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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Subhrangsu Panda vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 24 July, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION)
APPELLATE SIDE
Present :
The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee
WPA 9004 of 2024
With
CAN 1 of 2024
Subhrangsu Panda
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Petioner-in-person : Mr. Subhrangsu Panda.
For the Respondents : Mr. Wasim Ahmed,
Sk. Md. Masud.
Heard on : 14.07.2025 Judgment on : 24.07.2025 Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.:- Prelude:
1. The present writ petition has been instituted by Subhrangsu Panda, a
practicing advocate of this Hon’ble Court, seeking extraordinary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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2. The petition primarily challenges the actions of the traffic authorities,
specifically Respondent No. 10, Traffic Sergeant Palash Halder, in relation to
the seizure of the petitioner‟s driving licence.
Petitioner’s Case:
3. The factual matrix, as presented by the petitioner in the writ petition,
centers around an incident that occurred on March 26, 2024, at the
intersection of Khidirpur Road and A.J.C. Bose Road. The petitioner‟s vehicle,
bearing registration number WB 12BP-7205, was intercepted by the private
respondent no. 10 while he was traveling from his native place at Kakdwip,
District South 24 Parganas, to his residence at Baksara, Howrah.
4. An allegation of over-speeding was made against the petitioner, with his
vehicle reportedly recorded at 77 km/h, exceeding the stipulated speed limit of
60 km/h. The petitioner has categorically denied the allegation, contending
that the matter ought to have been processed through the designated online
portal, thereby affording him his fundamental right to a fair trial before a
competent court of law.
5. Crucially, the petitioner alleges that the Respondent No. 10, Palash
Halder, while discharging his official duties, demanded a cash payment of Rs.
1,000 as a fine. Upon the petitioner‟s refusal to pay in cash and his insistence
on making the payment through the prescribed online mode, Respondent No.
10 is stated to have seized the petitioner‟s driving licence without assigning
any cogent reason.
6. The petitioner disclosed his identity to Respondent No. 10 and informed
him that he is a practicing advocate of this Hon‟ble Court. He also displayed
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the sticker issued by the Bar Association, High Court at Calcutta in his favour,
affixed to his vehicle. Despite this, Respondent No. 10 neither returned the
petitioner‟s driving licence nor did issue a temporary authorisation slip, as
contemplated under Section 206(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1988 Act’).
7. The petitioner repeatedly informed Respondent No. 10 that, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 206(2) of the 1988 Act, the police authorities
are not empowered to seize a driving licence unless there exists a specific
reason to apprehend that the alleged offender may abscond or avoid service of
summons. He further apprised Respondent No. 10 that this position has been
affirmed in several decisions of this Hon‟ble Court, which have consistently
held that, in the absence of a recorded and specific reason by the police officer,
seizure of a driving licence is not legally permissible.
8. In response, Respondent No. 10 asserted that he had full authority to seize
the driving licence. He further claimed that he was well-versed in the law, was
aware of the functioning of this Hon‟ble Court, and had previously discharged
duties under a former Hon‟ble Judge of this Court. On that basis, he remarked
that the petitioner need not trouble himself with explaining the law to him.
9. Subsequently, the petitioner received an SMS on his mobile phone bearing
SIM card number 9903826338, sent through the Kolkata Traffic Police Portal,
informing him that he had been prosecuted under Sections 112/183(1) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. An online challan bearing compound number
AK24938642 was also generated.
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10. Faced with the aforesaid situation, the petitioner has been constrained to
file the present writ petition, primarily seeking the issuance of an appropriate
writ for quashing the seizure of his driving licence. He further prays for a writ
of mandamus directing the concerned respondents to initiate disciplinary
proceedings against Respondent No. 10, and to issue appropriate directions to
ensure strict compliance with the applicable rules, regulations, notifications,
and judicial pronouncements by all traffic sergeants while discharging their
official duties.
11. During the pendency of this writ petition, another learned Advocate of this
Hon‟ble Court filed an application, being CAN 1 of 2024, seeking leave to
intervene in the present proceeding. In his application, the intervener
narrated a similar incident that occurred on 26.03.2024, when he was
returning from his native village to his residence in Kolkata, driving his
vehicle bearing registration number WB-12BP-7205. The intervener‟s vehicle
was intercepted at the junction of Khidirpur Road and A.J.C. Bose Road by the
private respondent no. 10.
