Sumant Kumar vs The Union Of India Through National … on 23 April, 2025

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Jharkhand High Court

Sumant Kumar vs The Union Of India Through National … on 23 April, 2025

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Gautam Kumar Choudhary

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

           Cr. Appeal (DB) No.597 of 2024
                      ------
    Sumant Kumar, aged about 38 years S/o Sri Bharat
    Ram Gope, R/o House No. 319, Village-Birsa Nagar,
    Pugu, P.O. Armai, P.S.-Gumla, District- Gumla,
    Jharkhand.            .... ....      Appellant
                             Versus

    The Union of India through National Investigating
    Agency, represented by the Superintendent of Police,
    National Investigating Agency, having its office at N.I.A.
    Camp office, Quarter No. E-305, Sector-II, HEC Colony
    P.O.&P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand 834004.
                            .... ....       Respondent
                            ----
 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY
                            ------

   For the Appellant    :Mr. A.K. Kashyap, Sr. Adv.
                        :Mr. Sanjeet Nayak, Advocate
   For the NIA          :Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
                        : Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
                           ------

C.A.V. on 27.03.2025        Pronounced on 23/04/2025

    Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant appeal, preferred under Section 21(4) of the

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, is directed

against the order dated 18.03.2024 passed by the learned

A.J.C.-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA Ranchi, in Misc. Cr.

Application No. 3706 of 2023 (Special (NIA) Case No.02 of

2018) corresponding to R.C. No.02/2018/NIA/DLI, arising

out of Bero P.S. Case No.67 of 2016 registered for the

offence under Sections 212, 213, 414/34 of the I.P.C.,

Section 17(ii) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1908

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and Sections 13, 17 & 40 of the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for

regular bail of the appellant has been rejected.

Prosecution Case and Factual Matrix

2. The brief facts of the prosecution case leading to this

Criminal Appeal is that on 10.11.2016, on receiving secret

information, the informant namely Mr. Bindeshwari Das,

Officer In-charge of Bero P.S. registered an information

received regarding the associates of Supremo of PLFI

depositing ill-gotten money of crime proceed realized as

extortion of levy at SBI, Bero, Ranchi. After having

informed his superior authorities and having received

their directives, he proceeded for its verification along with

other police officials and reserve guards.

3. At about 03.15 PM, he reached along with his team at

SBI, Bero, Ranchi, and after surrounding the same waited

in ambush. In the meantime, after having seen the police

party, 3-4 persons making hue and cry attempted to flee

away with bag having articles carrying in their hand, and

one of the persons was apprehended from campus of the

Bank and three persons were apprehended while boarding

Safari Vehicle No. JH01Y 2898. On asking, the persons

apprehended disclosed their name as Binod Kumar,

Chandra Shekhar Kumar, Nand Kishore Mahto and

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Mohan Kumar.

4. The Informant conducted search of these persons in

presence of independent witnesses and alleged

levy/extorted amount of Rs.25,38,000/- was recovered.

The accused persons were unable to show any document

and one of the co-accused confessed before the Informant

that the PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope had instructed him

on mobile phone after the Central Government Policy of

demonetization to deposit the amount. It was further

confessed by a co-accused that levied, extorted money,

was given by PLFI extremist organization for getting it

converted white money by depositing in the name of the

said petrol pump. Accordingly, all the said articles were

seized in presence of independent witnesses and seizure

list was prepared.

5. It is alleged that these accused persons were involved in

the extortion of levied amount and such ill-gotten money

was being converted by hardcore outlawed PLFI extremist

people which is dangerous to the national interest and

helpful for the extremist organization.

6. Accordingly, a case was registered on the basis of written

report made by Sub-Inspector of Bero P.S Mr. Bindeshwari

Das, as Bero P.S. Case No.67 of 2016 under Sections 212,

213, 414/34 of the I.P.C., Section 17(ii) of the Criminal

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Law (Amendment) Act, 1908 and Sections 13, 17 & 40 of

the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act against accused

persons.

7. Later on, considering the gravity of the offence, Ministry

of Home Affairs, Government of India vide order dated

16.01.2018 directed National Investigation Agency (NIA),

to take over the investigation of the Bero P.S. Case No.67

of 2016.

8. In compliance to the directions of the Ministry of Home

Affairs, Government of India, (Order

No.F.No.11011/51/2017/IS-IV dated 16.01.2018), re-

registered the aforesaid case as NIA Case no. RC-

02/2018/NIA/DLI dated 19.01.2018 under Sections

212,213,414 and 34 of IPC of the Indian Penal Code

(I.P.C.), Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under

Sections 13,17 and 40 of the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act 1967 (UA(P) Act 1967) against the

accused persons.

9. After obtaining the administrative approval of the

competent authority the case docket and case exhibits

were transferred to the NIA by the Investigating agency

and accordingly investigation was taken up by the NIA.

10. During the course of further investigation it surfaced

that the absconding accused Dinesh Gope (A-6), supremo

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of PLFI, continued to channelize levy amount into

legitimate means by depositing/transferring into the bank

accounts of his wives(A-13), and A-14 and associates by

using several Pragya Kendra operative through various

banking channels and also in the bank accounts of

Companies opened in the name of his wives i.e namely

Shakuntala (A-13) and Hira (A-14) and Sumant Kumar (A-

7) [the appellant herein]) and Fuleshwar Gope.

11. The present appellant was arrested on 26.04.2019.

Accordingly, 1st supplementary charge-sheet was

submitted against the other accused persons including

the present appellant and he was arrayed as an Accused

no.07.

12. Consequently, the above-named appellant had

preferred the regular bail application vide Misc. Cr.

Application No. 586/2019 and the same was dismissed

vide order dated 03.07.2019, thereafter, the present

appellant had preferred an appeal being Criminal appeal

DB no. 1026/2019 before this Court, which was rejected

on 01.03.2021. Consequently, the present Appellant

preferred special Leave petition before the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court, vide SLP no.5340/21 and the same was

also dismissed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.

13. The present appellant had again preferred an

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application being Misc. Cr. Application No. 3706 of 2023

before the NIA Special Court, Ranchi for grant of regular

bail but the same has been rejected vide order dated

18.03.2024, against which, the present appeal has been

filed.

Submission advanced on behalf of the learned counsel
for the Appellant:

14. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the

impugned order on the following grounds: –

(i) The appellant has falsely been implicated in the

instant case without any valid evidence of his

involvement in the alleged crime attracting the

ingredients of Section 17 of the U.A.(P) Act and

hence, the other penal provision as contained under

U.A.(P) Act is not made out.

(ii). Submission has been made that there is no

direct evidence against him in spite of that the

appellant has been made accused in the present

case. Further, except prosecution witness 101 (X-3)

and 124(X-4) none of the protected witnesses of first

supplementary chargesheet has deposed against the

petitioner to establish his proximity towards Dinesh

Gope and member of PLFI.

