Telangana High Court
The Apsrtc, Rep. By Its M.D. And Another vs Ashannagari Laxmi , Kankavva And 5 … on 14 February, 2025
Author: T. Vinod Kumar
Bench: T. Vinod Kumar
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR
M.A.C.M.A. No.656 OF 2014
JUDGMENT:
1. This Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is
preferred aggrieved by the judgment, dt.28.06.2011, in O.P.No.226
of 2009, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-IX
Additional District Judge, Kamareddy (hereinafter referred to as
‘the Tribunal’) on the ground that the Tribunal had erred in holding
the Corporation jointly liable along with the owner of the vehicle.
2. The appellants herein are respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the O.P.
filed by respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein.
3. The brief facts of the case are that, the Respondents No.1 is
the wife, Respondent No.2 is the father and Respondents No. 3 & 4
are the minor children of the deceased Mr. Ashannagari Sathaiah.
On 07.04.2009, the deceased along with one Mr. Tirumalaiah was
travelling in an auto from Medak to Ramayampet. At 3.00 pm, they
were on the outskirts of Pathoor village, when an APSRTC bus
bearing No. AP/23/U/9077 travelling at a high speed in a rash and
negligent manner, rammed into the auto from opposite direction.
On account of the accident, the passengers including the deceased
2
received injuries and were rushed to Gandhi Hospital,
Secunderabad. On 12.04.2009, the deceased succumbed to his
injuries while receiving treatment at Gandhi Hospital,
Secunderabad. The Respondents/claimants had filed the aforesaid
OP claiming a compensation of Rs.8,00,000/- for the death of the
deceased.
4. The Tribunal, after considering the evidence, had held that
the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the
RTC bus hired by the Appellants, owned by Respondent No. 5,
insured with Respondent No.6. The Tribunal had then partly
allowed the petition, awarding a total compensation of
Rs.3,75,700/-, along with Rs.20,000/- towards loss of consortium,
along with proportionate costs and interest @ 7.5% per annum
from the date of petition. It had also held that the compensation
was to be equally paid by the Appellants and the Respondents No.5
& 6. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is preferred.
5. The Appellants contend that the Tribunal had erred in
holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent
driving of the RTC bus. It is further contended that, the corporation
had only hired the subject vehicle, and since the Respondent No.5
3
was the owner, Respondent No.6 i.e., the insurer of the vehicle, is
solely liable to pay compensation. It is also contended that the
Tribunal erred in applying ’15’ as the multiplier when there was no
proof that the deceased was earning. It is finally contended that the
Tribunal had erred in taking the daily wage of the deceased as
Rs.100/-.
6. On the other hand, the Respondents No.1 to 4 contend that
the Tribunal had rightly held the Appellants jointly liable along
with the Respondents No.5 and 6.
7. Heard Mr. H. Venugopal, learned counsel for the Appellants,
Mr. D. V. Chalapathi Rao, learned counsel for the Respondent
No.5 and Mr. A.V.K.S. Prasad, learned counsel for the Respondent
No.6, and perused the record.
8. The primary dispute in this appeal is with relation to the
finding of the Tribunal, holding the Appellants jointly liable along
with the Respondents No. 5 & 6. The position of law in this aspect
is well settled that person hiring a vehicle, squarely falls within the
definition of an owner under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act, 1988’) and is thus jointly liable along
with the owner of the vehicle and insurer. The Supreme Court in
4
the case of Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C. and Ors. Vs. New
India Assurance Company Ltd. and Ors 1, while dealing with the
question of joint liability of the insurer held as under:
“31. In Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Kulsum and Ors.
(2011) 8 SCC 142, this Court has considered the question of vehicle given on
hire by owner of the vehicle to UPSRTC with its existing and running
insurance policy. It was held that the UPSRTC have become the owner of the
vehicle during the specified period and vehicle having been insured at the
instance of the original owner, it would be deemed that vehicle was transferred
alongwith insurance policy to UPSRTC. The insurer cannot escape the
liability to pay the compensation. The appeal preferred by UPSRTC was
allowed. The instant cases are more or less the same and the decision of this
Court in UPSRTC v. Kulsum (supra) also buttress the submission raised by
KSRTC. This Court has held as under:
30. Thus, for all practical purposes, for the relevant period, the
Corporation had become the owner of the vehicle for the specific
period. If the Corporation had become the owner even for the
specific period and the vehicle having been insured at the instance of
original owner, it will be deemed that the vehicle was transferred
along with the insurance policy in existence to the Corporation and
thus the Insurance Company would not be able to escape its liability
to pay the amount of compensation.
