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Supreme Court of India
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan vs The State Of (Nct Of Delhi) on 12 August, 2025
2025 INSC 969
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3271 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.17915 of 2024)
SUKHDEV YADAV @ PEHALWAN …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF (NCT OF DELHI) & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The salient question that arises in this appeal is, whether,
an accused/convict who has completed his “life imprisonment for
a fixed term” such as twenty years of actual sentence without
remission, as in the instant case, is entitled to be released from
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
BORRA LM VALLI
Date: 2025.08.12
18:26:44 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 62
prison on completion of such a sentence. In other words, on
completion of the fixed term of sentence as aforesaid, should the
accused/convict seek remission of his sentence of “life
imprisonment” by making an application to the competent
authority for seeking “reduction of his sentence”.
Background Facts:
3. By the impugned order dated 25.11.2024, the learned single
Judge of the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Crl.) No.1682 of 2023
rejected the petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeking release of the appellant on furlough for a period of
three weeks considering the apprehension expressed by the
complainant i.e. mother of the deceased victim and respondent
No.3 herein.
3.1 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 25.11.2024, the
appellant has preferred this appeal.
3.2 The relevant facts of the case are that on 17.02.2002, FIR
No.192/2002 was registered at P.S. Kavi Nagar, District
Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh under Section 364/34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”) on the basis of a complaint
Page 2 of 62
filed by Smt. Nilam Katara i.e. complainant and mother of the
deceased. On 28.05.2008, after completion of investigation and
trial, his co-convicts – Vikas Yadav and Vishal Yadav – were
convicted for commission of offences under Sections 302, 364, 201
read with Section 34 of the IPC in SC No.78/2002 by the Additional
Sessions Judge (01), New Delhi, (“Sessions Court”). Thereafter,
they were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment as well as fine
of Rs.1,00,000/- each under Section 302 of the IPC and in default
of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
They were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years and
fine of Rs.50,000/- each for their conviction under Section 364/34
IPC and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple
imprisonment of six months, and rigorous imprisonment for five
years and fine of Rs.10,000/- each under Section 201/34 IPC and
in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for
three months. All sentences were to run concurrently.
3.3 On 06.07.2011, the appellant herein was found guilty of
commission of offences under Sections 302, 364, 201 read with
Section 34 of the IPC in SC No.76/2008 by the Sessions Court.
Page 3 of 62
Subsequently, on 12.07.2011, the appellant was sentenced to
undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/- for commission
of the offence under Section 302 IPC and in default of payment of
fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years; rigorous
imprisonment for seven years and fine of Rs.5,000/- for
commission of the offence under Section 364 IPC, and in default
of payment of fine, rigorous imprisonment for six months; rigorous
imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.5,000/- for his
conviction under Section 201 IPC and in default of payment of
fine, rigorous imprisonment for six months. All sentences were to
run concurrently.
3.4 Aggrieved by their conviction, the co-convicts and the
appellant herein preferred criminal appeals before the High Court
of Delhi. By judgment dated 02.04.2014, the Criminal Appeal
No.145/2012 preferred by the appellant herein was dismissed by
the High Court of Delhi and his conviction was upheld. During the
pendency of the aforesaid appeals, the State had also preferred
Criminal Appeal No.1322/2011 against the appellant along with
Criminal Appeal No.958/2008 against the co-convicts seeking
Page 4 of 62
enhancement of sentence of life imprisonment to imposition of
death penalty. The complainant had also preferred Criminal
Revision Petition No.369/2008 against the order of the Sessions
Court, seeking enhancement of sentence for all convicts including
the appellant herein. By judgment dated 06.02.2015, the High
Court disposed of all appeals and the revision petition by modifying
the sentence imposed upon the appellant by judgment and order
dated 12.07.2021 and directed that he shall undergo the sentence
as extracted hereunder:-
“881 xxx
(I)
For Sentences awarded to Sentence awarded
commission each of Vikas Yadav & to Sukhdev Yadav
of offences Vishal Yadav
under
Section Life imprisonment Life imprisonment
302/34 IPC which shall be 25 years which shall be 20
of actual imprisonment years of actual
without consideration imprisonment
of remission, and fine without consideration
of Rs.50 lakh each of remission, and fine
of Rs.10,000/-.”
Upon default in Upon default in
payment of fine, they payment of fine, he
shall be liable to shall be liable to
undergo rigorous undergo simple
imprisonment of 3 imprisonment for one
years. month
Section Rigorous 10 years rigorous
364/34 IPC imprisonment for 10 imprisonment with
years with a fine of Rs. fine of Rs. 5,000/-,
2 lakh each,
Page 5 of 62
For Sentences awarded to Sentence awarded
commission each of Vikas Yadav & to Sukhdev Yadav
of offences Vishal Yadav
under
Upon default in Upon default in
payment of fine, they payment of fine, he
shall be liable to shall be liable to
undergo rigorous undergo simple
imprisonment for 6 imprisonment for 15
months days.
Section Rigorous 5 years rigorous
201/34 IPC imprisonment for 5 imprisonment with
years with a fine of Rs. fine of Rs. 5,000/-,
2 lakh each,
Upon default in Upon default in
payment of fine, they payment of fine, he
shall be liable to shall be liable to
undergo rigorous undergo simple
imprisonment for 6 imprisonment for 15
months days.
(underlining by us)
(II) It is directed that the sentences for conviction of the
offences under Section 302/34 and Section 364/34 IPC
shall run concurrently. The sentence under Section
201/34 IPC shall run consecutively to the other sentences
for the discussion and reasons in paras 741 to 745 above.
(III) The amount of the fines shall be deposited with the
trial court within a period of six months from today.
xxx
(V) Amount of fines deposited by Sukhdev Yadav and other
fines deposited by Vikas Yadav and Vishal Yadav shall be
forwarded to the Delhi Legal Services Authority to be
utilized under the Victims Compensation Scheme.
(VI) In case an application for parole or remission is moved
by the defendants before the appropriate government,
notice thereof shall be given to Nilam Katara as well as Ajay
Katara by the appropriate government and they shall also
be heard with regard thereto before passing of orders
thereon.”
Page 6 of 62
3.5 Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant herein
preferred Criminal Appeal Nos.1528-1530/2015 before this Court
which, along with appeals preferred by co-convicts, was disposed
of by a common judgment dated 03.10.2016, with a singular
modification in the sentence, i.e. the sentence under Section
201/34 IPC shall run concurrently.
3.6 Since the year 2015, the appellant herein has been
intermittently granted parole for short periods. On 30.11.2022, the
appellant moved an application seeking grant of first spell of
furlough for a period of three weeks as per Rule 1223 of the Delhi
Prison Rules, 2018 (for short, “2018 Rules”) before the Director
General of Prisons, Prison Headquarters, Tihar (hereinafter,
“Competent Authority”). However, the same came to be rejected
vide order dated 28.04.2023 considering the nature of crime
committed, the sentence awarded and apprehension that the
appellant may abscond, disturb law and order and cause
irreparable damage to the victim’s family.
3.7 Aggrieved by the order rejecting the application for grant of
furlough, the appellant filed Writ Petition Criminal No.1682/2023
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before the High Court of Delhi seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the State to release the petitioner on furlough for a period
of three weeks. By impugned order dated 25.11.2024, the writ
petition preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the High
Court on the ground, inter alia, that there were serious
apprehensions with regard to threat to life and liberty of the
complainant and the star witness.
