Telangana High Court
State Rep., By Inspector Of Police vs Sangi Linga Raju And Another on 24 January, 2025
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
*****
Criminal Appeal No.850 OF 2013
Between:
State rep. by Inspector of Police,
ACB, Karimnagar Range ... Appellant
And
Sangi Linga Raju and another ... Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 24.01.2025
Submitted for approval.
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
1 Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see the Yes/No
Judgments?
2 Whether the copies of judgment may
be marked to Law Reporters/Journals Yes/No
3 Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship
wish to see the fair copy of the Yes/No
Judgment?
__________________
K.SURENDER, J
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SURENDER
+ Crl.A. No. 850 OF 2013
% Dated 24.01.2025
# State rep. by Inspector of Police,
ACB, Karimnagar Range. ... Appellant
And
$ Sangi Linga Raju another ... Respondents
! Counsel for the Appellant: Learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB
^ Counsel for the Respondents: Sri S. Surender Reddy.
Sri A.Ravinder
Sri Nayakwadi Ramesh
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1
(2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 544
2
(2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 687
3
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.850 OF 2013
JUDGMENT:
1. This Criminal Appeal is filed by the ACB aggrieved by the
acquittal of the respondents/A1 and A2 for the offence under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act
vide judgment in C.C.No.47 of 2010 dated 13.03.2013 passed by
the II Additional Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil
Courts, Hyderabad.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that Accused No.1/1st
respondent (Sangi Linga Raj), served as a Senior Assistant in the
Office of the Deputy Transport Commissioner & Secretary,
Regional Transport Authority (SRTA), Karimnagar, from 9.9.2003
to 21.5.2005. Accused No.2/2nd respondent (Madasu Anjaneya
Rao) is a private individual. PW1 lodged a Telugu written
complaint stating that his father, Raja Mallu and his father’s
partner, A. Anjaneyulu, jointly purchased a Swaraj Tractor and
Trailer with a loan of Rs.2,50,000/- from Union Bank. PW1 used
to maintain the Tractor and Trailer. PW1 paid Rs.6,500/- to a
transport broker, Kasthuri Laxman, RTA agent, for securing the
registration certificate in the names of his father and his father’s
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partner. However, the agent deceived him without completing the
work. When PW1 started driving the tractor in Choppadandi
Mandal without registration certificate, he was caught by the
Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector, who seized the Tractor and
Trailer and kept them at Choppadandi PS.
3. On 30.4.2005, PW1 got the Tractor and Trailer released
after paying the compounding fee at the RTA Office, Karimnagar.
On 11.5.2005, PW1 submitted Ex.P2, an application for a
registration certificate for the Tractor and Trailer, at the office of
the Deputy Transport Commissioner & SRTA, where A1 was a
Senior Assistant. During the submission of the application, A1
allegedly demanded Rs.1,000/- for issuing the registration
papers, in addition to the requisite fees of Rs.560/- each for the
Tractor and Trailer. PW1 paid Rs.1,000/- via DD through a
broker, and A1 informed him to collect the registration certificate
after five days. On 19.5.2005, at 11:30 A.M, when PW1 met A1,
A1 allegedly demanded an additional bribe of Rs.600/- to deliver
the registration certificate. PW1 informed his father and the
partner, who advised him to file a case against A1. As PW1 was
unwilling to pay the bribe, he approached PW5/DSP, ACB and
lodged a complaint/Ex.P1 on 20.5.2005 at 10:30 AM before PW5.
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PW5, after verifying the complaint and obtaining permission from
the competent authority, registered FIR Ex.P12 in Cr. No. 6/ACB-
KNR/2005 under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988, at 10:00 AM on
21.5.2005 and initiated the investigation.
4. PW5 secured the presence of P.W.1 and mediators/PW2 and
LW3. After completing all formalities and concluding
Ex.P4/Mediator’s Report, P.W.5, assisted by LW9 and PW7, laid a
trap against A1 at the office of the Deputy Commissioner &
SRTA, Karimnagar, on 21.5.2005 at 11:50 AM.
