Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Pintu S/O Late Badar on 18 August, 2025
Bench: Vivek Kumar Birla, Pramod Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:140531-DB Court No. - 42 Case :- GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 330 of 2022 Appellant :- State of U.P. Respondent :- Pintu S/O Late Badar Counsel for Appellant :- Shiv Kumar Pal Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.
Hon’ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.
Re: Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal)
1. Heard Sri Rahul Asthana, learned AGA appearing for the appellant-State of UP and perused the record.
2. Present government appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 22.12.2021 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No.5, Varanasi in Sessions Trial No.177 of 2018, arising out of Case Crime No.765 of 2017, under Sections, 376/511, 354B, 323, 506 IPC, P.S. Badagaon, District Varanasi.
3. Prosecution story, in brief, is that on 09.11.2017, the victim moved an application addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi, stating that her age is 38 years and on the date of incident, i.e. 02.11.17 at 05:30 a.m., when she had gone from her house to the field in South Siwan for defecation then Pintu son of Bodar, aged about 32 years, suddenly came to the field and with the intention of rape pulled her saree and stripped her naked and tore the blouse and threw her on the field and tried to rape her but could not do so due to the strong resistance of the victim. On failing, the accused badly beaten the victim and threatened that if she informed anyone about this, he would kill her children. On this the incident was reported to the police station on the same day but no action was taken. Then the victim got her injuries medically examined on 06.11.17 at Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay Government Hospital, Varanasi. On the above written complaint submitted by the victim, the Superintendent of Police, Varanasi ordered to investigate the case and take appropriate legal action. On the basis of the complaint FIR was registered against accused Pintu at Police Station Baragaon, on 04.12.2017 as Crime No. 765/17, under Sections 376/511, 323, 506, 354-B IPC. Thereafter, the investigating officer started investigation and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the accused. The accused denied the prosecution allegations and claimed to be tried.
4. In support of prosecution case, PW-1 Victim, PW-2 independent witness Geeta, PW-3 Head Constable Subodh Kumar PW-4 S.I. Satish Chandra Nigam, PW-5 Dr. Arun Kumar Tiwari and PW-6 S.I. Rajbahadur were produced and examined before the Court below.
5. The judgement of acquittal was passed on the ground that there was delay in lodging the FIR. It is alleged that the incident had taken place on 02.11.2017 at about 05:30 a.m. in an agricultural filed, whereas, for the first time the incident was reported by the victim after seven days to the Senior Superintendent of Police on 09.11.2017 and FIR was registered on 04.12.2017. The victim is aged about 38 years. The court below found that although the victim has supported the prosecution case in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., however, fact remains that she admits that only attempt to commit rape was made and as per the Medical Report, she has suffered only minor injuries which by itself are not sufficient to prove that any extreme use of force as alleged by her was used on her. Such minor injuries could have been suffered by her on falling on the ground. The court further found that there was admitted enmity between the parties and PW-2 Geeta was interested witness as she had already lodged one criminal prosecution against the accused persons and this fact was admitted by PW-2 Geeta in her cross examination. PW-2 Geeta who alleges herself to be the eye-witness in her cross-examination admitted that she reached the spot after the incident. The court further found that the victim while appearing as PW-1 has increased the gravity of the offence by alleging certain other facts including that, her vagina started bleeding, however, there was no such indication in the Medical Report. In this background, the court below found that the victim is not sterling witness and it would not be safe to convict the accused persons on her sole oral evidence and, therefore, judgment of acquittal was passed. Under such circumstances, the Court below found that the prosecution could not prove his case beyond doubt and the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and judgement of acquittal was passed.
6. Challenging the impugned judgment, Sri Rahul Asthana, learned AGA submits that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record. He further submits that impugned judgment is against weight and evidence on record. The prosecution has fully proved the case beyond doubt. The sole testimony of the victim was sufficient convict the accused and she had suffered injuries which could have been caused in the agricultural filed as alleged by her. She stood by her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and minor discrepancies are of no consequence. Submission, therefore, is that the judgement and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court requires serious consideration and reversal and the accused herein is liable to be convicted.
7. We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.
8. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
9. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”
10. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
“The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ”possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.”
11. In a judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
“10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
“12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
“…the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses….”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an “order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
12. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.”
12. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
13. On perusal of record, we find that there was a considerable delay in informing the incident to the Senior Superintendent of Police after seven days of the incident and, we furhter, find that accused side has also lodged one prosecution registered as Case Crime No.668 of 2017, wherein, charge-sheet was submitted against the informant side and the case crime number of the present case is 765 of 2018. Therefore, the enmity between the parties is admitted. Further, PW-2, alleges herself to be the eye-witness in her cross-examination had clearly admitted that prior to the date of incident, she had lodged one prosecution against the accused Pintu, one Suraj and one Dharmraj which is still pending. She has further admitted that she had reached the spot after the incident. That apart, we further find that alleged injuries suffered by the victim are of extremely simple in nature and are as follows:
“i. Greenish-red contusion present over anterior aspect of left knee area 0.5 cm x 0.5cm. ii. Greenish-red contusion area 02 cm x 0.2 cm present over left scapula region of back. iii. Pain in right shoulder.”
14. The above injuries could have been received by falling on the ground as per the statement of PW-5 Dr. Arun Kumar Tiwari. It was asserted that because of the offence the vagina of the victim started bleeding, however, there was no such indication in the Medical Report and, we further find that in place of going to the nearby Government Hospital, the victim submits that she was getting treatment from a private doctor and did not report the incident for about seven days to anyone. In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the court below has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this Court taking a different view as per the law discussed above.
15. Accordingly, it is not a case worth granting leave to appeal. The application for granting leave to appeal is rejected.
Re: Government Appeal
1. Consequently, since the Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal) has been rejected by order of date, the present government appeal is also dismissed.
Order Date :- 18.8.2025
S.A.