31. The liability to pay compensation is based on a statutory provision.
Compulsory insurance of the vehicle is meant for the benefit of the third
parties. The liability of the owner to have compulsory insurance is only in
regard to third party and not to the property. Once the vehicle is insured,
the owner as well as any other person can use the vehicle with the
consent of the owner. Section 146 of the Act does not provide that any
person who uses the vehicle independently, a separate insurance policy
should be taken. The purpose of compulsory insurance in the Act has
been enacted with an object to advance social justice.
33. In view of the decision in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Reshma and Ors.(supra), the
insurer cannot escape the liability, when ownership changes due to the
hypothecation agreement. In the case of hire also, it cannot escape the liability,
even if the ownership changes. Even though, KSRTC is treated as owner
Under Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, the registered owner continues to
remain liable as per terms and conditions of lease agreement lawfully
entered into with KSRTC.
34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that registered owner,
insurer as well as KSRTC would be liable to make the payment of
compensation jointly and severally to the claimants and the KSRTC in
terms of the lease agreement entered into with the registered owner would be
1
(2016)2SCC382
5
entitled to recover the amount paid to the claimants from the owner as
stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer.”
9. Therefore, the contention of the Appellants that they cannot
be held liable as the Respondent No.5 is the owner of the bus,
cannot be accepted. Further as this Court is not privy to the
agreement between the Appellants and the Respondents No. 5 & 6,
no further observation can be made with respect to recovery of the
amount paid by the Appellants to the claimants from the
Respondent No. 5.
10. As the Appellants had raised an issue regarding the
calculation of compensation, this Court after examining the same is
of the view that, the Tribunal had not considered the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma and Ors. Vs. Delhi
Transport Corporation and Ors 2.
11. The just compensation according to this Court would be as
follows. In calculating the income of the deceased, the Tribunal
had erred in taking the wages of a daily labourer to be Rs.100/-.
The wages as notified by the government, at the relevant period are
Rs. 175 per day. The claimant would also be entitled to 25%
towards future prospects according to National Insurance
2
(2009) 6 SCC 121
6
Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors 3. Thus, the monthly
income of the deceased would be Rs. 5,687.50 Ps. (4,550 (175 x
26) + 1,137.50). Thereby, the annual contribution of the deceased
to his family after 1/4th deduction for his personal expenses would
be Rs. 51,187.50/-. The appropriate Multiplier to be considered
according to column (4) of Sarla Verma‘s case (supra) is ’14’ as
the deceased was 45 years of age. Therefore, the loss of
dependency amounts to Rs. 7,16,625/-. In addition to the same, the
respondents No. 1 to 4 are also entitled to conventional heads of
compensation as per Pranay Sethi‘s case.
12. However, since no Cross-Appeal or Cross – Objection was
filed by the Respondents No.1 to 4 it is now pertinent to consider
whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant just compensation in
absence of a cross appeal by the claimants.
13. It is a settled position of law that the Tribunal/Court is
empowered to grant just compensation to the claimant, though such
compensation exceeds the amount claimed by the claimant.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal
Singh and Ors4, while considering the provisions of the Act, 1988
3
(2017) 16 SCC 680
4
(2003) 2 SCC 274
7
particularly sub section (4) to section 166 held that the Tribunal has
the power to treat any report given to it under section 158 as an
application under section 168 of the Act, 1988. The relevant
observations are as under:
“7. Firstly, under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter
referred to as “the MV Act“) there is no restriction that compensation
could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an
appropriate case where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal
court considers that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than
claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. Only embargo is–it should be
‘Just’ compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor
unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant
provisions of the M.V. Act. Section 166 provides that an application for
compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury
to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property
of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has
sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has
resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the
deceased: or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any
of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.
Under the proviso to Sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the
deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as
respondents to the application for compensation. Other important part of the
said Section is Sub-section (4) which provides that “the Claims Tribunal
shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of
Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” Hence,
Claims Tribunal in appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as
an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no
specified amount is claimed.
xxx
9. It appears that due importance is not given to Sub-section (4) of Section
166 which provides that the Tribunal shall treat any report of the accidents
forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158, as an application for
compensation under this Act.
10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to “make an
award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be
just”. Therefore, only requirement for determining the compensation is
that it must be ‘just’. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power
for awarding just compensation.”