4. Hence, this appeal.
5. By Order dated 06.01.2025, this Court issued notice in the
instant matter. During subsequent hearings, this Court passed
the following order on 24.02.2025:
“We have perused the judgment of the High Court dated
6th February, 2025 in Criminal Appeal No.145 of 2012. As
regards the sentence awarded to the petitioner, in
paragraph 881 of the operative part of the judgment, it is
stated thus:
“Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission, and
fine of Rs.10,000/-.”
The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for
the respondent State of Delhi states that even after
completion of 20 years of actual imprisonment, the State
Government will not release the petitioner,
notwithstanding what is stated in paragraph 881 of the
judgment of the High Court which has attained finality.
Page 8 of 62
We direct the Secretary of the Home Department of the
State of NCT of Delhi to file an affidavit making a statement
on oath on the question whether after completing 20 years
of actual sentence, the petitioner will be released. An
affidavit to be filed by 28th February, 2025.
List on 3rd March, 2025.”
(underlining by us)
5.1 On 03.03.2025, this Court adjourned the matter for two
weeks on the assurance of the learned Additional Solicitor General
(ASG) appearing for the State that the case of the appellant for
remission shall be considered and decided within a period of two
weeks from the date of the order. However, as the same was not
done by the next date of hearing i.e. 17.03.2025; this Court issued
notice to the Principal Secretary of the Home Department of Delhi
Government calling upon him to indicate why action under the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 should not be initiated against him.
The order of this Court recorded as follows:
“A solemn statement on instructions of the State
Government was recorded in this order. Now we are
informed that Sentence Review Board is likely to consider
the case of the petitioner today. The State Government has
not shown elementary courtesy of making an application
for grant of extension of time.
We, therefore, issue notice to the Principal Secretary of the
Home Department of Delhi Government calling upon him
to show why action under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 should not be initiated against him.
Page 9 of 62
Notice of contempt is made returnable on 28th March,
2025. We direct the Secretary to remain present through
video conference.”5.2 Pertinently, during the pendency of the instant appeal, the
appellant completed twenty years of actual incarceration on
09.03.2025.
5.3 On 28.03.2025, this Court listed the matter on 22.04.2025
for considering the issue whether the appellant is entitled to be
released on completion of actual twenty years of incarceration.
However, on 22.04.2025, despite its clear and advance notice to
all parties that this Court will consider the aforesaid substantive
question of sentencing, the learned ASG raised a preliminary
objection after a half an hour of arguments that since the appellant
had not canvassed this ground in his petition, this Court could not
go into the question. In these circumstances, the appellant was
directed to file an amended petition within three days from the date
of the order, which recorded as follows:
“The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
completed his submissions. The learned ASG appearing
for the State of NCT of Delhi, after making submissions for
half an hour, raised a preliminary objection that the
petitioner has not raised a plea in this Petition that he is
entitled to be released after undergoing actual sentence ofPage 10 of 62
20 years. Thus, the submission in short was that this
Court cannot go into this question. As indicated in the
earlier two orders, which we have quoted above, make it
clear that we had put the learned counsel for the parties
to the notice that the issue whether the petitioner is
entitled to be released on completion of 20 years of
incarceration will be considered today. While the learned
ASG was arguing, we thought that the Advocates waiting
for other cases should not be made to wait as remaining
part of the day’s time was likely to be consumed in this
case. Therefore, at 3:15 p.m., we discharged the rest of the
cases on the cause list and informed the members of the
Bar that those cases will not be taken up. Fifteen minutes
thereafter, this preliminary objection was raised by the
learned ASG. Therefore, raising such a preliminary
objection after arguing the case for half an hour especially
in the light of the two orders which we have quoted above,
is unfair to the other litigants whose cases were listed
before this Court today. Since this strong objection has
been raised, we permit the petitioner to amend the Petition
for raising the contention noted in the earlier orders,
though this amendment is strictly not required in view of
our earlier orders. We direct the petitioner to file an
amended petition within three days from today with an
advance copy to the learned counsel representing the
respondents.”5.4 On 07.05.2025, the application seeking permission to amend
the special leave petition was allowed by this Court. Having
completed twenty years of actual incarceration on 09.03.2025, the
appellant also moved I.A. No.147782/2025 seeking release on
furlough for a suitable period during the pendency of instant
special leave petition. By Order dated 25.06.2025, this Court
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allowed the application and granted the relief of furlough to theappellant for a period of three months from the date of release,
subject to appropriate terms and conditions to be imposed by the
learned trial court. The said order reads as under:
“I.A. No.147782/2025 in SLP (Crl.) No.17915/2024
We have heard Shri Siddharth Mridul, learned senior
counsel for the petitioner, Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave,
learned A.S.G. for the respondent(s)/State and Ms. Vrinda
Bhandari, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
This interlocutory application has been filed by the
petitioner seeking the relief of his release on furlough for a
suitable period during the pendency of the related special
leave petition.
Be it stated that the related SLP(Crl) No. 17915/2024
has been preferred by the petitioner against the order
dated 25.11.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi in
W.P. (Crl.) No.1682/2023 [Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan Vs.
State (NCT of Delhi] whereby and whereunder prayer of the
petitioner for grant of furlough was rejected.
Be it stated that petitioner was convicted by the Trial
Court under Sections 302, 364 and 201 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life.
In Criminal Appeal No.145/2012, the High Court
passed judgment and order dated 06.02.2015 enhancing
the sentence of the petitioner to life imprisonment which
shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment without
consideration of remission and fine of Rs.10,000/-. This
order of the High Court has been affirmed by this Court.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that
petitioner had completed 20 years of actual imprisonment
Page 12 of 62
without consideration of remission on 09.03.2025.
However, prior thereto the related Writ Petition, i.e., W.P.
(Crl.) No.1682/2023 was filed before the High Court
seeking furlough for a period of three weeks.
As noted above, by the impugned order dated
25.11.2024, the said prayer was rejected.
In the course of hearing of the main SLP, this Court
permitted the petitioner to amend the Special Leave
Petition incorporating the ground that petitioner’s
sentence would come to an end on undergoing 20 years of
actual incarceration without remission.
In the hearing today, learned A.S.G very fairly submits
that since it is a matter of furlough, Court may consider
passing appropriate order. But, at the same time, the
security of the informant should also be taken into
consideration by the Court as she has already been offered
security by the State because of the circumstances
surrounding the case.
Learned counsel for respondent No.2 vehemently
objects to the prayer of the petitioner. She submits that
conduct of the petitioner leaves much to be desired and
would not entitle him to any discretionary relief from the
Court. In this connection, she has referred to an order
dated 06.02.2025 passed by a learned Judge of the High
Court in W.P. (Crl.) No.1848/2020 whereby the learned
Judge recused herself from hearing the matter observing
that attempts have been made to influence the Court.
While such conduct is highly deplorable and
condemnable, there is nothing on record to show whether
any enquiry was conducted to find out who had indulged
in such reprehensible activity. In the absence thereof, it
would not be just and proper to deny relief to the petitioner
on that count.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and
taking an overall view of the matter, more particularly the
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factum that petitioner has completed 20 years of
uninterrupted incarceration without remission, as ordered
by the High Court which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, we are of the view that it is a fit case where
petitioner deserves to be released on furlough at least for
a limited duration. Of course, necessary conditions would
have to be imposed on the petitioner so that liberty of
furlough is not misused. That apart, safety and security of
respondent Nos.2 and 3 are also required to be protected.