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(iii) As far as M/s Bhavya Engicon Pvt and M/s Shiv

Aadi Shakti Minerals Pvt Ltd is concerned both are

submitting their income tax return regularly. There

is no material on record to suggest that Bhavya

Engicon has indulged in any terrorist act as defined

under UA(P) Act. Further, Shiv Aadi Shakti

Company Ltd was declared an inactive company in

2015 by the registrar of the company, Jharkhand

but Shiv Aadi Shakti has been contesting such

declaration before the learned National company

Law Tribunal and the matter is sub-judice.

(iv).Further, till date no money trail has been

established by the NIA to connect the business

activities of companies with the appellant and any

terrorist act. There is no material on record to

suggest that fund allegedly provided by the appellant

to Shakuntala Devi(A-13) for her upkeep were

derived from terrorist act of Dinesh Gope and it was

proceeds of terrorism.

(V). The prosecution has assumed the case to be a

case of extortion without any vital piece of evidence

or completing the chain of events, so far as the

present appellant is concerned, and the alleged

extortion has later on been converted to terror

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funding. Therefore, no offence under section U.A. (P)

Act and Section 17 of the CLA Act is made out

against the appellant. Further, offence under Indian

Penal Code is also not made out against the

appellant because appellant has not forged a single

document and nothing has been recovered from

conscious possession of the appellant.

(vi). The allegation against the appellant is that he

was involved in channelizing the extorted amount

into legitimate means by depositing the same in

individual bank accounts and companies owned by

him.

(vii) Taking the ground of long incarceration,

submission has been made that the appellant is

languishing in judicial custody since 26.04.2019 i.e.,

about six years and further there is no likelihood of

the trial to be concluded in near future, therefore, as

per the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex

Court in the case of Union of India Vrs. K.A.

Najeeb, reported in [(2021) 3 SCC 713], the present

appeal may be allowed.

(vii) The ground of parity has also been taken and it

is submitted that the other co-accused person,

namely, Jitendra Kumar and Binod Kumar and

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three others have been directed to be released on

bail by the co-ordinate bench of this Court vide

order dated 08.05.2023 and 03.10.2023 passed in

Cr. Appeal (DB) No.514 of 2020 and Cr. Appeal (DB)

No.201 of 2020 respectively and the case of the

appellant stands on better footing.

(viii) It has further been submitted that the co-

accused persons namely, Jai Prakash Singh

Bhuiyan, Chandrashekar Singh, Arun Gope, and

Amit Kumar Jaiswal, have also been directed to be

released on bail by the co-ordinate bench of this

Court vide order dated 05.01.2024, 19.02.2025,

05.03.2025 and 05.03.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal

(DB) No. 14 of 2021, Cr. Appeal (DB) No.520 of

2020, Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 68 of 2024 and Cr. Appeal

(DB) No.1778 of 2023 respectively, therefore the

instant appeal may be allowed and the present

appellant may also enlarged on bail.

(ix) Further, the another co-accused namely Navin

Bhai Jayanti Bhai Patel has also been enlarged on

bail by the Hon‟ble Apex Court Vide order dated

03.02.2025 passed in SLP(Crl) 16179 of 2025, as

such it is fit case wherein bail may be granted to the

present appellant by allowing the present appeal.

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15. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the aforesaid

premise, has submitted that the learned court ought to

have considered that aspect of the matter, while

considering the prayer for regular bail, but having not

been considered, therefore, the impugned orders need to

be interfered with.

16. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for

the respondent-NIA has taken the following grounds by

defending the impugned order: –

(i).Submission has been made that during the

course of investigation, it has surfaced that the

absconding accused, Dinesh Gope (A-6), supremo of

PLFI, continued to channelize the levy amount into

legitimate means by depositing/transferring into the

bank accounts of his wife, namely, Shakuntala Devi

and Hira Devi and others, by using several pragya

Kendra through various banking channels and also

in the bank accounts of the companies opened in

the connivance of the present appellant.

Furthermore, the extorted money collected in the

form of levy was invested in the company wherein

present appellant is a co-director.

(ii). It has been submitted that so far trial is

concerned, the prosecution witnesses have already

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been closed and trial in this case on verge of

completion, therefore, if the appellant is released on

bail at this stage, there is every likelihood of hamper

in trial.

(iii). Further submission has been made that bail of

other co-accused persons, who were also involved in

channelizing the extorted money, have been rejected

by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. Appeal

(DB) No. 59 of 2021 [Hira Devi, first wife of accused

Dinesh Gope].

(iv).Further vide order dated 21.03.2024 the Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court had denied the

privilege of bail to another-co-accused, namely,

Fuleshwar Gope in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 767 of 2022

and the said order has been affirmed vide order

dated 03.02.2025 passed by the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)

No(s).7703/2024 by which prayer for bail of the said

appellant has been rejected.

(V). Submission has been made that the Hon‟ble

Apex Court recently in the case of Gurwinder Singh

Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [2024 SCC OnLine SC

109] has held that for the offence under U.A. (P) Act,

„bail will be an exception and jail will be the rule‟ and

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mere the ground of period of custody is not the

ground for bail, therefore, the case laws cited by the

appellant in this regard is of no aid to the appellant.

17. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent-NIA

based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that since

the nature of allegation levelled against the appellant is

very grave and, therefore, the present appeal is also fit to

be dismissed.

18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and

considered the finding recorded by learned Court in the

impugned order as also the charge-sheet.

19. At the outset before proceeding to examine as to

whether the appellant has been able to make out a prima

facie case for enlarging him on bail, it needs to refer

herein that before filing the instant appeal, the present

appellant had preferred the regular bail application vide

Misc. Cr. Application No. 586/2019 before the special

Judge which was dismissed vide order dated 03.07.2019,

thereafter, the present appellant had preferred an appeal

being Criminal appeal DB no. 1026/2019 before co-

ordinate Bench of this Court, which was also rejected on

01.03.2021. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs

of the order dated 01.03.2021 are being quoted as under:

5. Learned counsel for the NIA on the other hand has
opposed the prayer and has drawn our attention towards

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the statements of the two protected witnesses, who have
stated that the appellant was also directly involved in
collecting the levy for PLFI supremo Dinesh Gope.

Learned counsel has also drawn our attention that
during investigation, it was found that the second wife of
the PLFI supremo Dinesh Gope was the co-Director along
with appellant in the shell companies, through which, the
illegal transactions were being made. The statement of
the second wife of PLFI Supremo was also recorded and
from her statement, it appears that the appellant was the
sister‟s son of Dinesh Gope and he was actively involved
in the illegal activities with Dinesh Gope. Even the car of
the second wife of Dinesh Gope has been recovered from
the premises of the appellant. It has also been pointed
out that the appellant had made arrangements of stay of
two wives of the Dinesh Gope. In that view of the matter,
at this stage, it cannot be said that the accusation
against the appellant is prima facie not true.

6. Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act provides a clear bar for granting bail, in cases where
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against the accused is prima facie true. In the
facts of this case, we find that there are ample materials
collected by the NIA to show that the accusations against
the appellant are prima facie true and accordingly, no
case is made out for granting bail to the appellant in view
of the express bar in Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act.

