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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
State Of West Bengal vs Sagarika Pandit on 27 August, 2025
Author: Debangsu Basak
Bench: Debangsu Basak
2025:CHC-AS:1658-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Debangsu Basak
&
The Hon'ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas
DR 3 of 2024
State of West Bengal
Vs.
Sagarika Pandit
With
C.R.A.(DB) 33 of 2025
Sushila Majhi
-Versus-
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
With
C.R.A.(DB) 364 of 2024
Sagarika Pandit
-Versus-
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Appellant : Mr. Kaushik Gupta, Sr. Adv.
[CRA(DB) 33 of 2025] Mr. Arijit Bhusan Bagchi, Adv.
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2
For the Appellant : Mr. Niladri Sekhar Ghosh, Adv.
[CRA(DB) 364 of 2024) Ms. Sompurna Chatterjee, Adv.
Mr. Sourov Mondal, Adv.
Ms. Laboni Sikdar, Adv.
Mr. Souvik Dey, Adv.
For the State : Mr. Debasish Roy, Ld. P.P.
Mrs. Anasuya Sinha, Ld. A.P.P.
Mr. Nahid Ahmed, Adv.
Hearing concluded on : 28th July, 2025
Judgment On : 27th August, 2025
Prasenjit Biswas, J:-
1.
Both the appeals are filed challenging the impugned
judgment and order dated 30.09.2024 and 01.10.2024 passed by
the learned Judge POCSO Act-cum-Additional Sessions Judge, 1st
Court, Arambagh, Hooghly in connection with POCSO Case No. 6
of 2018.
2. By passing the impugned judgment both the convicts
namely, Sagarika Pandit and Sushila Majhi are found guilty for
committing the offence punishable under Section
302/363/365/201 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced
to death under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. These
appellants were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
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3
seven years under Section 363, 365 and 201of the Indian Penal
Code along with fine of Rs. 5000/- in each of the offences and in
default of payment of fine to suffer further imprisonment for one
month.
3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said impugned
judgment and order of conviction, the present appeal is preferred
at the behest of the appellants.
4. The story of the prosecution in nutshell is that:
“A complaint was lodged on 03.02.2018 at 3.35 P.M. by
the defacto complainant before Khanakul Police Station
to the effect that on 02.02.2018 at about 7:00 P.M. his
minor daughter (victim) who was aged about 4 years 3
months at that point of time left their house with her
mother but did not return. The defacto complainant
and others started searching for her everywhere but did
not find her. Subsequently, on 07.02.2018 the dead
body of the said minor victim girl was found in the
bathroom chamber of one Ghantu Singh. These
appellants along with other accused Murari Pandit
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4(since deceased) were detained by the local people and it
was confessed that they murdered the victim. The
accused Murari along with his wife Sagarika was
arrested on 09.02.2018 by the Investigating Officer and
thereafter on 14.02.2018 the other appellant Sushila
Maji, who happens to be the maternal grandfather of
the deceased was arrested on the basis of the statement
made by other two accused i.e. Murari Pandit and
Sagarika Pandit. On the basis of that complaint a police
case bearing Khanakul P.S. Case No. 31/18 dated
03.02.2018 was registered and after completion of
investigation charge-sheet was submitted by the
prosecuting agency against these appellants along with
other deceased accused Murari Pandit under Section
5. During trial of the case, the accused Murari Pandit died and
as such, the case against that accused was ‘filed for ever’.
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5
6. During trial, prosecution had examined sixteen witnesses
and produced documents and materials which were marked as
exhibits 1 to 17 and MAT Exhibit I and II in this case. Neither any
oral, nor any documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the
appellants.
7. Mr. Kaushik Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the
appellant has said that the present case is based on
circumstantial evidence and no circumstance has been
established or placed on record to connect these appellants with
the offence alleged. It is said by the learned Advocate that the
prosecution claims that the victim was sacrificed to a “Deity” for
“Tantra Sadhana” but the dead body of the victim did not bear any
precise cut injuries to establish that blood was offered to a “Deity”
for “Tantra Sadhana”. It is said that during the trial or
investigation no witness has ever claimed any incident of rape by
anyone or rape by the deceased accused. The present appellants
are women and thus the allegation of rape is not sustainable
against them. The learned Advocate further contended that the
prosecution claimed that there was an extra judicial confession by
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the appellant Sagarika Pandit and her husband before the
villagers who allegedly suspected them to commit the offence. On
the contrary, during trial no witness claimed that any such extra-
judicial confession was ever made to them. It is further said by the
learned Advocate that such confession was made before Anil
Dhank (PW12), Becharam Bag (PW10), and Haru Pakira (PW-13),
but these witness at the time of deposing before the Trial Court
did not confirm or claimed such confession.
