Madhya Pradesh High Court
Tejnarayan Kushwah vs State Of M.P on 25 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:19149
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 25th OF AUGUST, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 1429 of 2012
TEJNARAYAN KUSHWAH
Versus
STATE OF M.P AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Alok Katare - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri B.M. Patel - Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed by the petitioner seeking following reliefs:-
“(i) That, the present petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be
allowed;
(ii) That, the respondents may kindly be directed to grant the
regular increments of the revised pay scale of Rs.3050-75-3950-
80-4590/- to the petitioner from the date of his initial appointment
along-with arrears and also with interest at the rate of 9% per
annum.
(iii) That, any other just, suitable and proper relief, which this
Hon’ble Court deems fit, may also kindly be granted to the
petitioner. Costs be also awarded in favour of the petitioner.”
(2) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially, the
petitioner was appointed on the post of Assistant Grade-III vide order dated
13.04.2004 on probation. After the appointment of petitioner, regular
increment of the revised pay scale has not been paid to the petitioner, even
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after expiry of the probation period, the regular increment has not been paid
to the petitioner. Thereafter on 16.02.2012, the petitioner has filed a present
writ petition seeking the aforesaid reliefs.
(3) On 27.02.2012, this Court has issued notice to the respondents,
thereafter, respondents filed their reply on 02.06.2012 and enclosed the copy
of Annexure R/1, i.e., 26.04.2012 by which the probation period has been
completed with retrospective effect i.e., 19.04.2005 and the benefit of regular
increment has been granted with effect from 19.04.2005. Counsel for the
petitioner further submitted that as the respondents have granted the benefit
of increment by order dated 26.09.2012 and as the respondents are in fault,
granting the annual increment in the year 2006 and prays to pay the interest
on arrears at the rate of 9% per annum.
(4) Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the order of Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Mahendra Singh Vs. State of M.P. &
Ors. vide order dated 25.07.2025 passed in W.P.No.13157/2021 and also
cited the Judgment of Principal Seat of this Court in case of Ram Lal
Mahobia Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. vide order dated 06.01.2017 passed in
W.P.No.18392/2013, aforesaid cases are distinguishable and in that case, the
delay in making the payment is solely attributable to the respondent only and
in the present case, the petitioner is also approached this Court in the year
2012 and seeking the reliefs for grant the benefit of regular pay scale and
increment with effect from 2005, therefore, in both the judgments, the facts
are different.
(5) Per contra, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the
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present petition has been filed on 16.02.2012 and thereafter immediately,
Annexure R/1 dated 26.04.2012 has been issued and entire benefit has been
granted to the petitioner. Learned Government Advocate further submitted
that the petitioner himself has filed the present petition with delay and not
filed with delay of six years and for that delay, the interest cannot be granted
to the petitioner.
(6) Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
(7) The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others vs. C.
Girija and others by order dated 13.02.2019 passed in Civil Appeal No.
1577/2019 has held as under:-
“13. This Court again in the case of Union of India and Others Vs.
M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 on belated representation laid down
following, which is extracted below:-
“15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale”
or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do
so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as
furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the
“dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of
limitation or delay and laches should be considered with
reference to the original cause of action and not with
reference to the date on which an order is passed in
compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s
direction to consider a representation issued without
examining the merits, nor a decision given in
compliance with such direction, will extend the
limitation, or erase the delay and laches.”
14. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had
occasion to consider question of delay in challenging the
promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a
stale 15 claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh cause
of action. In Paragraph Nos. 19 and 23 following was laid down:-
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“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal
that even if the court or tribunal directs for
consideration of representations relating to a stale claim
or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause
of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a
phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation
to the competent authority does not arrest time.
23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC
137, this Court, testing the equality clause on the
bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of
service benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p. 145, para 16)
“16. … filing of representations alone would not save
the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that
nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in
favour of those who are alert and vigilant.”
15. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in 16 P.S.
Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152
noticed that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior
over his head should approach the Court at least within six months
or at the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph No. 26 and
28, following was laid down:-
“26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer
to a two-Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy
v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152, wherein it has been
laid down that: (SCC p. 154, para 2)
“2. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a
junior over his head should approach the Court at least
within six months or at the most a year of such
promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation
for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226
nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts
cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain
length of time. But it would be a sound and wise
exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise
their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case
of persons who do not approach it expeditiously forSignature Not Verified
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relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and
then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and
try to unsettle settled matters.”
28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and
laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled
principles and even 17 would not remotely attract the
concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the
same may not be applicable in all circumstances where
certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed.
But, a stale claim of getting promotional
benefits definitely should not have been entertained by
the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.”
(8) The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd.
Vs. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under :
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.
Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion
has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes
had stated :
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to placeSignature Not Verified
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him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in
which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of
the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards
that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed
in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India that no relief can be given
to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation
approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It
was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it
does not follow from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles
and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there
is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but
also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of thirdparty rights in the meantime is an important
factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
(9) The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State
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of T.N. Reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :-
“11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast
rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case.
In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-
1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the
order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the
writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The
writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the
same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious.
A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable
reason, cannot be given any benefit.”
(10) The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India
reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 has held as under :-
“6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to
be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in
mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on
the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction
with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to
the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in
Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
7 . What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at p. 239
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service. Sir Barnes
had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an
arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in aSignature Not Verified
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SHARMA
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situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal that the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there
is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have
the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but
also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of thirdparty rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not
to exercise such jurisdiction.”
(11) The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School
Council Vs. Sristidhar Biswar reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as
under :
“11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the
petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in
Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the
court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is
very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot
come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of theirSignature Not Verified
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rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the
delay of nine years cannot be countenanced.”
(12) The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant
Singh reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as under :
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury’s
Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
“In determining whether there has been such delay as to
amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by
while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent
after the violation has been completed and the claimant
has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant
a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it;
or where by his conduct and neglect, though not
waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a
position in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In
such cases lapse of time and delay are most material.
Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.”
(13) The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of
Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :
“18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay
disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or
Article 32 of the Constitution.”
(14) The Supreme Court in the case of NDMC Vs. Pan Singh reported
in (2007) 9 SCC 278 has held as under :
“16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost
sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years.
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They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as
noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the
earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as
parties even in the reference made by the State before the
Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those
employees who were employed or who were recruited after the
cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a
long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been
entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the
discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are
relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh and
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time.
(See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India and M.R. Gupta v. Union
of India.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: (SCC p. 277,
paras 9-10)
“9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of
cases that representations would not be adequate
explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated
in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There
is a limit to the time which can be considered
reasonable for making representations and if the
Government had turned down one representation the
making of another representation on similar lines will
not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan
Samantaray making of repeated representations was not
regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that
case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone.
(See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik.)
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however, cannot
be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It
would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is
filed beyond a reasonable period say three years
normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the
relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of
about three years. The High Court did not examine
whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it
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would have found that there was no scope for
interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition
on that score alone.”
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case
where the High Court should have exercised its discretionary
jurisdiction in favour of the respondents herein.”
(15) Thus, it is clear that successive representations would not give a
fresh cause of action and further this Court should not direct the respondents
to decide the representation made in respect of stale cases. As the petitioner
had not given any explanation for not immediately approaching this Court
and since the petitioner has approached this Court by filing a writ petition on
16.02.2012, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petition suffers
from delay and laches, as the respondents granted the annual increment to
the petitioner with retrospective effect and also paid the arrears immediately
after the filing of the present petition, and the benefit was granted by the
respondents within three months thereafter. Therefore, the petitioner is not
entitled to interest on the delayed payment.
(16) Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
Monika
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