That being the position, we grant furlough to the
petitioner for a period of three months from the date of
release. Petitioner shall be produced before the learned
Trial Court within a maximum period of seven days from
today, whereafter the learned Trial Court shall release the
petitioner on furlough on appropriate terms and
conditions including concerning safety and security of
respondent Nos.2 and 3.
The Interlocutory Application is disposed of.
List the matters before the Regular Bench on
29.07.2025, as already ordered.”
6. Admittedly, during the pendency of the appeal before this
Court, on 09.03.2025 the appellant has completed his jail
sentence inasmuch as he served the sentence which was awarded
to him under Section 302/34 of the IPC vide paragraph 881 of the
order of the High Court of Delhi dated 06.02.2015. For
convenience, the same is extracted as under:
“Life Imprisonment which shall be twenty years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission and fine
of Rs.10,000/-.”
(underlining by us)Page 14 of 62
Submissions:
7. We have heard learned senior counsel Sri Siddharth Mridul
for the appellant and learned ASG Ms. Archana Pathak Dave
appearing for the respondent(s)-State and learned senior counsel
Ms. Aparajita Singh for the respondent No.2/complainant and
perused the material on record.
7.1 It was submitted by learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that the appellant has complied with the
sentence imposed on him and learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the respondent(s)-State has also acknowledged the
fact that he has completed twenty years of actual imprisonment.
In the circumstances, the appellant is entitled to be released on
completion of his sentence. Consequently, it was contended that
it would be unnecessary to go into the question of the correctness
or otherwise of the impugned order dated 25.11.2024 and the
appeal may be allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms on
the basis of the aforesaid admitted facts.
7.2 Learned senior counsel Sri Mridul further contended that
although the application filed by the appellant for release on
Page 15 of 62
furlough has not been accepted and in fact, the writ petition filed
by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution has been
dismissed by the High Court, the significant fact that on
09.03.2025, the appellant has completed his sentence inasmuch
as he has undergone incarceration for twenty years and has also
paid the fine would entitle him to be released. Since by interim
order dated 25.06.2025, this Court has released the appellant on
furlough, the appellant may be stated to have been released from
jail on completion of his sentence, if not wanted in any other case.
7.3 Per contra, learned ASG appearing for the respondent-State
contended that the appellant has been sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment. That the period of incarceration being twenty years
is to be construed as the period without remission. However, on
completion of the period of twenty years, the Sentence Review
Board would have to consider whether the appellant is entitled to
be released from jail or not. This would be on remission of his life
sentence. That having regard to the serious crime in which the
appellant has been convicted of and the fact that he has sustained
the sentence of life imprisonment, he cannot straightaway seek
Page 16 of 62
release from jail in the absence of any application being made
seeking remission of his sentence. In other words, it was
contended that it is necessary to consider as to, whether, the
appellant is entitled for release from jail at all inasmuch as he has
been sentenced to life imprisonment and hence, unless there is
an order of remission of sentence passed in favour of the appellant
remitting his sentence of life imprisonment, he cannot be released
from jail. Therefore, on completion of the period of three months
furlough granted by this Court, the appellant has to surrender
and return to jail.
7.4 Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-
complainant also echoed the very same submission and in that
regard referred to the judgments of this Court in the case of Navas
alias Mulanavas vs. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
315 (“Navas alias Mulanavas”) and Maru Ram vs. Union of
India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 (“Maru Ram”), to contend that the
appellant cannot be simply released from jail only because he has
completed twenty years of incarceration when in fact he has been
sentenced to life imprisonment. It was therefore vehemently
Page 17 of 62
submitted by the learned senior counsel for the respective
respondents that the appeal would not call for any further
consideration and the same may be dismissed.
7.5 By way of reply arguments, learned senior counsel Sri
Mridul submitted that there is a distinction between release from
jail on completion of sentence of imprisonment and remission of
a sentence. He pointed out that remission of a sentence is
considered when the sentence is not yet complete whereas release
from jail is only upon completion of the period of incarceration
that the convict was sentenced to undergo. It is not in dispute that
on 09.03.2025, the appellant herein completed his jail sentence
of imprisonment being twenty years and therefore was entitled to
be released from jail; however, the respondents have raised highly
technical and irrelevant submissions before this Court which has
delayed the release. Nevertheless, this Court has been pleased to
grant a furlough order dated 25.06.2025 only for a period of three
months, which implies that he would have to surrender on
completion of the said period.
Page 18 of 62
7.6 Learned senior counsel argued that the course of action
suggested by the State to be taken in the case of the appellant,
that is, the appellant for seeking remission of his sentence must
be made by him (which could also be rejected) would be illegal and
contrary to the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the
appellant and in violation of appellant’s right to liberty. That the
submissions of the learned senior counsel for the respondents
would tantamount to sitting in judgment over a judicial order
imposing the sentence on the appellant herein by the High Court
which has been sustained by this Court and, therefore, no other
authority can interfere with the sentence imposed on the
appellant. Learned senior counsel therefore contended that the
appellant would no longer require to plead for remission of a
sentence or for furlough in future as he has completed his period
of imprisonment being twenty years and is, therefore, entitled to
be released on such completion of a sentence, if not wanted in any
other case. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted
that the objections raised by the respondents are wholly
unsustainable and therefore, bearing in mind the aforesaid facts,
the appeal may be allowed.
Page 19 of 62
8. In light of the aforesaid rival contentions, it is necessary to
delineate on the distinction between remission of sentence and
release on completion of a sentence of an accused-convict in the
case of a life sentence. But before that, it is necessary to
understand the meaning of the phrase “life imprisonment”.
Life Imprisonment:
8.1 Section 53 of the IPC speaks about various punishments
which could be ordered against the offenders and imprisonment
for life is one of such punishment. The said Section reads as under:
“53. Punishments.- The punishments to which offenders
are liable under the provisions of this Code are –First. – Death;
Secondly. – Imprisonment for life;
***[Clause “Thirdly” omitted by Act 17 of 1949, sec. 2
(w.e.f. 6.4.1949].
Fourthly. – Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions,
namely :-
(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
(2) Simple;
Fifthly. – Forfeiture of property;
Sixthly. – Fine.”
Section 57 of the IPC is also relevant and is extracted as
under:
Page 20 of 62
“57. Fractions of terms of punishment.– In calculating
fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life
shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for
twenty years.”8.2 The expression life imprisonment has been considered in
various decisions of this Court which could be adverted to at this
stage. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1961 SC 600 (“Gopal Vinayak Godse”), it was observed that a
sentence of imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
convicted person’s natural life. In Ashok Kumar alias Golu vs.
Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1792, it was observed that the
expression “imprisonment for life” must be read in the context of
Section 45, IPC. Then, it would ordinarily mean imprisonment for
the full or complete span of life. In Saibanna vs. State of
Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 165, it was observed that life
imprisonment means to serve imprisonment for the remainder of
his life unless sentence is commuted or remitted. It cannot be
equated with any fixed term. In Swamy Shraddananda (2) vs.
