Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Susmita Maity Jana & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 8 January, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 1790 of 2022
SUSMITA MAITY JANA & ANR.
VS.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Anirban Dutta,
Mr. Sujit Banerjee.
For the State : Mr. Madhusudan Sur,
Mr. Manoranjan Mahata.
Hearing concluded on : 10.12.2024
Judgment on : 08.01.2025
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :
1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of Debra PS FIR no.181 of 2022 dated 18th April,
2022 under Sections 409/427/323/325/307/506 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 3(e)(s)(h) of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. The petitioners’ case in short is as follows:-
Page 2
i. The petitioner no.2 is the husband of the petitioner
no.1 and is involved in cultivation activities.
ii. In the year 2003, the petitioner no.1 joined as an
assistant teacher in Morunia Primary School at
Sankrail Jhargram.
iii. In the year 2006, the petitioner no.1 became a head
mistress of the said school and thereafter in the year
2012, she was transferred to Chaksahapur Primary
School under the Debra east circle.
iv. After joining in the said school, she came to know
that the head mistress of Chaksahapur Primary
School is also holding and/or responsible as one of
the cheques issuing authority for a nearby hostel for
primary girls under the name and style of Lodha
Hostel. Another person for cheque signing authority
for hostel was the superintendent of that school.
Such responsibility was by way of default under the
scheme of the Government of West Bengal.
v. Thus, whenever caretaker of the hostel used to come
with an estimate and cheque for signing, the
petitioner no.1 used to sign the cheques as one of
the signatories thereof for said Lodha Hostel.
Page 3
vi. From 2012 to 2017 one Smt. Nanu Singh was
caretaker of the girls hostel and still continuing with
the same. She is the supporter of one local
Panchayat Member Mr. Sanjay Mallick and Mr. Shib
Shankar Adhikary.
vii. The petitioner no.1 noticed that the students who
attended the school were not wearing new uniforms
and suffering from skin diseases though State
Authorities were providing the said facilities to the
hostel girls. The petitioners on finding that the
hostel superintendent was not providing the same,
lodged complaints on 2nd June, 2017, 5th June,
2017 and 19th June, 2017 with the local BDO,
Additional District Magistrate, Paschim Midnapore
against the aforesaid activities of the then hostel
superintendent.
viii. As the petitioner no.1 stopped signing the cheques
for the hostel, the opposite party no.2 started a false
propaganda against the petitioner no.1 about
misappropriation of food items along with Mr.
Sanjay Mallick, Ex-Panchayat.
ix. The then elected Panchayat Member Mr. Samar
Bhokta, after investigation of whole allegations and
Page 4counter allegations filed a report with the local BDO
Authority disclosing inter alia the nexus between the
erstwhile Gram Pradhan (Mr. Shib Sankar Adhikary)
and said Sanjay Mallick and the then hostel
superintendent, Mrs. Nanu Singh and it was clearly
indicated that due to the syndicate and nexus
between the aforesaid persons, children of the hostel
were suffering.
x. The Chairman of District Primary Council, Paschim
Midnapore, arranged a hearing on the basis of said
complaint. On the date of hearing on 27th July, 2017
aforesaid political persons not only personally
appeared but they also arranged their blind
supporters who started shouting against the
petitioner no.1 at the indication of those two
political persons before the said Chairman of
District Primary Council, Paschim Midnapore.
xi. On 20th January, 2018, the petitioner no.1 was
temporarily transferred to one Paramhansha Part
Basic Primary School which is situated 9 Kms from
Balichak.
xii. On or about 27th December, 2021, the petitioner
no.1 received a letter from the office of the Chairman
Page 5of District Primary Council, Paschim Midnapore
directing the petitioner no.1 to join in her mother
school, Chaksahapur Primary School.
xiii. Unfortunately, on 30th December, 2021 when the
petitioner no.1 went to join in the aforesaid mother
school, the said persons of the political party
restrained her to enter into the teachers’ room of the
said school. Mr. Sanjay Mallick was now elected
Panchayat Member and he was making hue and cry
against her so that she cannot assume the charge
as the head mistress of that school. She thereafter
reported the said facts to the school authority vide
her letter dated 30th December, 2021 and also the
higher authorities.
xiv. Finding no other alternative, the said higher school
authorities allowed her to join on notional basis
asking her to sign the acknowledgement of joining in
his office itself which was continued from 30th
December, 2021 to 3rd January, 2022.
xv. On 13th January, 2022, she again attempted to
enter in the said school but the aforesaid Mr. Sanjay
Mallick personally started restraining her to enter in
the teachers’ room. He locked the teachers’ room
Page 6from outside when other teachers were all in the
said teachers’ room. He again instigated their few
henchmen to gherao the car of the petitioner no.1 by
taking law in his hand. She also requested the local
police authority to provide the necessary police help
but they refused.
