Telangana High Court
The Hyderabad Cricket Association vs M/S. Visaka Industries Limited on 25 June, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA,
HYDERABAD
***
I.A.No.1 of 2025
IN/AND
COMCA.No.32 of 2024
Between:
The Hyderabad Cricket Association
Appellant
AND
M/s.Visaka Industries Limited and Others
Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 25.06.2025
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
I.A.No.1 of 2025
IN/AND
COMCA.No.32 of 2024
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether Her Ladyship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : No
_________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
2
* THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
+ I.A.No.1 of 2025
IN/AND
COMCA.No.32 of 2024
ORDER:
% Dated 25.06.2025
# Between:
The Hyderabad Cricket Association
Appellant
ANDM/s.Visaka Industries Limited and Others
Respondents
! Counsel for the appellant: Mr.C.S.Vaidyanathan, learned Senior
Counsel representing Mr.Dharmesh D.K.Jaiswal.^ Counsel for the respondent No.1: Mr.Sunil B.Ganu, learned
Senior Counsel representing Mrs.Manjari S.Ganu.< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1. 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 827
2. 2019 SCC OnLine SC 904
3. 2010 15 SCC 717
4. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219
5. (2003) 5 SCC 705
6. (2011) 1 SCC 394
7. (2015) 4 SCC 136
8. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 830
9. (2019) 4 SCC 163
10. (2024) 3 SCC 623
11. (2022) 4 SCC 116
12. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 218
13. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 170
14. (2022) 3 SCC 1
15. AIR 1963 SC 1405
16. (2004) 13 SCC 44
17. (1994 (28) DRJ 482)
18. (2005 (80) DRJ 113
3THE HON’BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAOI.A.No.1 of 2025
IN/AND
COMCA.No.32 of 2024Sri C.S.Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Dharmesh
D.K. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellant.
Sri Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Smt. Manjiri S
Ganu, learned counsel for the respondent No.1
JUDGMENT:(Per Hon’ble. Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)
1. The present Appeal arises out of an order dated
19.07.2024 passed by the learned Principal Special Court in the
Cadre of District Judge for Trial and Disposal of Commercial
Disputes, at Hyderabad (‘the Commercial Court’) dismissing the
appellant’s application (C.O.P.No.83 of 2016) for setting aside
the arbitral Award dated 15.03.2016. The Appeal has been
preferred under section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’).
2. M/s.Visaka Industries Limited (‘Visaka’) was the claimant
in the arbitration namely, COP No.83 of 2016. The dispute
between the parties arose out of the Agreement dated
16.10.2004. The appellant terminated the said Agreement on
4
16.07.2011 and Visaka invoked the arbitration clause i.e.,
clause 15(iii) of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 by way of a
Notice dated 08.10.2010.
3. The brief facts forming the background to the arbitral
Award and the impugned order are as follows.
Facts:
3.1. Hyderabad Cricket Association (‘HCA’) and Visaka entered
into an Agreement dated 16.10.2004 for in-stadia advertisement
rights for construction of an International Cricket Stadium at
Uppal Kancha, Hyderabad, to conduct domestic and
international cricket matches, training and other programmes
for the development and popularization of the game of cricket.
The Recitals to the Agreement state, inter alia, that Visaka
(referred to as ‘the Company’ in the Agreement) paid Rs.6.50
Crores to HCA for the exclusive vesting of the irrevocable right
to name the Stadium as ‘Visaka International Cricket Stadium’
in the Company/Visaka and for the advertisement, publicity
and display rights granted by HCA to Visaka. While things
remained so, HCA claimed that it had received a letter dated
15.03.2008 from the Board of Control for Cricket in India
(‘BCCI’) with regard to the proposed DLF-Indian Premier League
5
(‘IPL’) matches to be conducted at the Stadium and also
stipulated the terms and conditions towards the conduct of the
IPL matches and on 02.04.2008, wrote to Visaka expressing its
inability to honour its obligations under the Agreement dated
16.10.2004 by stating that their Agreement is not binding on
the BCCI-IPL arrangement.
