Orissa High Court
The Collector And District vs Harekrushna Samal & Others …. … on 8 August, 2025
Author: S.K. Panigrahi
Bench: S.K. Panigrahi, G. Satapathy
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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET No.169 of 2021
Along with
RVWPET No.167 of 2021 with CONTC Nos.4724 and 4725 of 2021
(From the common order dated 19.02.2021 passed by the Division
Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.1112 and 1114 of 2016)
The Collector and District .... Petitioner(s)
Magistrate, Jagatsinghpur & Anr.
(In RVWPET Nos.169 and 167 of 2021)
Abhaya Kumar Samal and others
(In CONTC No.4724 of 2021)
Harekrushna Samal & Others
(In CONTC No.4725 of 2021)
-versus-
Harekrushna Samal & Others .... Opposite Party (s)
(In RVWPET No.169 of 2021)
Abhaya Kumar Samal and others
In RVWPET No.167 of 2021)
Sangram Kishori Mohapatra,
Collector & District Magistrate,
Jagatsinglipur and another
(In CONTC Nos.4724 & 4725 of 2021)
Advocates appeared in this case through Hybrid Arrangement Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pitambar Acharya, Sr. Adv.
Advocate General with
Mr. Ajodhya Ranjan Dash, AGA
For Opposite Party(s) : Mr. Surya Prasad Misra, Sr. Adv.
along with associates
Mr. BudhadebaRoutray, Sr. Adv.
along with associates
Mr. Prafulla Kumar Rath, Sr. Adv.
along with associates
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
MR. JUSTICE G. SATAPATHY
DATE OF HEARING:-08.05.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT: -08.08.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. Since the aforesaid RVWPETs and CONTCs arise out of the same
judgment, the same were heard together and are being disposed of by
this common judgment.
2. RVWPET Nos.169 and 167 of 2021 have been filed under Order 47
Rule 1 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908(hereinafter
referred to as “the C.P.C.” for brevity) at the instance of the State with
a prayer to review the common order dated 19.02.2021 passed by the
Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1112 and W.P.(C) No.1114
of 2016 directing the land Acquisition Officer (Civil), Jagatsinghpur to
assess the compensation in terms of the provisions of Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 and extend such benefits to the Petitioners
therein accordingly.
3. CONTC Nos.4724 and 4725 of 2021 have been filed by the Petitioners
for non-compliance of the common order dated 19.02.2021 passed by
the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1112 and W.P.(C)
No.1114 of 2016 by the Opposite Parties/ State.
4. It is apparent that the review Petitioners were the Opposite Parties in
W.P.(C) No.1112 and W.P.(C) No.1114 of 2016.
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
5. The then Petitioners are now Opposite Parties in W.P.(C) No. 1112 of
2016 and W.P.(C) No. 1114 of 2016 were land owners of village
Fatepur and Patrapur whose lands measuring Ac. 86.64 dec were
acquired by the State Government upon following the due process of
law for establishing an industrial township by IDCO.
6. Notifications u/s 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act, 1894 have been issued
respectively on 8.7.2008 and 31.8.2009. The first award was passed on
18.3.2011 and notices u/s 12(2) of the Act, 1894 for receiving the award
amounts were issued at the same time to all other such landowners.
Physical possession of the entire land has been handed over to IDCO.
7. In an earlier land acquisition proceeding of other villages situated
nearby in 2006, the land owners had agitated against the alleged low
estimate and decided not to receive compensation money.
Accordingly, a tripartite meeting was held between the land owners,
the State Government and the private company for whom the land
was being acquired where the rate of compensation was enhanced.
8. The present Opposite Parties also similarly did not accept the
compensation amount and demanded revision of the same. Therefore,
the compensation amount awarded initially was revised by the 1st
District Level Compensation Advisory Committee.
9. However, the present Opposite Parties preferred W.P.(C) No. 1112 of
2016 and W.P.(C) No. 1114 of 2016 seeking higher compensation in
terms of the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”). Vide impugned
order dated 19.2.2021, further corrected on 21.4.2021, this Court was
observed that the present Opposite Parties were entitled to
compensation in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 and direct
assessment of compensation in terms of the Act, 2013 within three
months.