12. The intervener contended that the speed of his vehicle was allegedly
recorded at 77 km/hour, exceeding the stipulated speed limit of 60 km/hour.
He was also asked to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 in cash. In the same manner, he
insisted on making the payment through the designated online portal.
13. The intervener also disclosed his identity and informed Respondent No.
10 that he was a practicing advocate of this Hon‟ble Court. However, despite
this disclosure, his driving licence was seized. The intervener protested,
stating that such seizure was unlawful. This statement reportedly provoked
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Respondent No. 10, who reacted angrily, asserting that the intervener need
not attempt to explain the law to him. He further remarked that he was well
aware of the standard of advocates practicing before this Court. Respondent
No. 10 then referred to a former Hon‟ble Judge of this Court, claiming that he
had previously served under him and was „his man.‟ He mocked the
intervener, allegedly saying that without having any money in his pocket, he
dared to drive a vehicle. Respondent No. 10 then directed the intervener to
check how much cash he was carrying, hand it over to him, and leave the spot.
14. The intervener claimed that, in order to avoid further humiliation at the
hands of Respondent No. 10, he handed over a 500 rupee note to him,
retrieved the key to his vehicle, and left the spot.
Respondents’ case:
15. The record indicates that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by its order
dated 28.03.2024, noted that respondent no. 10 had refused to accept notice
of the present writ petition. Subsequently, by an order dated 24.04.2024, the
Co-ordinate Bench directed respondent no. 10 to file an affidavit in response
to the averments made in paragraph nos. 12 and 13 of the writ petition. The
State was also directed to file an affidavit-in-opposition addressing the issues
raised in the writ petition.
16. However, respondent no. 10 ultimately filed an affidavit. In his affidavit, he
stated that on 26.03.2024, while performing his official duties, he observed a
vehicle bearing registration number WB 12BP 7205 being driven recklessly at
a dangerous speed of 77 km/hour, which was significantly above the notified
and permissible speed limit of 50 km/hour. The speed was recorded using a
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manual speed laser gun. Respondent no. 10 intercepted the vehicle and
informed the petitioner of the violation. Thereafter, in exercise of his powers
under Sections 206(4) and 200 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, he asked the
petitioner either to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- or to allow him to impound his
driving licence.
17. The affidavit further states that the petitioner refused to pay the fine but
handed over his driving licence to respondent no. 10. Respondent no. 10
claims that he attempted to persuade the petitioner to pay the fine either in
cash or through the UPI facility available on the KTP Challan App, so that an
acknowledgment slip for the seizure could be generated automatically.
However, his efforts to persuade the petitioner were unsuccessful.
18. After a prolonged conversation, the deponent had no other option but to
impound the petitioner‟s driving license in accordance with the provisions of
Section 206(4) of the 1988 Act as the vehicle was being driven in
contravention of the provisions of Section 183 of the 1988 Act.
19. The deponent contended that the provisions of Section 206(4) were
incorporated into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by Section 88 of Act 32 of
2019, with effect from 01.10.2020 (vide S.O. 3311(E) dated 25.09.2020),
which is subsequent to the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of
Dipankar Dutta vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. The respondent no. 10
further asserted that in a decision rendered in WPA 14318 of 2022 (Priyasha
Bhattacharyya vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.), a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court held that while a police officer has the authority to seize and
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impound a driving licence, the power to suspend the licence does not vest in
the police.
20. Respondent no. 10 further contended that the Expert Committee
constituted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court Committee on Road Safety had
identified over-speeding, among other offences, as one of the primary causes
of fatal road traffic accidents. The Committee recommended suspension of the
driving licences of offending drivers as a deterrent measure. He claimed that
he acted in good faith, in his capacity as a public servant, and diligently
discharged his statutory duties.
21. He contended that as many as 22 fatal and 71 non-fatal road traffic
accidents occurred on Khidirpur Road and AJC Bose Road during the period
from 01.01.2023 to 29.04.2024. According to statistical records, the area is
considered highly vulnerable for road users. Notably, within the past year
alone, 4 fatal accidents occurred on Khidirpur Road and 6 fatal accidents on
AJC Bose Road, all in the year 2023.
22. Respondent no. 10 categorically denied having demanded any bribe from
the intervener and stated that he could not recall any such incident.