3.2. On 19.04.2008, Visaka filed an Application under section
9 of the 1996 Act vide O.P.No.689 of 2008 before the learned
III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for
restraining HCA from denying in-stadia advertisement rights
during the IPL matches between 22.04.2008 to 01.06.2008, in
violation of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004. By order dated
19.04.2008, the Trial Court granted a temporary injunction.
On 08.10.2010, Visaka issued a Notice under section 11 of the
1996 Act to resolve the disputes pertaining to the rights and
privileges arising out of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004
nominating Mr.M.R.Vikram as the Arbitrator. The fact that
Mr.M.R.Vikram was a partner of M/s. Anandam & Co. was
specifically mentioned in the said notice.
3.3. On 07.03.2011, HCA addressed a letter to Visaka stating
that as per the License Agreement between the HCA and Visaka,
6
the IPL matches are not included in the aforesaid Agreement. In
response, Visaka issued a reply on 14.03.2011 asserting that
the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 is not a License Agreement but
an agreement specifically acknowledging various rights of
Visaka. It also denied that IPL matches were excluded from the
Agreement.
3.4. HCA terminated the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 by a
letter dated 16.07.2011 on the ground of impossibility of
performance. Visaka objected to the said termination by a letter
dated 19.07.2011 and filed an application under section 9 of the
1996 Act vide O.P.No.754 of 2011 for interim protection before
the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in
September 2011. Visaka was granted interim protection by the
City Civil Court, Hyderabad, on 16.09.2011 by way of a
temporary injunction restraining HCA from interfering with any
of the rights available to Visaka under the Agreement dated
16.10.2004.
3.5. Other orders were passed against HCA including one on
16.09.2011 finding HCA guilty of disobedience of the ad-interim
injunction orders granted in favour of Visaka and ordering
attachment of the properties of HCA. An Appeal filed by HCA
7
under section 37(1)(a) of the 1996 Act, against the aforesaid
order, was dismissed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad on 17.10.2011. On 16.03.2012, the Supreme Court
dismissed the SLP filed by the HCA against the order dated
17.10.2011. HCA wrote several letters to Visaka thereafter from
29.03.2012 to 29.05.2012 regarding its commitment under the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004.
3.6. The arbitral Award was made on 15.03.2016 wherein
Visaka’s claim of Rs.25.92 Crores was allowed with costs
including the fee of the Arbitrators paid by Visaka as well as the
incidental costs incurred by Visaka. Visaka was also held to be
entitled to receive an interest @18% per annum till the date of
realization. Aggrieved by the Award, HCA filed COP No.83 of
2016 for setting aside of the arbitral Award and the same was
dismissed by the Commercial Court by the impugned order
dated 19.07.2024.
4. Although the Memorandum of Appeal contains several
grounds for challenging the impugned order dated 19.07.2024,
the appellant/HCA has restricted the challenge in the present
Appeal, essentially, to three grounds.
8
Arguments:
5. The grounds argued by learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellant are with regard to the dominant position of
Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand as the Vice-President and
Executive Member of the HCA, respectively. According to Senior
Counsel, Mr.G.Vinod served as the President of HCA as well as
the Director of Visaka in 2010 and 2004 respectively, whereas
Dr.G.Vivekanand was the Executive Member from July 2012 to
September 2014 and the President of HCA from March 2017-
2018 while also holding the position of the Managing Director in
Visaka. Senior Counsel argues that the dominance and
influence of these two persons resulted in HCA executing the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004 under economic duress which
unduly served the interests of Visaka.
6. Senior Counsel further argues that the appointment of
Mr.M.R.Vikram as a nominee arbitrator on behalf of Visaka
violates the requirements of fair disclosure as mandated under
section 12(1)(a) of the Act as Mr.M.R.Vikram was a partner of
M/s. M.Anandam & Co., which was the statutory auditor of
Visaka. Senior Counsel has also urged that the Award is in
9
conflict with sections 73 and 74 of The Indian Contract Act,
1872 (‘the 1872 Act’).
7. The particulars of these arguments will be discussed in
the captioned heading in the later part of this judgment.
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent
No.1/Visaka places emphasis on the limited scope of
interference in an appeal filed under section 37 of the 1996 Act.