10. Aggrieved, the State has preferred the present Review Petitions.
11. Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have been
laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the
contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been urged
seeking the exercise of this Court’s plenary powers of review.
II. PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS:
12. It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner that the Impugned
Order is amenable to review in view of the power of this Court under
Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the same cannot be
circumscribed by Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. As the Petitioner’s
submissions are alleged to have escaped consideration, and led to an
error apparent on the face of record, a review petition would be the
appropriate remedy instead of cogitating the issues in an appeal.
13. On merits, it is submitted that this Court did not properly apply the
settled position of law to the facts at hand, much less even went into
the facts at hand. It is urged that the Petitioners, then Opposite Parties
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
were not given sufficient opportunity to file a counter affidavit which
led to this Court proceeding on an erroneous view of facts.
14. It is strongly submitted that the proceedings under Act, 1894 would
not ‘lapse’ in terms of the Act, 2013 as the majority of the awarded
amount has been paid to the land losers and possession has also been
taken by the State.
III. OPPOSITE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS:
15. Per contra, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Opposite Parties that
they are entitled to compensation as per the Act, 2013 in light of
Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.
16. It is strongly urged that there is no manifest error or mistake apparent
on the face of the record. A review is not an appeal in disguise. The
judgment may be incorrect in the petitioner’s view, but unless it
contains a patent error that is self-evident and not dependent on
elaborate reasoning, review is impermissible.
17. Moreover, it is also submitted that the Court’s review jurisdiction is
narrow and exceptional, not equivalent to an appellate process. The
petitioner’s attempt to invoke it as a second appeal or revision is
legally impermissible.
IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
18. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on
record, this court has identified the following issues that have to be
determined which have emerged contentiously during the course of
the hearing and is germane to finally decide the lis at hand;
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Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
A. WHETHER THE REVIEW PETITION AT THE INSTANCE OF THE
PRESENT PETITIONERS IS ENTERTAINABLE WITHIN THE
PARAMETERS OF LAW LAID DOWN FOR ENTERTAINING A
REVIEW APPLICATION, PARTICULARLY KEEPING IN VIEW
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CASE?
19. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the
doctrine of “actus curiae niminem gravabit”. There is no doubt that the
review is a creature of the statute. Therefore, the same has to be based
on the principle as enumerated in Order-47 Rule-1 of
the CPC although the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908 does not apply to the writ proceedings in view of the specific
provision contained in the explanation to Section-141
of CPC However, as a standard practice, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
as well as this Court have on many occasions held that the principle
laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the writ
proceedings although the substantive provision may not be applicable
to the writ proceeding.
20. Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law, this Court would
proceed to analyze the provisions contained in Order-47 Rule-1 of
the CPC Order-47 Rule-1 of the CPC provides that any person
considering himself aggrieved (a) by a decree or order from which an
appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; (b)
by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed; or (c) by a
decision on a reference from a court to small causes and who from the
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Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the
exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not
be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order
made, or on account of same mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record or for any other sufficient reason desires to obtain a review
of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply
for review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made
the order. The aforesaid sub-rule(1) is clarified by the provisions
contained in sub-rule(2). Sub-rule(2) provides that a party, who is not
appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of the
judgment notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal by some other
party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the
applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can
present to the appellate court the case on which he appeals for the
review. Moreover, the explanation attached to Order-47 Rule-1
of CPC reveals that the fact that the question of law involved in the
judgment of the court, which has been reversed or modified by the
subsequent decision of a superior court in another case, shall not be a
ground for review of such judgment.
21. Before proceeding to examine the contentions raised by the Petitioner
in support of his plea that the judgment needs to be reviewed, it
would be pertinent to delineate the scope and ambit of interference by
a Court at the time of deciding the review petition and for this, this
Court may first refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.
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Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka1, where it has been held that the
review literally and even judicially means re-consideration/re-
examination and primarily the philosophy inherent in a review is the
universal acceptance of human fallibility, yet in the realm of law,
Courts have leaned strongly in favour of finality of decisions which
are legally and properly delivered. Supreme Court also noted that
exceptions, both statutorily and judicially, have been carved out to
correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. In Lily
Thomas v. Union of India2, the Supreme Court while affirming that
power of review can be exercised for correction of mistakes, penned a
word of caution that it cannot be used as a tool to substitute a view
and review proceedings cannot be decided as an appeal in disguise.