8. The attention of this Court is drawn to the deposition of the
PW12 and PW13 who are the witnesses to the seizure. It is said
that PW12 in his evidence that the police prepared documents at
the police station and obtained his signature, once in front of the
house of the appellant. Whereas PW13 did not mention about
seizing of ‘chappal’, during his examination and that seizure
witness admitted that he signed a seizure list on asking of police.
So, as per submission of the learned Advocate that the claim of
the prosecution regarding seizure of “chappal” (sleepers) from the
cowshed of the one of the appellants is not at all believable.
Moreover, no witnesses including the mother of the victim (PW2)
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7
mentioned the “chappal” during their depositions. So, it is said by
the learned Advocate that chain of circumstances in connection
with this case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
9. As per submission of the learned Advocate there is not a
single iota of evidence, far less, a clinching piece of evidence, to
link these appellants with the death of the child. Reliance has
been placed by the learned Advocate upon the decision rendered
by the Apex Court in the Case of Hanumant -vs- State of
Madhya Pradesh1 and in the case of State of Punjab -vs- Kewal
Krishan2. It is further said by the learned Advocate that the
conviction cannot be justified solely on the basis of the statement
of a co-accused regarding the involvement of the other accused in
the crime. It is said that PW16 (Investigating Officer) has stated in
his evidence that the other co-accused persons revealed the name
of the appellant Sushila Maji regarding her involvement in the
alleged crime and the appellant Sushila Maji was arrested on
14.02.2018 from the residential house of PW1. In support of his
1
(1951) 2 SCC 71
2
2023 SCC OnLine SC 746
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8
contention, he placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra
Patel -vs- The State of Gujrat3. So, it is said by the learned
Advocate that the learned Trial Judge failed and/ or neglected to
appreciate the aforesaid aspects as per the law laid down by the
Apex Court and proceeded to arrive at a finding of guilt against
these appellants thereby causing serious prejudice to them. So, it
is said that the impugned judgment and order of conviction
passed by the learned Trial Court may be set aside.
10. Per contra, learned Advocate representing the State
submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt by adducing prosecution witnesses through
reliable cogent, oral and documentary evidence. There is nothing
material and in the record for which the findings of the Trial Court
may be interfered with. It is said by the learned Advocate that the
offence committed by the appellant in a diabolical manner and the
victim girl who was aged about four years was murdered by these
appellants.
3
(2019) 16 SCC 547
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9
11. We have considered the rival submissions advanced by both
the parties and have gone through all the materials on record.
12. Undoubtedly, this case was based on circumstantial
evidence and there is no witness to the incident. It is now well
settled that when a case is based solely on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn must be fully established, and as such circumstances
must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused and wholly incompatible with any other reasonable
hypothesis. The chain of circumstances must be so complete as to
exclude every possible hypothesis except that of the guilt of the
accused. The prosecution is obliged to prove each link in the chain
by reliable and cogent evidence, a missing link or a broken chain
inevitably enures to the benefit of the accused. Suspicion,
however, strong cannot take the place of proof. It is also trite law
that the circumstances proved must be of conclusive nature and
must unerringly point towards the accused as the perpetrator of
the offence. In the absence of such a complete and unbroken
chain, it would be wholly unsafe to sustain a conviction.
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10
13. PW1 has stated in his evidence that on the date of incident
he went outside for the purpose of the work and returned to his
residence at about 7 P.M. after purchasing food for the victim. But
on return to his house this witness could not see the victim and
thereafter he searched for her daughter but could not find her. On
the next day, this witness went to the police station in the
morning and lodged written complainant at Khanakul Police
Station. It is said by this witness that after five days of the
incident PW11 Ghantu Singh called him on saying that some bad
smell was coming out from his latrine chamber and when the lid
of the chamber was opened, the dead body of the victim was found
therein, police was informed and the dead body of the victim was
picked up from the chamber. It is said by this witness that
sometimes after they came to know the deceased accused Murari
@ Kochi and his wife Sagarika (one of the appellants) surrendered
at police station. So, this witness did not see the victim with the
appellants on the fateful date of incident.
14. PW2, mother of the victim girl has stated in his evidence that
on the date of incident at about 7 P.M. a quarrel was going on in
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11
the house of her neighbour and she went there to see the matter.