7. Accordingly, we find no illegality in the impugned
order dated 03.07.2019 passed by the NIA Court in Misc.
Cr. Application No.586 of 2019, rejecting the bail of the
appellant”

20. It is evident from the aforesaid order that the co-ordinate

Bench of this Court while hearing the said appeal had

taken in to consideration that the appellant was co-director

along with the second wife of the PLFI supremo Dinesh

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Gope in the shell companies, through which, the illegal

transactions were being made. The Court had also taken in

to consideration the statement of the second wife of PLFI

Supremo wherein it has been stated that the appellant was

the sister‟s son of Dinesh Gope and he was actively

involved in the illegal activities with Dinesh Gope.

21. Accordingly, the co-ordinate bench while taking in to

consideration the import of the Section 43(D)5 of the Act

1967 and further taking in to consideration the specific

culpability of the present appellant had rejected prayer for

bail.

22. Consequently, the present appellant against the order

dated 01.03.2021 had preferred a special Leave petition

being SLP no.5340/21 before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.

The said application has also been dismissed on

05.08.2021 by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.

23. Thus, from the aforesaid factual aspect it is evident

that earlier the prayer for bail of the appellant has already

been adjudicated on merit by the co-ordinate Bench of this

Court as well as by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.

24. Further, it needs to refer herein that the present

appellant had again preferred an application being Misc.

Cr. Application No. 3041 of 2023 before the NIA Special

Court, Ranchi for grant of regular bail but the same has

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been rejected vide order dated 15.12.2023, against which,

the present appeal has been filed.

25. From perusal of the order dated 15.12.2023, it is

evident that the learned special Judge while taking note of

the fact that the present appellant received huge amount of

money obtained by Dinesh Gope through levy, to which he

invested in the name of shell companies, in which wives of

Dinesh Gope, his brother-in-law were the Directors and

petitioner himself was working as active Director, has

rejected the appellant‟s prayer for bail.

26. It is evident from aforesaid that although earlier the

prayer for bail of the appellant on merit has already been

adjudicated by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court but

herein since the appellate jurisdiction of this Court which

has been stipulated under Section 21(4) of National

Investigation Agency Act 2008 (herein referred as Act 2008)

has been invoked by the appellant, as such this Court is

bound to see the propriety of the impugned order dated

15.12.2023 by which the prayer for bail of the present

appellant has been rejected by the special Judge.

27. At this juncture this Court deems it fit and proper to

discuss some settled proposition of law and the relevant

provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

(hereinafter referred to as Act, 1967).

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28. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers

available for dealing with activities directed against the

integrity and sovereignty of India. As per Preamble, Act

1967 has been enacted to provide for the more effective

prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and

associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for

matters connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object

of enactment of UAPA is also to provide for more effective

prevention of certain unlawful activities.

29. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective

prevention of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in

its wisdom has provided that where an association is

declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3,

a person, who is and continues to be a member of such

association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a

term which may extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable

to fine.

30. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines

“terrorist organization”. It is defined as an organization

listed in the First Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the

1967 Act incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the

title “punishment for terrorist act”. Clause (k) of Section 2

provides that “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to it

under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act

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which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as

defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second

Schedule.

31. As per mandate of section 13 of the Act 1967 who

takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or

incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be

punishable with imprisonment for a term which may

extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

32. As per the provision of Section 15, whoever has acted

with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity,

integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of

India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror

in the people or any section of the people in India or in any

foreign country would be covered under the definition of

“terrorist act”. This provision, therefore, stipulates that any

activity with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike

terror will come under the fold of terrorist act if done to

threaten the unity, integrity, security, sovereignty of India

or economic security, which has been inserted by way of

Act 3 of 2013 with effect from 01.02.2013.

33. Further, Section 17 provides punishment for raising

funds for terrorist act which reads as under:

“17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist
act.–Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or
indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds,

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whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any
person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or
collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that
such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such
person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a
terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a
terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were
actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.–For the purpose of this section,–

(a) participating, organising or directing in any of the acts
stated therein shall constitute an offence;

(b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or
providing funds through production or smuggling or
circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency;
and

(c) raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner
for the benefit of, or, to an individual terrorist, terrorist
gang or terrorist organisation for the purpose not
specifically covered under section 15 shall also be
construed as an offence.

34. It is evident from the contents of Section 17 of the Act,

1967 that whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly

or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds,

whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any

person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or

collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that

such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such

person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a

terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a

terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were

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actually used or not for commission of such act, the same

would be covered under the aforesaid provision. Meaning

thereby, raising of funds directly or indirectly to commit a

terrorist act by a terrorist organization or by terrorist gang

or by an individual terrorist, irrespective of the fact

whether this was actually used for commission of such act,

would be punishable under Section 17

35. Sub-section (c) of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 enlarges

the scope of the terrorist act since the same provides that

any act for the benefit of an individual terrorist, terrorist

gang or terrorist organisation even if not specifically

covered under Section 15 shall also be construed as an

offence.

36. At this juncture it will be purposeful to discuss the

core of Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates

that the person shall not be released on bail if the court is

of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accusations made are prima facie true

apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of

committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the

UA(P) Act, 1967.

37. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of

the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail

fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the

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case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad

Shah Watali, [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it

has been held by interpreting the expression “prima facie

true” as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967

which would mean that the materials/evidence collated by

the investigation agency in reference to the accusation

against the accused concerned in the First Information

Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or

disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows

the complicity of such accused in the commission of the

stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be

good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or

the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless

rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is

lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is

“prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the

accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the

other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph

23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted

herein which reads hereunder as :-

“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the
duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against the
accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention
was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had
an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in
TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those

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decisions may have some bearing while considering the
prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967
Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such
as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required
to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged
offence. There is a degree of difference between the
satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not
guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded
for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable
11 grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the
expression “prima facie true” would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in
reference to the accusation against the accused concerned
in the first information report, must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other
evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of
such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It
must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a
given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated
offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the
degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to
opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as
compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of
such offence as required under the other special
enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be
recorded by the Court for opining that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the
degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a
discharge application or framing of charges in relation to
offences under the 1967 Act….”

38. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National

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Investigation Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah

Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court

to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on

record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a

prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.

39. Further It is settled proposition of law that at the

stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is

merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad

probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in

the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and

the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence

is not required to be done at this stage.

40. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court by setting out

propounding the law in the same case of National

Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali

(supra), has observed that the elaborate examination or

dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at

this stage and the Court is merely expected to record a

finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the

involvement of the accused in the commission of the

stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference

paragraph 24 and 25 of the aforesaid judgment is being

quoted herein under:-

“24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court
at this stage–of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of

22
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

bail–is markedly different from discussing merits or
demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or
dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at
this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a
finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the
involvement of the accused in the commission of the
stated offence or otherwise.

25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it
appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an
area of examining the merits and demerits of the
evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of
statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not
admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service
by the investigating agency were not admissible in
evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the
document had been recovered from the residence of
Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the
impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High
Court in completely discarding the statements of the
protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on
the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed
cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court
and also because reference to such statements having
been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already
filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete
disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that
the accusation made against the accused concerned
is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be
reached by the Court not only in reference to the
accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents
of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report
under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered by
the investigating agency during investigation.”

41. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be

undertaken by the court at this stage of granting bail of

giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail that is

23
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of

the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of

the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.

Rather, the Court is merely expected to record a finding

on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the

involvement of the accused in the commission of the

stated offence or otherwise.

42. Further it is the duty of the Court to record its

opinion that the accusation made against the accused

concerned is prima facie true or otherwise and such

opinion must be reached by the Court not only in

reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in

reference to the contents of the case diary and including

the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC) and

other material gathered by the investigating agency

during investigation. Reference in this regard may be

taken from the Judgment as rendered by the Hon‟ble

Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing

Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2005) 5

SCC 294. For ready reference, the following paragraph of

the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted herein under:-

“46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to
weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a
finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However,
while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having

24
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of
Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the
matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that
the materials collected against the accused during the
investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The
findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing
bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may
not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial
court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis
of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner
being prejudiced thereby.”

43. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in a very recent

judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of

Punjab and Another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC

109 while taking into consideration of the judgment as

rendered in the National Investigation Agency v.

Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Union of

India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) has observed that, the

proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a

complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to

release an accused on bail and lays down that if the

Court, „on perusal of the case diary or the report made

under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure‟, is

of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accusation, against such person, as

regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter

IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true,

25
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

such accused person shall not be released on bail or on

his own bond.

44. The Hon‟ble Apex Court further observed that the

conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis

ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts

must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase – „bail is the

rule, jail is the exception‟ – unless circumstances justify

otherwise – does not find any place while dealing with

bail applications under UAP Act and the „exercise‟ of the

general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is

severely restrictive in scope.

45. In the aforesaid context, it has further been

observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the courts

are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand

and in dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the

courts are merely examining if there is justification to

reject bail and the „justifications‟ must be searched from

the case diary and the final report submitted before the

Special Court.

46. In the aforesaid background the Hon‟ble Apex

Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite

plain and Bail must be rejected as a „rule‟, if after

hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the

final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a

26
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It

has further been observed that it is only if the test for

rejection of bail is not satisfied – that the Courts would

proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with

the „tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing witnesses,

tampering with evidence).

47. For ready reference, following paragraphs of the

aforesaid Judgment are being quoted herein under:

“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D
shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a
Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without
affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being
heard on the application seeking release of an accused
on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts
a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to
release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court,
„on perusal of the case diary or the report made under
Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure‟, is of the
opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation, against such person, as regards
commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV
and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true,
such accused person shall not be released on bail or on
his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no
analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the
one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense,
the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains
unique to the UAP Act.

28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must
tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase – „bail is the rule, jail

27
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

is the exception‟ – unless circumstances justify otherwise

– does not find any place while dealing with bail
applications under UAP Act. The „exercise‟ of the general
power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely
restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso
to Section 43D (5)– „shall not be released‟ in contrast with
the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC –
„may be released‟ – suggests the intention of the
Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.

29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive
task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under
UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is
justification to reject bail. The „justifications‟ must be
searched from the case diary and the final report
submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has
prescribed a low, „prima facie‟ standard, as a measure
of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court
when scrutinizing the justifications [materials on
record]. This standard can be contrasted with the
standard of „strong suspicion‟, which is used by Courts
while hearing applications for „discharge– —”

48. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is

quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a „rule‟, if after

hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the

final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a

conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is

only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied that the

Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in

accordance with the „tripod test’ (flight risk,

influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). This

28
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D,

which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail

specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the

restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any

other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.

49. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the aforesaid

judgment after textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP

Act, has formulated the guideline which was summarized

in the form of a twin-prong test. For ready reference the

relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:

“31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the
inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding
bail applications under the UAP Act can be summarized
in the form of a twin-prong test:

Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?

Examine if, prima facie, the alleged „accusations‟ make
out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act

Such examination should be limited to case diary and
final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;

Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in
light of the general principles relating to grant of bail
under Section 439 CrPC („tripod test‟)?”

50. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the

stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is

merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad

probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in

the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and

29
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence

is not required to be done at this stage.

51. Further, it is the duty of the Court to record its

opinion that the accusation made against the accused

concerned is prima facie true or otherwise and such

opinion must be reached by the Court not only in

reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in

reference to the contents of the charge-sheet and other

material gathered by the investigating agency during

investigation.

52. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position

of law and the factual aspect as has been gathered

against the appellant, is proceeding to examine as to

whether the accusation against the appellant is prima

facie true as compared to the opinion of accused not

guilty by taking into consideration the material collected

in course of investigation.

53. From perusal of the 1st supplementary charge-

sheet as appended with the memo of appeal, it is evident

that the appellant has been charge-sheeted as accused

(A-7) of the instant case. It is further evident from the

perusal of charge-sheet that NIA in its investigation has

found that accusation against the appellant is

mentioned in various paragraphs of the 1st

30
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

supplementary charge-sheet. For ready reference the

relevant paragraphs are being quoted herein under: –

17.8 Investigation into the criminal conspiracy
hatched among the accused persons for
channelizing the extorted money of PLFI into
legitimate means by depositing in the shell
companies.

Besides the collection of the extorted/levy amount, Dinesh
Gope (A-6) in investing the extorted money in the dubious
shell companies, formed as part of the larger (conspiracy)
plan and on his directions to his associates/members of
PLFI, for channelizing it in the alleged legal manner. It is
pertinent to mention here, for this purpose, Dinesh Gope
(A-6) formed various modules to operate for furtherance of
his unlawful activities. Initially, extorted levy amount was
getting converted through A-1 to A-4 and post arrest of A-
1 to A5, he (A-6) assigned the same task to another
module having the same Modus Operandi/ intention, with
the association/under the leadership of A-7 A-7 was
holding the post of Director in Bhavya Engicon Pvt. Ltd,
Shiv Aadi Shakti Minerals Pvt. Ltd, with the purpose to
disguise his actual intention with the partnership of
Shakuntala Kumari, alleged second wife of Dinesh Gope
(A-6). After getting funds in cash directly from Dinesh
Gope (A-6), Sumant Kumar (A-7) either himself or with
active association of Arun Gope (A-10) deposited
extorted/levy amount in the accounts of the above
dubious shell companies. Sumant Kumar (A-7) with the
close association of (A-11) hatched the criminal conspiracy
in the name of alleged surrender of Dinesh Gope (A-6),
self-styled Chief of PLFI with the association of A-8, A-9 &
A-12 and arranged/held meeting with the political
leaders. As per the pian of A-6 & PLFI, A-7 along with his
associates were directly, deeply involved in the larger
conspiracy and in the commission of the instant crime and
were channelizing the extorted/levy amount into alleged
legitimate means by depositing the same in the accounts

