Delhi High Court
State vs Manjeet on 24 February, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on : 24.02.2025
+ CRL.REV.P. 554/2017 & CRL.M.A. 12166/2017
STATE .....Petitioner
versus
MANJEET .....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr.Naresh Kumar Chahar, APP for the
State with SI Dharmveer, PS Chhawla.
For the Respondent : Mr. Anirudh Yadav, Adv. (through VC)
CORAM
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
CRL.M.A. 12166/2017 (condonation of delay of 12 days in filing the
present petition)
1. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is
allowed and the delay in filing the present petition is condoned.
2. The application stands disposed of.
CRL.REV.P. 554/2017
3. The present petition is filed against the order dated 24.03.2017
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(hereafter ‘impugned order’) passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’), Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in SC No.
144/2017 whereby the respondent was discharged of the offence under
Sections 376/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC‘).
4. The FIR No. 255/2016 dated 28.06.2016 was registered on a
complaint made by the prosecutrix. It is alleged that the prosecutrix
was on friendly terms with the respondent for the last about one and a
half year. It was alleged that the respondent wanted to establish
physical relations with the prosecutrix and when she refused, he
promised to marry her. Thereafter the respondent took the prosecutrix
to his office on several occasions and established physical relations
with her.
5. It was alleged that thereafter when the prosecutrix got pregnant,
she was forced to take pills to terminate her pregnancy. It was further
alleged that on 26.06.2016, the respondent forcibly entered into
physical relationship with the prosecutrix and also refused to marry
her. The same culminated into the registration of the subject FIR under
Sections 376/313/506 of the IPC.
6. Chargesheet in the present case was filed under Sections
376/506 of the IPC.
7. By the impugned order, the learned ASJ discharged the
respondent of the offences under Sections 376/506 of the IPC. It was
noted that there had been an inordinate delay in the registration of the
subject FIR. It was noted that in the FIR as well as her statement under
Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC‘), the
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prosecutrix failed to mention any specific date and time indicating
when the alleged offences took place. It was noted that the respondent
was acquainted with the prosecutrix. It was noted that the prosecutrix
was mature enough to understand what was happening between the
respondent and herself.
8. It was noted that the prosecutrix was medically examined on
28.06.2016, and the MLC report does not indicate any external injury
mark on the person of the prosecutrix at the time of the examination. It
was noted that there existed no medical evidence to support the
version of the prosecutrix, and that she had been taken to the hospital
after considerable delay.
9. The learned ASJ noted that the oral and documentary evidence
did not disclose a grave suspicion against the respondent for framing a
charge under Sections 376/506 of the IPC.
10. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State
submitted that the learned ASJ erred in discharging respondent of the
offences under Sections 376/506 of the IPC. He submitted that the
learned ASJ did not correctly assess the prosecution evidence at the
time of framing of the charges. He submitted that the impugned order
is based on presumptions and conjectures, and is consequently liable
to be set aside.
11. He submitted that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is
not required to conduct a roving enquiry. He submitted that at such
stage, the Court is only required to ascertain whether a prima facie
case is made out against the accused or not. He submitted that the guilt
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of the respondent can be inferred from the statement of the prosecutrix
herself wherein she conceded that she did consent to engage in
physical relation a few times, however, on other occasions, the
respondent forcibly established physical relations with the prosecutrix
on the pretext of marrying her.
12. He submitted that the learned ASJ erroneously observed that no
specific date and time when the alleged incident took place was
mentioned. He submitted that the statement under Section 164 of the
CrPC specifically notes that the accused had refused to marry 2 – 3
days before giving the complaint.
13. He submitted that the learned ASJ failed to appreciate that the
prosecutrix extended her consent to engage into physical relations
with respondent only on the basis of a misconception of fact. He
consequently submitted that the impugned order ought to be set aside.
14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted
that the learned ASJ rightly discharged the respondent. He submitted
that the respondent had falsely been implicated in the present case. He
submitted that from a bare perusal of the statement of the victim, it is
evident that the relation between the prosecutrix and the respondent
was consensual. He submitted that since no prima facie case for the
alleged offences was made out, the respondent was rightly discharged
of the alleged offences by the learned ASJ.
Analysis
15. The scope of interference by High Courts while exercising
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revisional jurisdiction in a challenge to order framing charge/discharge
is well settled. The power ought to be exercised sparingly, in the
interest of justice. It is not open to the Court to misconstrue the
revisional proceedings as an appeal and reappreciate the evidence
unless any glaring perversity is brought to its notice.