The Apex Court also ruled that mere possibility of two views on the
subject is not a ground for review and analysed the provisions of
Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, which provides that any person aggrieved
by a judgment/order/decree from which no appeal is allowed or
where appeal is allowed but has not been preferred, can be filed by
any person aggrieved and who from the discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence
was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when judgment/decree/order was passed or on account of some
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order
1993 Supp (4) SCC 595
1
(2000) 6 SCC 224
2
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Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13
made against him, may apply for a review of the judgment to the
Court which passed the decree or made the order. The expression ‘any
other sufficient reason’ was interpreted to mean a reason sufficient on
grounds mentioned or at least analogous to those specified under
Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, as held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki3.
22. 3. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa4, the Supreme Court has held that
‘an error apparent on the face of the proceedings’ is an error which is based
on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law i.e. an error
which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. This position
was further reiterated and reaffirmed in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
Ahmad Ishaque5, where the Supreme Court held that to seek review
there should be something more than a mere error, it must be one
which is manifest on the face of the record and no error could be an
error apparent on the face of the record, if it is not self-evident and
requires examination or argument to establish it.
23. It would also be relevant to allude to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of
Delhi6, where the Supreme Court considered the powers of review
under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and the relevant passage is as
follows:–
3
AIR 1922 PC 112
4
(1955) 1 SCR 250
5
(1955) 1 SCR 1104
6
(1980) 2 SCC 167Page 9 of 33
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Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13“8. It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a
review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the
purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The
normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the
Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified
only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling
character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845 : (1965) 1 SCR 933, 948 :
(1965) 1 SCJ 377]. For instance, if the attention of the
Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during
the original hearing, the Court will review its
judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC
189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279 : (1971) 3 SCR 748, 750]. The
Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has
been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and
effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge,
Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5 : (1971) 2 SCR 11, 27]. Power to
review its judgments has been conferred on the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that
power is subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil
proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on
a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an
error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule
1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of
the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding
cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and
the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not
be reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent
mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial
fallibility”: Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib [(1975) 1
SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200 : (1975) 3 SCR 933].”
24. On the aspect of scope of review, it would also be relevant to refer to a
recent judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V.
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Narayana Reddy7, where after referring to another judgment of the
Supreme Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati8 , where the Supreme
Court has succinctly culled out the principles for exercise of review
jurisdiction, while discussing the confines and scope of Order XLVII
Rule 1 CPC and I quote:–
“24. After discussing a series of decisions on review
jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, this Court
observed that review proceedings have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule
1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the
review application has already been dealt with and
answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the
impugned judgment only because an alternative view is
possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction
were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as
below:
“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence,
was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could
not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been
interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this
Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev.
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034
7
8
2013 SCC OnLine SC 714
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Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean “a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”.
The same principles have been reiterated in Union of
India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd.
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is
not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material
error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines
its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and
corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the
subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record
should not be an error which has to be fished out
and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully
within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot
be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same
relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter
had been negatived.
xxx xxx xxx
26. In State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta, this Court
emphasized the requirement of the review petitioner who
approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new
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matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not
within his knowledge and held thus:
“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that
where a review is sought on the ground of
discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or
evidence must be relevant and must be of such a
character that if the same had been produced, it
might have altered the judgment. In other words,
mere discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex
debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking
review has also to show that such additional matter
or evidence was not within its knowledge and even
after the exercise of due diligence, the same could
not be produced before the court earlier.””
25. From a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments and the principles
culled out by the Supreme Court which guide the Courts in deciding a
review petition, it is luminously clear that a review petition is not an
appeal in disguise and the Court in a review petition cannot be called
upon to re-hear the matter and pass a fresh decision on merits. If two
views on the issues under consideration are possible and the Court
has taken one view, it cannot be urged in a review petition that
another view was possible. While it is true that if there is an error
apparent on the face of record or there are mistakes which require
correction, Courts should not hesitate in correcting the same in the
interest of justice, however, what is impermissible is a re-hearing on
merits since judicial precedents have always leaned towards attaching
finality to judgments delivered by Courts. It needs no reiteration that
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a review Court is neither an Appellate Court nor a Court hearing the
matter as an original proceeding.