5. On 21.5.2005, during the trap at 11:45 AM, PW1
approached A1, who was seated at counter No. 3. On seeing PW1,
A1 allegedly asked whether the bribe amount was brought. Upon
PW1’s affirmative response, A1 instructed PW1 to pay the bribe
amount to A2, a private bus owner visiting the office to obtain a
tourist permit for his bus. Following A1’s instructions, PW1
offered the tainted amount of Rs.600/- to A2, who allegedly
accepted it, counted it with both hands, wrapped it in a white
paper, and placed it on A1’s table. A1 allegedly accepted the
tainted amount through A2 as a bribe for delivering the
registration certificate of the Tractor and Trailer, already issued
by the authority. Upon receiving the signal, PW5, along with
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mediators PW2 and LW3 and the staff, entered the office and
apprehended AO1 and AO2. Phenolphthalein tests conducted on
A2’s hand fingers yielded positive results, with solutions
preserved under MOs 3 and 4. A1’s hand fingers yielded negative
results, with solutions preserved under MOs 5 and 6.
MO7/tainted amount was recovered from A1’s office table,
wrapped in white paper. Sodium carbonate testing of the white
paper using a cotton swab also yielded positive results. The said
solution was preserved under MO8. PW5 seized Exs.P5 to 8 from
A1’s possession and prepared ExP9/rough sketch.
6. A1 and A2 were arrested on 21.5.2005 and the post-trap
proceedings were recorded under ExP10. PW7/Investigating
Officer took over the investigation from PW5, while PW6
conducted subsequent investigation. Sanction to prosecute A1
was granted by PW4, being the competent authority, i.e.,
Principal Secretary to Government, Transport, Roads, and
Buildings Department, Secretariat, AP. No sanction was required
for A2’s prosecution as he is a private individual. After
completing the investigation, PW6 filed a charge sheet alleging
that A1 committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and
7
13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of PCA, and A2 committed an offence under
Section 12 of the Act.
7. Defence of the Accused No.1 is that on the day of the trap,
PW1 brought a sealed cover and asked A1 to accept it, which is
spoken to by D.W.1. When A1 refused, PW1 left the sealed cover
at A1’s counter, which was later seized by ACB officials as tainted
cash. Further the recovery of tainted amount/MO7 was neither
from A1’s person nor from his belongings. Furthermore, the
absence of phenolphthalein traces on A1’s hands, as confirmed
by MOs 5 and 6, negates the presumption under Section 20(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act that A1 accepted the bribe
amount from PW1 pursuant to a demand. Mere recovery of the
tainted amount, without context or corroborating circumstances,
does not suffice to establish guilt. Accused No.1 was falsely
implicated by PW1 out of malice. PW1 bore a grudge because A1
had refused to assist PW1 in reducing the compounding fee that
PW1 had paid on 30.4.2005 at the transport office. PW1 owed the
compounding fee after his vehicles were seized by the Assistant
Motor Vehicle Inspector for operating the Tractor and Trailer
without a registration certificate.
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8. A2’s defence is that even if it is assumed that A2 received
the amount from PW1 at the instance of A1, this alone does not
implicate A2 in an offence under Section 12 of the Act. Without
proof of the essential ingredients of abetment as defined under
Section 107 of IPC, it cannot be established that A2 intentionally
aided A1 in committing the offence. Further according to the
evidence on record, A2 was present in A1’s office on the trap date
to obtain a tourist permit for his bus. He was waiting at the side
counter near counter no. 3, where A1 was handling work. A2
appeared to have obliged A1’s request to collect the amount from
PW1. However, this innocent act of receiving money from PW1,
without any knowledge of the transaction’s purpose or
background between PW1 and A1, does not substantiate the
offence of abetment against AO2.
9. Learned Special Judge framed the following points for
consideration insofar as A1 is concerned:
1. Whether AO1 demanded a bribe of Rs.600/-, in
addition to an amount of Rs.1000/- already received by
him from PW1 as illegal gratification, for doing an official
favour of issuing the registration certificate for the Tractor
and Trailer, and accepted the said amount from PW1 on
the trap date?
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2. Whether AO1, by obtaining the bribe of Rs.600/-,
committed the offence of criminal misconduct?
3. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of AO1 for the
offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2)
beyond all reasonable doubt?