Senior Counsel contends that the appellant is not entitled to
raise factual issues for challenging the Award and the impugned
order. Senior Counsel submits that the three grounds raised by
the appellant in the present Appeal lack any factual basis since
neither Mr.G.Vinod nor Dr.G.Vivekanad exerted any influence
on HCA at the relevant time i.e., at the time of executing the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004. It is further argued that the HCA
acted upon the terms of the Agreement for more than three
years and the rights granted to Visaka were minuscule in
comparison to the total rights available in relation to the
Stadium.
9. Senior Counsel further submits that Visaka invoked the
arbitration clause by a Notice dated 08.10.2010 nominating
Mr.M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator upon full disclosure of
10
Mr.Vikram’s position as a partner of M/s.M.Anandam & Co.
This is also evidenced by Mr.M.R.Vikram’s letter dated
18.09.2011, which brought this information to the attention of
the appellant and was endorsed by Mr.K.Suryanarayana,
Advocate, who was representing HCA at the relevant time.
10. Counsel further relies on section 73 of The Indian
Contract Act, 1872 to argue that the compensation/damages
were rightly awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal since Visaka was
denied its rights under the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and
consequentially suffered immeasurable losses due to the
appellant’s termination of the Agreement.
Decision:
11. The claim of the respondent No.1/Visaka (claimant before
the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three learned Arbitrators)
encompassed the following facts:
12. HCA was looking for corporate entities for considering
part-financing the construction of an International Cricket
Stadium in Uppal Kancha, Hyderabad. HCA requested Visaka
to act as one of the sponsors and to part-finance the project.
Visaka agreed to the proposal and invested a sum of Rs.4.32
11
Crores. In return, HCA granted specific rights to Visaka for
advertisement, publicity and display of Visaka’s company name,
product, logo, trademark, promotional material or devices and
certain other benefits/privileges to Visaka and its nominees.
Incorporating the same, the parties executed an Agreement
dated 16.10.2004 and agreed to be bound by the terms and
conditions therein. Though some of the clauses in the
Agreement were later modified, Visaka continued to enjoy
advertisement rights and other benefits under Clauses 2A and
2B of the Agreement.
13. Disputes arose between the parties leading to HCA
terminating the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 on the ground of
alleged impossibility of performance. Visaka invoked the
arbitration clause i.e., clause 15(iii) of the Agreement dated
16.10.2004 and sought an award against HCA for recovery of
damages amounting to Rs.25.92 Crores, being six times the
consideration paid by Visaka to HCA under the Agreement
dated 16.10.2004. Visaka also claimed interest @ 18% per
annum and for an award declaring that the termination
conveyed in HCA’s communication dated 16.07.2011 is void and
non-est. Visaka also sought for a direction on HCA to pay one-
12
time damages in terms of Clause 6(v) of the Agreement dated
16.10.2004.
14. The Arbitral Tribunal framed six issues, namely,
(i) whether the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was unenforceable
for being executed by HCA under financial duress; (ii) whether
HCA was entitled to terminate the said Agreement on the
ground of impossibility of performance; (iii) whether only ‘Test
Cricket Matches’ and ‘One Day International Cricket Matches’
were within the purview of the Agreement; (iv) whether Visaka
was entitled to an award of Rs.25.92 Crores; (v) whether Visaka
was entitled to a declaration that the termination of the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was void and non-est and (vi)
whether Visaka was entitled to any other reliefs?.
15. The Arbitral Tribunal found that HCA had failed to bring
the existing rights of Visaka and the difficulties that would arise
if Visaka was denied its rights under the terms of the Agreement
to the notice of the BCCI. The Arbitral Tribunal also relied on
the evidence given by the witness examined on behalf of HCA
(RW.1), who specifically deposed that BCCI was never informed
about the existing rights of Visaka/sponsor with regard to the
Cricket Stadium. The Tribunal found that HCA failed to take
13
necessary steps to inform BCCI about Visaka’s rights in the
Stadium, particularly in the context of IPL matches to be held
there. The Arbitral Tribunal accordingly held that the
termination of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was
unsustainable and further that IPL matches were within the
purview of the said Agreement. The Arbitral Tribunal also held
that the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 was enforceable and had
not been executed by HCA under financial duress.