26. As the Petitioner has alleged that there is an error apparent on the face
of record, this Court is of the opinion that the Review Petition is
entertainable, whether it succeeds or not, shall be examined in the
following issue.
B. WHETHER THE GROUNDS TAKEN IN THE REVIEW PETITION
ARE SUFFICIENTLY GOOD GROUNDS TO COME TO A
CONCLUSION THAT THERE EXISTS AN ERROR APPARENT
ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE
SAME CALLS FOR INTERFERENCE IN FINAL ORDERS DATED
19.2.2021 BY THIS COURT IN EXERCISE OF ITS REVIEW
JURISDICTION?
27. A review is not a routine procedure. This Court therefore had
resolved to hear the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner at length to remove
any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard.
However, as discussed above, this Court cannot review its earlier
order unless satisfied that a material error, manifest on the face of the
order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
As held by the Apex Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib9:
“A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant
resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent
mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial(1975) 1 SCC 674
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Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13fallibility …. The present stage is not a virgin ground but
review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of
finality”
28. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Indore Development
Authority case [Indore Development Authority (Lapse-5
J.) v. Manoharlal10] has opined that satisfaction of either of the
conditions, namely, either taking possession of the acquired land or
payment of compensation to the landowners would be sufficient to
save the acquisition from being lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act. Various questions posed before the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court were also answered. Relevant paras 365 and 366
are extracted below:
“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal
Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal
Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is
hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune
Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ)
274] has been followed, are also overruled. …
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the
questions as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the
award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of
commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of
proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the
provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window
period of five years excluding the period covered by an
interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue(2020) 8 SCC 129
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Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under
the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as
“and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings
under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due
to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to
commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has
not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other
words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has
not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken
then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of
compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is
provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not
been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then
all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification
for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions
of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled,
interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted.
Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in
the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-
deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years
or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to
the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation
as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not
open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under
Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of
compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by
tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners
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who had refused to accept compensation or who sought
reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be
treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act
and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of
inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed
on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the
land vests in State there is no divesting provided under
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been
taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or more
before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land
acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-
2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by
court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to
new cause of action to question the legality of concluded
proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a
proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013
Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred
claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow
landowners to question the legality of mode of taking
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate
acquisition.”
29. Further, with reference to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the position is
summed up in para 208 of Indore Development Authority case, which
is extracted below:
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the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector.
Landowners cannot be forced to receive it. In case a person
has not accepted the amount wants to take the advantage of
non-payment, though the amount has remained (sic unpaid)
due to his own act. It is not open to him to contend that the
amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be
lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for
payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay
amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for
majority of holding, for that adequate provisions have been
given in the proviso also to Section 24(2). The scheme of the
2013 Act in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that
provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act.”
30. The issue as to what is meant by “possession of the land by the State
after its acquisition” has also been considered in Indore Development
Authority case. It is opined therein that after the acquisition of land
and passing of award, the land vests in the State free from all
encumbrances. The vesting of land with the State is with possession.
Any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has treated to be a
trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not
supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession
and start cultivating on the land till it is utilised. The Government is
also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same
once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of
acquisition is complete and land vests in the State free from all
encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any
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re-entry made by any person is nothing else but an act of trespassing
on the State land.
31. This Court has carefully examined the contentions raised in Review
Petitions RVWPET No. 169 of 2021 and RVWPET No. 167 of 2021,
which challenge the common orders dated 19.2.2021 (as corrected on
12.4.2021) in WP (C) No. 1112 of 2016 and WP (C) No. 1114 of 2016.
The primary grievance of the Review Petitioners, who represent the
State, is that the adjudication proceeded without the benefit of their
counter affidavit, resulting in the omission of critical documentary
evidence and factual context that was essential to a just and
comprehensive decision. It is evident from the pleadings that certain
pivotal facts relating to the timelines of acquisition and the statutory
framework applicable were not adequately presented or considered.