23. The respondent no.5 has filed a separate affidavit-in-opposition.
Reiterating the stand taken by the respondent no. 10, the respondent no. 5, in
his affidavit, contended that he went through the CCTV footages of the area
where the vehicle was intercepted by the respondent no. 10 and found that the
petitioner was driving the car in a reckless and dangerous manner at a speed
of 77 km/hour. On 26.03.2024, the affidavit stated, several individuals
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including the petitioner was prosecuted for violating the stipulated and
permissible speed limit in accordance with the 1988 Act.
24. The affidavit asserted that a police officer is empowered to seize the
license of a driver for violation of the provisions of 183,184, 185, 189, 190,
194C, 194D or 194E of the 1988 Act.
Contents of affidavit-in-reply filed by the petitioner:
25. The petitioner filed two separate affidavits in response to the affidavits-
in-opposition. In his reply, the petitioner contended that a signboard was
displayed in the concerned area indicating that the maximum speed limit was
60 km/hour. He further stated that the compound slip, prepared under Rule
349 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1989
Rules”), itself mentioned that the fine was payable either in cash or through
the UPI portal within seven days from the date of issuance of the notice.
26. The petitioner asserted that a driving licence could be seized only upon
fulfilment of any of the conditions enumerated under Section 206 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and that a person can be disqualified from driving a
vehicle only in accordance with the provisions of Section 19A of the said Act.
He also contended that the judgment delivered in Dipankar Dutta vs. The
State of West Bengal & Ors. continues to remain binding and holds the field.
Submission:
27. Mr. Panda, appearing in person, asserted that the seizure of his driving
licence on March 26, 2024, was unlawful, arbitrary, whimsical, and actuated
by mala fides, amounting to a clear violation of statutory provisions and
causing him considerable mental anguish.
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28. He contended that the power to seize a driving licence under Section
206(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is neither absolute nor automatic, but
is to be exercised only under specific conditions, such as when there exists a
“reason to believe” that an offence under certain provisions of the Act has
been committed, or where the driver attempts to abscond or evade the due
process of law. The petitioner submitted that mere suspicion or doubt does
not satisfy the statutory requirement for such a coercive measure, and that the
expression “reason to believe” must be founded upon objective and verifiable
facts.
29. He argued that a significant lapse on the part of respondent no. 10 was
the failure to issue a temporary acknowledgment for the seized licence. He
further contended that the payment of the fine should be made exclusively
through the designated online portal, and that demanding cash or seizing a
licence for non-payment is illegal and beyond the scope of permissible action
under the law.
30. Mr. Panda cited two decisions, reported at (2004) 4 CHN 380 (Dipankar
Dutta vs. State of West Bengal), (1998) 1 CalLJ 441 (Dipankar Dutta vs. State
of West Bengal & Ors.), and two unreported decisions by two different Co-
ordinate Benches of this Court rendered in WPA 4360 (W) of 2020
(Suryaneel Das vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) and in WPA 14318 of
2022 (Smr. Priyasha Bhattacharyya vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors.). He
also relied on an unreported decision by a Co-ordinate Bench of the Madras
High Court in W.P. No. 11 of 2023 (K. Senthilkumar vs. Inspector of Police &
Anr.), and contended that the actions of respondent no. 10 are in direct
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contempt of the orders passed in the aforesaid decisions and that the said
respondent is liable to face contempt proceedings.
31. Mr. Panda heavily relied on the decision rendered in the case of Smt.
Priyasha Bhattacharyya (supra) and argued that even the instructions issued
by the Road Safety Expert Committee indicate that the police authorities do
not have the authority to automatically seize and impound a driving licence.
He further contended that the “compound slip” issued in the present case is
not in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and
Rules.
32. In response, Mr. Ahmed, learned Advocate appearing for the State,
submitted that in the present case, the driving licence has already been
returned to Mr. Panda. He urged Mr. Panda to reconsider whether he wished
to seriously pursue the present writ petition, particularly in light of the fact
that his driving licence has been received.
33. Ultimately, Mr. Panda and Mr. Ahmed jointly submitted that, since the
matter involves a question of law, this Court may pass an appropriate order
that would serve as a guideline for police officers entrusted with traffic duties.
Discussion and Conclusion:
34. Before delving into the contours of the controversy that led to the
institution of the present writ petition, it would be appropriate to examine the
legal framework and to quote certain provisions from the 1988 Act and its
connected rules, governing the seizure of driving licences, issuance of
acknowledgment slips, compounding slips, and the authority to impound such
licences.