16. Since the State has assailed the impugned order whereby the
respondents were discharged for the offences under Sections 376/506
of the IPC, it will be apposite to succinctly discuss the statutory law
with respect to framing of charge and discharge as provided under
Section 227 and 228 of the CrPC. The same is set out below:
“227. Discharge If, upon consideration of the record of the
case and the documents submitted therewith, and after
hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in
this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge
the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
228. Framing of Charge
(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the
Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence which–
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may,
frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer
the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, 1 [or any
other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the
accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as
the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on
such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate]
shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the
trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;
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(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in
writing a charge against the accused.
(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of
subsection (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the
accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads
guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar
Samal : (1979) 3 SCC 4, dealt with the scope of enquiry a judge is
required to make with regard to the question of framing of charges.
Inter alia, the following principles were laid down by the Court:
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned
above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing
the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally
depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay
down a rule of universal application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that
the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some
suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he
will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI :
(2010) 9 SCC 368, has culled out the following principles in respect
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of the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC while observing that
a prima facie case would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding
out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has
been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would
depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
the documents produced before the court, any basic
infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could
form an opinion that the accused might have committed
offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the
conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into but beforeSignature Not Verified
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framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the
material placed on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken
at their face value disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at
that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as
gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the
broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the
trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and
at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in
conviction or acquittal.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. In State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao : (2023) 17
SCC 688, the Hon’ble Apex Court has discussed the parameters that
would be appropriate to keep in mind at the stage of framing of
charge/discharge, as under:
“7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being
necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by
the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be
necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by
examining the defence of the accused when an application for
discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely
examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order toSignature Not Verified
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determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to
proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet
material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by
the investigating agency or the documents produced in which
prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances
against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice
and such material would be taken into account for the
purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the
accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the
opinion, after such consideration of the material there are
grounds for presuming that accused has committed the
offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be
framed.
xxx xxx xxx
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of
charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at
this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not
be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in
the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC
659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC
338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court
at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of
prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of
charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the
existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence
alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value
of the material on record and to check whether the material
on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion
of trial.”
20. The Court at the stage of framing of charge is to evaluate the
material only for the purpose of finding out if the facts constitute the
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alleged offence, given the ingredients of the offence. Thus, while
framing of charges, the Court ought to look at the limited aspect of
whether, given the material placed before it, there is grave suspicion
against the accused which is not properly explained. Though, for the
purpose of conviction, the same must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
21. The limited question for the determination of this Court is thus
whether the learned ASJ rightly discharged the respondent of the
alleged offences.
22. The translated copy of the statement of the prosecutrix under
Section 164 of the CrPC reads as under :
“COMPLAINANT XXXXX UNDER SECTION 164
CRPCDuring the course of investigation on 28.06.2016 I SI
got registered statement of complainant XXXXX under
section 164 CrPC in the court of Sh. Vaibhav Mehta, MM,
Dwarka Court which is as follows – my name is XXXXX. I
am 21 years of age. In year 2015 a boy namely Manjit met
me. He used to come in my neighbourhood area for meeting
someone. He proposed me for solemnizing marriage with
me. I told him yes. In the last 1-1/2 years. I with Manjit
made physical relations enough times. All this used to
happen in office in Shyam Vihar. In all these physical
relation, few were made with my sweet will and the
remaining were made under pressure. Manjit used to tell
that our marriage is going to solemnized and sometimes he
used to threaten me for coming in my house that he will
state to my mother all facts regarding it. Manjit remained
postponing in respect of solemnization of the marriage andSignature Not Verified
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finally before 2-3 days Manjit denied for solemnization of
marriage. Now he wants to solemnize his marriage with a
girl namely Veenita. Manjit had done sexual intercourse
with me several times, few from my own sweet will and few
after putting me under pressure. If he solemnizes his
marriage with me then I will withdraw my case because
therefore I have done sexual intercourse with him because
sometimes he used to say that he will solemnize his
marriage with me otherwise I want to take sternest legal
action against him.”
23. The allegation against the respondent is that he established
physical relations with the prosecutrix on multiple occasions on the
false pretext of marriage. The case of the prosecutrix therefore is
essentially that a promise was made to her by the respondent that he
would be marrying her. Consequently, it is further her case that the
prosecutrix consented to engage in physical relations with the
respondent on the misconception that the respondent would ultimately
be marrying her.
24. It is pertinent to mention that Section 90 of the IPC deals with
consent given under fear or misconception. The same reads as
reproduced hereunder:
“90. Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.–A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by
a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of
fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to
believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such
fear or misconception; orSignature Not Verified
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Consent of insane person.–if the consent is given by a person
who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to
understand the nature and consequence of that to which he
gives his consent; orConsent of child.–unless the contrary appears from the
context, if the consent is given by a person who is under
twelve years of age.”
