Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sudhir Kumar Khare vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 24 April, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
Writ Petition No.4708 of 2020
SUDHIR KUMAR KHARE
Vs.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
APPERANCE
Shri Santosh Agrawal - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri K.S. Tomar - Govt. Advocate for the State.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on : 09/04/2025
Delivered on : 24/4/2025
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming
on for pronouncement this day, the Hon'ble Shri Justice Milind
Ramesh Phadke pronounced/passed the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORDER
The present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by the petitioner seeking following reliefs:
“It is humbly prayed that the writ in the nature
of writ of mandamus or certiorari, or any other
suitable writ order or direction may kindly be issued
by setting aside order Annexure P-1 with further
direction to the respondent either to pay the
compensation to the petitioner as per Act 2013 against
acquisition of land bearing survey no.339//01 ad-
measuring area .0.329 hectare situated Civil line
2Datia or restored the possession of petitioner the with
clear approachable path with further direction to
make payment of compensation for unauthorized
occupation on the such land by police department to
petitioner as directed earlier. Any other relief which
this Hon’ble Court may deems fit in the facts and
circumstances of the case in favour of petitioner.”
2. Short facts of the case are that the petitioner is/was the owner of a
land bearing Survey No.339/01, ad-measuring 0.81 hectares situated at
Ramnagar, Civil Line, Tehsil Datia, which was forcibly taken by the
Police Department without due process of law provided under the Land
Acquisition Act. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid illegal action, the
petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No.1453 of 1999 and vide order
dated 27.03.2003, this Court had held that the respondents since had
without following due process of law, forcibly taken possession of the
land, therefore, the petitioner will be entitled for mesne profit for
unauthorised occupation of his land from the year 1991 on the basis of
10% of the valuation of land which was determined by the respondents
at Rs.1,20,512/- and further he would be entitled to the said mesne
profit till respondents delivered the possession of the land to the
petitioner; however, if the respondent’s acquire the land, the
compensation shall be determined at the market value of the land on the
date of acquisition and till the acquisition, he will be entitled for mesne
profit @ 10% of valuation determined by the respondents.
3. In compliance of the aforesaid order, a notification of acquisition
of the land in question was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 on 02.09.2003 and subsequently, further
3
notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was
issued on 27.03.2004. A notice to take possession of the land was issued
on 19.11.2004 and the possession of the land was taken on 15.11.2005
and he was awarded Rs.22,74,221/- towards land acquisition. According
to the petitioner, in spite of passing of Award dated 15.11.2005 in the
Land Acquisition Proceedings No.1/A-82/03-04 vide Annexure P/5, the
amount of compensation has not been paid to him. Aggrieved by the
non-payment of amount, the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition
No.4993 of 2006 before this Court.
4. Vide order dated 03.11.2009, this Court had allowed the said
petition by issuing following directions :
“i) That, any proceeding pending before the authority
with regard to denotification of the land under Section
48A of the Land Acquisition Act is declared void.
ii) The respondents are directed to pay compensation
to the petitioner, however, it is open to the respondents
to take any recourse of law, if they feel that the
compensation is on higher side.
iii) The respondents are also free to take any other
course, if permissible to them under any other
provision of law with regard to return of land to the
petitioner.
iv) The respondents are granted three months time
to follow the directions.”
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, both the parties had
preferred Writ Appeal Nos.117 of 2010 and 190 of 2010 before Division
Bench of this Court. Vide order dated 12.02.2015, the Division Bench,
4
in the light of assurance given by the State that a different land had been
given to the petitioner in exchange of the land acquired, dismissed Writ
Appeal No.117 of 2010 being rendered infructuous and as a
consequence thereof, Writ Appeal No.190 of 2010 was also dismissed
as infructuous.