State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 (“Swamy
Page 21 of 62
Shraddananda (2)”), it was observed that it is conclusively settledby a catena of decisions that the punishment of imprisonment for
life handed down by the Court means a sentence of imprisonment
for the convict for the rest of his life. However, further discussion
of this case is made later. In Mohinder Singh vs. State of
Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294, it was observed that life imprisonment
cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or twenty
years or even thirty years, rather it always means the whole
natural life. In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1, it was observed that
imprisonment for life is to be treated as rigorous imprisonment for
life. It was also observed that life imprisonment cannot be
considered as equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or
twenty years or even thirty years, rather it always means the whole
natural life.
8.3 However, in a catena of cases, the punishment of
imprisonment for life has been restricted to certain number of
years, for instance twenty years or thirty years or thirty-five years.
In such a situation, would it mean, on completion of the fixed term
of imprisonment, say twenty years as in the instant case, that the
Page 22 of 62
accused-convict would have to continue to remain in jail for the
remainder of his life or become entitled to be released from jail on
completion of the term of twenty years?
8.4 Krishna Iyer, J. in Mohd. Giasuddin vs. State of A.P.,
(1977) 3 SCC 287, quoted (at SCC p. 290, para 9) George Bernard
Shaw, the famous satirist who said, “If you are to punish a man
retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform him, you must
improve him and, men are not improved by injuries.” According to
him, humanity today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a
person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern
community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the
offender as a means of social defence. Thus, the reformative
approach to punishment should be the object of criminal law, in
order to promote rehabilitation without offending communal
conscience and to secure social justice.
9. In Swamy Shraddananda (2), a three-Judge Bench of this
Court considered the question as to how would the sentence of
imprisonment for life works out in actuality. This Court pondered
over the definition of the word “life” in Section 45 of the IPC which
Page 23 of 62
has been defined to denote the life of the human being, unless the
contrary appears from the context. Further, whether this Court,
which commutes the punishment of death awarded by the trial
court and confirmed by the High Court as life imprisonment, would
mean literally for life or in any case, for a period far in excess of
fourteen years. It was observed that this Court in its judgment may
make its intent explicit and state clearly that the sentence handed
over to the convict is imprisonment till his last breath or, life
permitting, imprisonment for a term not less than twenty, twenty-
five or even thirty years. But once the judgment is pronounced, the
execution of the sentence passes into the hands of the executive
and is governed by the different provisions of law. This Court
questioned as to how the sentence of imprisonment for life (till its
full natural span) given to a convict as a substitute for the death
sentence be viewed differently and segregated from the ordinary
life imprisonment given as the sentence of first choice.
9.1 The appellant in the said case, on conviction, was imposed
the death sentence, which was confirmed by the High Court. A
two-Judge Bench of this Court concurred on the conviction of the
Page 24 of 62
appellant but was unable to agree on the punishment to be meted
out to him. Sinha, J. felt that in the facts and circumstances of the
case the punishment of life imprisonment, rather than death
would serve the ends of justice. However, he opined, the appellant
would not be released from prison till the end of his life. Katju, J.
on the other hand, was of the view that the appellant therein
deserves nothing but death penalty. Hence, the matter was
referred to a three-Judge Bench.
9.2 Aftab Alam, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench, after
discussing the manner in which the crime was committed referred
to the judgments in Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1983) 3
SCC 470 (“Machhi Singh”) and Bachan Singh vs. State of
Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (“Bachan Singh”). It was observed
that in Bachan Singh, the principle of “the rarest of rare” cases
was laid down and in Machhi Singh, this Court for practical
application, crystallised the principle into five definite categories of
cases of murder and in doing so also considerably enlarged the
scope for imposing death penalty. It was also observed that in
reality in the later decisions neither “the rarest of rare cases”
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principle nor the Machhi Singh categories were followed
uniformly and consistently. Holding that this Court was reluctant
to confirm the death sentence of the appellant therein, the
question about the punishment being commensurate to the
appellant’s crime was considered. Not accepting the fact that life
imprisonment could be equated to a term of fourteen years, it was
observed that “the answer lies in breaking this standardisation
that, in practice, renders the sentence of life imprisonment equal
to imprisonment for a period of no more than fourteen years: in
making it clear that the sentence of life imprisonment when
awarded as a substitute for death penalty would be carried out
strictly as directed by the Court.” This Court, therefore, thought it
fit to lay down a good and sound legal basis for imposing the
punishment of imprisonment for life, when awarded as substitute
for death penalty, beyond any remission so that it may be followed
in appropriate cases as a uniform policy not only by this Court but
also by the High Courts, being the superior courts in their
respective States.
Page 26 of 62
9.3 Referring to Sinha, J. order, that a life sentence was meant
to be “life sentence”, reference was also made to the judgments of
this Court in Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC
458; Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296;
Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2002) 2 SCC 35; Ram Anup Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6
SCC 686; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 417
(“Mohd. Munna”); Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 109; and Nazir Khan vs. State of
Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461.
9.4 In the aforesaid seven decisions, this Court modified the
death sentence to imprisonment for life or in some case
imprisonment for a term of twenty years with a further direction
that the convict must not be released from prison for the rest of
his life or before actually serving the term of twenty years, as the
case may be, primarily on two premises: one, an imprisonment for
life, in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC meant
imprisonment for the rest of life of the prisoner and two, a convict
undergoing life imprisonment has no right to claim remission. In
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support of the second premise, reliance was placed on the line of
decisions beginning from Gopal Vinayak Godse and upto Mohd.
Munna.
9.5 In Swamy Shraddananda (2), this Court took note of the
contention that to say that a convict undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment has no right to claim remission was not the same
as the Court, while imposing the punishment of imprisonment,
suspending the operation of the statutory provisions of remission
and restraining the appropriate Government from discharging its
statutory function. It was contended in the said case that just as
the Court could not direct the appropriate Government for
granting remission to a convicted prisoner, it was not open to the
Court to direct the appropriate Government not to consider the
case of a convict for grant of remission in sentence. It was
contended therein that giving punishment for an offence is a
judicial function but the execution of the punishment passes into
the hands of the executive and under the scheme of statute, the
Court had no control over the execution. This contention was
however, not accepted and held to be untenable. Referring to
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Sections 45, 53, 54, 55 and 57 of the IPC, it was observed that
Section 57 provides that in calculating fractions of terms of
punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent
to imprisonment for twenty years. That Section 57 of the IPC does
not in any way limit the punishment for imprisonment for life to a
term of twenty years. It only provides that imprisonment for life
shall be reckoned as imprisonment for twenty years while
calculating fraction of terms of punishment. It was observed that
the object and purpose of Section 57 would be clear by referring to
Sections 65, 116, 119, 129 and 511 of the IPC.
9.6 Discussing on remission, it was pointed out that under the
Prison Acts and the Rules for good conduct and for doing certain
duties, etc. inside the jail, the prisoners are given some days’
remission on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. The days of
remission so earned by a prisoner are added to the period of his
actual imprisonment (including the period undergone as an
undertrial) to make up the term of sentence awarded by the Court.