3. The petitioner no.1 then filed WPA 1116 of 2022 wherein relief
was granted to the petitioner to join the school and the
respondents therein were stopped from restraining the petitioner
from joining the school.
4. The complainant in the present case is a supporter of Mr. Sanjay
Mallick and Mr. Shib Shankar Adhikary. Since the year 2012,
the opposite party no.2 was the caretaker of the adjacent boys
hostel. At no point of time, there was any interaction with said
opposite party no.2 during the service of the petitioner no.1 in
between the year 2012 to 2017 as the petitioner no.1 was the
disbursing officer as well one of the cheque signing authorities
for the girls hostel for which said Mrs. Nanu Singh was the
caretaker. Both Mrs. Nanu Singh and the opposite party no.2
were instrumental in corruption with said Mr. Sanjay Mallick
and Mr. Shib Shankar Adhikary and through them used to
misappropriate the Government funds for the children for their
personal wrongful gain.
Page 7
5. A Public Interest Litigation being WPA(P) 11 of 2022 was filed
against the petitioner no.1. The said writ petition was disposed
of with the direction that the petitioners would be at liberty to
approach the appropriate forum. The opposite party no.2 then
filed WPA 1639 of 2022 praying for departmental enquiry against
the petitioner no.1. The Court directed the District Primary
Council to enquire into the matter as to the allegations and if
found true, necessary steps to be taken.
6. On an appeal by the petitioner no.1, the Hon’ble Division Bench
directed that the enquiry may be conducted but only the
complainant should be allowed during the enquiry. On 11th
February, 2021, the petitioner no.1 again tried to enter the
school when Mr. Sanjay Mallik was present with 20 to 25
persons and they started assaulting the petitioner no.1
7. The de facto complainant then lodged a complaint which gave
rise to Debra PS case no.181 of 2022 on 18.04.2022 under
Sections 409/427/323/325/307/506 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 read with Section 3(e)(s)(h) of the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, on the
allegations in respect of the offences alleged therein.
8. On 18.04.2022 at 15:25 hrs O.C. Debra P.S. received a Court
complaint from one Gangaram Hembram S/O-Birendra Nath
Hembram of Antala, PS- Debra, Dist- Paschim Medinipur duly
Page 8
forwarded by the Court of Ld. CJM, Paschim Medinipur vide MP
Case No. 147/2022 to the effect that the complainant is the
member of ST community and aged person. The accused person
namely (1) Susmita Maity W/O Soumendra Prasad Jana of
Vill+P.O- Maligram, PS- Pingla, Dist- Paschim Medinipur A/P
C/O Manas Kumar Dey of Vill+PO- Saintol, PS- Debra, Dist-
Paschim Medinipur is the head teacher of Chaksahapur Primary
School. She along with her husband namely Soumendra Prasad
Jana threatened the complainant and the witnesses mentioned
in the court complaint on 20.01.2021 when the complaint
protested about not serving proper mid day meal to the students
of Chaksahapur Lodha Balak and Balika Asram and selling the
govt provided food in lieu of money. On 13.02.2022 the accused
persons abused the complainant by uttering ‘Saotaler Bachha
Nichu Jatir Bachha’ ‘Harh er Bachha’ and also with some other
filthy languages due to the previous grudge. Then the accused
person started assaulting the complainant by fists and blows
and spit on him. They also threw away his bag and destroyed
some important paper which was in the bag. When the
complainant tried to escape from the accused person to save
himself the accused persons tried to kill him by strangulation.
When the local people came to the spot the accused persons
repulsed him from there and again abused the complainant by
uttering ‘Saotaler Bachha’, ‘Nichu Jater Bachha’, ‘Harh o Itorer
Page 9
Bachha’. After that the complaint anyhow came at his home and
treated himself by a private doctor.
9. In Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.,
Criminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020, on 05.11.2020, held:-
“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is
insult or intimidation in “any place within
public view”. What is to be regarded as “place
in public view” had come up for consideration
before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through
Standing Counsel & Ors.,(2008) 8 SCC 435.
