Himachal Pradesh High Court
Subhash Chand vs Bhag Devi on 14 August, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.210 of 2024
Reserved on: 06.08.2025
.
Decided on: 14.08.2025
Subhash Chand ....... Petitioner
Versus
Bhag Devi ......Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner: Mr. Dibender Ghosh, Advocate.
For the Respondent: M/s Prajwal Sharma and Ms.
Aashima Vashista, Advocates, vice
Mr. Vinod Sharma, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the order
dated 04.07.2023, passed by learned Additional District Judge,
Kinnaur at Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla (learned
Appellate Court), vide which the application for condonation of
delay filed by the petitioner (applicant before the learned
Appellate Court) was dismissed.
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?No
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the respondent (petitioner’s wife) filed a
petition under Section 127 of Cr. P.C. for enhancement of the
.
maintenance awarded to her. The Court issued a notice to the
petitioner who appeared through learned counsel. He sought an
adjournment to file reply on 26.10.2013, which was granted
subject to the payment of cost of ₹400/- as an exceptional
opportunity. Matter was posted on 12.11.2013 for filing a reply.
The petitioner was present on 12.11.2013 but did not file a reply.
Hence, the right to file a reply was closed by the order of the
court, and the matter was listed for recording the evidence of
the wife. None appeared on behalf of the petitioner on
06.05.2014. Hence, the court proceeded ex parte against him,
recorded the statements of two witnesses and enhanced the
maintenance to the wife to ₹5000/- from ₹500/- vide order
dated 12.11.2014.
3. The petitioner filed an application under Section
126(2) of Cr. P.C. for setting aside the ex parte order, however,
this application was withdrawn on 08.09.2018. A revision was
preferred before the learned Additional District Judge, Kinnaur,
at Rampur Bushehar against the order dated 12.11.2014 along
with an application for condonation of delay.
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4. It was asserted in the application for condonation of
delay that the maintenance order was passed on 12.11.2014,
which came to the petitioner’s notice on 12.05.2016, when the
.
Court served a notice in the execution petition. He applied for a
certified copy, which was supplied on 28.05.2016. An
application was filed for setting aside the ex parte order under
Section 126 (2) of Cr.P.C. The petitioner pursued the application
with due diligence, but ultimately, withdrew it. The time spent
in pursuing the application was to be condoned under Section 14
of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it was prayed that the delay in
filing the revision be condoned.
5. The application was opposed by the respondent-
wife. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and
affirming those on the application was filed.
6. Learned Appellate Court framed the following
issues:-
1. Whether there are sufficient grounds to
condone the delay in filing the revision, as
prayed for? OPA.
2. Whether the petition is not maintainable in
the present form, as alleged? OPR.
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3. Whether the applicant has not approached the
court with clean hands, as alleged? OPR.
4. Relief.
.
7. The parties were called upon to produce the
evidence, and the petitioner examined himself (PW1). The
respondent-wife examined herself (RW1).
8. Learned Appellate Court held that the petitioner
admitted that his counsel appeared on 03.11.2016 and he had
knowledge. He also admitted that Tehsildar Sangla had passed
an order of auction of his land on 05.06.2017. He also admitted
that he had knowledge of the application under Section 127 of
Cr.P.C. Thus, there was no explanation for the delay. The law
will not favour a person who sleeps over his rights. Therefore,
issues Nos. 1 to 3 were answered in the negative and the
application was dismissed.
9. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Appellate Court, the petitioner has filed the present revision
asserting that the learned Appellate Court passed the order in a
slipshod manner without going through the application and the
relevant case law. The petitioner belongs to the tribal district of
Kinnaur and could not appear before the Court on each and
every date of hearing. The order was passed ex parte and was
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not in the knowledge of the petitioner. He applied for
modification of the order, but withdrew the application as per
the advice of counsel. There was sufficient cause for the
.
condonation of the delay. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned
Revisional Court be set aside.
10. I have heard Mr. Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel
for the petitioner and M/s Prajwal Sharma and Ms. Aashima
Vashista, Advocates vice Mr. Vinod Sharma, Advocate, learned
counsel for the respondent.
11. Mr. Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the learned Magistrate has passed an
ex parte order against the petitioner. The petitioner came to
know about the order when the notice was served upon him
during the execution proceedings. He mistakenly filed an
application under Section 126(2) Cr. P.C. for setting aside the ex
parte order. This application was withdrawn as per the advice of
the counsel. This led to the delay in filing the revision. Learned
Revisional Court had taken a hyper-technical view while
dismissing the application. Therefore, he prayed that the
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present revision be allowed and the order passed by the learned
Revisional Court be set aside.