It is said by this witness that at that time the appellant Sushila
Maji was at their house and after returning home, her husband
(PW1) could not see the victim at home. It is further said by this
witness that on asking, the appellant Sushila Maji told PW1 that
the victim had come following this witness to place where she
went to see the quarrel. So, this witness did not see the victim
that who took her daughter with them. It is said by this witness
that the appellant Sagarika Pandit disclosed before public that the
victim was handed over to Sagarika by the appellant accused
Sushila Maji and Sushila Maji took the victim from their house to
Sagarika Pandit. This PW2 has said that Murari Pandit and
Sagarika Pandit killed their daughter for doing some secret ‘Tantra
Sadhana” and after killing the victim the deceased accused Murari
Pandit kept the dead body under heap of straw and thereafter the
body of the victim was thrown into the septic tank of PW11.
15. PW6, father of the defacto complainant has deposed that
after four to five days of the incident people observed bad smell
was coming from the septic tank and flies were gathering on the
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12
septic tank of neighbouring house and as such, the police was
informed and they recovered the dead body of the victim from the
said septic tank.
16. PW4, sister of the complainant also deposed in the same line
of PW1 and PW2. It is said by this witness that the dead body of
the victim was found in the septic tank of Ghantu Singh (PW11).
This witness further said that at that time the appellant Sagarika
along with her husband, the deceased accused Murari were fleeing
away from the village but they were caught by the village people
and they confessed there in front of the people.
17. PW5, Netai Mallik has stated in his evidence that he saw one
person was running and he followed him to some distance and the
said person entered into the jungle and then he quit to follow him
and further deposed that after 4/5 days the dead body of the
victim was recovered from the septic tank of PW11.
18. So, none of the witnesses saw Sagarika Pandit and Murari
Pandit taking away the victim to their Gowal Ghar (Cowshed) and
then putting the dead body into the septic tank chamber of PW11.
The victim was missing on 02.02.2018 at about 3 P.M. and the
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13
information was given by PW1 to the police station on 03.02.2018
at around 3.35 PM. The post-mortem report of the victim was
conducted on 08.02.2018. A notice for interrogation by the
Investigating Officer was sent to the Murari Pandit and his wife
Sagarika Pandit and they were interrogated on 07.02.2018 and
were released. Murari and Sagarika were again interrogated by the
Investigating Officer on 09.02.2018 and their confessional
statements were recorded and on the basis of their statement they
were arrested. The I.O. (PW16) arrested the other appellant
Sushila Maji on 14.02.2018 who happens to be the maternal
grandmother of the deceased on the basis of statement of other
two accused Murari and Sagarika.
19. In the case at hand, the circumstances projected by the
prosecution suffer from material gaps and inconsistencies, leaving
the chain incomplete. In the case based on circumstantial
evidence the prosecution is required to prove each circumstance
beyond reasonable doubt, all such circumstances must form an
unbroken and continuous chain leading only to the inference that
the accused, and none else, committed the offence. Suspicion,
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14
however strong, cannot replace legal proof, and the Court must
guard itself against conjectures and surmises. Where any link in
the chain of evidence is missing or where the proved facts are
consistent with the innocence of the accused, the benefit of doubt
must go in favour of the accused. It is only when all the proved
circumstances are interlinked in such a manner that they form a
complete and conclusive chain pointing unmistakably towards the
guilt of the accused that a conviction can be sustained.
20. The prosecution claims that there was an extra judicial
confession by the deceased accused Murari and his wife Sagarika
before the villagers who were allegedly suspected to commit the
offence. It is claimed by the prosecution that on 07.02.2018 when
the body of the victim was discovered, Murari and his wife
Sagarika (one of the appellants) were fleeing from the village and
they caught by the villagers and they confessed guilt in front of
them and were handed over to the police. But during trial no
witness claimed that any such extra-judicial confession was ever
made to them, the persons before whom such confession was
made namely, Anil Dhank (PW12), Becharam Bag (PW10), and
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15
Haru Pakira (PW-13). At the time of giving depositions before the
Trial Court these witnesses did not confirm or claimed such
confession.
21. PW16, Investigating Officer has stated in his evidence that he
sent a notice to Murari and the appellant Sagarika for
interrogation and after getting such notice they appeared for
interrogation on 07.02.2018 and were released from the same
date. Their confessional statements were recorded on 09.02.2018
and they were arrested on that date.
22. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-
judicial confessions, being statements made outside the judicial
process, must be approached with great circumspection. This
caution becomes more pronounced when such confession is
alleged to have been made before members of the public, who are
neither law enforcement officials nor judicial authorities. The
inherent possibility of misinterpretation, embellishment, or
motivated testimony in such circumstances demands that the
Court subject the evidence to a strict and searching scrutiny. The
reliability of an extra-judicial confession hinges upon the
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16
credibility of the witness, the voluntariness of the statement, the
absence of any animus, and the consistency of the account. The
Court must, therefore, be satisfied that the confession was
spontaneous, untainted by threat, inducement, or promise, and
made in a mental state conducive to truth-telling. Mere assertion
by public witnesses that the accused confessed is insufficient
unless it inspires complete confidence and is corroborated, at least
in material particulars, by other reliable evidence. In the present
case, while the extra-judicial confession is admissible under the
Evidence Act, the rule of prudence mandates its careful evaluation
in light of the surrounding facts, the neutrality of the witnesses,
and the absence of suspicious circumstances. Only if these
safeguards are met can such a confession before the public form a
safe foundation for conviction.
23. When the confession is made before members of the public–
such as co-villagers, acquaintances, or bystanders–it is subject to
even stricter scrutiny because of the possibility of
misinterpretation, exaggeration, or fabrication. Yet, if the public
witnesses are found wholly reliable, have no motive to implicate
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17
the accused falsely, and their testimony withstands cross-
examination, the confession can be safely relied upon.
24. In this case it is alleged that on 07.02.2018 the deceased
accused Murari and one of the present appellants Sagarika Pandit
were fleeing away from the village and upon suspicion the
villagers apprehended them and upon asking reason, they made
extra-judicial confession. We have already said that none of the
witnesses stated who were the persons apprehended them and
before whom such extra-judicial confessions were made. It is said
by PW1 in his deposition that sometimes after recovery of the
body, he came to know that Murari Pandit and his wife Sagarika
Pandit are miscreants and committed the misdeed. PW2, mother
of the victim also stated in the same voice of PW1 and has said
that when the body was recovered, at that point of time people
saw Murari Pandit and Sagarika Pandit were fleeing away to fields
and people caught them and then Sagarika Pandit disclosed to the
public that they have committed the crime. But the said statement
has not been made before the police at the time when she was
examined by the police. So, the extra-judicial confession made by
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18
the accused Murari Pandit and his wife Sagarika Pandit is very
much doubtful and as such, such confession cannot be safely
relied upon on the prosecution witnesses did not corroborate PW1
and PW2 on this score at the trial.
25. In this case, some bloodstained earth was seized from the
alleged place of occurrence where the victim was allegedly killed,
being the cowshed of the accused Murari and Sagarika and the
sample was sent to the FSL for the examination to determine
whether the blood was that of the victim. The forensic laboratory
could not determine whether the blood was human or if it
belonged to the victim.
26. At the time of investigation some articles i.e. vermilion-
stained dry leaves, some dry marigold flowers, some rice, half-
burnt incense sticks, an empty bottle of rose-scented perfume,
and an open vermilion packet were seized from the cowshed of
Murari and Sagarika but the prosecution has failed to prove that
‘Tantra Sadhana’ was performed or the victim was sacrificed there,
by seizing those articles. There is no such evidence on record that
the victim was taken to that place of ‘Tantra Sadhana’ which is at
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the cowshed of the accused Murari and Sagarika on the relevant
date.
27. In this case, a pair of sleepers (chappal) allegedly belonging
to the victim were seized from the corner of the cowshed where
allegedly ‘Tantra Sadhana’ was held by the accused Murari and
Sagarika. PW1 (de-facto complainant/ father of the victim) during
his examination from 17.08.2018 to 19.04.2022 never said about
‘chappal’. After about a year PW1 was recalled on the basis of an
application filed on behalf of the prosecution, a question was put
to this PW1 and then he identified the seized chappal as belonged
to the victim. In cross-examination, PW1 admitted that he had
informed the police about the victim’s wearing apparel at the time
of her disappear but had not mentioned chappals. PW12, one of
the witnesses to the seizure did not identify the chappal. PW13 did
not mention of the chappal during his entire examination. PW2,
mother of the victim also did not mention the chappal during
giving her deposition. None of the witnesses also did not say about
chappal.