6. Despite of assurance given by the State, the land was not given to
the petitioner. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No.729
of 2016 and during the pendency of the said petition, the Additional
Collector vide its order dated 29.11.2017 had sent a proposal to the
State Government for approval and proper guidance with regard to land
of the petitioner. Thereafter, a Review Petition No.280 of 2018 was filed
by the State against the order dated 12.02.2015 passed in Writ Appeal
No.117 of 2010. Vide order dated 14.09.2018, the said review petition
was disposed of by observing and directing as under:
“Evidently, there is no direction by the Court to
settle the dispute by giving land in exchange. It is
further borne out from record and the submissions
made on behalf of the petitioners/State that the land in
question is not required, yet the fact is that it has
remained with the Police Department and no
compensation in any form has been paid to the
respondent, the undisputed owner of the land in
question. When we say no compensation in any form,
we mean that even for temporary occupation, the
compensation is not paid. Thus even if we accept the
contention on behalf of the petitioner that erroneous
statement was made by the counsel appearing for the
5State, a restoration of writ appeal will not serve any
purpose because sub-section (1) of Section 48 of Land
Acquisition Act stipulates that except in the case
provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at
liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of
which possession has not been taken.
In the present case since the possession of land
in question is still with the Police Department, we
deem it appropriate in the interest of justice to dispose
of the review petition with a direction to settle the
claim of the respondent in right earnest in accordance
with law and the statement made by the Government
Advocate which led to dismissal of appeal will not
come in way for settlement of claim of the petitioner,
which shall be within three months.
True it is that the writ appeal could have been revived
but taking into consideration the plight of respondent
the owner of the land deprived of the possession since
1999 nor is paid the compensation, the present order
is passed to render complete justice.”
7. Alleging willful disobedience of the order dated 14.09.2018
passed in Review Petition No.280 of 2018 preferred by the State, a
Contempt Petition No.3540 of 2018 was filed by the petitioner. Vide
order dated 15.05.2019, the Division Bench on the response filed by the
State stating that an amount of Rs.41,25,000/- was deposited in the
account of the petitioner in lieu of compensation of the land in question,
disposed of the contempt petition. According to the petitioner, such
6
amount was calculated as per Award passed under repealed Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 not as per Section 24(2) of the of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
8. Against the order dated 15.05.2019 passed in Review Petition
No.894 of 2019, the present petitioner preferred a Special Leave to
Appeal (C) No.25238-25239 of 2019 before the Apex Court. Vide order
dated 21.10.2019, the Apex Court had dismissed the said SLP by
observing as under:
“We decline to interfere in these Special Leave
Petitions.
However, we make it clear that if the petitioner
has any other remedy, he is free to pursue the same in
accordance with law. contentions available to decided
on its own merits. All the parties in those proceedings
be decided on its own merits.
The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed
accordingly.”
Hence, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner while placing reliance on the
Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, has submitted before
this Court that the land acquisition proceedings under Act No.1 of 1894
shall be deemed to have lapsed where no award under Section 11 of the
said Land Acquisition Act is made, and all provisions of the Act of 2013
relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or where an
award under Section 11 has been made, that such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the
7
said Act has not been repealed, but as no award had been passed as per
Section 11 of the Act of 1894 and the said Act has been repealed by a
new Act called “the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013” w.e.f.
01.01.2014, the amount of award was required to be calculated as per
Act of 2013.
10. Further while placing reliance on Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of
the Act of 2013, it was submitted that in case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),
where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years
prior to the commencement of this Act, but the physical possession of
the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid, the
said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate
Government, if it so chooses, is required to initiate the proceedings of
such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and as per Proviso thereof, where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been
deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries
specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said
Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled for compensation in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of 2013.
11. It was further submitted that as it is a settled principle of law that
no person can be deprived of the property without authority of law,
therefore, the petitioner cannot be deprived of his property in violation
of his constitutional right as enshrined under Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India.