In such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Court to assess
whether the absence of such information, especially when not
attributable to any deliberate default but rather to the structure of the
original proceedings, amounts to an error apparent on the face of the
record. The Court finds it necessary to revisit the matter, given the
weight of evidence now brought forth and its bearing on the legal
determinations previously made.
32. The impugned order had directed the assessment of compensation
under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
“Act, 2013”), but failed to undertake the requisite statutory inquiry as
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to whether the land acquisition proceedings, originally commenced
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter “Act, 1894”), had
lapsed or were preserved under the saving clause of Section 24(1)(b)
of the Act, 2013. The Review Petitioners assert that the acquisition
processes concerning the villages of Fatehpur and Patrapur had
matured with awards being passed in the year 2011, which is much
prior to the cut-off date of 1.1.2014 when the 2013 Act came into force.
This fact, if considered within the correct legal framework, squarely
places the acquisition within the protective ambit of Section 24(1)(b),
whereby the repealed Act continues to apply to proceedings and
where award was already passed before the new law came into effect.
The statutory presumption is clear: such proceedings do not lapse,
and there exists no legal basis for importing the provisions of the 2013
Act. The Court is, thus, required to re-evaluate the legal effect of these
timelines in the light of the legislative scheme laid down under both
statutes.
33. It is not in dispute that during the hearing of the original Writ
Petitions, the Review Petitioners were unable to place their counter
affidavit on record as the Court passed the order without affording an
opportunity to file the counter affidavit. This procedural anomaly had
the effect of precluding the Court from examining crucial documents
that established the chronological progression of the acquisition
process and the corresponding discharge of statutory obligations
under the Act, 1894. The absence of such documents significantly
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impaired the factual matrix on which the legal conclusions were
based. In legal proceedings concerning land acquisition, the sequence
and timing of statutory milestones–such as issuance of notification
under Section 4, declaration under Section 6, passing of awards under
Section 11, and disbursement of compensation–are not merely
clerical details but are central to determining the applicable legal
regime. Therefore, any adjudication that proceeds without full
cognizance of these details runs the risk of misconstruing the
statutory context. The review jurisdiction of this Court is
appropriately invoked in such cases to correct material oversight
where the factual foundation of the judgment is demonstrably
incomplete or inaccurate. The Review Petitioners have now placed
sufficient material to justify such a corrective course of action.
34. Reliance has been rightly placed by the Review Petitioners on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai v. Pratibha Industries Ltd.,11 which authoritatively holds
that the High Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article
226, retains the power to review its orders if it is shown that a material
suppression of facts or oversight has led to a decision that does not
reflect the true factual or legal position. The principle laid down in
that case resonates with the present circumstances, where non-
disclosure of the acquisition records–not due to any mala fide
conduct on the part of the Review Petitioners, but for a lapse in
11
(2019) 3 SCC 203
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procedural sequencing–led to an incomplete presentation of facts.
The Court’s responsibility in such matters extends beyond a
mechanical reading of pleadings; it must ensure that orders,
particularly those affecting statutory rights and liabilities of numerous
stakeholders, are passed upon a full and fair appraisal of all relevant
circumstances. Suppression of material facts, even if unintentional,
has the legal consequence of undermining the integrity of judicial
findings. The record now reveals that significant parts of the
acquisition process had been completed in conformity with the Act,
1894, a fact not previously adjudicated upon.
35. A meticulous review of the documents submitted by the Review
Petitioners now establishes that the land acquisition proceedings for
Fatehpur village commenced in the year 2008, culminating in awards
being passed on 18.3.2011. In respect of Patrapur village, a declaration
under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 20.8.2009, and the
majority of awards were similarly finalized in 2011. These facts,
supported by the original acquisition records, firmly place the
proceedings within the pre-2014 legal framework. The statutory
import of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013 is that if an award under
Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been passed prior to 1.1.2014, the
acquisition proceedings shall not lapse and will be governed as if the
1894 Act has not been repealed. This statutory continuity is not
contingent upon subjective judicial discretion but arises by operation
of law. Thus, any adjudication that overlooks this temporal
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classification risks applying an inapplicable legal standard, which not
only disrupts administrative finality but also creates legal uncertainty
in land acquisition matters. The petitions now present sufficient cause
to conclude that such oversight requires judicial correction to uphold
statutory consistency and procedural equity.