16. The Arbitral Tribunal found the termination of the
Agreement by the HCA to be unjustified since HCA had failed to
establish the element of impossibility or duress. The Award
contains a specific finding that HCA did not allow Visaka to
enjoy its rights under the Agreement and relied on Clause 6(v) of
the Agreement dated 16.10.2004 which provided that HCA
would be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages amounting to
six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA in the event
HCA failed to provide to Visaka advertisement space and
benefits in any year during the currency of the Agreement. The
Arbitral Tribunal held that Visaka was entitled to Rs.25.92
Crores which is six times the amount paid by Visaka i.e.,
Rs.4.32 Crores along with 18% interest till realization. Visaka
14
was also awarded costs of Rs.35,15,731/- along with 12%
interest till realization.
Positions of Conflict and Execution of the Agreement dated
16.10.2004 by HCA under Economic Duress
17. The case of the appellant/HCA is that Mr.G.Vinod and
Dr.G.Vivekanand, who were the Chairman/Director and
shareholders of Visaka, held important positions as the
President/Vice-President and Executive Committee Member in
HCA and exercised rampant control in the affairs of HCA. The
appellant says that Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand were
instrumental in HCA executing the Agreement dated 16.10.2004
giving undue privileges to Visaka.
18. Before giving our view on this argument, it is important to
note that the alleged dominant position and exercise of power by
these two gentlemen do not form the grounds in the
Memorandum of Appeal. The only ground taken is that the
Agreement was executed under economic duress and was
impossible to perform.
15
19. The appellant sought to take the ground of the alleged
dominant position exercised by Mr.G.Vinod and
Dr.G.Vivekanand only as part of the additional grounds in
February, 2025, whereas the Award is of 15.03.2016 and the
impugned order forming the basis of the present Appeal is dated
19.07.2024.
20. We have perused the 20th Annual Report of Visaka, which
is a part of the Appeal papers. Clause 2 of the Annual Report for
the Year 2001-2002 specifically records that Mr.G.Vinod ceased
to be a Director of Visaka under section 283(1)(g) of The
Companies Act, 1956. The Certified Copy of the Company
Certificate of Visaka is also part of the records. Since the
Agreement was executed after two years of the cessation of office
by Mr.G.Vinod on 16.10.2004, we do not find any conflict of
interest in the management of affairs of HCA or any basis to the
argument of Mr.G.Vinod coercing HCA into executing the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004. The HCA also has a Managing
Committee as is reflected from the Annual Report for the year
2004-2005 which also discloses a list of office bearers consisting
of former Test Cricketers, IPS Officers and members of the
Managing Committee. Therefore, the argument of a single
individual (Mr.G.Vinod) exercising all-pervasive control over the
16
affairs of HCA and forcing the Agreement on HCA to the
exclusion of its Managing Committee and office bearers is far-
fetched. The evidence of Mr.N.Shivlal Yadav (RW.1) who was the
Honorary Secretary of the HCA at the time of execution of the
Agreement reinforces the all-important role of the Managing
Committee of HCA at the relevant point of time. HCA has also
not led any evidence in the Arbitration or before the Commercial
Court or even in the present Appeal to substantiate such
allegations.
21. Dr.G.Vivekanand also ceased to be the President of HCA
after 2018. The reasons given for rejecting the allegations made
against Mr.G.Vinod would be equally applicable for
Dr.G.Vivekanand since there is no evidence of any conflict of
interest on the part of this gentleman as well. In such a case, it
is impossible to accept a case of unilateral control over the
affairs of HCA to the exclusion of its Managing Committee and
office bearers.
22. The appellant/HCA has laboured to make out a case of
undue influence and economic duress only to nullify the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004 and to justify its termination on
16.07.2011. The appellant’s plea of impossibility of performance
17
of the Agreement is linked to this argument. However, it is
undisputed that the appellant acted upon and gave effect to the
Agreement from 2004 till 2011 or at least four years before
disputes arose between the parties.