12. It was further submitted that since 26.09.2013 the new Act 2013
8
has been introduced and Section 24 (2) is applicable and even after
passing final award, no compensation has been paid for nearby about 10
years i.e. before coming into force of new Act 2013, hence by virtue of
section 24(2), the proceeding under old Act can be said to have lapsed
and now, the petitioner is entitled for compensation treating initial
notification for acquisition on 01.01.2014 as per the procedure laid
down in the Schedule-I of the Act 2013. On the basis of the aforesaid
arguments, it was prayed to direct the respondent either to pay the
compensation to the petitioner as per the Act of 2013 against acquisition
of his land or restore his possession over the land in question.
13. Per contra, Shri K.S. Tomar – learned Govt. Advocate for the
State had opposed the prayer so made by counsel for the petitioner and
has prayed for dismissal of the present petition.
14. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
15. The Apex Court in the matter of Indore Development Authority
vs Manoharlal And Ors. Etc. reported in 2020 (8) SCC 129, has
overruled the earlier judgment of Pune Municipal Corp. & Anr vs
Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors. reported in 2014 (3) SCC 183
and has held that satisfaction of either of the conditions, namely, taking
possession of the acquired land or payment of compensation to land
owners would be sufficient to save the acquisition from being lapsed in
terms of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013. Relevant para No.366 is
explained below:
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer
the questions as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case
the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of
9commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of+
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined
under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the
window period of five years excluding the period
covered by an interim order of the court, then
proceedings shall continue as provided underSection
24(1) (b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it
has not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as “nor”
or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition
proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes
place where due to inaction of authorities for five
years or more prior to commencement of the said Act,
the possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. In other words, in case
possession has been taken, compensation has not been
paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation
has been paid, possession has not been taken then
there is no lapse
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a
deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of
non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)
in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries
10
(landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation
under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the
said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation
(in court) does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with
respect to the majority of holdings for five years or
more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid
to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the
compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the
1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that
acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-
payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount
under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused
to accept compensation or who sought reference for
higher compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is
to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of
Section 24 (1) (b).
11
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894
Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by
drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award
has been passed on taking possession under Section
16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act, as once possession has been taken there is no
lapse under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or
more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a
proceeding for land acquisition pending with the
authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of
subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be
excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise
to new cause of action to question the legality of
concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24
to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of
the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and
time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded
proceedings nor allow landowners to question the
legality of mode of taking possession to reopen
proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the
treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.”
12
(emphasis supplied)
16. The expression “compensation has not been paid” in Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act and its effect on the subject acquisition, it is
necessary to refer to Section 24 which reads as follows:
“24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, –
a) Where no award under section 11 of the said
Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all
provisions of this Act relating to the determination of
compensation shall apply; or
b) Where an award under said section 11 has
been made, then such proceedings shall continue
under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act,
as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where
an award under the said section 11 has been made five
years or more prior to the commencement of this Act
but the physical possession of the land has not been
taken or the compensation has not been paid the said
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate
the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in
accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made
13and compensation in respect of a majority of land
holding has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said
Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.”
17. Insofar as Sub-section (1) of Section 24 is concerned, it begins
with non-obstante clause. By this, Parliament has given overriding
effect to this provision over all other provisions of 2013 Act. It is
provided in Clause (a) that where the land acquisition proceedings have
been initiated under the 1894 Act, but no award under Section 11 is
made, then the provisions of 2013 Act shall apply relating to the
determination of compensation. Clause (b) of Section 24(1) makes
provision that where land acquisition proceedings have been initiated
under the 1894 Act and award has been made under Section 11, then
such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as
if that Act has not been repealed.
18. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause, which has
overriding effect over Section 24(1). Section 24(2) enacts that in
relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under 1894 Act,
where an award has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is
satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken or
(ii) the compensation has not been paid, such acquisition proceedings
shall be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition
proceedings, if the appropriate government still chooses to acquire the
14
land which was the subject matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act
then it has to initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013 Act. The
proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where in
respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act an award has
been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings
has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries then all the
beneficiaries specified in Section 4 notification becomes entitled to
compensation under 2013 Act.