The Court had drawn distinction between the
expression “public place” and “in any place
within public view”. It was held that if an
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in
a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be
seen by someone from the road or lane outside
the boundary wall, then the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. On
the contrary, if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the public are
there (not merely relatives or friends) then it
would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view. The Court held as under:
“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”)
when he stood near the car which was parked
at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this
was certainly a place within public view, since
the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different
matter had the alleged offence been committed
inside a building, and also was not in the
public view. However, if the offence is
committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
someone from the road or lane outside the
boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a
place within the public view. Also, even if the
remark is made inside a building, but some
members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an
Page 10offence since it is in the public view. We must,
therefore, not confuse the expression “place
within public view” with the expression “public
place”. A place can be a private place but yet
within the public view. On the other hand, a
public place would ordinarily mean a place
which is owned or leased by the Government or
the municipality (or other local body) or gaon
sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and
not by private persons or private bodies.”
15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing
the informant were within the four walls of her
building. It is not the case of the informant that
there was any member of the public (not merely
relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in
the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that
the words were uttered “in any place within
public view” is not made out. In the list of
witnesses appended to the charge-sheet,
certain witnesses are named but it could not be
said that those were the persons present within
the four walls of the building. The offence is
alleged to have taken place within the four
walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the
judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it
cannot be said to be a place within public view
as none was said to be present within the four
walls of the building as per the FIR and/or
charge-sheet.”
10. The Supreme Court in Ramawatar vs State of Madhya
Pradesh reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228, wherein the Court
categorically held:-
“16. On the other hand, where it appears to
the Court that the offence in question,
although covered under the SC/ST Act,
primarily private or civil in nature, or where
the alleged offence has not been committed
on account of the caste of the victim, or
where the continuation of the legal
proceedings would be an abuse of the
process of law, the Court can exercise its
power to quash the proceedings. On similar
lines, when considering a prayer of quashing
Page 11on the basis of compromise/settlement, if the
Court is satisfied that the underlying
objection of the Act would not be contravened
or diminished even if the felony in question
goes unpunished, the mere fact that the
offence is covered under a „special statue’
would not refrain this Court or the High
Court, from exercising their respective powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution or
Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.”
11. The Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. in Criminal Appeal
No…../2023 (arising out of SLP(CRL) No. 1249 of 2023) in
which Paragraph 18 reads as follows:-
“18. That apart, assuming arguendo that
the appellant had hurled caste related
abuses at the complainant with a view to
insult or humiliate him, the same does not
advance the case of the complainant any
further to bring it within the ambit of section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from
the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet
that the same makes no reference to the
utterances of the appellant during the course
of verbal altercation or to the caste to which
the complainant belonged, except for the
allegation/observation that caste-related
abuses were hurled. The legislative intent
seems to be clear that every insult or
intimidation for humiliation to a person
would not amount to an offence under
Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of
course, such insult or intimidation is
targeted at the victim because of he being a
member of a particular Scheduled Caste or
Tribe. If on calls another an idiot (bewaqoof)
or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place
within public view, this would obviously
constitute an act intended to insult or
humiliate by user of abusive or offensive
language. Even if the same be directed
generally to a person, who happens to be a
Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not
Page 12be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless
such words are laced with casteist remarks.
Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars
invocation of the court‟s jurisdiction under
Section 438, Cr.P.C. and having regard to
the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over
other laws, it is desirable that before an
accused is subjected to a trial for alleged
commission of offence under section 3(1)(x),
the utterances made by him in any place
within public view are outlined, if not in the
F.I.R. (which is not required to be an
encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at
least in the charge-sheet(which is prepared
based either on statements of witnesses
recorded in course of investigation or
otherwise) so as to enable the court to
ascertain whether the charge sheet makes
out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act
having been committed for forming a proper
opinion in the conspectus of the situation
before it, prior to taking cognizance of the
offence. Even for the limited test that has to
be applied in a case of the present nature,
the charge-sheet dated 21st January, 2016
does not make out any case of an offence
having been committed by the appellant
under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to
stand a trial.”
12. In Randheer Singh vs The State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal
Appeal No. 932 of 2021, on September 02, 2021, the
Supreme Court held:-
“23. Even though an FIR need not contain
every detail, an offence has to be made out in
the FIR itself. It is the case of the Private
Respondents that Bela Rani has no title. Bela
Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in
favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased).