9.7 Taking note of the way in which remission is actually allowed
in cases of life imprisonment, it was found necessary to make a
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special category for the very few cases where the death penalty
might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life
or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put
that category beyond the application of remission. This Court
further observed that if the Court’s option is limited only to two
punishments, one a sentence of life imprisonment, for all intents
and purposes, of not more than fourteen years and the other
death, the Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into
endorsing the death penalty which would be disastrous in certain
cases. The Court observed thus:
“A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be
to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter
of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus
between 14 years’ imprisonment and death. It needs to be
emphasized that the Court would take recourse to the
expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case,
the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would amount to
no punishment at all.”9.8 Consequently, the three-Judge Bench agreed with the view
taken by Sinha, J. and substituted the death sentence given to the
appellant therein by imprisonment for life and directed that he
shall not be released from prison till the rest of his life.
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10. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of
India vs. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (“Sriharan”) considered,
inter alia, the following two questions:
“(i) As to whether the imprisonment for life means till the
end of convict’s life with or without any scope for
remission?
(ii) Whether a special category of sentence instead of death
for a term exceeding 14 years can be made by putting that
category beyond grant of remission?”
10.1 The Constitution Bench speaking through Kalifulla, J.- for
the majority- observed that the first question relates to Sections
53 and 45 of the IPC vis-à-vis the meaning of “life imprisonment”
as to whether it means imprisonment for the rest of one’s life or a
convict has a right to claim remission. The second question is
based on the ruling of Swamy Shraddananda (2).
10.2 Having noted the judgments of this Court in Gopal Vinayak
Godse and Maru Ram as well as other cases discussed therein
which have followed those decisions, it was observed that, “The
first part of the first question can be conveniently answered to the
effect that imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with
Section 45 of the Penal Code only means imprisonment for rest of
the life of the prisoner subject, however, to the right to claim
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remission, etc. as provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution to be exercisable by the President and the Governor of
the State and also as provided under Section 432 of the Criminal
Procedure Code.”
10.3 On the concept of remission in paragraph 62, it was
observed as under:
“62……Similarly, in the case of a life imprisonment,
meaning thereby the entirety of one’s life, unless there is a
commutation of such sentence for any specific period,
there would be no scope to count the earned remission. In
either case, it will again depend upon an answer to the
second part of the first question based on the principles
laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2).”
(underlining by us)10.4 With regard to the second part of the first question which
pertains to the special category of the sentence to be considered in
substitute of death penalty by imposing a life sentence i.e., the
entirety of the life or a term of imprisonment which can be less
than full life term but more than fourteen years and put that
category beyond application of remission which has been
propounded in paragraphs 91 and 92 of Swamy Shraddananda
(2), it was observed that the said dictum “has come to stay as on
this date”.
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10.5 Analysing the decision in Swamy Shraddananda (2) and
endorsing the same, it was observed that the death penalty in that
case was set aside although much anguish was expressed on the
nature of the crime and the life sentence for the rest of the life of
the convict therein was ordered by this Court. The justification for
the same was stated in paragraph 68 of Sriharan in the following
words:
“68. … But in an organised society where the Rule of Law
prevails, for every conduct of a human being, right or
wrong, there is a well-set methodology followed based on
time tested, well-thought out principles of law either to
reward or punish anyone, which were crystallised from
time immemorial by taking into account very many factors,
such as the person concerned, his or her past conduct, the
background in which one was brought up, the educational
and knowledge base, the surroundings in which one was
brought up, the societal background, the wherewithal, the
circumstances that prevailed at the time when any act was
committed or carried out whether there was any pre-plan
prevalent, whether it was an individual action or personal
action or happened at the instance of anybody else or such
action happened to occur unknowingly, so on so forth. It
is for this reason, we find that the criminal law
jurisprudence was developed by setting forth very many
ingredients while describing the various crimes, and by
providing different kinds of punishment and even relating
to such punishment different degrees, in order to ensure
that the crimes alleged are befitting the nature and extent
of commission of such crimes and the punishments to be
imposed meets with the requirement or the gravity of the
crime committed.”Page 33 of 62
10.6 After referring in detail to the judgment of this Court inSwamy Shraddananda (2), it was observed that when by way of
a judicial decision, after a detailed analysis, having regard to the
proportionality of the crime committed, it is decided that the
offender deserves to be punished with the sentence of life
imprisonment i.e. till end of his life or for a specific period of twenty
years, thirty years or forty years, such a conclusion should survive
without any interruption. In such an event, it can be stated that
such punishment imposed will have no remission or other such
liberal approach should not come into effect to nullify such
imposition. Accepting the submission of learned Solicitor General
that there is no restriction to fix any period beyond fourteen years
and up to the end of one’s life span, it was stated that the Court
can sentence the accused to undergo imprisonment for a specified
period even beyond fourteen years without any scope for remission.
The Court can direct that such offender is not to be released early
and be kept in confinement for a longer period by imposition of an
appropriate sentence.
Page 34 of 62
10.7 Moving further it was observed that nowhere under the IPC
is there any prohibition that the imprisonment cannot be imposed
for any specific period within the lifespan. Thus, when life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court can specify the period up to
which the said sentence of life should remain, befitting the nature
of the crime committed, when the Court’s conscience does not
persuade the death penalty. Therefore, the dictum in Swamy
Shraddananda (2) was approved by this Court by observing that
within the prescribed limit of life imprisonment, imprisonment for
a specified period would be a proportionate punishment having
regard to the nature of the crime as well as the interest of the
victim.
10.8 Therefore, the law-makers have thought it fit to prescribe
the minimum and maximum sentence to be imposed having regard
to the nature of crime and have left it to the Courts to determine
the kind of punishments that have to be imposed within the
prescribed limit under the relevant provision. In other words, while
the maximum extent of punishment of either death or life
imprisonment is provided for under the relevant provisions, it will
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be for the Courts to decide if, in its opinion, the imposition of death
may not be warranted, what should be the number of years of
imprisonment that would be judiciously and judicially more
appropriate. This is by taking into account, apart from the crime
itself, the interest of the society at large and other relevant factors
which cannot be put in any straight jacket formula. The said
process of determination must be held to be available with the
courts by virtue of extent of the punishments provided for such
specified nature of crimes and such power is also to be derived
from those penal provisions themselves.
10.9 Further, it was noted that even with regard to the nature
of punishment imposed by the Sessions Court insofar as capital
punishment is concerned, the reference made to the Division
Bench of the High Court is in order to give a second look to the
findings arrived by the Sessions Court, both with regard to
conviction as well as with regard to the death penalty imposed. In
a death reference case, the High Court can commute the death
penalty to life imprisonment or for any specific period of more than
fourteen years i.e. twenty, thirty or so on, depending upon the
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gravity of the crime committed and the exercise of judicial
conscience vis-à-vis the offences proved to have been committed.
In conclusion, it was observed as under:
“105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from
the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the
punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such
specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court
and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme
Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it
differently, the power to impose a modified punishment
providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the
end of the convict’s life as an alternate to death penalty,
can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme
Court and not by any other inferior court.”10.10 Consequently, the ratio laid down in Swamy
Shraddananda (2) with regard to special category of sentence was
affirmed. It was expressed that the opinion of this Court in
Sangeet vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 that the
deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by
awarding sentences of twenty or twenty-five years without any
remission was not permissible, was not in consonance with law
and hence, the said judgment was overruled.