31
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

of family members/close associates as well as the firms
owned by A-7 or having partnership with them.
17.11) Investigation in respect of transfer of
extorted money Rs.48 Lakhs transferred from
Ranchi to New Delhi by A-7 & A-11 on dated
21.05.2018 and subsequently received on
22.05.2018 through non-banking Channel and
further holding by A-8, A-9, A-11 & A-12.
Investigation has established that on 21.05.2018, Sumant
Kumar and Jitender Kumar were present at Ranchi. He
(A-7) sent his employee/driver namely Badal Sani @
Brajesh Soni with direction to deliver a bag containing Rs.
48 lakhs at the shop of Prasann Kumar Jain (Hawala
Operator), simultaneously A7&A 11 got in touch with
Prasann Kumar Jain using the mobile phone of A-11 It is
established that Prasann Kumar Jain had sent seral
number depicted on a ten rupee note as a token of
confirmation which was be used by A-7 & A-11 at the
time of receipt of transferred money at Panipat. Further,
A-7 & A-11 moved to Delhi and subsequently received Rs.
48 Lakhs from Suraj Kumer ¡Hawala Operator) on
showing the pre decided serial number of the ten rupee
note at Panipat on 22.05.2018 Further, the same amount
was brought to New Delhi by A-7 & A-11 along with A-9
in the vehicle of Hotel Lee-Seasons, Mahipalpur, New
Delhi and the above extorted money was further been
handed over to Nandlal Swarnkar Nandlal Soni (A-8) and
Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel (A-12) in furtherance of the
activities of PLFI as per larger conspiracy and plan of
PLFI. Part of the said amount has been recovered at
various stages of investigation. After analyzing the CDRs
of the above said persons, it has been established that
accused A-7, A-8, A-9, A-11 & A-12 were in constant
touch with one another to execute the plan of PLFI.
17.14 Deposition of statement u/s 164 CrPC of the
independent witnesses to be cited (PW 4. PW 39 PW
56, PW-65, PW-67, PW-68, PW-77, PW-79, PW 100,
PW-127) before the Hon’ble Court:

32

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During the course of investigation, independent
witnesses cites as PW-4, PW-19, PW 56, PW-63, PW 57,
PW-68, PW-77, PW-79 PW-100 and PW-127 deposed in
their respective statements u/s 164 CrPC before the Ld.
Designated Court at Ranchi, in which it is established
that A-6 is Self-styled Chief of terrorist gang PLFI and
under his command, his gang members/operatives used
to extort levy from contractors/businessmen engaged in
development projects etc. A-6 used this levy amount for
purchasing the arms and ammunitions and for
expansion of his armed cadre of PLFI and raised funds
for the terrorist gang. As along with the co-conspirators
and with association of A7, A8, A9, A-10, A-11 and A 12
were channelizing the extorted money, collected in the
form of extortion/Levy by him and by the operatives of
PLFI, which were derived and obtained by PLFI
operatives from commission of terrorist acts (levy,
extortion) and acquired through the terrorist fund and
hatched the criminal conspiracy As part of larger
conspiracy, A-6 formed dubious shell companies with’,
the co-accused/conspirator namely Sumant Kumar (A-

7). As part of larger conspiracy/plan of PLFI as well of A-

6 A-7, have criminally conspired with A-8, A9, A-10, A-
11 & A-12, for channelzing the extorted money into
alleged legitimate means/alleged business.
17.17 Role of the accused A-7
A-7 is a close associate of Dinesh Gope A-6 and is well
acquainted with the facts that dinesh Gope is a terrorist
and chief of PLFI and collects/ raises funds through
extortion of Levy. A-7 has also held the post of director
in Bhavya Engicon Pvt Ltd and Shiv Aadi Shakti
Minerals Pvt Ltd with the partnership of Shakuntala
Kumari, alleged second wife of Dinesh Gope A-6. Further
Sumant Kumar A-7 used to collect cash funds directly
from Dinesh Gope A-6 and got it deposited in the
account of the above dubious shell companies. Sumant
Kumar A-7 and his associates were deeply involved in
the larger conspiracy and in the commission of the

33
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

instant crime and were channelising the extorted
amount through legitimate means by depositing the
same in the account of family members / close
associates as well as firms owned by him or with the
partnership of them. Investigation established that A-7
was closely associated with the absconding Accused
Dinesh Gope A-6, PLFI self styled chief. As per the plan
of PLFI post arrest of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 and A-7, he
was running dubious shell companies with the
partnership of the wives of Dinesh Gope A-6 and his
associates. It is on record that A-7 criminally conspired
with PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope A-6, Arun Gope A-10
and others with intent to chanelise the extorted amount
in shell companies namely M/s Palak Enteprises,
Bhavya Engicon Pvt Ltd and shiv Aadi shakti Minerals
Pvt Ltd.”

54. It is apparent from the record that NIA filed first

supplementary chargesheet on 21.10.2019 against Vinod

Kumar @ Binod Kumar (A-1), Chandrashekhar Kumar (A-2),

Nand Kishore Mahto (A-3), Mohan Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar

(A-4), Dinesh Gope (A-6), Sumant Kumar @ Pawan Kumar

(A-7)(present appellant), Nandlal Swarnkar @ Nandlal Soni

(A-8) Chandra Shekhar Singh (A-9),Arun Gope (A-10),

Jitendra Kumar (A-11) and Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel (A-

12).

55. From the aforementioned paragraph it is evident

that during investigation it has come that besides collection

of levy Dinesh Gope is also investing extorted money in the

companies opened in the name of his two wives namely

Shakuntla (A 13) and Hira Devi (A 14) and also in the name

34
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

of other co- accused Fuleshwar Gope (A-17) and present

appellant Sumant Kumar (A-7). They formed larger

conspiracy plan with members of PLFI and they started

channelizing levy amount into alleged legal manner.

56. During investigation it is also brought on record by

the NIA that Dinesh Gope (A-6) continued to channelize

levy amount into legitimate means by depositing/

transferring into the bank accounts of his wives A-13 and

A-14 with the help of Fuleshwar Gope (A17) and appellant

Sumant Kumar (A7).

57. It has come in Para 17.11 of the chargesheet that

investigation in respect of transfer of extorted money Rs.48

lakhs transferred from Ranchi to New Delhi by A-7 and A-

11 on dated 21/5/2018 and subsequently received on

22.5.2018 through non-banking channel.

58. Offences against Sumant Kumar A-7 is mentioned

in para 17.28 of the chargesheet which disclose that

Sumant Kumar A-7 was the part of second module which

was working for A-6. A-7 alongwith other accused persons

hatched conspiracy with an intent to aid / assist in the

management of PLFI and to assist the A-6 self-styled chief

of PLFI.

59. It has been revealed in the investigation that they

were involved directly/ indirectly for channelizing the

35
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

collected funds from illegitimate source knowing the fact

that such funds are likely to be used by the terrorist gang

for committing a terrorist act or otherwise knowing

dishonestly received/ retained the money/ amount i.e

stolen property and voluntarily assisted in concealing or

disposing of or making away with amount collected

through extortion/ levy by A-6 and through the operatives

of PLFI.