Alternatively, the Power of Attorney, in itself,
was a forged document.
33. In this case, it appears that criminal
proceedings are being taken recourse to as a
weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It
Page 13is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR
does not disclose any offence so far as the
Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of
how and in what manner, this Appellant is
involved in any criminal offence and the charge
sheet, the relevant part whereof has been
extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can
be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the
purpose of preventing abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal
offence or not depends on the nature of the
allegation and whether the essential
ingredients of a criminal offence are present or
not has to be judged by the High Court. There
can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil
transactions may also have a criminal texture.
The High Court has, however, to see whether
the dispute of a civil nature has been given
colour of criminal offence. In such a situation,
the High Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings as held by this Court in
Paramjeet Batra (supra) extracted above.”
13. Case diary has been placed by the State.
14. It appears that prima facie there are no materials in the case diary
to support the allegations against the petitioner herein.
15. In Ramesh Chandra Gupta vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 993, Criminal Appeal No(s). ………
of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 39 of 2022), the
Supreme Court held:-
“15. This Court has an occasion to consider
the ambit and scope of the power of the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing of criminal proceedings in Vineet
Kumar and Others vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC
369 decided on 31st March, 2017. It may
be useful to refer to paras 22, 23 and 41 of
Page 14the above judgment where the following
was stated:
“22. Before we enter into the facts of the
present case it is necessary to consider the
ambit and scope of jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court.
Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power
of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order
under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice.
23. This Court time and again has
examined the scope of jurisdiction of the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid
down several principles which govern the
exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge
Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v.
L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 held that
the High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the Court or
that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7
of the judgment, the following has been
stated :
„7. … In the exercise of this wholesome
power, the High Court is entitled to quash a
proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the court or
that the ends of justice require that the
proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving
of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in
civil and criminal matters, is designed to
achieve a salutary public purpose which is
that a court proceeding ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal
case, the veiled object behind a lame
prosecution, the very nature of the material
on which the structure of the prosecution
rests and the like would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in the
Page 15interest of justice. The ends of justice are
higher than the ends of mere law though
justice has got to be administered according
to laws made by the legislature. The
compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper
realisation of the object and purpose of the
provision which seeks to save the inherent
powers of the High Court to do justice,
between the State and its subjects, it would
be impossible to appreciate the width and
contours of that salient jurisdiction.‟
41. Inherent power given to the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose
and object of advancement of justice. In
case solemn process of Court is sought to be
abused by a person with some oblique
motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt
at the very threshold. The Court cannot
permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls
in one of the categories as illustratively
enumerated by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335. Judicial process is a solemn
proceeding which cannot be allowed to be
converted into an instrument of operation or
harassment. When there are materials to
indicate that a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fides and
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive, the High Court will not
hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding
under Category 7 as enumerated in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 which is to the following effect :
„102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fides and/or
where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge.‟ Above Category 7 is
clearly attracted in the facts of the present
case. Although, the High Court has noted
the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Page 16Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 but did not
advert to the relevant facts of the present
case, materials on which final report was
submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully
satisfied that the present is a fit case where
the High Court ought to have exercised its
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and
quashed the criminal proceedings.”
16. The exposition of law on the subject
relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution
or the inherent power under Section 482
CrPC are well settled and to the possible
extent, this Court has defined sufficiently
channelized guidelines, to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
This Court has held in para 102 in State of
Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and
Others, 1992 Supp. (1) 335 as under :
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation
of the various relevant provisions of the
Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in
a series of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to
give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
Page 17
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.”
Page 18
17. The principles culled out by this Court
have consistently been followed in the
recent judgment of this Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra and Others, 2021 SCC
Online SC 315.”
16. The present case falls under clause 1, 3 and 7 of Para 102 of
Bhajan Lal (Supra).
17. Thus, continuing with the present criminal proceeding, shall be
an abuse of the process of law.
18. CRR 1790 of 2022 is thus allowed.
19. The proceedings being Debra PS FIR no.181 of 2022 dated 18th
April, 2022 under Sections 409/427/323/325/307/506 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 3(e)(s)(h) of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, is hereby quashed in respect of the petitioners
namely Susmita Maity Jana and Soumendra Prasad Jana.
20. All connected Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
21. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
22. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
23. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal
formalities.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]
[ad_1]
Source link