12. M/s Prajwal Sharma and Ms. Aashima Vashista,
.
learned vice counsel representing the respondent, submitted
that the petitioner knew about the proceedings. He was present
when his right to reply was closed by the order of the Court. He
failed to appear before the learned Trial Court when the matter
was listed for recording the evidence. He cannot take advantage
of his own wrong and claim that he did not know about the
Court proceedings. His application for setting-aside ex parte
order was barred by limitation. He withdrew the same without
any justification and filed the revision, which was hopelessly
barred by limitation. Learned Appellate Court had rightly
dismissed the application. Therefore, they prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
13. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records
carefully.
14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the
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( 2025:HHC:27420 )revisional court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and
it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the
law. It was observed at page 207: –
.
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at
the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent
findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after adetailed appreciation of the material and evidence
brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision
against conviction is not supposed to exercise
jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope ofinterference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397
of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“) vests
jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding,sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The
object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an
error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-
founded error which is to be determined on the merits of
individual cases. It is also well settled that while
considering the same, the Revisional Court does not
dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to
reverse those findings.
15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to
call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for
the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which
has crept in such proceedings.
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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained
.
as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of
an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying
itself as to the legality and regularity of any
proceedings or order made in a case. The object
of this provision is to set right a patent defect or
an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a
well-founded error, and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token
r of careful consideration and appear to be in
accordance with law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that
the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where
the decisions under challenge are grossly
erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes,
but are merely indicative. Each case would have
to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a
very limited one and cannot be exercised in a
routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions
is that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where
the Court is dealing with the question as to
whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of
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its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor
.
case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has also
laid down principles to be considered for exercise ofjurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context
of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section
228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ], SCC pp. 482-83,para 27)
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and
r Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line ofjurisdictional distinction, it will now be
appropriate for us to enlist the principles with
reference to which the courts should exercise
such jurisdiction. However, it is not onlydifficult but inherently impossible to state such
principles with precision. At best and upon
objective analysis of various judgments of thisCourt, we are able to cull out some of the
principles to be considered for proper exerciseof jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to
quashing of charge either in exercise ofjurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of
the Code or together, as the case may be.
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution
is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The
power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly the charge framed in terms of
Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection, and
that too in the rarest of rare cases.
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27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations
.
are so patently absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach such a conclusion, and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied, then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether the
case would end in conviction or not at the stage
of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material
on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily
with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an
abuse of the process of court leading to
injustice.
***
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to
the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the
offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by
finding out inconsistencies in the statements of
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witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The
High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that
the trial court was dealing with an application for
discharge.
16. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under
Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power tocall for and examine records of an inferior court, is for
the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which
has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of
Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained
as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of
an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying
itself as to the legality and regularity of any
proceedings or order made in a case. The object
of this provision is to set right a patent defect or
an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a
well-founded error, and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token
of careful consideration and appear to be in
accordance with law. If one looks into the
various judgments of this Court, it emerges that
the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where
the decisions under challenge are grossly
erroneous, there is no compliance with the
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provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes,
but are merely indicative. Each case would have
.
to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a
very limited one and cannot be exercised in a
routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions
is that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where
the Court is dealing with the question as to
whether the charge has been framed properly
r and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of
its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor
case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has also
laid down principles to be considered for exercise ofjurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context
of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ], SCC pp. 482-83,
para 27)
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, it will now be
appropriate for us to enlist the principles with
reference to which the courts should exercise
such jurisdiction. However, it is not only
difficult but inherently impossible to state such::: Downloaded on – 14/08/2025 21:27:56 :::CIS
13
( 2025:HHC:27420 )principles with precision. At best and upon
objective analysis of various judgments of this
Court, we are able to cull out some of the
principles to be considered for proper exercise
of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to.
quashing of charge either in exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of
the Code or together, as the case may be.
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution
is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The
power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of
Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and
that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations
are so patently absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever
reach such a conclusion, and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied, then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly
interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether the
case would end in conviction or not at the stage
of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material
on the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily
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with the allegations taken as a whole whether
they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an
abuse of the process of court leading to
injustice.