11. Recently, this Court in Shiva Kumar vs. State of
Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817 (“Shiva Kumar”) reiterating the
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aforesaid observations made in Sriharan, observed that there is apower which can be derived from the IPC to impose a fixed term
sentence or modified punishment which can only be exercised by
the High Court or in the event of any further appeal, by the
Supreme Court and not by any other Court. It was further
observed that the Constitution Bench in Sriharan held that power
to impose a modified punishment of providing any specific term of
incarceration or till the end of convict’s life as an alternative to
death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the
Supreme Court and not by any other inferior Court. More
pertinently, it was observed that the observations of the
Constitution Bench in Sriharan cannot be construed in a narrow
perspective. Oka, J. speaking for the Bench observed that “the
majority view in Sriharan cannot be construed to mean that such
a power cannot be exercised by the Constitutional Courts unless
the question is of commuting the death sentence”. For this,
paragraph 104 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in
Sriharan was relied upon. Clarifying the position at paragraph 14
of the judgment in Shiva Kumar, Oka, J. held as under:
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“14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a
case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not
proposed, the constitutional courts can always exercise
the power of imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence
by directing that a life sentence, as contemplated by
“secondly” in Section 53IPC, shall be of a fixed period of
more than fourteen years, for example, of twenty years,
thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment cannot be for
a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate of
Section 433-A CrPC.”
(Underlining by us)
11.1 In the said case, the sentence imposed by the Fast Track
Court (Sessions Court) on the appellant therein to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for rest of his life for an offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC was modified to the extent that the
appellant was directed to undergo thirty years of actual sentence
and to be released thereafter. The appeal was partly allowed to the
above extent.
12. Navas alias Mulanavas was a criminal appeal which arose
out of a death reference from the judgment of the Additional
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Thrissur in Sessions Case
No.491 of 2006. The High Court had modified the death penalty to
imprisonment for life with the further direction that the accused
shall not be released from prison for a period of thirty years
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including the period already undergone with set off under Section
428 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) alone.
The accused approached this Court assailing the aforesaid
judgments both on conviction as well as on sentence. While
considering the alternative submission regarding the sentence of
imprisonment for thirty years without remission being excessive
and disproportionate, this Court speaking through one of us
(Viswanathan, J.) considered the judgments discussed above and
after a chronological survey of a large number of cases, observed
in paragraph 59 as under:
“59. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove
shows that the fundamental underpinning is the principle
of proportionality. The aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which the Court considers while deciding
commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,
have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of
compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. As a
judicially trained mind pores and ponders over the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and in cases
where they decide to commute the death penalty they
would by then have a reasonable idea as to what would be
the appropriate period of sentence to be imposed under
the Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle too. Matters
are not cut and dried and nicely weighed here to formulate
a uniform principle. That is where the experience of the
judicially trained mind comes in as pointed out in V.
Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the process of arriving at
the number of years as the most appropriate for the case
at hand, which the convict will have to undergo beforePage 40 of 62
which the remission powers could be invoked, some of the
relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are : – (a) the
number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their
age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including sexual
assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was
committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when
the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the
premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship
between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust
if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the
convict, if released, would be a menace to the society.
Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the
convict; (2) the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the
convict not being a professional killer; (4) the
socioeconomic condition of the accused; (5) the
composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct
expressing remorse. These were some of the relevant
factors that were kept in mind in the cases noticed above
while weighing the pros and cons of the matter. The Court
would be additionally justified in considering the conduct
of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone to
arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the
convict should, serve as part of the sentence of life
imprisonment and before which he cannot apply for
remission. These are not meant to be exhaustive but
illustrative and each case would depend on the facts and
circumstances therein.”12.1 Applying the aforesaid factors to the case, this Court
allowed the appeal in part by modifying the sentence imposed
under Section 302 IPC by the High Court for a period of thirty
years’ of life imprisonment without remission to a period of twenty-
five years without remission, including the period already
undergone.
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13. We have discussed the implications of the punishment
imposed on the appellant herein by analysing the same and
holding that the life imprisonment has been fixed at twenty years
of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission. This
means that within the twenty years of sentence the appellant could
not have sought any remission of his sentence. Therefore, it was
mandatory on the part of the appellant to have completed twenty
years of actual imprisonment without remission and pay fine of
Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand). This sentence imposed by the
High Court was affirmed by this Court except for the singular
modification already noted. Then, what would be the position after
completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment? Does it mean
that after the completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment
the appellant has to seek remission of his sentence inasmuch as
he has been awarded a life imprisonment or, on the other hand,
on completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment without
remission the appellant can be released from prison.
14. The expression “remission” has been considered in a
number of judgments which we can discuss. This is as opposed to
the expression “parole and furlough” etc. With reference to the
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decisions of this Court and on a discussion of the expression
“remission”, it becomes clear that the said expression is used in
two nuances: firstly, when the remission of sentence would mean
a reduction in the sentence imposed on a convict without wiping
out of the conviction which does not amount to an acquittal. On
the other hand, remissions are also granted during the course of
undergoing a sentence on the basis of the certain legal
considerations. The same can be discussed in detail.
14.1 The principles covering grant of remission as distinguished
from concepts such as “commutation”, “pardon”, and “reprieve”
can be brought out with reference to a judgment of this Court
in State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 (“Prem
Raj”). Articles 72 and 161 deal with clemency powers of the
President of India and the Governor of a State respectively, and
also include the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or
remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the
sentences in certain cases. The power under Article 72, inter alia,
extends to all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an
offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive
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power of the Union extends and in all cases where the sentence is
a sentence of death. Article 161 states that the Governor of a State
shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or
remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the
sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law
relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State
extends. It was observed in the said judgment that the powers
under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India are absolute
and cannot be fettered by any statutory provision, such as,
Sections 432, 433 or 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter, “CrPC”) or by any prison rules.
14.1.1 It was further observed in Prem Raj that a pardon is an
act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It affects both the punishment prescribed for the
offence and the guilt of the offender. But pardon has to be
distinguished from “amnesty” which is defined as a “general
pardon of political prisoners; an act of oblivion”. An amnesty would
result in the release of the convict but does not affect
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disqualification incurred, if any. “Reprieve” means a stay of
execution of a sentence, a postponement of a capital sentence.
“Respite” means awarding a lesser sentence instead of the penalty
prescribed in view of the fact that the accused has had no previous
conviction. It is tantamount to a release on probation for good
conduct under Section 360 of the CrPC. On the other hand,
remission is reduction of a sentence without changing its
character. In the case of a remission, neither the guilt of the
offender is affected nor is the sentence of the court, except in the
sense that the person concerned does not suffer incarceration for
the entire period of the sentence, but is relieved from serving out
a part of it. Commutation is change of a sentence to a lighter
sentence of a different kind. Section 432 of the CrPC empowers the
appropriate Government to suspend or remit sentences.
14.2 Further, a remission of sentence does not mean acquittal
and an aggrieved party still has every right to vindicate himself or
herself. In this context, reliance could be placed on Sarat
Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334,
wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court, while distinguishing
between a pardon and a remission, observed that an order of
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remission does not wipe out the offence and it also does not wipe
out the conviction. All that it does is to have an effect on the
execution of the sentence; though ordinarily a convicted person
would have to serve out the full sentence imposed by a court, he
need not do so with respect to that part of the sentence which has
been ordered to be remitted. An order of remission, thus, does not
in any way interfere with the order of the court; it affects only the
execution of the sentence passed by the court and frees the
convicted person from his liability to undergo the full term of
imprisonment inflicted by the court even though the order of
conviction and sentence passed by the court still stands as it is.