(emphasis supplied)
8
Therefore, it is clear that the Tribunal is empowered to grant just
compensation to the victim/family of the victim without any claim
being made by them.
14. Further, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar and Ors 5, held that an appeal
filed under Section 173 of the Act, 1988 is a regular first appeal
under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short
‘the Code’), it is understood that the High Court can exercise its
powers conferred under Order XLI of the Code, particularly in
view of the powers conferred under Rule 33.
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharanamma and Ors. Vs.
M.D., Divisional Contr. Nekrtc6, by holding that the normal rules
of appeal before the High Court apply to an appeal filed under
Section 173 and that the entire case was open before the Appellate
Court, reaffirmed the aforesaid position of law. The relevant
observations are as under:
“13. When an Appeal is filed under Section173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
(hereinafter shall be referred to as the ‘Act’), before the High Court, the normal
Rules which apply to Appeals before the High Court are applicable to such
an Appeal also. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that when
an Appeal is provided for, the whole case is open before the Appellate
Court and by necessary implication, it can exercise all powers incidental
thereto in order to exercise that power effectively.
5
(2000) 10 SCC 158
6
(2013) 11 SCC 517
9
14. A bare reading of Section 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no
curtailment or limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to consider
the entire case on facts and law.
15. It is well settled that the right of Appeal is a substantive right and the
questions of fact and law are at large and are open to Review by the Appellate
Court. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to
make the provision of law effective.
16. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered
with in an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or
mistake has taken place. If the assessment of compensation by the Tribunal
was fair and reasonable and the award of the Tribunal was neither contrary nor
inconsistent with the relevant facts as per the evidence available on record then
as mentioned hereinabove, the High Court would not interfere in the Appeal.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhangir and Ors.
Vs. Madan Mohan and Ors 7, while observing that the powers
conferred under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code were discretionary,
held that the Appellate Court should not refuse to exercise its
discretionary powers on ‘mere technicalities’, if exercising them
would render complete justice to the case.
17. Thus, it is of significance to note the powers conferred on
the High Court under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code. The said
provision reads as under:
Rule 33: Power of Court of Appeal: The appellate court shall have
power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been
passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order
as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court
notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and
may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or
parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any7
AIR 1988 SC 54 : 1987 (Supp) SCC 528
10appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-
suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in
respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have
been filed against such decreesProvided that the appellate court shall not make any order under section
35a in pursuance of any objection on which the court from whose decree
the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
From the language employed in the aforesaid provision it is clear
that the High Court on considering the entire case has power to
pass any order which ought to have been passed, even though the
said appeal is only against a part of the impugned order and the
respondents had not raised a cross objection against it.
18. On an objection being taken in the case of The APSRTC,
rep. by its General Manager and Ors. Vs. M. Ramadevi and Ors 8,
a two-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the
contention that the High Court lacked power to enhance
compensation without the Claimant’s Appeal.
19. Though a coordinate Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Ranjana Prakash and Ors. Vs. Divisional Manager
and Or, 9 had held as under
8
(2008) 3 SCC 379
9
(2011) 14 SCC 639
11
8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation,
irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is
to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just
compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if
it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer.
Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal
by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by owner/insurer for
reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an
appeal by owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the
compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of
compensation.
20. Hence, it becomes pertinent to note the subsequent decisions
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
21. In Sanobanu Nazirbhai Mirza and Ors. Vs. Ahmedabad
Municipal Transport Service 10, the Hon’ble Apex Court had
enhanced compensation without a claimant appeal noting that it
was the statutory duty of the Tribunal and the Appellate Court to
award just and reasonable compensation.
22. In Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Ors. Vs. Kasam
Daud Kumbhar and Ors 11, though compensation was enhanced by
exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court had reiterated the principle of law, that
it was the obligatory on part of the Courts and Tribunals to award
just, fair and reasonable compensation. The relevant observations
are as under:
10
(2013 ) 16 SCC 719
11
(2015) 4 SCC 237
12“13. The tribunal has awarded Rs. 2,24,000/- as against the same, claimants
have not filed any appeal. As against the award passed by the tribunal when the
claimants have not filed any appeal, the question arises whether the income of
the deceased could be increased and compensation could be enhanced. In terms
of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the courts/tribunals are to pass
awards determining the amount of compensation as to be fair and
reasonable and accepted by the legal standards. The power of the courts in
awarding reasonable compensation was emphasized by this Court i n Nagappa
v. Gurudayal Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/1107/2002 : (2003) 2 SCC 274,
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir and Anr. MANU/SC/0899/2009 :
(2009) 6 SCC 280, and Ningamma and Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
MANU/SC/0802/2009 : (2009) 13 SCC 710. As against the award passed by
the tribunal even though the claimants have not filed any appeal, as it is
obligatory on the part of courts/tribunals to award just and reasonable
compensation, it is appropriate to increase the compensation.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Similarly, on an appeal being carried from the decision of
Bombay High Court in Surekha and Ors. Vs. Santosh and Ors 12,
on a ground that just compensation was rejected as the claimant
failed to file an appeal, though taking an exception, a three – judge
bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the principle that in
compensation matters, the Court should not take a hyper technical
approach and ensure that just compensation is awarded to affected
persons or claimants.