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35. Section 2(10) of the 1988 Act defines that the „driving licence‟ which
means the licence issued by a competent authority under Chapter II
authorising the person specified therein to drive, otherwise than as a learner,
a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle of any specified class or description
whereas, Section 2(20) does define that „licencing authority‟ which means an
authority empowered to issue licences under Chapter II or, as the case may be,
Chapter III.
36. Section 19 of the Act confers the Power of licensing authority to disqualify
from holding a driving licence or revoke such licence if he is satisfied, after
giving the holder of a driving licence an opportunity of being heard, that any
of the eight conditions enumerated in that provision has been fulfilled. Section
19A, which was inserted in the Act by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act,
2019 (32 of 2019), S. 11 w.e.f. 09-08-2019, is quoted below:
“(1A) Where a licence has been forwarded to the licensing authority
under sub-section (4) of section 206, the licensing authority, if satisfied
after giving the holder of the driving licence an opportunity of being
heard, may either discharge the holder of a driving licence or, it may for
detailed reasons recorded in writing, make an order disqualifying such
person from holding or obtaining any licence to drive all or any class or
description of vehicles specified in the licence-
(a) for a first offence, for a period of three months;
(b) for a second or subsequent offence, with revocation of the driving
licence of such person:
Provided that where a driving licence is revoked under this
section, the name of the holder of such driving licence may be placed in
12the public domain in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central
Government.]”
37. Therefore, it is needless to state that the power to revoke a driving
licence or to disqualify a holder of driving licence rests with the licencing
authority as defined in Section 2(20) of the 1988 Act.
38. Undoubtedly, the provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 112 of the 1988
Act have empowered the State Government to fix the maximum speed limit in
a particular area or on a particular road or roads. Sub-Section (1) of 112
mandates that no person shall drive a motor vehicle or cause or allow a motor
vehicle to be driven in any public place at a speed exceeding the maximum
speed or below the minimum speed fixed for the vehicle under this Act or by
or under any other law for the time being in force.
39. The provisions of Section 200 of the 1988 Act cloths the officers or
authorities, as the State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify, with the power to compound the offences referred to in
Section 200 of the Act, including the offences committed under Section 183 of
the Act which prescribes punishment for driving a vehicle in contravention of
the speed limit referred to in Section 112 of the Act.
40. To shed a light on the issue, it would be prudent to quote the provisions of
Section 206 of the 1988 Act, which are as follows:
” 206. Power of police officer to impound document :-
(1) Any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf by the
State Government may, if he has reason to believe that any
identification mark carried on a motor vehicle or any licence, permit,
13certificate of registration, certificate of insurance or other document
produced to him by the driver or person in charge of a motor vehicle is
a false document within the meaning of section 464 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) seize the mark or document and call upon the
driver or owner of the vehicle to account for his possession of or the
presence in the vehicle of such mark or document.
(2) Any police officer or other person authorised in this behalf by the
State Government may, if he has reason to believe that the driver of a
motor vehicle who is charged with any offence under this Act may
abscond or otherwise avoid the service of a summons, seize any licence
held by such driver and forward it into the court taking cognizance of
the offence and the said Court shall on the first appearance of such
driver before it, return the licence to him in exchange for the temporary
acknowledgment given under sub-section (3).
(3) A police officer or other person seizing a licence under sub-section
(2) shall give to the person surrendering the licence a temporary
acknowledgment therefore and such acknowledgment shall authorise
the holder to drive until the licence has been returned to him or until
such date as may be specified by the police officer or other person in
the acknowledgment whichever is earlier:
Provided that if any Magistrate, police officer or other person
authorised by the State Government in this behalf is, on an application
made to him, satisfied that the licence cannot be, or has not been,
returned to the holder thereof before the date specified in the
14acknowledgment for any reason for which the holder is not responsible,
the Magistrate, police officer or other person, as the case may be, may
extend the period of authorization to drive to such date as may be
specified in the acknowledgment.
1 [(4) A police officer or other person authorised in this behalf by the
State Government shall, if he has reason to believe that the driver of a
motor vehicle has committed an offence under any of sections 183, 184,
185, 189, 190, 194C, 194D, or 194E, seize the driving licence held by
such driver and forward it to the licensing authority for disqualification
or revocation proceedings under section 19:
Provided that the person seizing the licence shall give to the person
surrendering the licence a temporary acknowledgement therefor, but
such acknowledgement shall not authorise the holder to drive until the
licence has been returned to him.]”