19. The Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi v.
MIDC, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 has held as under :
“8. The appellants were deprived of their immovable
property in 1964, when Article 31 of the Constitution
was still intact and the right to property was a part of
fundamental rights under Article 19 of the
Constitution. It is pertinent to note that even after the
right to property ceased to be a fundamental right,
taking possession of or acquiring the property of a
citizen most certainly tantamounts to deprivation and
such deprivation can take place only in accordance
with the “law”, as the said word has specifically been
used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Such
deprivation can be only by resorting to a procedure
prescribed by a statute. The same cannot be done by
way of executive fiat or order or administration
caprice. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, it has been held as follows : (SCC p. 627,
para 48) “48. In other words, Article 300-A only limits
15the powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
There [is] no deprivation without [due] sanction of
law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition
or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other
words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.”
9. The right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a
human right. Though, it is not a basic feature of the
Constitution or a fundamental right. Human rights are
considered to be in realm of individual rights, such as
the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to
shelter and employment, etc. Now however, human
rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted
dimension. The right to property is considered very
much to be a part of such new dimension. (Vide
Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram, Amarjit Singh v. State
of Punjab, State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan,
State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar and Delhi Airtech
Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.).
20. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of B.K. Ravichandra v.
Union of India reported in (2021) 14 SCC 703 has held as under :
“35. It is, therefore, no longer open to the State :
in any of its forms (executive, State agencies, or
legislature) to claim that the law — or the Constitution
can be ignored, or complied at its convenience. The
decisions of this Court, and the history of the right to
16property show that though its preeminence as a
fundamental right has been undermined, nevertheless,
the essence of the rule of law protects it. The evolving
jurisprudence of this Court also underlines that it is a
valuable right ensuring guaranteed freedoms and
economic liberty. The phrasing of Article 300-A is
determinative and its resemblance with Articles 21
and 265 cannot be overlooked, they in effect, are a
guarantee of the supremacy of the rule of law, no less.
To permit the State : whether the Union or any State
Government to assert that it has an indefinite or
overriding right to continue occupying one‟s property
(bereft of lawful sanction) — whatever be the pretext,
is no less than condoning lawlessness. The courts‟
role is to act as the guarantor and jealous protector of
the people‟s liberties : be they assured through the
freedoms, and the right to equality and religion or
cultural rights under Part III, or the right against
deprivation, in any form, through any process other
than law. Any condonation by the court is a validation
of such unlawful executive behaviour which it then can
justify its conduct on the anvil of some loftier purpose,
at any future time, aptly described as a “loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”
21. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the right to hold property is not
only a Constitutional Right as enshrined under Article 300-A of
17
Constitution of India but is also a Human Right and no one can be
deprived of his property except in accordance with law.
22. The Supreme Court in the case of Hari Krishna Mandir Trust Vs.
State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2020) 9 SCC 356 has held
as under:-
“99. In case of dispossession, except under the
authority of law, the owner might obtain restoration of
possession by a proceeding for mandamus against the
Government as held by this Court in Wazir Chand v.
State of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of H.P., AIR 1954
SC 415 : 1954 Cri LJ 1029] Admittedly, no
compensation has been offered or paid to the
appellant Trust. As observed by this Court in K.T.
Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [K.T.
Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9
SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414] , even though the
right to claim compensation or the obligation of the
State to pay compensation to a person who is deprived
of his property is not expressly provided in Article
300- A of the Constitution, it is inbuilt in the Article.
The State seeking to acquire private property for
public purpose cannot say that no compensation shall
be paid. The Regional and Town Planning Act also
does not contemplate deprivation of a landholder of
his land, without compensation. Statutory authorities
are bound to pay adequate compensation.
100. The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction
18under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only
have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or in the
nature of mandamus, but are duty-bound to exercise
such power, where the Government or a public
authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly
exercised discretion conferred upon it by a statute, or
a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has
exercised such discretion mala fide, or on irrelevant
consideration.
