Tanuj Kumar vs Chairman / Managing Director Bank Of … on 8 July, 2025

Allahabad High Court

Tanuj Kumar vs Chairman / Managing Director Bank Of … on 8 July, 2025

Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery

Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:107757
 
Court No. - 5
 

 
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2437 of 2021
 

 
Petitioner :- Tanuj Kumar
 
Respondent :- Chairman / Managing Director Bank Of Baroda And 3 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- In Person
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Anadi Krishna Narayana,Ashok Trivedi,Manu Mishra
 

 
Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
 

1. Petitioner, a Divyang (Visually), after crossing all hurdles and after participating in open selection, was appointed as a Bank Officer in Bank of Baroda on 06.11.2009 at a Branch in District Kanpur Nagar.

2. Petitioner was promoted on Scale-II on 21.06.2013. On 19.06.2014 he was put under suspension and served with a “Memorandum”, “Articles of Charge” and “Statement of Allegations” dated 28.04.2015 under relevant regulations of Bank of Baroda Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 and disciplinary proceedings were initiated to impose major penalty.

3. The allegations were mainly with regard to irregularities in number of Car loan accounts, irregularities committed in number of bank accounts and the process undertaken for the purpose of different loans given to different customers. Irregularities were also pointed out in cash credit and different loan accounts, two wheeler loan accounts etc.

4. Petitioner has not filed all relevant papers, however, from perusal of counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent-Bank, it is clearly evident that departmental inquiry was attended by petitioner regularly and on his demand the relevant papers in connection with number of irregularities were provided. Petitioner was also confronted with statements of witnesses examined by Bank to which an opportunity was granted to him to cross-examine as well as he was allowed to produce defence witnesses, therefore, an argument raised on behalf of petitioner-in-person, that due procedure was not followed, is absolutely contrary to record. Principles of natural justice were completely followed; all the papers related to number of allegations were provided; full opportunity was granted for cross-examination and to produce his witness and petitioner-in-person, is not able to show any defect in the process of departmental inquiry, as provided under relevant regulations.

5. On basis of inquiry a punishment order dated 14.03.2016 was passed whereby petitioner-in-person, was awarded major penalty on proved charges and awarded following punishment:

“Reduction to a lower Grade i.e. from MMG/S-II to JMG/S-I and be placed at the Basic pay of Rs. 23,700/- scale in JMG/S-I.”

6. Petitioner-in-person, has filed an appeal against aforesaid order, however, the same was dismissed vide order dated 08.06.2017 as no substantive grounds were available to interfere with order of punishment. A review application filed against order dated 08.06.2017 was also rejected by a reasoned order dated 05.10.2017.

7. Petitioner-in-person, has argued at length and on the request of Court, Sri Mrityunjay Pandey, Advocate has also assisted the Court.

8. Sri Ashok Trivedi, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of Respondent-Bank.

9. Petitioner-in-person, has vehemently submitted that he is a victim and with mala fide intentions an inquiry was initiated and punishment order was passed, despite no irregularity was committed by him. He has repeatedly requested respondents not to appoint him as a Bank Manager, treating his physical position and he may be given some other responsibility, however, with mala fide intentions and in order to harass him, concerned respondent has posted him as a Bank Manager at two Branches. He has cooperated in inquiry and despite repeated requests to provide all relevant papers, the same were not provided, though the Court has already observed in earlier paragraphs that said submission is contrary to record.

10. Petitioner-in-person, has also referred relevant part of punishment order that admittedly despite alleged irregularities, no financial loss was caused to Bank as well as that there was no element of personal gain, still petitioner was awarded major penalty which is shockingly disproportionate. Petitioner-in-person, has vehemently, refers following paragraphs of punishment order:

“Thus, the various acts of omission and commission observed against the CSO are serious in nature, which in retrospect, could have avoided the perpetration of frauds and wrong selection of borrowers. I, the undersigned as Disciplinary Authority is therefore of the opinion that the acts of CSO are not justifiable and should attract severe penalty especially in respect of misuse and abuse of his official position by manipulating irregular and unauthorized transactions in the account of Mr. Abdul Rauf. This cannot be just seen as an omission/negligence but infact unauthorized entries made show they were intentional.

In a financial institution like a bank if a responsible Officer commits such intentional manipulation of accounts/ transactions the acts would generally make him seen as incapable/of being continued in the Bank service and would attract maximum punishment.

However, looking to the fact that such entries neither caused ultimately any loss to the bank and nor there is any element of personal gains being derived along with the fact that the CSO is a handicapped person (visually) I am willing to give him another chance under the reformatory approach by proposing the penalty short of maximum punishment.”

11. Sri Mrityunjay Pandey, Advocate has also assisted the Court that once a finding is returned that there was no financial loss to Bank and there was no personal gain to petitioner as well as that petitioner has earlier requested not to post him as Bank Manager looking to his physical position, the Court may take a lenient view and atleast interfere with major penalty.

12. Per contra, learned Advocate appearing for Respondent-Bank, submits that petitioner-in-person, has indulged himself in number of irregularities; he was not careful to scrutinize the documents before sanctioning loans; during inquiry a detailed procedure was followed; petitioner-in-person, was granted complete opportunity; and, there is no error in decision making process. Learned Advocate further submits that a sympathetic view has already been taken and instead of awarding punishment of dismissal, petitioner was awarded a lesser punishment. He further submits that in financial institutions, the irregularities committed by petitioner, are considered to be a serious misconduct and it is not necessary that it led to financial loss, rather the Bank employees have to remain cautious to stop the likelihood of any financial loss.

13. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material available on record.

14. It is well settled that in normal circumstances, Courts are slow in causing interference in the orders passed in departmental proceedings. For reference relevant part of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 is mentioned hereinafter:

“23.The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v.S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-Judge Bench stated:

‘7…. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant:it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’

24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:

’21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723:(1964) 3 SCR 25:(1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.

xxx

25. In State Bank of India v. S.K. Sharma,(1996) 3 SCC 364, two learned Judges of this Court held:

’28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [[1949] 1 All ER 109 : 65 TLR 225] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a strait-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405 : (1978) 2 SCR 272]) The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. (See A.K. Roy v. Union of India [(1982) 1 SCC 271:1982 SCC (Cri) 152] and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC 664].) As pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipakv. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262], the dividing line between quasi-judicial function and administrative function (affecting the rights of a party) has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable — a fact also emphasised by House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1984] 3 All ER 935 : [1984] 3 WLR 1174 : [1985] A.C. 374, HL] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the case, it is from the standpoint of fair hearing — applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called — that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/hearing may defeat the very proceeding — which may result in grave prejudice to public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post-decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1984) 3 SCC 465]. There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries : a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between “no notice”/”no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate opportunity”. To illustrate — take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin [[1964] A.C. 40 : [1963] 2 All ER 66 : [1963] 2 WLR 935]). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid — or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin v. Carr [[1980] A.C. 574 : [1979] 2 All ER 440 : [1979] 2 WLR 755, PC]). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer’s report (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704]) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi [(1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62]) it would be a case falling in the latter category — violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice — in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touchstone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct — in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e., adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice as aforesaid.”

15. Here, it is also relevant to mention some other judgments passed by Supreme Court that in the cases of misconduct at financial institutions or Bank, to impose a major penalty on proved charges, actual loss is not mandatory and for reference relevant paragraphs of the judgments passed in State Bank Of India And Anr vs Bela Bagchi And Ors, 2005(7) SCC 435 and Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager and others vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, 1996(9) SCC 69, are mentioned hereinafter:

Bela Bagchi (supra)

“15. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, [1996] 9 SCC 68, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charge against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance.”

Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra)

“7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges, the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the Bank to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. It requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him, Breach of Regulation 3 is “misconduct” within the meaning of Regulation 24. The findings of the Enquiry Officer which have been accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in number of instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a Bank – for that matter, in the case of any other organization – every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/ employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the Bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the Bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organization, more particularly, a Bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority – that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances – is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of Banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organization and more particularly, a Bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and over-drawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit – huge profit, as the High Court characterizes it – they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterize them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class-I officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge No.9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that inspite of instructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Enquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge No.8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that inspite of reminders, the respondent did not submit “Control Returns” to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterized as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24.”

16. The Court has already referred that there is no defect in procedure and as referred above in Bhupendra Singh (supra) once the Court is of the view that there is no error in decision making process, the outcome of disciplinary inquiry cannot be interfered. Therefore, on basis of material available as well as on basis of detail punishment order; order passed by Appellate Authority as well as by Reviewing Authority, there is no doubt that petitioner was careless towards his duties as Bank Manager and has not scrutinized the papers carefully while granting loans and as referred in Bela Bagchi (supra) and Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), if such misconduct is proved it is not relevant, whether it led to any financial loss or not.

17. The other argument of petitioner that he has represented earlier that he may not be given charge of Bank Manager or it was against any provision, has no legal basis since it is not denied that petitioner has discharged duties as Bank Manager and sanctioned loan etc., therefore, if irregularities are committed, he has to owe the responsibility. Petitioner has never approached this Court at the stage when he was posted as Bank Manager allegedly contrary to provisions, therefore, such argument is rejected.

18. Now the only question remains is, whether punishment, i.e., “Reduction to a lower Grade i.e. from MMG/S-II to JMG/S-I and be placed at the Basic pay of Rs. 23,700/- scale in JMG/S-I” is shockingly disproportionate or considering earlier service of petitioner, being extraordinary, and petitioner’s undertaking that he will not commit any misconduct in future and will remain careful as well as that he will use polite language while communicating with officers of Bank, punishment can be interfered and he may be restored to his original post.

19. In this regard reference of a recent judgment of Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373 would be appropriate and paras 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the judgement are quoted hereunder:

“23. The well ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.

24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.

25. The principles have been culled out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it was observed as under:

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Anr. v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 as under:

19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.

19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” (emphasis supplied)

20. In aforesaid circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that punishment of demotion awarded to petitioner would not only discourage him to undertake his duties actively but it may cause mental disturbance also. Therefore, impugned orders dated 14.03.2016, 08.06.2017 and 05.10.2017 is interfered so far as punishment is concerned and matter is remitted back to Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order taking a more lenient view and to impose some alternative punishment instead of punishment already awarded, so that petitioner may work at his original post. While passing fresh order Disciplinary Authority will consider that the period when petitioner has already worked at demoted position may not be ignored or interfered. This exercise shall be concluded within a period of two months from today.

21. With aforesaid observations/ directions, this writ petition is disposed of.

Order Date :- 08.07.2025

AK