41. Thus, a plain reading of the provisions of Sub-section Section 206 of the Act
indicates that Sub-section (1) empowers the police officer to seize the driving
licence if he has reason to believe to seize the licence that there is any mark or
document relate to the vehicle is false. Sub-section (2) empowers the police
officer authorised by the State Government to seize the licence if he has reason
to believe that that driver concerned may abscond or otherwise avoid the
service of a summons. Sub-section (3) mandates such police officer to issue
acknowledgement of such licence to the driver concerned. Sub-Section (4)
empowers the police officer to seize the licence if he has reason to believe that
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the driver concerned committed an offence under any of the Sections, viz.,
183, 184, 185, 189, 190, 194C, 194D or 194E of the 1988 Act.
42. Therefore, a combined reading of Sub-Sections (1), (2), (3) and (4)
indicates that a police officer cannot claim to have unfettered power to seizure
of a driving licence by a police officer. Seizure of driving licence by a police
officer can be done only in three contingencies, which are as follows:
i) when the identification mark or licence or the documents
relating to the vehicle are false;
ii) if the driver concerned try to abscond or avoid service of
summons;
iii) if the police officer has reason to believe that has committed an
offence under any of the Sections, namely, 183, 184, 185, 189,
190, 194C, 194D or 194E of the 1988 Act.
43. It is pertinent to note that the legislature has consciously employed the
expression „reason to believe‟. Section 26 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
corresponding to 2(29) of BNSS, 2023, defines the expression „reason to
believe‟, which is as follows:
“A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing, if he has
sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.”
44. The phrase “sufficient cause” implies that there must be concrete
circumstances that would lead a prudent and reasonable person to draw a
particular inference. The term “believe” should not be confused with
“suspect.” This belief must be based on objective satisfaction rather than
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subjective interpretation or unfettered discretion. In other words, there must
be specific facts or grounds forming the basis for a reasonable belief.
45. Therefore, the seizure of a driving license is not an automatic process; it is
contingent upon the fulfilment of certain prescribed conditions. Furthermore,
once a license is seized, the concerned authority is obligated to issue an
acknowledgment to the driver. This acknowledgment serves as a temporary
authorization, enabling the driver to continue operating the vehicle either
until the license is returned or until the date specified in the acknowledgment.
46. Therefore, based on the discussions set out in the foregoing paragraphs, it
would not be inappropriate to observe that a police officer in uniform can
seize a driving licence only upon fulfilment of any of the conditions
enumerated in Section 206 of the 1988 Act and the officer is bound to issue
acknowledgment.
47. The recurring issues concerning the improper seizure of driving licences,
unlawful demands for parking fees, and the unauthorized insistence by police
officers on the production of registration and insurance certificates, despite
the absence of any legal mandate, have repeatedly invoked the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court and consumed a considerable amount of judicial
time. Moreover, serious allegations have been raised regarding coercive
practices by certain traffic officers, including persistent and illegal demands
for immediate payment of fines, whether in cash or through UPI, coercing
individuals into compounding the offence on the spot, and compelling them to
sign compound slips admitting guilt following the seizure of their licences.
Although this Court has on multiple occasions issued clear and specific
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directions to the concerned authorities, these violations continue to occur
repeatedly.
48. The records indicate that, at present, printed compound slips are being
issued without first ascertaining whether the driver concerned is willing to
face trial. It must be underscored that every alleged offender has the
fundamental right to defend himself, and any act of compelling a person to
admit guilt, make payment of a penalty, or sign a compound slip constitutes a
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
Support of this view shall be obtained from the proposition laid down in the
decision reported in (2004) 4 CHN 380 (Dipankar Dutta vs. State of West
Bengal).
49. In the decision of Smt. Priyasha Bhattacharya (supra), A Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court held that a police officer does not have the authority to
suspend a driving licence. The respondent no. 10 also admitted such legal
position in his affidavit. Furthermore, in another decision reported at (1998)
CLJ 441 (Dipankar Dutta vs. State of West Bengal & Others), another Co-
ordinate Bench held that while a police officer may require a driver to produce
the driving licence on the spot, the production of the certificate of registration
and the insurance certificate must be in accordance with the provisions of
Section 130 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
50. In Smt. Priyasha Bhattacharya (supra), it was further held that any
notification, circular, or instruction issued by the Expert Committee or the
Supreme Court-appointed Road Safety Committee would operate merely as an
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instruction, and such instruction cannot override the express provisions of the
statute.