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28. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) the Apex Court
enunciated the five golden principles, often referred to as the
panchsheel of circumstantial evidence, which must be
cumulatively satisfied before a conviction can be sustained: (i) the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established; (ii) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; (iii)
the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
(iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one
to be proved; and (v) there must be a complete chain of evidence
so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused. Unless these five
tests are satisfied, a conviction cannot be sustained merely on the
basis of suspicion, conjecture, or strong moral probabilities. In
other words, unless the prosecution is able to weave together a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstances which points
unerringly to the guilt of the accused, and which is wholly
inconsistent with any other rational conclusion, the accused is
entitled to the benefit of doubt. This is the cardinal safeguard
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against wrongful conviction and forms the very foundation of the
rule of law in cases based on circumstantial evidence.
29. If even one link in this chain is missing, broken, or left in
doubt, the benefit of such doubt must go to the accused, resulting
in acquittal. Conviction cannot be founded on suspicion,
conjectures, or probabilities, however strong they may appear.
30. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar (supra) the Hon’ble Apex
Court cautioned that circumstances should be “fully established”
and not merely “may be” established. The Court further observed
that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The
Apex Court laid down the principle that in cases depending on
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be of a definite
tendency pointing towards the guilt of the accused, and they must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
31. It is profitable to quote the following observations as made by
the Apex Court at paragraph 11 of the said report in the context of
this case.
“11. Assuming that the accused Nargundkar had taken
the tenders to his house, the prosecution, in order to
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22bring the guilt home to the accused, has yet to prove the
other facts referred to above. No direct evidence was
adduced in proof of those facts. Reliance was placed by
the prosecution and by the courts below on certain
circumstances, and intrinsic evidence contained in the
impugned document, Ext. P-3A. In dealing with
circumstantial evidence the rules specially applicable to
such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases
there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion
may take the place of legal proof and therefore it is right
to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the
jury in R.V. Hodge where he said:
“The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting
circumstances to one another, and even in straining them
a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one
connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the
individual, the more likely was it, considering such
matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some
little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact
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23consistent with its previous theories and necessary to
render them complete.”
32. Thus, when the prosecution fails to prove any of the essential
links–be it motive, last-seen circumstance, recovery of
incriminating articles, medical evidence consistent with the
prosecution version, or any other relevant factor–the entire case
collapses. It is trite law that the benefit of even a reasonable doubt
must be given to the accused, for the presumption of innocence is a
cardinal principle of criminal law. Therefore, in the absence of a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstances pointing irresistibly
to the guilt of the accused and ruling out any hypothesis consistent
with innocence, conviction is wholly unsustainable in law. Thus, it
is an inviolable rule that unless the entire chain of circumstances is
established beyond reasonable doubt, and unless those
circumstances are wholly consistent with the guilt of the accused
and inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation, the Court
cannot record a conviction. To do so in the absence of such a
complete chain would amount to a grave miscarriage of justice.
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33. It appears from the deposition of PW16 (I.O.) that the
accused Murari and his wife Sagarika (one of the appellants)
revealed the name of the other appellant Sushila who happens to
the mother-in-law of the complainant regarding her involvement in
the alleged crime. The accused Murari and his wife Sagarika were
arrested on 09.02.2018 and the appellant Sushila was arrested on
14.02.2018 from the residential house of PW1.
34. It is now a settled proposition of law that the statement of a
co-accused, whether recorded under Section 30 of the Indian
Evidence Act or otherwise, is not substantive evidence and cannot,
by itself, form the sole basis for the conviction of another accused.
The law recognises that such a statement stands on a weaker
footing than even that of an approver, for it is not made on oath, is
not subjected to cross-examination, and is often motivated by a
desire to shift or share culpability. The confession of a co-accused
can be taken into consideration only for lending assurance to
other independent evidence adduced by the prosecution; it cannot
be treated as evidence of the fact itself. In the absence of material
corroboration connecting the accused to the commission of the
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offence, reliance solely on such a statement would be wholly
unsafe and contrary to the mandate of law. In the case at hand,
save and except the bare assertion of the co-accused, there is no
independent, reliable, or corroborative evidence establishing the
complicity of the appellant. In these circumstances, the conviction
based purely on the statement of a co-accused is legally
unsustainable and cannot be allowed to stand.