60. Thus, from aforesaid prima facie it appears that

the appellant conspired and advocated, abetted advised the

commission of terrorist act or any act preparatory to the

commission of a terrorist act and he chanellised and raised

the illegal money collected through extortion which was

further being legalised through the creation of shell

companies registered in the name of family members of

Dinesh Gope A-6. In these shell companies, petitioner was

also director and active partner.

61. This Court, after appreciating the aforesaid

argument, is of the view that since this Court is to make

out a prima-facie view based upon the principle as provided

under Section 43D(5) of the U.A.(P) Act, therefore, is of the

view that at this stage, rather, for the purpose of making a

prima-facie view, the evidence available on record is to be

seen, which is available against the appellant.

36

( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

Issue of Parity

62. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant has

taken the ground of parity and submission has been made

that the other co-accused person, namely, Jitendra Kumar

and Binod Kumar and three others have been directed to

be released on bail by co-ordinate bench of this Court vide

order dated 08.05.2023 and 03.10.2023 passed in Cr.

Appeal (DB) No.514 of 2020 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No.201 of

2020 respectively to be released on bail by co-ordinate

bench of this Court and the case of the appellant stands on

better footing.

63. It has further been submitted that the co-accused

persons namely, Jai Prakash Singh Bhuiyan,

Chandrashekar Singh, Arun Gope, and Amit Kumar

Jaiswal, have also been directed to be released on bail by

the co-ordinate bench of this Court, and further another

co-accused namely Navin Bhai Jayanti Bhai Patel has been

directed to be released on bail by the Hon‟ble Apex Court.

64. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted

that since the other co-accused persons have already been

granted bail, therefore the present appellant may be

enlarged on bail.

65. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent

NIA has submitted that the case of the instant appellant is

37
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

on different footing in comparison to the other accused

persons who have already been granted bail.

66. It is further submitted that bail of other co-accused

persons, who were also involved in channelizing the

extorted money, have been rejected by the co-ordinate

Bench of this Court in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 59 of 2021 [Hira

Devi, first wife of accused Dinesh Gope]; and Cr. Appeal

(DB) No. 767 of 2022 [Fuleshwar Gope], as such the

present appellant is not entitled for the bail on the instance

of parity.

67. In the backdrop of the aforesaid contention, this

Court is now proceeding to examine the issue of parity. The

law is well settled that the principle of parity is to be

applied if the case of the fact is exactly to be similar then

only the principle of parity in the matter of passing order

but if there is difference in between the facts, then the

principle of parity is not to be applied.

68. It is further settled connotation of law that Court

cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has

to consider the totality of circumstances before granting

bail and by only simple saying that another accused has

been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a

case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been

established. Reference in this regard may be taken from the

38
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

judgment as rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in

Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai

Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230, wherein, it has been held

as under:

“25. We are constrained to observe that the orders
passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass
muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent
of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to
the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction.
In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 :] , this Court has held that
while applying the principle of parity, the High Court
cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and
has to consider the totality of circumstances before
granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17)

1. ”

17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a
stand was taken that the second respondent was a
history-sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High
Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously
record that the second respondent is entitled to be
admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated
with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity
and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v.
State of U.P.
, 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly
exposes the non-application of mind. That apart, as a
matter of fact it has been brought on record that the
second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of
number of other heinous offences. The High Court has
failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has
to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this
Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and
accordingly we set it aside.

39

( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

2. 2

6. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is
the manner in which the High Court has applied the
principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12-
2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020
SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana
v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the
High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta
Parbat Koli (A-15).
Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh
Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on
22-10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of
Gujarat
, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as
the High Court recorded) that he was “assigned similar
role of armed with stick (sic)”. Again, bail was granted to
Vanraj Koli (A-16) on the ground that he was armed with
a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10),
Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed
with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has
evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is
meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus
upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that
another accused who was granted bail was armed with
a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a
case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been
established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role
attached to the accused, their position in relation to the
incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The
High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a
simplistic assessment as noted above, which again
cannot pass muster under the law.”

69. Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Tarun

Kumar Versus Assistant Director Directorate of

Enforcement, reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1486

has observed that parity is not the law and while

40
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to

focus upon the role attached to the accused whose

application is under consideration.For ready reference,

relevant paragraph, i.e., paragraph-18 of the aforesaid

judgment reads as under:

“.18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to
grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co-
accused who were similarly situated as the appellant,
have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may
be noted that parity is not the law. While applying
the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus
upon the role attached to the accused whose
application is under consideration. It is not disputed
in that the main accused Sh. Kewal Krishan Kumar,
Managing Director of SBFL, and KMP of group companies
and the other accused Devki Nandan Garg,
owner/operator/controller of various shell companies
were granted bail on the ground of infirmity and medical
grounds. The co-accused Raman Bhuraria, who was the
internal auditor of SBFL has been granted bail by the
High Court, however the said order of High Court has
been challenged by the respondent before this Court by
filing being SLP (Crl.) No. 9047 of 2023 and the same is
pending under consideration. In the instant case, the High
Court in the impugned order while repelling the said
submission made on behalf of the appellant, had
distinguished the case of Raman Bhuraria and had
observed that unlike Raman Bhuraria who was an
internal auditor of SBFL (for a brief period statutory
auditor of SBFL), the applicant was the Vice President of
Purchases and as a Vice President, he was responsible
for the day-to-day operations of the company. It was also
observed that the appellant’s role was made out from the
financials, where direct loan funds have been siphoned

41
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

off to the sister concerns of SBFL, where the appellant
was either a shareholder or director. In any case, the
order granting bail to Raman Bhuraria being under
consideration before the coordinate bench of this Court, it
would not be appropriate for us to make any observation
with regard to the said order passed by the High Court.

70. In the light of aforesaid settled position of law this

Court has examined the allegations, as have been

alleged against aforesaid co-accused persons in the

charge-sheet and the said allegation has also been

referred in the orders of co-ordinate Bench by which the

said co-accused namely Jai Prakash Singh Bhuiyan,

Chandrashekar Singh, Arun Gope, and Amit Kumar

Jaiswal have been granted bail.