101. In all such cases, the High Court must issue a
writ of mandamus and give directions to compel
performance in an appropriate and lawful manner of
the discretion conferred upon the Government or a
public authority.
102. In appropriate cases, in order to prevent injustice
to the parties, the Court may itself pass an order or
give directions which the Government or the public
authorities should have passed, had it properly and
lawfully exercised its discretion. In Director of
Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao [Director of
Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC
638] . Pattanaik, J. observed: (SCC p. 659, para 17)
“17. … One of the conditions for exercising
power under Article 226 for issuance of a
mandamus is that the court must come to the
conclusion that the aggrieved person has a
legal right, which entitles him to any of the
19rights and that such right has been infringed.
In other words, existence of a legal right of a
citizen and performance of any
corresponding legal duty by the State or any
public authority, could be enforced by
issuance of a writ of mandamus,
“mandamus” means a command. It differs
from the writs of prohibition or certiorari in
its demand for some activity on the part of
the body or person to whom it is addressed.
Mandamus is a command issued to direct
any person, corporation, inferior courts or
Government, requiring him or them to do
some particular thing therein specified which
appertains to his or their office and is in the
nature of a public duty. A mandamus is
available against any public authority
including administrative and local bodies,
and it would lie to any person who is under a
duty imposed by a statute or by the common
law to do a particular act. In order to obtain
a writ or order in the nature of mandamus,
the applicant has to satisfy that he has a
legal right to the performance of a legal duty
by the party against whom the mandamus is
sought and such right must be subsisting on
the date of the petition (seeKalyan Singh v.
20
State of U.P. [Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P.,
AIR 1962 SC 1183]). The duty that may be
enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed
by the Constitution, a statute, common law or
by rules or orders having the force of law.”
103. The Court is duty-bound to issue a writ of
mandamus for enforcement of a public duty. There can
be no doubt that an important requisite for issue of
mandamus is that mandamus lies to enforce a legal
duty. This duty must be shown to exist towards the
applicant. A statutory duty must exist before it can be
enforced through mandamus. Unless a statutory duty
or right can be read in the provision, mandamus
cannot be issued to enforce the same.
104. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction
to entertain a petition under Article 226 merely
because in considering the petitioner’s right to relief,
questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a
petition under Article 226, the High Court has
jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise
of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary, but the
discretion must be exercised on sound judicial
principles. Reference may be made inter alia to the
judgments of this Court in Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal
Committee, Bhatinda [Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal
Committee, Bhatinda, (1969) 3 SCC 769] and State of
Kerala v. M.K. Jose [State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose,
21
(2015) 9 SCC 433] . In M.K. Jose [State of Kerala v.
M.K. Jose, (2015) 9 SCC 433] , this Court held: (SCC
pp. 442-43, para 16)
“16. Having referred to the aforesaid
decisions, it is obligatory on our part to refer
to two other authorities of this Court where it
has been opined that under what
circumstances a disputed question of fact can
be gone into. In Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal
Committee, Bhatinda [Gunwant Kaur v.
Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, (1969) 3
SCC 769] , it has been held thus: (SCC p.
774, paras 14-16)„
14. The High Court observed that they will
not determine disputed question of fact in a
writ petition. But what facts were in dispute
and what were admitted could only be
determined after an affidavit-in-reply was
filed by the State. The High Court, however,
proceeded to dismiss the petition in limine.
The High Court is not deprived of its
jurisdiction to entertain a petition under
Article 226 merely because in considering
the petitioner’s right to relief questions of
fact may fall to be determined. In a petition
under Article 226 the High Court has
jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law.
22
Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true,
discretionary, but the discretion must be
exercised on sound judicial principles. When
the petition raises questions of fact of a
complex nature, which may for their
determination require oral evidence to be
taken, and on that account the High Court is
of the view that the dispute may not
appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the
High Court may decline to try a petition.