The power to grant remission is an executive power and cannot
have the effect which the order of an appellate or revisional court
would have of reducing the sentence passed by the trial court and
substituting in its place the reduced sentence adjudged by the
appellate or revisional court. According to Weater’s Constitutional
Law, to cut short a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise
of executive power which abridges the enforcement of the
judgment but does not alter it qua the judgment.
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14.3 Reliance could be placed on State of
Haryana vs. Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606, to observe
that a right to be considered for remission, keeping in view the
constitutional safeguards of a convict under Articles 20 and 21 of
the Constitution of India, must be held to be a legal one. Such a
legal right emanates from not only the Prisons Act, 1894 but also
from the Rules framed thereunder. Although no convict can be
said to have any constitutional right for obtaining remission in his
sentence (except under Articles 72 and 161), the policy decision
itself must be held to have conferred a right to be considered
therefor. Whether by reason of a statutory rule or otherwise, if a
policy decision has been laid down, the persons who come within
the purview thereof are entitled to be treated equally – vide State
of Mysore vs. H. Srinivasmurthy, (1976) 1 SCC 817.
14.4 Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 can be
pressed into service to hold that the length of the sentence or the
gravity of the original crime cannot be the sole basis for refusing
premature release. Any assessment regarding a predilection to
commit crime upon release must be based on antecedents as well
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as conduct of the prisoner while in jail, and not merely on his age
or apprehensions of the victims and witnesses. It was observed
that although a convict cannot claim remission as a matter of
right, once a law has been made by the appropriate legislature, it
is not open for the executive authorities to surreptitiously subvert
its mandate. It was further observed that where the authorities are
found to have failed to discharge their statutory obligations despite
judicial directions, it would then not be inappropriate for a
Constitutional Court while exercising its powers of judicial review
to assume such task onto itself and direct compliance through a
writ of mandamus. Considering that the petitioners therein had
served nearly two decades of incarceration and had thus suffered
the consequences of their actions, a balance between individual
and societal welfare was struck by granting the petitioners therein
conditional premature release, subject to their continuing good
conduct. In the said case, a direction was issued to the State
Government to release the prisoners therein on probation in terms
of Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938
within a period of two weeks. Liberty was reserved to the
respondent State with the overriding condition that the said
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direction could be reversed or recalled in favour of any party or as
per the petitioner therein.
14.5 The following judgments of this Court are apposite to the
concept of remission:
14.5.1 In Maru Ram, a Constitution Bench considered the
validity of Section 433-A of the CrPC. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for
the Bench, observed: (SCC p. 129, para 25)
“25. … Ordinarily, where a sentence is for a definite term,
the calculus of remissions may benefit the prisoner to
instant release at the point where the subtraction results
in zero.”14.5.2 However, when it comes to life imprisonment, where the
sentence is indeterminate and of an uncertain duration, the result
of subtraction from an uncertain quantity is still an uncertain
quantity and release of the prisoner cannot follow except on some
fiction of quantification of a sentence of uncertain duration.
14.5.3 Referring to Gopal Vinayak Godse, it was observed
that the said judgment is an authority for the proposition that a
sentence of imprisonment for life is one of “imprisonment for the
whole of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural
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life”, unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by anappropriate authority under the relevant provisions of law. In the
aforesaid case, a distinction was drawn between remission in
sentence and life sentence. Remission, limited in time, helps
computation but does not ipso jure operate as release of the
prisoner. But, when the sentence awarded by the Judge is for a
fixed term, the effect of remissions may be to scale down the term
to be endured and reduce it to nil, while leaving the factum and
quantum of sentence intact. However, when the sentence is a life
sentence, remissions, quantified in time, cannot reach a point of
zero. Since Section 433-A deals only with life sentences,
remissions cannot entitle a prisoner to release. It was further
observed that remission, in the case of life imprisonment, ripens
into a reduction of sentence of the entire balance only when a final
release order is made. If this is not done, the prisoner will continue
to be in custody. The reason is that life sentence is nothing less
than lifelong imprisonment and remission vests no right to release
when the sentence is of life imprisonment nor is any vested right
to remission cancelled by compulsory fourteen years jail life as a
life sentence is a sentence for whole life.
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14.5.4 Interpreting Section 433-A, it was observed that it wasa savings clause in which there are three components. Firstly,
CrPC generally governs matters covered by it. Secondly, if a special
or local law exists covering the same area, the latter law will be
saved and will prevail, such as short sentencing measures and
remission schemes promulgated by various States. The third
component is that if there is a specific provision to the contrary,
then it would override the special or local law. It was held that
Section 433-A of the CrPC picks out of a mass of imprisonment
cases, a specific class of life imprisonment cases and subjects it
explicitly to a particularised treatment. Therefore, Section 433-A
of the CrPC applies in preference to any special or local law. This
is because, Section 5 of the CrPC expressly declares that specific
provision, if any, to the contrary will prevail over any special or
local law. Therefore, Section 433-A of the CrPC would prevail and
escape exclusion of Section 5 thereof. The Constitution Bench
concluded that Section 433-A of the CrPC is supreme over the
remission rules and short-sentencing statutes made by various
States. Section 433-A of the CrPC does not permit parole or other
related release within a span of fourteen years.
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14.5.5 It was further observed that criminology must includevictimology as a major component of its concerns. When a murder
or other grievous offence is committed, the victims or other
aggrieved persons must receive reparation and social
responsibility of the criminal to restore the loss or heal the injury
is part of the punitive exercise although the length of the prison
term is no reparation to the crippled or bereaved.
14.5.6 Fazal Ali, J. in his concurring judgment in Maru Ram
observed that crime is rightly described as an act of warfare
against the community touching new depths of lawlessness.
According to him, the object of imposing a deterrent sentence is
threefold. While holding that a deterrent form of punishment may
not be the most suitable or ideal form of punishment, yet, the fact
remains that a deterrent punishment prevents occurrence of
offence. He further observed that Section 433-A of the CrPC is
actually a piece of social legislation which by one stroke seeks to
prevent dangerous criminals from repeating offences and on the
other hand, protects the society from harm and distress caused to
innocent persons. Therefore, he opined that where Section 433-A
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applies, no question of reduction of sentence arises at all unless
the President of India or the Governor of a State choose to exercise
their wide powers under Article 72 or Article 161 of the
Constitution respectively, which also have to be exercised
according to sound legal principles as any reduction or
modification in the deterrent punishment would, far from
reforming the criminal, be counterproductive.
14.6 State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh, (2000) 3 SCC
394 is a case which arose under Section 432 of the CrPC on
remission of sentence in which the difference between the terms
“bail”, “furlough” and “parole” having different connotations were
discussed. It was observed that furloughs are variously known as
temporary leaves, home visits or temporary community release
and are usually granted when a convict is suddenly faced with a
severe family crisis such as death or grave illness in the immediate
family and often the convict/inmate is accompanied by an officer
as part of the terms of temporary release of special leave. Parole is
the release of a prisoner temporarily for a special purpose or
completely before the expiry of the sentence, on promise of good
behaviour. Conditional release from imprisonment is to entitle a
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convict to serve remainder of his term outside the confines of an
institution on his satisfactorily complying all terms and conditions
provided in the parole order.
