holding the post of Extension Officer in the Office of
Taluka Panchayath, Davanagere. The Complainant had applied for a
Validity Certificate with regard to claim under Category-II A and for the
grant of the same, the matter had to be placed before Caste Scrutiny
Committee along with a spot inspection report, to be prepared by the
Respondent.
18. In this connection, the Respondent visited the village of the
Complainant on 05.02.2007 and thereafter the Complainant went to
his office on 07.02.2007 at about 12:30 PM and again visited him at
5:30 PM on the same day.
19. The entire episode hinges around the aforesaid factual narrow
compass. As per the Complainant’s/prosecution version, the
Respondent, to favour the Complainant demanded Rs.1,500/-
(Rupees One Thousand Five Hundred) as illegal gratification from the
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Complainant when the Complainant came to his office at 12:30 PM on
07.02.2007. It is further alleged that to satisfy such demand, the
Complainant again went to the office of the Respondent on the same
day at 5:30 PM alongwith an amount of Rs.1,500/- (Rupees One
Thousand Five Hundred), which was allegedly accepted by the
Respondent in the presence of the trap witnesses/panchas.
20. On behalf of the prosecution, nine witnesses have been
examined, whereas on behalf of the defence, one witness was
produced.
21. From the evidence recorded of the prosecution witnesses,
PW2 stated that the Respondent asked about the alleged bribe, when
the Complainant asked about the report. However, in his cross-
examination, initially PW2 stated that he had not heard the
conversation between the Respondent and the Complainant which
occurred inside the chamber of the Respondent, as he was standing
near the entrance door. However, PW2 later stated that when the
Respondent and the Complainant came down, he followed them, and
the Respondent demanded the bribe amount from the Complainant,
and thereafter, when they walked down the stairs, he had seen the
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Complainant give the bribe amount to the Respondent from a distance
of 2 to 3 feet. Yet, PW2 further stated that he did not know whether
the Respondent had asked the Complainant for the amount he had
given to him. Except for this reference, coming in the deposition of
PW2 apart from that of the Complainant himself i.e., PW1, no other
witness has testified to being privy of such demand. Even in the initial
complaint of the Complainant, he has stated that he had gone to
enquire about the certified copy of the Validity Certificate from the
Respondent, whom he met on 07.02.2007 in the afternoon at about
12:30 PM, who is alleged to have told him that though the spot
inspection report, that had to be sent to the BCM Office, Davanagere
was ready, he would only forward it on payment of Rs.1,500/-
(Rupees One Thousand Five Hundred). The Complainant, taking the
plea that he did not have the money with him, told the Respondent
that he would return in the evening with the money. Thereafter, the
Complainant moved the Lokayukhta’s Office and the trap came to be
organized.
22. From the aforesaid, as per the version of the Complainant, the
demand was made for the first time on 07.02.2007 at about 12:30 PM
by the Respondent and later on as per the deposition of the
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witnesses, the Respondent is said to have informed the Complainant
that he had already forwarded the file and after that also asked for the
money, which was paid and recovered from the Respondent.
23. In such background, it is clear that, basically, it is only the
version of the Complainant himself which can be said to have some
basis with regard to the demand of the amount of Rs. 1,500/- (Rupees
One Thousand Five Hundred) as bribe, allegedly made by the
Respondent. The reference in PW2’s deposition being not very
coherent and slightly self-contradictory, the benefit thereof has to flow
to the Respondent, in the absence of PW2’s testimony being clear on
this point.
24. Coming to the deposition of the Complainant himself read with
his complaint – for it to be taken as fully reliable and made the sole
basis to convict the Respondent, the same would require greater
scrutiny apropos its veracity and reliability. A glaring pointer in this
regard is the fact that the Complainant categorically stated in his
deposition that he was not aware of any spot inspection report by the
accused on 05.02.2007, however the moment he was confronted with
the document viz. Exhibit D8, he, without demur, accepted the same.