10. Learned Special Judge, basing on the oral and documentary
evidence found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that A1 demanded or accepted the bribe on the
trap date and extended the benefit of the doubt to AO1, finding
him not guilty of offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2)
of the Act.
11. Learned Special Judge found as to how ACB officials knew
that A2 collected the bribe from PW1 on behalf of A1 and placed
it at A1’s counter when the trap party entered. Referring to
ExP10/Post trap proceedings, which stated that PW1 gave
prearranged signal indicating the demand and acceptance of the
bribe by A1 through A2, leading the trap party to enter, learned
Special Judge found it unclear as to how PW1 could give a signal
specifically conveying that A1 received the bribe through A2 or
that PW1 handed the amount to A2 to pass to A1. This doubt was
based on Ex.P4/Pre-trap proceedings and PW5’s evidence, which
did not mention A2 or foresee his role. Instructions to PW1 were
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only to hand over the cash to A1 on his demand and signal by
wiping his face with a handkerchief. The trap party understood
this signal to mean that A1 received the bribe. Moreover, PWs.1,
2, and 5 did not testify to PW1 giving additional signals indicating
A2’s involvement. Learned Special Judge also found contradiction
between PW1’s evidence and ExP10. According to PW1, his
version was recorded 15 minutes after the recovery of tainted
cash and scientific tests on A1 and A2. However, Ex.P10 stated
that PW1 was present in A1’s office and disclosed to PW5 that A1
received the bribe through A2, who kept the cash at A1’s counter.
Moreover, PW1 denied ExDs1 and 2 during cross-examination,
where he was reportedly quoted as stating that A1 refused to
accept the bribe, and A2 forcibly took him to the counter,
accepted Rs.600/-, wrapped it in registration papers, and placed
it at A1’s counter.
12. Learned Special Judge found from the evidence of P.W.3
that Ex.P5/Registration Certificate was ready on 12.5.2005 and
awaiting delivery, thereby PW1 could have collected it earlier, as
such, no official favour was pending with A1 on 19.5.2005 or
21.5.2005, making the alleged demand for a bribe improbable.
The learned Special Judge also considered the seizure of
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MO7/Cash. The cash was not found on A1’s person or belongings
but near his counter, and no incriminating evidence emerged
from scientific tests on A1’s hands. This undermined the
prosecution’s claim of acceptance of the bribe, preventing
reliance on the presumption under Section 20(1) of the Act. The
defence that PW1 bore a grudge against A1 for not assisting in
reducing the compounding fee for the Tractor and Trailer delivery
on 30.4.2005 was found plausible. During the course of cross-
examination, P.W.1 admitted to facts supporting this defence.
From the admission of P.W.1, it is clear that ExP5 was ready on
12.5.2005, PW1’s payment to A1 was unnecessary, making the
alleged demand on 19.5.2005 and 21.5.2005 improbable.
13. Learned Special Judge further considered the following
points insofar as A2 is concerned.
1. Whether AO2, a private individual and bus owner
who visited AO1’s office on the trap date, abetted AO1 in
demanding and accepting the illegal gratification of Rs
600 from PW1; and
2. Whether the prosecution proved AO2’s guilt under
Section 12 of the Act beyond all reasonable doubt?
14. P.W.1 stated in his deposition that A1 instructed A2 to
receive Rs.600/- from PW1. Thereafter, A2 placed amount at A1’s
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counter without using force. The learned Special Judge found
that PW1 deposed contrary to what he has stated before trap
officials in Section 161 Cr.P.C statement with regard to Exs.D1
and D2 and maintained that A2 acted merely as a bearer for A1.
15. Learned Special Judge further observed that A2 made no
demand for a bribe, as corroborated by the testimonies of PWs 1,
2, and 5, and no malice could be attributed to A2 to suggest
intentional aid in the commission of the offence. This finding was
further reinforced by P.W.1’s retraction of his statements under
Exs.D1 and D2, which represented major contradictions during
his cross-examination. In the light of the prosecution’s failure to
prove A2’s guilt under Section 12 of the Act beyond all reasonable
doubt, the learned Special Judge extended the benefit of the
doubt to AO2 and found him not guilty of the offence under
16. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB argued that
prosecution proved demand and money was recovered on trap
date. The burden shifts on to the accused, since presumption has
to be drawn under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
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17. In Mallappa and others v. State of Karnataka 1 the
Honourable Supreme Court summarised the principles whereby
appeals against acquittals can be interfered with. At para-42 of
the Judgment, it was held as follows;
“42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the
safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are
intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which
come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be
summarised as:
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial
and such appreciation must be comprehensive — inclusive of all
evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a
miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two
views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the trial court is a legally plausible view, mere
possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of
acquittal;
(v) If the appellate court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in
appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically
address all the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal and
must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or
error of law or fact in the decision of the trial court.”