14.7 In Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347,
it was observed that parole is a provisional release from
confinement but it is deemed to be part of imprisonment. Release
on parole is a wing of reformative process and is expected to
provide opportunity to the prisoner to transform himself into a
useful citizen. Parole is thus, a grant of partial liberty or lessening
of restrictions on a convict prisoner but release on parole does not
change the status of the prisoner. When a prisoner is undergoing
sentence and confined in jail or is on parole or furlough, his
position is not similar to a convict who is on bail. This is because
a convict on bail is not entitled to the benefit of the remission
system. In other words, a prisoner is not eligible for remission of
sentence during the period he is on bail or when his sentence is
temporarily suspended. Therefore, such a prisoner who is on bail
is not entitled to get remission earned during the period he is on
bail.
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15. The sentence imposed on the appellant herein, inter alia, is
recapitulated as under:
“Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission, and fine
of Rs.10,000/-.”The word “which” used after the words “life imprisonment”,
is an interrogative pronoun, related pronoun and determiner,
referring to something previously mentioned when introducing a
clause giving further information. Therefore, the sentence of life
imprisonment is determined as twenty years which is of actual
imprisonment. Further, during the period of twenty years, the
appellant cannot seek remission during his sentence of twenty
years of imprisonment i.e., after completion of fourteen years as
per Section 433A of the CrPC but must continue his sentence for
a period of twenty years without any remission whatsoever.
Therefore, the appellant has no right to make any application for
remission of the above sentence for a period of twenty years.
15.1 In Criminal Appeal Nos.1531-1533 of 2015 filed by Vikas
Yadav as well as in Criminal Appeal Nos.1528-1530 of 2015 which
also included the appeal filed by the appellant herein, the
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imposition of a fixed term sentence on the appellants by the HighCourt was also questioned but this Court observed that such a
term of sentence on the appellants by the High Court could not be
found fault with. Placing reliance on Gopal Singh vs. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545, at paragraph 84 of its judgment
in the aforesaid criminal appeal, this Court observed that “Judged
on the aforesaid parameters, we reiterate that the imposition of fixed
terms sentence is justified.”
15.2 In the instant case, as already noted, the life imprisonment
being twenty years of actual imprisonment was without
consideration of remission. Soon after the period of twenty years
is completed, in our view, the appellant has to be simply released
from jail provided the other sentences run concurrently. The
appellant is not under an obligation to make an application
seeking remission of his sentence on completion of twenty years.
This is simply for the reason that the appellant has completed his
twenty years of actual imprisonment and in fact, during the period
of twenty years, the appellant was not entitled to any remission.
Thus, in the instant case, on completion of the twenty years’ of
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actual imprisonment, it is wholly unnecessary for the appellant to
seek remission of his sentence on the premise that his sentence is
a life imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural life. On the other
hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State
and respondent-complainant contended that once the period of
twenty years is over, which was without any consideration of
remission, the appellant had to seek remission of his sentence (life
imprisonment) by making an application to the Sentence Review
Board which would consider in accordance with the applicable
policy and decide whether the remission of sentence imposed on
the appellant has to be granted or not. Such a contention cannot
be accepted for the following reasons:
(i) firstly, because, in the instant case, the sentence of
life imprisonment has been fixed to be twenty years
of actual imprisonment which the appellant herein
has completed;
(ii) secondly, during the period of twenty years the
appellant was not entitled to seek any remission;
and
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(iii) thirdly, on completion of twenty years of actual
imprisonment, the appellant is entitled to be
released.
15.3 This is because in this case, instead of granting death
penalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonment has been awarded
which shall be for a period of twenty years of actual imprisonment.
That even in the absence of death penalty being imposed, life
imprisonment of a fixed term of twenty years was imposed which
is possible only for a High Court or this Court to do so. The period
of twenty years is without remission inasmuch as the appellant is
denied the right of remission of his sentence on completion of
fourteen years as per Section 432 read with Section 433-A of the
CrPC. Such a right has been denied by the High Court but that
does not mean that on completion of twenty years of imprisonment
the appellant has to still seek reduction of his sentence on the
premise that he was awarded life imprisonment which is till the
end of his natural life. If that was so, the High Court would have
specified it in those terms. On the other hand, the High Court has
imposed life imprisonment which shall be twenty years of actual
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imprisonment without consideration of remission. The High Court
was of the view that for a period of twenty years, the appellant has
to undergo actual imprisonment which would not take within its
meaning any period granted for parole or furlough.
15.4 In the instant case, the actual imprisonment of twenty
years was admittedly completed by the appellant on 09.03.2025
which was without any remission. If that is so, it would imply that
the appellant has completed his period of sentence. In fact, the
award of the aforesaid sentence was also confirmed by this Court.
On completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment on
09.03.2025, the appellant was entitled to be released. The release
of the appellant from jail does not depend upon further
consideration as to whether he has to be released or not and as to
whether remission has to be granted to him or not by the Sentence
Review Board. In fact, the Sentence Review Board cannot sit in
judgment over what has been judicially determined as the
sentence by the High Court which has been affirmed by this Court.
There cannot be any further incarceration of the appellant herein
from 09.03.2025 onwards. On the other hand, in the instant case,
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the appellant’s prayer for furlough was refused by the High Court
and, thereafter, this Court granted furlough only on 25.06.2025 as
he had completed his actual sentence by then, pending
consideration of the amended prayer made by the appellant herein
on completion of his sentence on 09.03.2025. Therefore, the
continuous incarceration of the appellant from 09.03.2025
onwards was illegal. In fact, on 10.03.2025, the appellant ought to
have been released from prison as he had completed the sentence
imposed on him by the High Court as affirmed by this Court.
15.5 In Bhola Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 837, this Court lamented the unfortunate fate of
prisoners languishing behind bars even long after completing their
period of sentence noted as follows:
“23. …When such a convict is detained beyond the actual
release date it would be imprisonment or detention sans
sanction of law and would thus, violate not only Article
19(d) but also Article 21 of the Constitution of India. …”15.6 Although, presently the appellant is not in custody but on
furlough for three months pursuant to the interim order dated
25.06.2025 passed by this Court, he need not surrender after
expiry of the period of furlough as he has completed his jail
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sentence of twenty years on 09.03.2025, if not wanted in any othercase.
15.7 Consequently, we hold that in all cases where an
accused/convict has completed his period of jail term, he shall be
entitled to be released forthwith and not continued in
imprisonment if not wanted in any other case. We say so in light
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which states that no
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.
16. A copy of this order shall be circulated by the Registry of this
Court to all the Home Secretaries of the States/Union Territories
to ascertain whether any accused/convict has remained in jail
beyond the period of sentence and if so, to issue directions for
release of such accused/convicts, if not wanted in any other case.
Similarly, a copy of this order shall also be sent by the
Registry of this Court to the Member Secretary, National Legal
Services Authority for onward transmission to all Member
Secretaries of the States/Union Territories Legal Services
Authorities for communication to all the Member Secretaries of the
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District Legal Services Authorities in the States for the purpose of
implementation of this judgment.
This appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………, J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………, J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 29, 2025.
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