35. In the case of Deepak Bhai Jagadish Pattel (supra) the
Hon’ble Apex Court held that the conviction of a co-accused
cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into
service only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence
and feel the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of his
conclusions deducible from the said evidence. In criminal case
where the other evidence against the accused person is wholly
unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely of a confession of
a co-accused person, the presumption of an innocence which is
basis of criminal jurisprudence should be held in favour of the
accused person and compels the Court to render the verdict that
the charge was not proved against him and he is entitled to the
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26
benefit of doubt. In view of the above report there is nothing on
record against Sushila Maji except the statements of the co-
accused person.
36. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
guilt of an accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt
through legally admissible evidence. The presumption of
innocence is the foundation of criminal law, and this presumption
continues to operate in favour of the accused until it is displaced
by cogent, credible, and trustworthy proof. The “suspicion,
however grave, cannot take the place of proof,” and that there is a
long distance between “may be true” and “must be true.” The
prosecution must travel this entire distance by presenting
unimpeachable evidence; mere moral conviction or strong
suspicion is not enough to warrant conviction. The circumstances
relied upon by the prosecution must be fully established and
should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused; otherwise, no conviction can be sustained. The
conjectures or suspicion, no matter how strong, cannot be allowed
to replace proof. This principle is rooted in the high standard of
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proof required in criminal trials–proof beyond reasonable doubt–
which acts as a safeguard against wrongful convictions. Suspicion
may arise from circumstances such as motive, opportunity, or
conduct of the accused, but unless such suspicion is supported
by convincing evidence that forms a complete and unbroken chain
pointing to guilt, the court is bound to acquit. It is no doubt true
that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence
of the people in the judicial system, but wrongful convictions are
far worse and shake the very basis of society. The courts must
ensure that suspicion does not take the place of legal proof.
37. Therefore, even the gravest suspicion–based on strong
motive, questionable conduct, or circumstantial inferences–
cannot, by itself, form the basis for conviction unless the
prosecution’s evidence satisfies the test of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The protection against conviction on suspicion
alone is an indispensable safeguard for individual liberty and the
integrity of the justice system.
38. In this case, Madhabi Pandit (PW9), Ghantu Singh (PW11),
Anup Dhank (PW12), Haru Pakhira (PW13) did not say anything
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regarding involvement of the appellant Sushila Maji with the
alleged offence.
39. The contents of the FIR and the inquest report when read
with the juxtaposition of the deposition of Investigating Officer,
then it appears that the victim went out of the house with her own
mother (PW2) before she went missing. This contradicts the
prosecution’s claim that the victim went out with her
grandmother, who handed over to the other accused person
Murari and his wife Sagarika and this discrepancy completely
breaks the chain of circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has
sought to build its case on the footing that the victim was taken
away by her grandmother, who thereafter allegedly handed her
over to the co-accused Murari and his wife Sagarika. The twofold
version, emanating from the prosecution’s own documents and
witnesses, gives rise to a clear contradiction as to with whom the
victim was last seen alive. The so-called “last seen together”
circumstance, being one of the vital links in the chain of
circumstantial evidence, must be established with certainty and
beyond doubt. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to
2025:CHC-AS:1658-DB
29present a consistent and unambiguous narrative. The
inconsistency between the FIR, inquest report, and the
subsequent theory advanced by the prosecution completely erodes
the credibility of the “last seen” evidence. Once this link is broken,
the entire chain of circumstances falls apart, for it is well settled
that the chain must be complete and unbroken in order to sustain
a conviction. This glaring discrepancy, therefore, strikes at the
very root of the prosecution’s case and entitles the accused to the
benefit of doubt.
40. In view of the above facts and circumstances and discussion
made above we find that there is illegality and material irregularity
in the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the
learned Trial Court dated 30.09.2024 and 01.10.2024 and as
such, it is liable to be set aside.
41. Accordingly, both the appeals being CRA(DB) 364 of 2024
and CRA(DB) 33 of 2025 are hereby allowed.
42. The impugned judgment and order of conviction dated
30.09.2024 and 01.10.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court in
2025:CHC-AS:1658-DB
30
connection with POCSO Case No. 6 of 2018 arising out of P.S.
Case No. 31/18 dated 03.02.2018 is hereby set aside. Both the
appellants are to be released from the correctional home forthwith.
43. In view of provision of Section 437A of Cr.P.C. the appellants
shall have to execute bail bonds with sureties and such bail bonds
shall be in force for six months.
44. Let a copy of this judgment and order along with the Trial
Court Records be sent down to the Trial Court immediately for
taking necessary steps in this regard.
45. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be
given to the parties on payment of requisite fees.
[PRASENJIT BISWAS, J.]
46. I Agree
[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]
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