25. Accordingly, if a consent given under fear of injury or
misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe that the consent given was a consequence of such
fear or misconception, the same would not be considered as consent
under Section 90 of the IPC.
26. However, while noting so, it is pertinent to mention that if the
person giving the consent can be said to have an active understanding
of the facts and circumstances, and the consequences of the proposed
act, the same would only stipulate the presence of consent. The
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State
of Maharashtra and another : (2019) 9 SCC 608 while determining
the meaning of “consent” for the purpose of Section 375 of the IPC
observed as under:
“12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with
respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding
of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the
proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to
act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction)
as well as the various possible consequences flowing from
such action or inaction, consents to such action. In
Dhruvaram Sonar [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State ofSignature Not Verified
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Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC
3100] which was a case involving the invoking of the
jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed : (SCC
para 15) “15. … An inference as to consent can be drawn if
only based on evidence or probabilities of the case.
“Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with
deliberation. It denotes an active will in mind of a person to
permit the doing of the act complained of.” This
understanding was also emphasised in the decision of this
Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala [Kaini Rajan v. State
of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] :
(SCC p. 118, para 12) “12. … “Consent”, for the purpose of
Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after
the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the
significance of the moral quality of the act but after having
fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent.
Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on
a careful study of all relevant circumstances.”
xxx xxx xxx
14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged
by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her.
Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court
has observed that there is a distinction between a false
promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will
be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good
faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v. State of
Chhattisgarh [Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019)
13 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509] , this Court held :
(SCC para 12) “12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid
decisions would be that if it is established and proved that
from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the
prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and
the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse onSignature Not Verified
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such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her,
such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a
misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in such a
case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such
an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined
under Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the offence
under Section 376 IPC.” Similar observations were made by
this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [Deepak
Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 660] (Deepak Gulati) : (SCC p. 682, para 21) “21. …
There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise,
and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false
promise of marriage by the accused;”
xxx xxx xxx
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of
the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to
abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to
engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact”
that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a
breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To
establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should
have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of
giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is
vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where
such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage
in the said act. In Deepak Gulati [Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 660] this
Court observed : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. …
There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise,
and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false
promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consentSignature Not Verified
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involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case
where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused, and not
solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances
which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his
control, was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. ***
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence
to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself,
the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his
promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is
unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable
circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with
respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are
not very clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the
meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must
have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be
called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl
in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, [Ed. :
The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in
original.] unless the court is assured of the fact that from the
very beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her [Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original.] .”
xxx xxx xxx
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to
Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation
towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent”
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was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a
promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The
promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in
bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time
it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate
relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to
engage in the sexual act.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Naim Ahmed
v. State (NCT of Delhi) : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89 while
distinguishing false promise to marry from breach of promise by the
accused observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the
respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for
sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the
accused had given a false promise to marry her and
subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent
was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under
Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is
pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a
false promise and committing breach of promise by the
accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the
beginning would not have any intention to marry the
prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the
prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with
a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of
promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused
might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry
her, and subsequently might have encountered certain
circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances
beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his
promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach ofSignature Not Verified
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promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a
person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier,
each case would depend upon its proved facts before the
court.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. In the case of Sheikh Arif v. The State of Maharashtra and
Another : 2024 INSC 70, the Hon’ble Apex Court noted that the
consent of the prosecutrix would be vitiated if the same is premised on
the false promise to marry since the very inception. The relevant
paragraph is reproduced hereunder:
“7) Now, the question is whether a case for quashing the
criminal proceeding is made out. For that purpose, we are
referring to the material which forms a part of the charge
sheet. In view of the provisions of Section 375 of the IPC, if
the victim of the alleged offence of rape is not under 18 years
of age, maintaining a sexual relationship with her consent, is
not an offence. As held by this Court in the case of Anurag
Soni, if the consent of the victim is based on misconception,
such consent is immaterial as it is not a voluntary consent.
If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the
victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no
consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made
out.”
(emphasis supplied)
29. It is not in doubt that a man can be held liable if he engages into
a physical relationship with any woman on the false pretext of
marriage. However, in order to hold such man criminally accountable,
it must be shown that such physical relationship is a direct
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consequence of the false promise made by the accused, and is not
marred by any other consideration or circumstance on the part of the
woman.
30. For this reason, in instances where the physical relationship
between the prosecutrix and the accused is continued for a long
period, it cannot be said with conviction that the same is only based
out of the alleged promise made by the accused. Further, there must be
adequate evidence to indicate that ab initio, the accused had no
intention whatsoever to keep his promise to marry the prosecutrix.
Consequently, unless it can be established that the physical
relationship was chiefly because of the alleged promise, and is not
influenced by any other consideration thereby being directly linked to
the alleged promise made by the accused, it cannot be said that the
consent of the woman was based on a misconception of fact.