Rejection of a petition in limine will
normally be justified, where the High Court
is of the view that the petition is frivolous or
because of the nature of the claim made
dispute sought to be agitated, or that the
petition against the party against whom
relief is claimed is not maintainable or that
the dispute raised thereby is such that it
would be inappropriate to try it in the writ
jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.
15. From the averments made in the petition
filed by the appellants it is clear that in proof
of a large number of allegations the
appellants relied upon documentary evidence
and the only matter in respect of which
conflict of facts may possibly arise related to
the due publication of the notification under
23
Section 4 by the Collector.
16. In the present case, in our judgment, the
High Court was not justified in dismissing
the petition on the ground that it will not
determine disputed question of fact. The
High Court has jurisdiction to determine
questions of fact, even if they are in dispute
and the present, in our judgment, is a case in
which in the interests of both the parties the
High Court should have entertained the
petition and called for an affidavit-inreply
from the respondents, and should have
proceeded to try the petition instead of
relegating the appellants to a separate
suit.‟”
23. From the aforesaid, it is clear that although the right to claim
compensation or obligation of State to pay compensation to a person,
who is deprived of his property, is not expressly provided under Article
300-A of the Constitution of India, but it is inbuilt in the Article and the
State, who has acquired the private property for public purposes cannot
say that no compensation shall be paid. The statutory authorities are
bound to pay adequate compensation for illegally dispossessing the
petitioner from her private land
24. It is well established principle of law that any interpretation which
may lead to absurdity should be avoided. The Supreme Court in the
matter of Corporation Bank v. Saraswati Abharansala, reported in
(2009) 1 SCC 540 has held as under :
24
“24. The statute furthermore, it is trite, should
be read in a manner so as to do justice to the parties.
If it is to be held, without there being any statutory
provision that those who have deposited the amount in
time would be put to a disadvantageous position and
those who were defaulters would be better placed, the
same would give rise to an absurdity. Construction of
the statute which leads to confusion must be avoided.”
25. The Supreme Court in the matter of American Home Products
Corporation. vs. Mac Laboratories (P) Ltd., reported in (1986) 1
SCC 465 has held as under:
“66………..It is a well-known principle of
interpretation of statutes that a construction should
not be put upon a statutory provision which would
lead to manifest absurdity or futility, palpable
injustice, or absurd inconvenience or anomaly (see:
M. Pentiah v. MuddalaVeeramallappa). The Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court saw the absurdity,
inconvenience and hardship resulting from the
construction which was placed by it upon Section
48(2), as is shown by the passages from its judgment
reproduced earlier………..”
26. Thus, if the obvious intention of the statute gives rise to obstacles
in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of
overcoming those obstacles, so as to avoid absurd results. It is a well-
settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should
not be put on a statutory provision which would lead to manifest
25
absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience or
anomaly.
27. Herein case, the Award has been passed on 15.11.2005 but only in
the year 2019, compensation amount of Rs.41,2500/- has been paid
which is against the provisions of the Act of 2013 as well as against the
law laid down in Para 366.4 of the decision of the Indore Development
Authority (supra).
28. This Court in the light of aforesaid discussion finds that the
impugned order dated 14.09.2019 passed by the respondent authority is
per-se illegal and accordingly, it is hereby set aside. Resultantly, the
present petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to pay the
compensation amount to the petitioner as per the Act of 2013 against
acquisition of land in question after adjusting the amount of
Rs.41,25,000/- which has already been paid to the petitioner, as is
evident from order dated 15.05.2019 passed in Contempt Petition
No.3540 of 2018.
29. With the aforesaid observation and directions, the present petition
is disposed of finally.
(Milind Ramesh Phadke)
Judge
PAWAN
Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH BENCH GWALIOR,
pwn*
2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34d631
287f1b1cdd90b4a49f265f02d9d593f,
KUMAR
postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=61B9D129971D2EA4FD4455ED49
EA436EA65E26164BEEED89153191C56E98CE21,
cn=PAWAN KUMAR
Date: 2025.04.26 11:41:10 +05’30’
[ad_1]
Source link