36. The Review Petitioners have correctly drawn attention to the
oversight in the impugned order regarding the scope and applicability
of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. This provision applies only when two
cumulative conditions are met: that neither compensation has been
paid nor possession taken. The Review Petitioners have
demonstrated, through documentary evidence, that awards were
made in 2011–within the five years preceding the enforcement of the
Act, 2013–and compensation was in fact tendered. As such, the
requisite statutory bar for the proceedings to be considered lapsed
under Section 24(2) does not arise. Furthermore, under Section
24(1)(b), if an award has been made under the 1894 Act and the
compensation has been tendered, the proceedings continue as if the
2013 Act had not come into force. The impugned order, however,
assumed that the mere passage of time since initiation was sufficient
for lapse, without engaging with the critical legislative language of
Section 24(1)(b), which preserves concluded proceedings. The
petitioners’ detailed submissions have now clarified that there was no
legal basis to treat the acquisitions as lapsed. The absence of any
finding as to whether both conditions under Section 24(2) were
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satisfied is a significant legal omission, and the error justifies
revisiting the matter.
37. Another pivotal concern raised by the Review Petitioners is that the
Division Bench proceeded to decide the writ petitions without seeking
clarification from the State on the applicability of the Act, 2013 to the
acquisitions in question. When the proceedings themselves are
governed by a statutory framework that underwent substantial
changes, it is imperative for the Court to determine the applicable
legal regime before pronouncing a decision on compensation or
lapsing. The issue is not of mere procedural irregularity but of
substantive misapplication of law. A foundational inquiry into
whether the proceedings were governed by the repealed Act or the
2013 Act was not conducted. This legal question was central to the
outcome. The Court’s earlier assumption that the newer Act applied
across the board was not grounded in a full appreciation of the
relevant dates of acquisition activity and statutory compliance. The
Review Petitioners, now presenting a complete and structured set of
records, including timelines of Section 6 declarations and awards,
have enabled the Court to conclusively determine that the legal
foundation of the impugned order was incomplete. It is not a matter
of changing positions but of restoring fidelity to statutory
interpretation, which requires setting aside the order and enabling a
fresh adjudication on the correct legal premises.
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38. The Review Petitioners have appropriately invoked the precedent set
in S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission12, where
the Supreme Court clarified that a review may be entertained when an
error is so self-evident that it does not require elaborate argument to
establish. In the present case, the omission to examine the impact of
Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013 and to correctly apply the statutory
principles governing ongoing acquisitions constitutes precisely such
an error. The Court is not being asked to reconsider the matter on
fresh facts or reweigh evidence rather to recognize that a pivotal
statutory provision was not judicially analyzed, leading to an outcome
inconsistent with legislative intent. The clarity and finality offered in
the Indore Development Authority case further reinforces the position
that acquisitions where awards have been passed prior to 1.1.2014
must continue under the 1894 Act. The threshold for review is amply
satisfied when a material provision such as Section 24(1)(b) is not even
addressed in the impugned order. This is not merely an interpretive
oversight–it is a fundamental lapse that warrants judicial correction
in accordance with established legal standards.
39. The Court has now had the benefit of reviewing the comprehensive
acquisition records and timelines provided by the Review Petitioners.
These demonstrate that awards were indeed passed in 2011 for a
substantial number of landowners in both Fatehpur and Patrapur
villages. Compensation under the Act, 1894 was not only determined
12
(2009) 10 SCC 464
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but also tendered to many of the beneficiaries. The initial claim by the
Opposite Parties–that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to
non-payment–was premised on a misinterpretation of the statutory
scheme, particularly Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The new materials
on record clearly indicate that the State discharged its statutory
obligations in a timely manner. Tendering compensation constitutes
compliance under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, and the absence of
actual receipt by some landowners does not amount to default on the
part of the acquiring authority. As clarified by the Supreme Court, the
acquiring body is not required to secure acceptance but merely to
tender compensation to fulfill its obligations. Accordingly, the
premise on which the original order directed compensation under the
2013 Act was flawed. The present facts establish statutory compliance,
and no legal grounds exist to invoke Section 24(2), thereby
necessitating a review.