31. In the recent case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of
Maharashtra : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471, the Hon’ble Apex Court
reiterated the legal principles concerning consensual relationships and
the initiation of criminal proceedings on allegations of sexual
relationship on the false promise of marriage. The Hon’ble Apex
Court quashed the FIR against the appellant therein and held as under :
“22…… Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is
maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman,
it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical
relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made
by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown
that the physical relationship was purely because of the
promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the
physical relationship without being influenced by any otherSignature Not Verified
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consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of
consent under misconception of fact.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
27…… In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical
relationship between the partners without protest and
insistence by the female partner for marriage would be
indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a
relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male
partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.”
28. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of
marriage was made to the complainant initially by the
appellant, even though no such cogent evidence has been
brought on record before us to that effect, the fact that the
relationship continued for nine long years, would render the
plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years
was under misconception of fact that the Appellant would
marry her implausible. Consequently, the criminal liability
attached to such false promise would be diluted after such a
long passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest
was registered by the complainant during all those years.
Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship
without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in
effect takes out the sting of criminal culpability and
neutralises it.
29. It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant
who is otherwise a mature person with two grown up
children, was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of
the appellant who continued to have sexual relationship with
her for such a long period on the promise of marriage. Any
such mendacious act of the appellant would have been
exposed sooner without having to wait for nine years. The
inference one can draw under the circumstances is that there
was no such false promise made to the complainant by the
appellant of marriage by continuing to have physical
relationship so as to bring this act within the province of
Section 376 IPC and therefore, there was no vitiation of
consent under misconception of fact.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such
prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it
can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for
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imputing criminality to such long term relationships after
turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a
belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of stringent
criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing
criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of
which the Court must also be mindful.
32. In the present case, the learned ASJ noted that no specific date
and time when the alleged offences took place had been mentioned. It
was noted that the prosecutrix was known to the respondent.
33. It was noted that the prosecutrix was mature enough to fully
understand what was happening between the prosecutrix and the
respondent, and her act of entering into a physical relationship with
the respondent was not induced by any misconception of fact. It was
noted that the medical examination of the prosecutrix did not point
towards any external injury mark on the person of the prosecutrix. It
was also noted that there existed no medical evidence to support the
version of the prosecutrix.
34. From a perusal of the materials on record, and the statement of
the prosecutrix under Section 164 of the CrPC, it transpires that the
parties were acquainted with each other. It is the victim’s own case
that she had known the respondent since the year 2015. The victim
stated that the respondent proposed her for solemnizing marriage to
which the prosecutrix answered in affirmative. She stated that she had
entered into physical relations with the respondent on several
occasions, and a few of them were made of her own will and the
others were entered into under pressure. She further stated that 2-3
days before the filing of the complaint, the respondent refused to
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solemnize marriage with the prosecutrix, and instead stated that he
wanted to solemnize marriage with some other girl.
35. Upon a reading of the statement of the prosecutrix and the
materials on record, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix entered into
a physical relationship with the respondent solely on account of the
alleged promise made by the respondent. It is the prosecutrix’s own
case that she established physical relations with the respondent on a
few occasions of her own will. The complainant, being an adult,
entered into a relationship with the petitioner out of her own volition,
and her choice to continue the relationship reflects her consent to
maintain the relationship. Further, the conduct of the victim indicates
her decision to remain in the relationship voluntarily, and the same
does not seem to be influenced by any alleged deception.
36. Consequently, there is no grave suspicion against the
respondent for framing of charge under Section 376 of the IPC. The
learned ASJ rightly noted that the parties were acquainted with each
other and the compulsion to establish physical relations first without
ascertaining whether the respondent was willing to perform marriage
with her is not made out. It was rightly noted that the prosecutrix was
mature enough to fully understand what was happening between them.
For this reason, it cannot be said that the consent of the prosecutrix
was vitiated by virtue of Section 90 of the IPC.
37. Insofar as Section 506 of the IPC is concerned, the only
allegation levelled is that the respondent used to threaten the
prosecutrix that he would disclose all the facts to her mother should
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the prosecutrix refuse to come.
38. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that
before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be
established that an accused had an intention to cause alarm to the
complainant. Mere threats given by the accused not with an intention
to cause alarm to the complainant would not constitute an offence of
criminal intimidation.
39. Upon a consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances,
this Court is of the opinion that no grave suspicion arises against the
respondent for framing of charges under Sections 376/506 of the IPC.
Consequently, this Court does not find any ground that would warrant
an interference with the impugned order.
40. The present petition is accordingly dismissed.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
FEBRUARY 24, 2025
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