51. Although Section 206 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, uses the term
impound, the Act does not define this expression. Consequently, the meaning
of the word must be understood in its ordinary and common parlance. While
the police officer is empowered to seize a licence under the said provision
upon fulfilment of any of the conditions enumerated in Section 206 of the
1988 Act; however, he is to forward the same to the Court to take cognizance
of the offence allegedly committed by the driver and if the conditions
contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 206 of the 1988 Act, he is to send the
licence to the licencing authority for disqualification or for initiating
revocation proceeding under Section 19 of the Act. Therefore, the authority to
suspend, revoke, or impound the licence is vested solely in the licensing
authority that issued it. Consequently, I cannot agree with the contention of
respondent no. 10 that he had the power to impound the licence.
52. The record indicates that the licence was seized based on the reading of a
manual laser gun; however, there is no evidence to show that any
acknowledgment was issued to the petitioner at the time of seizure.
Respondent No. 10 claims that such acknowledgment was issued digitally, but
it remains unclear whether any effort was made to ascertain whether the
petitioner intended to face trial. On the contrary, the incident suggests that
the petitioner was coerced into compounding the offences. A printed form,
styled as a compound form and containing a column for the alleged offender,
namely, the driver- to admit guilt, has been brought on record. Therefore, it is
evident that the petitioner‟s right to defend the allegations was violated. Such
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incident suggests that, on other occasions, similar measures have been taken
by officers entrusted with traffic duties.
53. In the given case, Mr. Panda and Mr. Ahmed have conjointly stated that
the petitioner‟s driving licence has been returned to the petitioner and I have
been informed that the case which was started following the incident has been
compounded. However, if complaint or any consequential case, if registered,
is deemed to stand quashed by virtue of this order.
54. It is indeed unfortunate to note that both in the writ petition and in the
application filed by the intervener, serious allegations have been made against
on solemn affirmation. It has been alleged that the petitioner and the
intervener were subjected to rude and arrogant behaviour by respondent no.
10, who is further accused of making derogatory remarks against individuals
practicing before this Hon‟ble Court and taking the name of a former Judge of
this Court in an inappropriate manner. I am not inclined to abruptly jump to
the conclusion that those allegations are true.
55. If such conduct did in fact occur, it is unfortunate and unexpected from
a person holding the rank of an officer in the police department. This is not a
police State; it is a welfare State governed by the rule of law. It must be clearly
stated that, in a democratic society, even a person accused of a petty offence is
entitled to be treated with dignity and respect. No citizen should be subjected
to rude or arrogant conduct by any staff or officer of any department. The
justification that such behaviour is necessary for maintaining law and order
cannot be accepted. Public servants are expected to uphold constitutional
20
values and act with restraint, courtesy, and accountability in their interactions
with the public.
56. However, since the offences have been compounded and the driving
licence has already been returned, I do not consider it appropriate to make
any adverse remarks or to recommend disciplinary action against respondent
no. 10 at this stage. Nonetheless, having regard to the overall episode and the
manner in which the incident was handled by respondent no. 10, I am inclined
to issue a caution, directing him to strictly adhere to the due process of law in
future, particularly in matters involving the seizure of driving licences and the
handling of similar incidents, and to conduct himself with professionalism,
sensitivity, and responsibility in all interactions with members of the public.
57. The incident also highlights the need for proper and refresher training for
officers and staff, including the respondent no. 10, who are entrusted with
traffic duties in the city and across the State. Such training should aim to
ensure awareness of the relevant legal provisions and judicial
pronouncements. The Deputy Commissioner (Traffic) is directed to arrange
for such training and to ensure that, in every case of licence seizure, an
acknowledgment is issued. Before compounding any offence, officers must
ascertain whether the individual wishes to contest the allegation in trial and
must strictly follow due process and the applicable legal principles.
58. The petitioner is directed to communicate this order to the Secretary;
Home Department, Government of West Bengal; the Director General of
Police, West Bengal; and respondent nos. 2, 3, and 4 for their information and
necessary compliance.
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59. With these observations and order, this writ petition and its connected
application are, thus, disposed of.
(Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.)
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