24. The aforesaid principle was yet again echoed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Janabai and Ors. Vs. I.C.I.C.I. Lambord
Insurance Company Ltd 13.
12
MANU/SC/0803/2020
13
(2022) 10 SCC 512
13
25. Similar views were expressed by the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court through Justice Dipankar Dutta (as his
lordship then was) in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Sulekha
Das and Ors 14, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in The National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. E.
Suseelamma and Ors 15, the Division Bench of the Madras High
Court in Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.
Vs. Vennila and Ors 16 and the High Court of Gauhati in The
Future Generali India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Boby Bora and
Ors17.
26. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the
observations made by the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Jagdish Vs. Mohan and Ors 18. The Apex Court
in the said case had held that compensation ought not to be a
pittance, but rather an enforceable right intrinsic to human dignity.
Though the said observations were made in relation to injury cases,
they resonate more with cases of death. The relevant observations
are as under:
14
MANU/WB/1128/2017: 2018(1)CLJ(CAL)24
15
2023:APHC:28075 : MANU/AP/1282/2023
16
MANU/TN/3255/2015
17
MANU/GH/0059/2022
18
(2018) 4 SCC 571
14“11. In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful
of the fact that the Appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has
suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual
activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands
is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing-at least in the facts of
this case-can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a
genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks
of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question
whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a
realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering.
Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of rights, they
constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift
from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of
enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. Therefore, from a conspectus of the aforesaid authoritative
pronouncements in the light of the purport of the Act, 1988, this
Court is of the humble view that the High Court being the Court of
First Appeal has power to enhance the compensation granted by
the Tribunal, even in the absence of the claimant’s Cross-
Appeal/Objection. However, as seen from the ratio in
Sharanamma’s case (supra), such discretionary powers ought to be
exercised on satisfaction of the condition that there is a glaring
discrepancy/mistake in the order of the Tribunal.
28. At the cost of repetition, as the Tribunal failed to consider
Sarla Verma‘s case (supra) while calculating just compensation in
the present case, this Court is of the view that it is just to exercise
the discretionary powers vested in this Court.
15
29. Thus, the total compensation payable to the appellant is as
under:
Head of Compensation Enhancement by this
Compensation awarded by the Court
Tribunal Amount (in Rupees)
Amount (in
Rupees)
Loss of Earning 700/- -
Loss of life, love and 3,60,000/- -
affection, etc
Loss of Dependency - 7,16,625/-
Loss of Estate - 16,500/-
Loss of Consortium 20,000/- 1,76,000/-
(44,000/- x 4)
Funeral Expenses 15,000/- 16,500/-
TOTAL 3,75,700/- 9,25,625/-
30. Accordingly, this Motor Accident Civil Miscellaneous
Appeal is disposed of as under:
i. The finding of the Tribunal that the Appellants along with
the Respondents No. 5 & 6 are jointly and severally liable is
unaltered.
ii. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced
from Rs. 3,75,700/- to Rs. 9,25,625/- with an interest of
7.5% per annum from the date of the petition till realization.
16
iii. The Appellants and the respondents No. 5 & 6 are directed
to deposit the enhanced compensation within three (3)
months from the date of this order.
iv. However, as the Respondents No. 1 to 4 have only claimed
Rs.8,00,000/- in the original petition, they are directed to
deposit the deficit court fee on Rs. 1,25,625/- before the
Tribunal. On such deposit, the Respondents No. 1 to 4 are
permitted to withdraw the same along with interest accrued.
31. Needless to say, that the interim order dated 30.07.2012
stands vacated.
32. Pending miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stand closed.
No order as to costs.
______________________
T. VINOD KUMAR, J
14th February, 2025.
mrkr/vsv
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