23. The argument of impossibility of performance on the
ground of the Agreement being one-sided i.e., in favour of
Visaka, is purely a matter of construction of the contractual
terms and one which is within the decision-making domain of
the Arbitral Tribunal. The absence of any evidence on the
conflict of interest of Mr.G.Vinod or Dr.G.Vivekanand or
economic duress deflates the substance of the appellant’s
argument. The appellant failing to even include these grounds
in the Memorandum of Grounds in the present Appeal and
seeking to supplement the same in February, 2025 that too by
way of Additional Grounds goes to the root of the credibility of
the argument.
24. I.A.No.1 of 2025 was filed by HCA on 10.02.2025 seeking
permission to raise additional Grounds ‘W’ and ‘X’.
25. Ground ‘W’ pertains to the alleged dominant position
wielded by Visaka in the management of HCA through Mr. G.
Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand. Ground ‘X’ relates to the alleged
18
ineligibility of Mr. M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator including the
contention that the letter issued by Mr. M.R.Vikram dated
18.09.2011 and the letter issued by HCA’s Advocate dated
20.09.2011 were not part of the records before the Arbitral
Tribunal.
26. It is pertinent to note that the Appeal was filed by HCA on
27.09.2024 and was heard on several occasions by a Co-
ordinate Bench commencing from 29.10.2024. The Appeal was
thereafter considered by this Bench from 27.01.2025. However,
the I.A. for raising additional grounds was filed only on
10.02.2025, and that too, only after the respondent pointed out
that the Memorandum of Appeal did not contain any grounds
pertaining to Mr.G.Vinod or Dr.G.Vivekanand.
27. The proceeding sheets would further show that the filing
of the I.A. was brought to the notice of the Court only on
21.04.2025. Therefore, the inordinate delay on the part of the
appellant in raising additional Ground ‘W’ remains unaccounted
for. This delay is palpable in view of the fact that the appellant
failed to raise such a ground either during the arbitration
proceedings, which culminated in the Award dated 15.03.2016,
or in the Trial Court proceedings including in the application for
19
setting aside the Award. The dilatory tactics of the appellant
even in the present Appeal are evident from the proceeding
sheets and further weaken the appellant’s case for introducing
additional grounds at this belated stage.
28. Ground ‘X’ is completely misconceived and devoid of
merit, since the disclosure letters of Mr.M.R.Vikram dated
18.09.2011 and the acknowledgment thereof by HCA’s Advocate
on 20.09.2011 were produced before this Court during the
course of the hearing of the Appeal. HCA did not dispute the
existence or content of these letters.
29. We, hence, do not find any reason to allow I.A.No.1 of
2025, which is clearly an afterthought and is liable to be
rejected. I.A.No.1 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed.
30. The contention of economic duress would also be
contradicted by the admitted fact of Visaka taking a loan of
Rs.4.32 Crores from the Industrial Development Bank of India
for the purpose of investing in the construction of an
International Cricket Stadium at a huge interest rate liability.
Having availed of the loan from Visaka and utilizing the same
for construction of the International Cricket Stadium, it
certainly does not behove HCA from the unsubstantiated and ex
20
post-facto allegations of irregularities and misappropriation of
funds of HCA on the part of the office bearers of Visaka.
31. The orders passed by the Ombudsman on 08.03.2018
with regard to Dr.G.Vivekanand or the orders of the High Court
and thereafter by the Supreme Court are not relevant for the
overall factual conspectus including the attempt to link
Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G.Vivekanand on their commercial interest
in HCA. The orders are of 2017 and 2018 whereas the disputes
between the parties arose in 2008 and the Agreement was
terminated on 16.07.2011.