40. The Review Petitioners have firmly established that the legal
consequences flowing from Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013 were not
factored into the impugned order. This provision, which stipulates
that acquisition proceedings shall not lapse if an award has been
made under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 before 1.1.2014, forms the
legislative safeguard for acquisitions already crystallized prior to the
new Act. By failing to engage with this provision, the impugned order
inadvertently directed a shift to a legal regime that does not govern
the facts at hand. It is not open to courts to ignore such express
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statutory saving clauses, particularly where the legislative intent is to
protect the validity of concluded administrative acts. The Review
Petitioners’ submissions confirm that the acquisition, having matured
through all statutorily mandated stages, must remain governed by the
Act, 1894. Any direction to assess compensation under the Act, 2013,
therefore, lacks legal foundation and cannot be sustained without a
complete re-examination of the case based on all relevant material and
statutory principles.
41. Another critical issue misapprehended in the impugned order
pertains to the alleged lapse due to non-payment of compensation.
The Review Petitioners have placed concrete data, backed by
acquisition records, showing that compensation was tendered in most
cases. Tendering, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, constitutes
fulfillment of the State’s obligation under Section 31(1) of the Act,
1894. The claim by the Opposite Parties that compensation was not
accepted by them is legally insufficient to trigger a lapse under
Section 24(2), as mere non-acceptance does not imply non-payment
when the acquiring authority has duly offered compensation. The
Court must distinguish between procedural imperfection and legal
default. In this case, the procedural actions of the acquiring
authority–issuing awards, tendering compensation, and effecting
possession–are evident, and the statutory chain under the 1894 Act
was fulfilled, negating the basis for treating the acquisition as lapsed.
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42. The Review Petitioners have also clarified that ex-gratia payments
made under the Orissa Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 2006
were misconstrued in the impugned order as being equivalent to
compensation under the Act, 1894. This misunderstanding distorted
the assessment of the compensation status under the applicable legal
framework. Ex-gratia payments are policy-driven measures provided
in addition to, and not in substitution of, statutory compensation.
They have no bearing on the validity or completion of acquisition
proceedings under either the 1894 Act or the 2013 Act. Misinterpreting
such administrative payments as determinative of the status of
acquisition proceedings introduces serious inconsistencies into the
legal framework governing eminent domain. The Review Petitioners
have rightly distinguished these voluntary benefits from the statutory
obligations discharged under the acquisition laws. It is important that
courts maintain a strict boundary between policy-led ex-gratia relief
and statutory compensation to preserve the legal sanctity of land
acquisition processes. The erroneous conflation of these two distinct
categories of payments in the impugned order reinforces the need for
a comprehensive review to prevent distortion of well-settled legal
principles.
43. Another point of contention arises from the assumption in the
impugned order that adjacent villages received compensation under
the Act, 2013, thereby creating a presumption of parity. The Review
Petitioners have now provided a complete rebuttal of this assumption,
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demonstrating through acquisition records that no such application of
the 2013 Act occurred in nearby areas. This factual error influenced
the impugned order’s reasoning, leading to an incorrect comparison
and resulting in an unjustified direction for compensation
reassessment. Courts must refrain from drawing inferences
unsupported by the record, especially in matters involving large-scale
public acquisitions where a small factual mistake can have
widespread administrative implications. Equally, parity cannot be
presumed between different land parcels without verifying the
applicable acquisition dates, legal processes, and award timelines. The
application of the law must remain fact-specific and rooted in
statutory compliance, not broad analogies. The erroneous assumption
regarding neighboring villages materially affected the conclusions of
the impugned order and justifies its recall.
44. The Review Petitioners have further shown that the majority of
landowners in Fatehpur and Patrapur were either offered or paid
compensation prior to the enforcement of the Act, 2013. This evidence
refutes the claim that the majority did not receive compensation,
which would be a precondition for triggering a lapse under the
proviso to Section 24(2). The legal threshold for lapse is stringent and
must be applied carefully, with due regard to both tendering and
possession. The data now placed before the Court, including the
Additional Affidavits, provides a clear picture of how the acquisition
progressed through its legally required stages. When the evidentiary
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burden is met with this degree of specificity, the judicial response
must be to restore the legal framework that governs the facts. It would
be contrary to legislative intent to treat valid proceedings as void
merely because of procedural oversights in the writ stage. The new
information not only substantiates the legality of the acquisition but
also reinstates administrative finality, which is essential for ongoing
public infrastructure projects. The petitions present a compelling case
for review and reset of the adjudication.
