Allahabad High Court
State Of U.P. vs Satto Pandit Alias Satya Prakash S/O … on 18 July, 2025
Author: Vivek Kumar Birla
Bench: Vivek Kumar Birla
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:116894-DB Court No. - 42 Case :- GOVERNMENT APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 227 of 2025 Appellant :- State of U.P. Respondent :- Satto Pandit Alias Satya Prakash S/O Munna Lal Counsel for Appellant :- Ashutosh Kumar Sand Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.
Hon’ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha,J.
Order of Delay Condonation Application:-
1. Heard Sri Rahul Asthana, learned AGA for the State and perused the record.
2. Vide order dated 9.5.2025, notice was issued to opposite party on the delay condonation application.
3. As per office report dated 17.7.2025, notice has been served upon mother of the sole respondent however none has put in appearance on behalf of the opposite party and no counter affidavit has been filed.
4. As per report of Stamp Reporting Section the present appeal is delayed by 56 days.
5. For reasons shown in affidavit accompanying with the application for condonation of delay and keeping in view the short duration of delay and affidavit being uncontroverted, the delay is sufficiently explained.
6. Application for condonation of delay is allowed. The delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned.
7. Office is directed to allot regular number to the present appeal.
Re: Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal):-
1. Heard Sri Rahul Asthana, learned AGA appearing for the appellant-State of UP and perused the record.
2. Present government appeal has been preferred against the judgement and order dated 18.11.2024 passed by the Additional Session Judge, Court No. 27, Agra in Session Trial No. 493 of 2018, arising out of Case Crimes No. 98 of 2017 under Sections 376, 511 IPC and under Section 3/4/18 POCSO Act, P.S.- Douki, District- Agra.
3. Prosecution story, in brief, is that the victim’s father gave a written complaint to the police station for lodging first information report in which he had stated that when victim along with her younger sister had gone from inside the college boundary to the adjacent plot, a person came to victim and tried to commit rape with her. When the victim raised alarm, he and many other people reached on the spot, seeing this the person fled away from the spot. People present on the spot told his name as Satto Pandit, present respondent.
4. In support of prosecution case, PW-1 Victim, PW-2 father of victim, PW-3 younger sister of victim, PW-4 Dr. Neeta Kulshreshtha and P.W.-5 Harish Kumar and P.W. 6 constable Ritu Yadav were produced and examined before the learned trial court.
5. The judgement of acquittal has been passed by the learned trial court on the ground that P.W. 1 has stated in her statement recorded under section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. that somebody tried to rape her however on raising alarm, he ran away. Accused was not named in the first information report whereas P.W. 1 Victim, P.W. 2 father of the victim and P.W. 3 sister of the victim, have stated that Satto Pandit was known to them still he was not named in the first information report itself. P.W. 1 victim in her statement recorded under section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., has not named accused anywhere and her sister P.W. 3 present on the spot had also not named anyone. D.W. 2 Dr. Sunita Kumari who had examined the victim had stated that if the victim had any external injury on her external body or if the victim had told me, she would have entered the same on paper no. 6K/1 but the victim did not say anything about any attempt to rape on her or the name of any person. She had also certified that victim has refused to undergo internal examination and at that time her mother was present. The victim expressed her desire to undergo age determination examination. As per her medical age verification, she was aged about 17 years and during medical examination, the victim herself stated that she was aged about 18 years. In this background, the trial court found that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond doubt and the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and judgement of acquittal was passed.
7. Challenging the impugned judgement, Sri Rahul Asthana, learned AGA submitted that the view of the learned trial court is not one of the possible view. Submission of learned AGA for the State is that the learned trial Court has given undue weightage to the evidence of defence and has wrongly ignored the prosecution evidence.
8. We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.
9. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.
10. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”
11. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
“The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ”possible view’. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact.”
12. In a recent judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under:
“10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
“12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
“…the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses….”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under:
“(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an “order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes:
i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;
ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.
12. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166, Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222, and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.”
13. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
14. On perusal of record, we find that the accused person has been named in the first information report on the ground that when the victim raised alarm, father of the victim and some other persons reached on the spot and the persons present on the spot have informed that the accused was Satto Pandit, the accused herein and he was named in the first information report on that basis whereas the victim P.W. 1 and her younger sister P.W. 3 present on the spot have admitted the fact that Satto Pandit was known to them however he was not named in their statement.
15. It has come on record that accused herein Satto Pandit was local shopkeeper, therefore prima facie, it is worth belief that accused person was known to the prosecution witnesses however he was not specifically named, neither by the victim nor by her younger sister present on the spot. Victim was found 18 years old. She never received any external injury. P.W.-4 Dr. Neeta Kulshreshtha has stated that the victim had refused internal medical examination as well whereas we find that D.W. 1 Pal Singh had stated that about 3-4 days back some dispute had taken place between the informant, father of the victim and Satto Pandit the accused herein, who was local shopkeeper, for the goods that were borrowed by father of the victim and that day, informant had threatened Satto Pandit for serious consequences and a few days later, he came to know that informant had filed a rape case against Satto Pandit by using his daughter.
16. In this background we find that victim was an adult girl and only on the basis of her sole testimony the accused person was rightly not convicted by learned trial court.
17. In such view of the matter, we, therefore, find that the court below has taken possible view of the matter on appreciation of entire evidence on record, which cannot be substituted by this Court taking a different view as per the law discussed above.
18. Accordingly, it is not a case worth granting leave to appeal. The application for granting leave to appeal is rejected.
Re: Government Appeal:-
1. Consequently, since the Criminal Misc. Application (Leave to Appeal) is rejected by order of date, the present government appeal is also dismissed.
Order Date :- 18.7.2025
SY