Ineligibility of Mr.M.R.Vikram as Arbitrator
32. Learned Senior Counsel has argued on behalf of the
appellant/HCA that the third Arbitrator, is a Partner of
M/s.M.Anandam & Co., which served as the statutory auditors
of Visaka. HCA urges that Mr.M.R.Vikram’s appointment as
one of the three Arbitrators is hit by section 12(1) of The
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
33. The documents forming part of the Appeal reflect the
undisputed facts which include the Notice of invocation of the
Arbitration Agreement by Visaka dated 08.10.2010 nominating
21
Mr.M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator. The Notice specifically
mentions that Mr.M.R.Vikram is a Partner of M/s.M.Anandam
& Co., Chartered Accountants, 7-A Surya Towers, S.P. Road,
Secunderabad. This was followed by a letter issued by
Mr.M.R.Vikram on 18.09.2011 informing both the parties that
he is one of the partners of the statutory auditors of Visaka.
This letter bears an endorsement of Mr.K.Suryanarayana,
Advocate who was representing HCA at the material point of
time. Mr.K.Suryanarayana also sent a letter dated 20.09.2011
on his letterhead which refers to the disclosure made by
Mr.M.R.Vikram on 18.09.2011.
34. Both these documents were filed by Visaka along with its
counter affidavit which is part of the record. HCA has not filed
any reply affidavit to the aforesaid letters disclosed by Visaka or
denied their existence. Admittedly, HCA did not raise the issue
with regard to the alleged conflict of interest of Mr.M.R.Vikram
till the proceedings before the Commercial Court in the section
34 application filed by HCA.
35. It is also undisputed that Mr.M.R.Vikram did not sign on
the Balance Sheet of Visaka at any point of time and only served
as one of the many partners of M/s. M.Anandam & Co.
22
Further, there is no evidence of M/s. M.Anandam & Co.,
exercising any control over the management of Visaka which
would give rise to the possibility of bias or conflict of interest on
the part of Mr. M.R. Vikram.
36. The issue of conflict of interest and bias of arbitrators has
been addressed in section 12 of the 1996 Act read with the Fifth
and Seventh Schedules thereto. Both these Schedules were
introduced into the Act by the 2016 Amendment, which came
into effect on 23.10.2015. In the present case, the arbitration
agreement was invoked by Visaka’s Notice dated 08.10.2010
nominating Mr.M.R.Vikram as an Arbitrator much prior to the
Amendment. As stated above, Mr.M.R.Vikram’s disclosure letter
was sent to both the parties on 18.09.2011 followed by the letter
of the HCA’s Advocate – Mr.Suryanarayana dated 20.09.2011.
Therefore, the nomination of Mr.M.R.Vikram, the disclosure
thereof and HCA’s acceptance of the same without demur were
all completed prior to the amendment to the 1996 Act in 2016,
which came into effect on 23.10.2015: West Bengal Housing
Board Vs. Abhishek Construction 1.
1
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 827
23
37. It is undisputed that the date of the commencement of the
arbitral proceedings in the present case was 08.10.2010, when
Visaka invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement. The
notice was received by HCA on 12.10.2010. Section 21 of the
1996 Act defines ‘commencement of arbitral proceedings’ as the
date on which the request for reference of the dispute to
arbitration is received by the respondent, unless otherwise
agreed to by the partners. Both Visaka’s notice of invocation
and HCA’s receipt/acknowledgment of the same are part of
records.
38. Hence, it is undisputed that the arbitral proceedings
commenced at least 5 years prior to the amendment to the 1996
Act, particularly, section 12(1) thereof. The amendment provided
for a challenge to the appointment of an Arbitrator under
clauses (a) and (b) of section 12(1) i.e. for failure to disclose any
direct or indirect relationship or interest with any of the parties
or the subject matter of the dispute which would give rise to
justifiable doubts as to the Arbitrator’s independence: West
Bengal Housing Board v. Abhishek Construction. Although
section 12(1) of the 1996 Act guards against the possibility of
bias or conflict of interest on the part of the Arbitrator, the very
fact that Mr. M.R.Vikram disclosed his position as a partner of
24
Visaka’s statutory auditor and that Visaka accepted the same
without raising any objection as far back as in 2011 renders the
Amendment argument irrelevant and settles the issue in favour
of Visaka.
39. The decisions relied on by the appellant on the issue of
bias and conflicts are distinguishable on facts. In Vinod
Bhaiyalal Jain Vs. Wadhwani Parmeshwari Cold Storage Private
Limited 2 , counsel for one of the parties was appointed as the
Arbitrator and had proceeded to deal with the dispute despite
objections raised to his appointment. The Advocate had also
not disclosed his association as counsel for the party concerned.