71. The role of the Jai Prakash Singh Bhuiyan has been

depicted in para 17.18 of the second supplementary

chargesheet, which reads as follows:-

17.18: Offences established against accused
Jaiprakash Singh Bhuiyan ( A-15):

It is established that A-15 being an associate of PLFI , is
well acquainted with the facts that A-6 is a terrorist and
chief of PLFI and collects/raises levy through extortion. A-
15 has criminally conspired with the
members/associates of PLFI, an Unlawful Association
and terrorist gang proscribed by the State of Jharkhand,
namely A-6, A-13, A14 & A-16. Although A-15 had
surrendered earlier before the Jharkhand State
Government as a PLFI cadre, but he continued to be an
active member of PLFI, a terrorist gang. A-15, on the
direction of A-6 used to take care of the school i.e. Vidhya
Vihar Public School, Garai, Rania, DisttKhunti, alleged to

42
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

belonging to A-6. On direction of A-6, A-15 along with A-

16, used to transfer/deposit levy amount received from
A-6, in the accounts of A-14 (Allahabad Bank A/c No.
50484783145), Dipak Majumdar (UBI A/c No.
1401010068217), Sandhya Majumdar (Bandhan Bank
A/c No. 50170016481037) and Nasir Ahmad Khan
(Federal Bank A/c No. 11570200066404) through
various banking channels by using Pragya Kendra
operatives. Investigation revealed that within a span of
11 months, A-15, along with A-16, had
transferred/deposited approx. Rs.15,75,000/- which
was derived or obtained from A-6. Therefore, A-15 was
instrumental in channelizing the levy amount into
legitimate means by depositing/transferring the same in
the bank accounts of A-14 and her associates. A-15, with
the association of A-6, A-13, A-14 and A-16, was deeply
involved in the larger conspiracy and in the commission
of the instant crime and was channelizing the extorted
amount as per the larger conspiracy of A-6. Thereby,
Jaiprakash Bhuiyan (A-15) committed offences under
sections 120B of the IPC, Sections 18, 20 & 21 of the
UA(P) Act and section 17(i), (ii) of the CLA Act, 1908“.

72. It is evident from aforesaid paragraph that the

major charge, which has been levelled against the Jai

Prakash Singh Bhuiya, is that of being involved in a

larger conspiracy along with several other co-accused

persons in channelizing the extorted money of Dinesh

Gope (A-6) into the account of Hira Devi @ Anita Devi

(A-14) and other persons.

73. The role of the Chandrashekar Singh (A-9) has

been depicted in para 17.19 of the second

supplementary chargesheet, which reads as follows

43
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

“17.19 Role of A-9:- It is established that A-9 was well
acquainted with the facts that Dinesh Gope (A-6) was a
terrorist and chief of PLFI (People‟s Liberation Front of
India) and collected/raised funds through extortion/levy.
He was further acquainted with the fact that Sumant
Kumar (A-7) is close associate of Dinesh Gope (A-6), who
collected/raised funds on the behest of Dinesh Gope (A-6)
and further channelized the funds through legitimate
means. Chandra Shekhar Singh (A-9), as per the
directions of A-6 and A-7, used to collect/extort levy from
the road contractors and the other businessmen, engaged
in developmental projects. Besides collection of money
through extortion, accused A-9, along with A-7, had
meetings several times with A-6 in the forest near Garai.
A-9 with the association of A-7, A-11 and other
associates were deeply involved in the larger conspiracy
in channelizing the extorted amount as part of conspiracy
of PLFI. A-9, extorted money on behalf of PLFI and
screened A-6 from legal punishment and in lieu of
screening the A-6, A9 received restitution and knowingly
held the amount which was derived or obtained by the
operatives of PLFI and Dinesh Gope from commission of
terrorist act (levy, extortion) or acquired through the
terrorist fund and further channelized the extorted money
through legitimate means.”

74. It is evident from the aforesaid that the said co-

accused Chandrashekar Singh (A-9) has been involved

in a larger conspiracy in channelizing the extorted

money collected on behalf of PLFI to make it

legitimate.

75. The co-accused Arun Gope has been arrayed as

A-10 in the First Supplementary Charge-Sheet and his

role and activities have been depicted at Para-17.20 of

44
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

the same which reads as under:

17.20) Role of A-10:- It is established A-10 was well
acquainted with the facts that Sumant Kumar (A-7) is a
close associate of his brother-in-law (Jija, husband of his
elder sister Shakuntala Kumari) namely Dinesh Gope (A-

6) and used to collect funds directly from Dinesh Gope
(A-6). A-10, being brother-in-law of the absconding
Dinesh Gope criminally conspired with A-6. A-7 and
others and used to receive/collect the extorted money
from operatives of PLFI including Sumant Kumar (A-7)
and further deposited/sent in the accounts of/to
Shakuntala Kumari, wife of Dinesh Gope. It has been
established that, as per the directions, received
telephonically from Sumant Kumar (A7) and Shakuntala
Kumari, elder sister of the accused A-10, he used to
collect amount less then Rs. 50, 000/- (Fifty thousand
rupees) from A7, who-is director/partner in the dubious
shell companies formed as per direction of A-6 with
Shakuntala Kumari, wife of Dinesh Gope (A-6) and used
to deposit the collected money in the account of Palak
Enterprises at SBBJ branch, Pee Pee Compound, Main
Road, Ranchi and the amount between Rs. 50,000/-
(Fifty Thousand rupees) to Rs. 1,00,000/- (One Lakh
rupees) used to be collected from Sumant Kumar (A-7)
and the collected amount was taken by the A-10 to
Kolkata where the collected amount was handed over to
Shakantala Kumari. The A-10 always remained in touch
with Dinesh Gope (A-6) and met him many times in the
forest areas of Raniya, Garai and Torpa and took his
directions in furtherance of PLFI activities.

76. The aforesaid would therefore indicate that the

co-accused Arun Gope was involved primarily in

channelizing the ill-gotten money through various

sources.

77. The co-accused Amit Kumar @ Amit Jaiswal has

45
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

been arrayed as A-15 in the Second Supplementary

Charge-Sheet and the role and activities attributed to

the appellant have been depicted in Para-17.19 of the

said charge sheet which reads as under:

“17.19 Offences established against accused Amit Kumar
@ Amit Jaiswal @ Amit Kumar Jaiswal ( A-16): It is
established that A-16 being an associate of PLFI, is well
acquainted with the facts that A-6 is a terrorist and chief
of PLFI and collects/raise levy through extortion. A16 has
criminally conspired with the members/associates of
PLFI, an Unlawful Association and terrorist gang
prescribed by the State of Jharkhand, namely A-6, A-13
& A-14 & A15. A-16, on the directions of A-6, used to
collect/extort levy from the contractors and other
businessmen engaged in development projects. On
direction of A-6, A16 along with A-15 used to
transfer/deposit levy amount, received from A-6, in the
accounts of A-14 (Allahabad Bank A/c No.
50484783145), Dipak Majumdar( UBI A.c No.
1401010068217), Sandhya Majumdar(Bandhan Bank
A/c No.50170016481037) and Nasir Ahmad
Khan(Federal Bank A/c No. 11570200066404) through
various banking channels by using Pragya Kendra
Operatives. Investigation has also revealed that within a
span of 11 months, A-16 along with A-15 had
transferred/deposited approx.. Rs.15,75,000/- which
was either derived or obtained from A-6 or levy collected
directly from contractors and other businessmen.
Therefore, A-16 was instrumental in channelizing the
levy amount into legitimate means by
depositing/transferring the same in the bank accounts of
A-14 and her associates. A-16, with the association of A-
6, A-13, A-14 and A-15, was deeply involved in the larger
conspiracy and in the commission of the instant crime
and was channelizing the extorted amount as per the

46
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

larger conspiracy of A-6. Thereby, Amit Kumar @ Amit
Jaiswal @ Amit Kumar Jaiswal (A-16) committed offences
under sections 120B r/w 386 of the IPC, sections 17, 18
& 21 of the UA(P) Act 1967 and sections 17(i), (ii) of the
CLA Act, 1908

78. It is evident from aforesaid paragraph that the

co-accused Amit Kumar @ Amit Jaiswal was

instrumental in channelizing the ill-gotten money

through various sources.