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Not stopping at acceptance, the Complainant also admitted to have
signed on the document and identified both his and his father’s
signature as also of the witness.
25. It is pertinent to note that till 05.02.2007, when the Respondent
had conducted the physical/spot inspection, there is not even a
whisper of there being any demand of bribe. Moreover, when the
Complainant went back to the Respondent’s office at 5:30 PM with the
money, the prosecution case itself as per the deposition of its
witnesses makes it clear that the Respondent had informed the
Complainant that he had already forwarded the concerned file. Thus,
if the same is accepted, there was no occasion for the Complainant to
go ahead with paying the amount, which he claims to be in the nature
of bribe demanded by the Respondent, after the work for which the
bribe was purportedly sought, had already been done. The
observation of the High Court to this extent is correct that just
because money changed hands, in cases like the present, it cannot
be ipso facto presumed that the same was pursuant to a demand, for
the law requires that for conviction under the Act, an entire chain –
beginning from demand, acceptance, and recovery has to be
completed. In the case at hand, when the initial demand itself is
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suspicious, even if the two other components – of payment and
recovery can be held to have been proved, the chain would not be
complete. A penal law has to be strictly construed [Md. Rahim Ali v
State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1695 @ Paragraph 45 and
Jay Kishan v State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 296 @ Paragraph
24]. While we will advert to the presumption under Section 20 of the
Act hereinafter, there is no cavil that while a reverse onus under
specific statute can be placed on an accused, even then, there cannot
be a presumption which casts an uncalled for onus on the accused.
Chandrasha (supra) would not apply as demand has not been
proven. In Paritala Sudhakar v State of Telangana, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1072, it was stated thus:
‘21. As far as the submission of the State is that the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was,
would operate against the Appellant is concerned, our
analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand , in
the backdrop of an element of animus between the
Appellant and complainant, is not proved. In such
circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act
would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of the
pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2006)
2 SCC 250:
‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in
the prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the
defence story set up by the appellant cannot be said
to be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it is not a
case where the burden of proof was on the accused
in terms of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise,
where demand has not been proved, Section 20
will also have no application. (Union of
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India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576:
(2005) 8 Scale 246] and T. Subramanian v. State of
T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC 401: (2006) 1 Scale 116])’
(emphasis supplied)’
(emphasis in bold is original, underlining is ours)
26. Moreover, the testimony of the Complainant, as discussed
supra, does not inspire confidence, inasmuch as, for reasons best
known to him alone, he completely denied the visit of the Respondent
for spot inspection, that too, just two days prior to the date of the trap
and immediately changed such stance by accepting such visit and
admitting the spot report as also identifying his own, his father’s and
the witness’s signatures. In the considered opinion of this Court, such
conduct is sufficient to render his testimony unreliable.
27. Though it can be commented that the High Court was required
to give detailed factual reasoning, which has not been done, as to why
it was overturning an order of conviction by that of acquittal, yet since
the factum of demand itself has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, the acquittal of the Respondent by the Impugned Judgment
cannot be termed perverse or unwarranted, in the factual matrix of the
present lis. In Yadwinder Singh v Lakhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 686,
this Court opined that ‘The Trial Court could have better worded its
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order through clearer reasoning.’ However, upon examination of all
relevant factors, the Court chose to restore the order of the Trial Court
therein and set aside the order impugned therein, upon examining all
factors of the matter itself. In the instant case, needless to add, we
have applied our mind independently to all material aspects and find
ourselves ad idem with the conclusion of the High Court.
28. Thus, on an overall conspectus of the facts and circumstances
of the case and the discussions made hereinabove, we do not find
any ground made out by the Appellant requiring interference by this
Court. The Impugned Judgment is, hence, upheld.
29. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.
30. No order as to costs.
..…………………………………..J.
[PANKAJ MITHAL]
.………………………………..…..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
MAY 19, 2025
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