Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
State vs Suraj Singh (2025:Rj-Jd:30486) on 12 July, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Garg
Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg
[2025:RJ-JD:30486]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 477/1996
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Suraj Singh S/o Prabhu Singh, B/c Rawna Rajput, R/o Ahore, PS
Ahore, District Jalore.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Deepak Choudhary, AAG assisted
by Mr. KS Kumpawat
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Chakravarti Singh Rathore
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
Judgment
12/07/2025
Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the State against
the judgment dated 17.06.1996, passed by learned Special Judge,
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Jalore in Special
Sessions Case No.16/1995, whereby the learned trial court
acquitted the accused-respondent from the offence under Section
3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act.
Brief facts of the case are that on 19.09.1995 at 4:20 PM,
when complainant Mancha Ram Meena, Assistant Engineer, Ahore
was working his office, at that time accused-respondent, who was
also serving in the office of the complainant, came and asked the
complainant to sign the revised LPC application. On refusal, the
accused-respondent started abusing the complainant with caste
oriented language. On 20.09.1995, the complainant filed a
complaint against the accused-respondent before the concerned
Police Station. Upon which, Police registered the case against the
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accused-respondent and started investigation. On completion of
investigation, police filed challan against the accused-respondent
for offence under Section 3 of SC/ST Act. Thereafter, the trial
court framed the charge for offence under Section 3(1)(x) of
SC/ST Act against the accused-respondent, who denied the same
and claimed trial.
During the course of trial, prosecution examined nine
witnesses in support of its case. Thereafter, statement of the
accused-respondent under section 313 Cr.P.C were recorded.
Upon conclusion of the trial, learned trial court vide
impugned judgment dated 17.06.1996 acquitted the accused-
respondent from the offence as mentioned earlier. Hence, this
appeal.
Learned AAG submits that the learned trial court has
committed grave error in acquitting the accused-respondent for
offence under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act. While passing the
impugned judgment, the learned trial court has not considered the
evidence and other aspects of the matter in its right perspective.
Thus, the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set
aside and the accused-respondent ought to have been convicted
and sentenced for offence under Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST Act.
Learned counsel for respondent has vehemently opposed the
prayer made by the counsel for the appellant-State and submitted
that the order of acquittal is just and proper and therefore, no
interference is required.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
evidence of the prosecution as well as defence and the judgment
passed by the trial.
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[2025:RJ-JD:30486] (3 of 5) [CRLA-477/1996]
On perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the
learned trial court while passing the impugned judgment has
considered each and every aspect of the matter and also
considered the evidence produced before it in its right perspective.
There are major contradictions, omissions & improvements in the
statements of the witnesses. The prosecution has failed to prove
its case against the accused-respondent beyond all reasonable
doubts and thus, the trial court has rightly acquitted the accused-
respondent from offence Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST Act.
In the case of ‘Mrinal Das & others v. The State of
Tripura, :2011(9) SCC 479,’ decided on September 5, 2011, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier
judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can
be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:
“An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only
when there are “compelling and substantial
reasons”,for doing so. If the order is “clearly
unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for
interference. When the trial Court has ignored the
evidence or misread the material evidence or has
ignored material documents like dying
declaration/report of ballistic experts etc.,the appellate
court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial
Court depending on the materials placed.
Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram
alias Vishnu Dutta, reported (2012) 1 SCC 602,’ the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:–
“A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence
of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has
taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in
appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a
view which could not have been taken by the court of(Downloaded on 12/07/2025 at 06:10:10 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:30486] (4 of 5) [CRLA-477/1996]competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled
canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be
reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal.”
Similarly in the case of State of State of Uttrakhand Vs.
Sanjay Ram Tamta, reported (2025) 2 SCC 159,’ the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:–
“6. Trite is the principle that the appellate courts would
be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially
since the presumption of innocence that is always
available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal
jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the
acquittal and unless there are very substantive and
compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal
of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the
findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible
from the compelling evidence is of guilt; appellate
courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal.
7. Recently, in Surender Singh Vs. State of
Uttrakhand, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to
various binding precedents of this Court succinctly laid
down the principle in the following manner in SCC para
24:
24 It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal
position that the interference with the finding of
acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be
warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of
acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same
is based on a misreading/omission to consider material
evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views
are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt
of the accused is possible from the evidence available
on record.”
There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal
against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The
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[2025:RJ-JD:30486] (5 of 5) [CRLA-477/1996]
preponderance of judicial opinion is that there is no substantial
difference between an appeal against acquittal except that while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view
the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted
by the trial Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached
by it had grounds well set out on the materials on record, the
acquittal may not be interfered with.
In the light of aforesaid discussion, the appellant has failed
to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which
interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under
challenge. The order passed by the learned trial court is detailed
and reasoned order and the same does not warrant any
interference from this Court.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, the present
criminal appeal has no substance and the same is hereby
dismissed.
Record of the trial court be sent back forthwith.
(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J
52-MS/-
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