***
.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to
the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the
offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by
finding out inconsistencies in the statements of
witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The
High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that
the trial court was dealing with an application for
discharge.
17. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC
OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the
absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of
Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the
revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of
Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State
of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri,
(1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering
the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court,
this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55,
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( 2025:HHC:27420 )“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High
Court can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order. In other words, the.
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting a
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a
second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily,
therefore, it would not be appropriate for the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence and
come to its conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in
appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to
the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment
of the High Court from the aforesaid
standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding
that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
interfering with the conviction of the
respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence.
…”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and
relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court
in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This
Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order
of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on
the ground that another view is possible. The following
has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the
Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the
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court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material or there
is palpable misreading of records, the
Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside
the order, merely because another view is
.
possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to
act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of
the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the
power of the court to do justice in accordance
with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
The revisional power of the court under
Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated
with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the
court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is
shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or
where the material facts are wholly ignored or
where the judicial discretion is exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not
interfere with the decision in exercise of their
revisional jurisdiction.”
14. In the above case, also the conviction of the accused
was also recorded, and the High Court set aside
[Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao
Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of
conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside
the High Court’s order holding that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and
that too without any legal basis.
18. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at
page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure::: Downloaded on – 14/08/2025 21:27:56 :::CIS
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( 2025:HHC:27420 )Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of
perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for
the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the
evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
.
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels
GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design
and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457] , it is a well-
established principle of law that the Revisional Court will
not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court
having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional
error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, inthe negative.”
19. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
20. It is apparent from the record of learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rampur Bushehar that the petitioner
was duly served in the proceedings under Section 127 of Cr.P.C.
He was present on 12.11.2013 when the matter was listed for
filing reply, and his right to file reply was closed by the order of
the Court. His counsel was present on 27.12.2013 when the
matter was listed for recording the statements of the witnesses.
His counsel was present on 28.03.2014, and the matter was
listed on 06.05.2014, however, nobody appeared on behalf of
the petitioner on 06.05.2014. Hence, the Court proceeded ex
parte against the petitioner and recorded the statements of two
witnesses.
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21. There is nothing on record to show that the
petitioner had a reasonable cause for not appearing before the
Court on 06.05.2014. His application for condonation of delay
.
filed before the learned Revisional Court is silent qua this fact.
He was duly represented by his counsel on 28.03.2014, and he
knew that the matter was posted on 06.05.2014 for recording
the evidence. He cannot take advantage of the fact that he had
failed to appear on 06.05.2014 to claim that he did not know the
proceedings of the Court. Therefore, the very premise of the
application that the ex parte order was passed without his
knowledge is incorrect.
22. The petitioner has not mentioned that he ever made
any inquiry about the proceedings pending before the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for seeking enhancement of
maintenance. He denied in his cross-examination that he had
received the summons in the proceedings under Section 127 of
the Cr. P.C., which is factually incorrect because not only his
presence was marked, but the presence of his learned counsel
was also marked.
23. Therefore, the learned Revisional Court was justified
in holding that the applicant has failed to assign any sufficient
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cause for not filing the revision against the order dated
12.11.2014 within the period of limitation. The reason assigned
by him that he did not know about the proceedings is incorrect,
.
and the learned Revisional court was justified in dismissing the
application for condonation of delay.
24. Mr. Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel for the
petitioner, placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dwarika Prasad (D) Thr. Lrs. Versus Prithvi
Raj Singh, 2024 SCC Online SC 3828, to submit that the Court
should be liberal in setting aside the ex parte decree. In the cited
case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the applicant had
entrusted his counsel to manage the suit and was not told about
the ex parte decree. In the present, no such plea was taken. The
petitioner never claimed that his counsel did not inform him of
the ex parte decree. Further, Section 126 (2) of Cr.P.C. clearly
provides that the proceedings are to be taken in the presence of
the person against whom an order of payment of maintenance
is proposed to be made, which clearly shows that the presence
of the husband is necessary on every date of hearing. Therefore,
the present case cannot be equated to a suit/appeal where the
presence of a party on every date of hearing is not required, and
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( 2025:HHC:27420 )
the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present
case.
25. No other point was urged.
.
26. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the
order passed by the learned Appellate Court. Consequently, the
present revision fails, and the same is dismissed.
27. Records of the learned Courts below be sent back
forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
14 August 2025.
(yogesh)
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