45. It is also important to clarify that the legal finality attached to awards
passed under Section 12 of the Act, 1894 cannot be undermined by
invoking writ jurisdiction to question their validity years later. The
Opposite Parties’ attempt to sidestep the statutory remedy available
under Section 18--where they could have sought a reference on
quantum of compensation–shows that their grievance lies not with
procedural irregularity but with the amount awarded. Writ courts are
not an alternative forum for litigants who fail to utilize the remedies
specifically provided by the legislature. The challenge raised in the
writ petitions, which culminated in the impugned order, was in
essence an indirect appeal against final awards, an approach that is
neither permissible nor sustainable. The proper remedy, had the
Opposite Parties been aggrieved by the awards, was to seek a
reference under Section 18 within the time prescribed. Their failure to
do so cannot now be cloaked under the broader challenge of lapsing
or inadequate application of the correct law. The Review Petitioners’
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argument on this issue aligns with well-established principles of
statutory finality and judicial restraint in writ matters.
46. The assertion that proceedings lapsed due to non-possession is
similarly contradicted by the record now before the Court. In
acquisition jurisprudence, possession can be established either
through actual transfer or constructive measures such as panchnamas
or administrative control. The Review Petitioners have placed credible
documentation showing that possession was in fact taken in most
cases prior to 1.1.2014. It is well settled that the concept of “lapse”
under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is a limited and exceptional
remedy meant for cases of clear governmental inaction. Where
possession has been taken and compensation tendered, the law does
not contemplate automatic lapse. This is especially so when the
acquiring body has fulfilled its part of the statutory process, and
delays in acceptance or litigation ensue due to private party conduct.
The constitutional bench in Indore Development Authority
(supra) reaffirmed this position by holding that both non-possession
and non-payment are mandatory to establish a lapse. The present case
does not meet that test, and continued reliance on that argument only
underscores the necessity for a judicial correction of the record.
47. Moreover, the Review Petitioners’ inability to file a counter affidavit
during the original proceedings is not a mere procedural lapse–it had
a determinative impact on the outcome. In matters of land acquisition,
where extensive documentation is required to trace the validity of
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actions under multiple statutes, the counter affidavit is not just a
formal response–it forms the evidentiary backbone of the State’s
position. The petitioners’ additional note of submission filed on
8.5.2023, supported by certified records, has now addressed this gap
comprehensively. It is clear that in Patrapur 82.09% of the awarded
amounts have been paid and 74% ex-gratia have been paid. So far as
Fatepur is concerned, 82.3% of the awarded amounts have been paid
and 63.72% ex-gratia have been paid. The Court acknowledges that
the absence of this material precluded a thorough legal analysis of
which Act applied and whether the proceedings had lapsed. Review,
in such circumstances, is not about second-guessing prior decisions
but about affording a complete and just hearing based on all relevant
material. Judicial discipline demands that errors caused by procedural
incompleteness be corrected when new, conclusive evidence is
produced, especially where large public interest and landowners’
rights intersect. The current record supports a review not as a
concession to the State but as a necessary exercise of judicial rectitude.
V. CONCLUSION:
48. In conclusion, the Review Petitioners have demonstrated, through
both statutory interpretation and evidentiary substantiation, that the
impugned order cannot be sustained. The cumulative effect of their
submissions–clarifying timelines of awards, establishing possession
and compensation, rebutting misapplied legal provisions, and
supplying omitted records–justifies setting aside the order dated
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Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:1319.2.2021. The acquisition proceedings for Fatehpur and Patrapur,
having substantially concluded under the Act, 1894, are saved by the
express terms of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013. There is no legal or
factual ground for invoking Section 24(2).
49. In the interest of justice and adherence to statutory mandate, both the
Review Petitions are allowed. The directions of this Court vide
impugned order dated 19.2.2021 are set aside.
50. Consequently, the afore-mentioned CONTCs are disposed of being
dropped.
51. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi)
Judge
G. Satapathy, J.I agree.
(G. Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 8th August, 2025/
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