79. So far as co-accused Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel

is concerned, the first supplementary charge sheet was

submitted against him and he was arrayed as an

accused no. 12 by the NIA. In the said charge-sheet it

has been alleged that the said co-accused Navinbhai

Jayantibhai Patel was part of 2nd module for

channelizing the illegitimate money into legitimate

means and was working for Dinesh Gope (i.e. main

accused no. 6) despite knowing the fact, the said fund

are proceeds of levy collected from Contractors,

businessmen etc. and were being used for procurement

of explosives, arms and ammunitions and for

committing disruptive activities.

80. Further so far, the other co-accused namely

Jitendra Kumar is concern the major charge, which has

been levelled against him, is that of being involved in a

larger conspiracy along with several other co-accused

47
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

persons in channelizing the extorted money of Dinesh

Gope (A-6) into the account of Hira Devi @ Anita Devi (A-

14) and other persons.

81. Further, the allegation against the other accused

persons namely Binod Kumar(A-1), Chandra Shekhar

Kumar, Nand Kishore Mahto and Rajesh Kumar @

Mohan Kumar is that they are of being involved in

criminal conspiracy with the other accused persons

more particularly PLFI supremo – Dinesh Gope into

channelizing the extorted money into legitimate means.

What would further be apparent is that the appellants

were acting as conduits in channelizing such ill-gotten

money.

82. This Court has already referred hereinabove the

allegation against the present appellant that during

investigation it has come that present appellant Sumant

Kumar (A-7) received huge amount of money obtained

by Dinesh Gope through levy, to which he invested in

the name of shell companies, in which wives of Dinesh

Gope, his brother-in-law were the Directors and

appellant himself was working as active Director. The

appellant appears to be very much instrumental behind

trail of the money. He used to invest collected levy

amount in the bank and further invested the said

48
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

amount in the shell companies.

83. Further, it appears that the appellant conspired

and advocated, abetted advised the commission of

terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of

a terrorist act and he chanellised and raised the illegal

money collected through extortion which was further

being legalised through the creation of shell companies

registered in the name of family members of Dinesh

Gope A-6. In these shell companies, petitioner was also

director and active partner.

84. Thus, it is evident that the culpability of the

present appellant is different in comparison to the other

accused persons against whom parity has been claimed.

85. Further, this Court has also gone through the

order dated 21.03.2024 passed in in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.

767 of 2022 by which the Co-ordinate Bench of this

Court had denied the privilege of bail to another-co-

accused, namely, Fuleshwar Gope.

86. It needs to refer herein that against the order

dated 21.03.2024 an appeal being Special Leave to

Appeal (Crl.) No(s).7703/2024 had been preferred before

the Hon‟ble Apex Court but vide order dated 03.02.2025

the said appeal has been rejected. For ready reference

relevant part of the said order is being quoted as under:

49

( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

“3.Since the date of issuance of notice in the present
petition, we notice that trial has substantially progressed
and is almost nearing completion.

4.Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that today co-accused (Accused No.12)
stands granted bail by a Coordinate Bench of this Court.

5.In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant
case relating to the petitioner, we are not inclined to
enlarge the petitioner on bail.

6. The present Special Leave Petition is, accordingly,
dismissed.”

87. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid order that

the Hon‟ble Apex Court while taking into consideration

the progress of trial which is almost nearing completion

has dismissed the prayer for bail of the co-accused

Fulshear Gope.

88. Further, it needs to refer herein that the learned

counsel for the NIA has submitted at Bar that trial of the

case is at its fag end and on verge of completion as

prosecution evidence have already been closed herein.

89. Thus on the basis of discussion made herein

above and this Court, after taking into consideration the

fact that this appellant was an active member of the

Company by which he was deeply involved by

channelizing the extorted amount as per the plan of PLFI

and further taking in to consideration the culpability of

the present appellant as discussed and referred herein

above is different in comparison to other co-accused

50
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

persons against whom parity has been claimed is of the

considered view that the principle of parity will not be

applicable herein.

90. So far as the argument regarding reliance having

been placed upon the judgment of Union of India vs.

K.A. Najeeb (Supra) is concerned, this Court is of the

view that in the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid

judgment will not be applicable herein since as per

prosecution the trial is at the fag end and verge of

completion as per the submission made by the

respondent-NIA.

91. While in the said case altogether 276 charge-

sheeted witnesses were to be examined and on the pin-

pointed question by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, the

investigating agency has submitted that there is no

question of reducing the number of charge-sheeted

witnesses and in view thereof and considering the period

of custody, i.e., more than 5 and half years and also

taking into consideration the spirit of Article 21 of the

Constitution of India the Hon‟ble Apex Court has not

interfered in the order by which the bail was granted to

respondent-accused.

92. While, the fact of the instant case is that there is

very grave nature of allegation against the present

51
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

appellant and further, in the instant case trial is on verge

of conclusion, thus ratio of the judgment of Union of

India vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra), in the present facts and

circumstances of the case will not be applicable herein.

93. Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of

Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (supra) while

taking into consideration the ratio of judgment of Union

of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (Supra), has observed that

mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one

involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground

to grant bail, for ready reference the relevant paragraph

is being quoted as under:

46. As already discussed, the material available on record
indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance
of terrorist activities backed by members of banned
terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum
of money through different channels which needs to be
deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the
appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that
he will influence the key witnesses of the case which
might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere
delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one
involved in the instant case cannot be used as a
ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument
on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted..

94. This Court, merely on the basis of the custody by

taking the ground of violation of Article 21 of the

Constitution of India, the same since has already been

dealt with by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of

52
( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

Gurwinder Singh (Supra) wherein the Hon‟ble Apex

court has taken into consideration the judgment

rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of K.A.

Najeeb (Supra), is of the view that the parameter which

statutorily has been provided under Section 43D(5) is to

be taken into consideration for the purpose of

consideration of bail, if the allegation as per the material

collected in course of investigation is found to be prima-

facie untrue then only prayer for bail, can be considered.

While, if the allegation has been found to be prima-facie

true, the privilege of bail cannot be granted.

95. This Court, on the basis of the facts and coming

to the settled position of law as referred hereinabove and

the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the

case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and of

Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another,

(supra) is of the view that it cannot be said that the

allegation levelled against the appellants is prima facie

untrue.

96. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reason, is

of the view that the order passed by the learned court

while rejecting the prayer for bail of the present appellant

suffers from no infirmity.

53

( 2025:JHHC:12098-DB )

97. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is

dismissed.

98. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also

stands dismissed.

99. We make it clear that the prima facie findings

recorded in this judgment are only for considering the

prayer for bail of the appellant. The reasons are confined

to the prayer for bail of the appellant. The same will have

no bearing on the trial of the case of the appellant and

co-accused.

         I Agree                         (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)



(Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)              (Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)



 Birendra/A.F.R.




                                    54
 



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