1
(2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 544
14
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Vijayakumar
v. State of T.N.2 held as hereunder:–
“20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the
trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on
record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and
valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section
378 CrPC, no differentiation is made between an appeal against
acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the
long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment
in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, [(2007) 4 SCC 415] has laid
down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate
Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal.
Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p.
432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
following general principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both
on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
2
(2021) 3 SCC 687
15
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
19. From the record, it is not clear as to how the ACB officials
concluded that A1 accepted the bribe through A2 when PW1 was
outside for 15 minutes after signalling. The pre-arranged signal
agreed upon by PW5 and PW1 was specifically intended to
indicate that A1 received the bribe. No alternate signal was
arranged to suggest that A1 accepted the bribe via someone else.
In the absence of P.W.1, it is not known as to how PW5 got to
know about A2’s involvement in the acceptance of bribe on behalf
of A1.
20. It is also pertinent to mention here as to why PW1 did not
collect the registration certificate after the alleged payment of the
bribe to A2 on the trap date. Even if it is accepted that A2
received the bribe on behalf of A1, PW1 testified that he and A2
went to the hall entrance, where PW1 handed over the tainted
amount to A2. However, this contradicts PW2’s testimony. PW2
stated that the hall gate was visible from the outside and A2 did
not follow PW1 to the gate, but only PW1 came out. PW2 further
16
deposed that PW1 was not holding any papers when they saw
him. Further, PW1’s earlier statements in Exs.D1 and D2,
claiming that A2 forcibly took him to the hall entrance and
accepted the bribe, also contradict PW2’s testimony. Therefore, it
is not clear as to where A2 accepted the bribe and who placed it
on A1’s table. Further, there was no evidence to establish any
prior relationship between A1 and A2 before the trap. Without
proof of such connection, it cannot be determined that A2 had
knowledge of the transactions between A1 and PW1 or that the
tainted amount constituted illegal gratification. In the absence of
this knowledge, it remains uncertain whether A2 accepted the
amount from PW1 with the intent to aid A1. If PW3’s statement is
to be considered as true that the RC for the Trailer and Tractor
was ready on 12.5.2005, it can be safely concluded that no
official favour was pending with A1 on 19.5.2005 and 21.5.2005.
21. The evidence of D.W.1 should be taken into consideration
since a defence witness is entitled to acceptance on par with a
prosecution witness. The prosecution has not established
recovery from A1’s person or belongings. Further, there were no
positive results from the phenolphthalein test on A1’s hands.
Though PW1 stated that on May 11, 2005, when he submitted
17
Ex.P2 application for the registration of the Tractor and Trailer,
A1 allegedly demanded bribe of Rs.1,000/-, which PW1 claimed
to have paid through A1’s broker, however, during cross-
examination, PW1 admitted that he did not know the broker’s
name. The prosecution failed to investigate the identity of the
broker who allegedly received the Rs.1,000/- bribe on A1’s
demand.
22. Unless there are compelling circumstances, in cases of
acquittal, the appellate Court cannot reverse the findings of
acquittal. Acquittal gives rise to presumption of innocence of the
accused. The trial Court has the opportunity of examining the
demeanor of the witnesses during the course of trial. The
circumstances in a case have to be collectively looked into by the
court and adjudicate upon the case. Only for the reason of there
being a complaint under Ex.P1 and the evidence of P.W.1, it
cannot be said that the factum of demand has been proved.
23. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any compelling
reasons or any incorrect findings on the facts of the case by the
learned Special Judge warranting interference in the present case
of acquittal.
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24. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal is dismissed.
__________________
K.SURENDER, J
Date: 24.01.2025
kvs
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