In V.K.Dewan and Company Vs. Delhi Jal Board 3, the Arbitrator
was hired as a full-time consultant of Delhi Jal Board prior to
his appointment as an Arbitrator. The issue before the Supreme
Court in the recent decision of Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification Vs. Eci Spic Smo Mcml (Jv) A Joint Venture
Company 4 was empanelment of the Arbitrators by Public Sector
Undertakings and the restriction imposed on the other party in
the matter of selection of its arbitrator from a panel curated by
the Public Sector Undertakings. The Supreme Court however
2
2019 SCC OnLine SC 904
3
2010 15 SCC 717
4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219
25
made a distinction between ‘ineligibility’ and ‘unilateral’
appointment of an arbitrator and held that the appointment of
an arbitrator who is otherwise eligible under the Seventh
Schedule to the Act should be permitted and that the
impartiality of the arbitrator must be examined within the
statutory framework of section 12(5) read with section 18 of the
1996 Act.
40. It is also relevant that Central Organisation (supra)
frowned upon one of the parties to an arbitration agreement
unilaterally constituting the Arbitral Tribunal or appointing a
Sole Arbitrator which would hinder equal participation of the
other party in the appointment process. The Supreme Court
opined that such denial would militate against section 18 of the
1996 Act, which provides for equal treatment of the parties in
the arbitration. The conclusions of the majority view in Central
Organisation (supra) in paragraph 169 of the Report do not align
with the factual conspectus of the present day.
41. In the facts before us, there is no doubt that
Mr.M.R.Vikram duly disclosed his partnership in
M/s.M.Anandam & Co., to the appellant which was
acknowledged and referred to by the appellant’s counsel two
26
days later. The appellant did not raise any objection regarding a
potential conflict of interest or bias on the part of Mr. M.R.
Vikram at any point during the arbitration proceedings which
culminated in the Award dated 15.03.2016. The objection was
raised much later before the Commercial Court in the section 34
proceedings.
42. As stated earlier, the appellant also did not respond to the
disclosure letter of Mr. M.R.Vikram or to the letters of HCA’s
Advocate dated 18.09.2011 and 20.09.2011 respectively, which
formed part of Visaka’s counter affidavit filed on 12.02.2020.
The appellant’s conduct and acquiescence would clearly fall
under the express waiver exception in section 12(5) of the 1996
Act. The appellant’s acceptance of the appointment of Mr. M.R.
Vikram is not one which is drawn by inference but one which is
explicitly reflected in the communications between
Mr.M.R.Vikram and the appellant in September, 2011.
43. The appellant subjecting itself to the Panel of the
Arbitrators consisting of Mr.M.R.Vikram for the next five years
amounts waiver of any objection to the appointment which is
now being raised under the bar contained in section 12(1) read
with the Fifth and Seventh Schedules thereto.
27
44. To sum up, we do not find the appointment of
Mr.M.R.Vikram as one of the three Arbitrators in the panel to be
in violation of the statutory safeguards against bias and lack of
independence. Needless to say, there is a palpable difference
between the unilateral appointment of a sole Arbitrator and the
nomination of one Arbitrator in a panel of three Arbitrators. The
1996 Act guards against both unilateral and ineligible
appointments. The perception of conflict or bias is relevant in
cases involving the latter where the Act specifies the
relationships which would give rise to conflict. Allegations of
bias or conflict are serious in nature and cannot be used to
dismantle an Arbitral Tribunal or discredit an Arbitrator unless
the appointment falls under one or more of the prohibited
relationships. Moreover, any claim of conflict or bias would
stand negated in the face of an express waiver by the objecting
party as is in the present case. The conduct of HCA amounted
to such an express waiver even if it is assumed that Mr.M.R.
Vikram was disqualified from acting as an Arbitrator.
45. We accordingly reject the issue of eligibility of Mr.M.R.
Vikram as one of the three Arbitrators constituting the Arbitral
Tribunal.
28
Is the Award in Conflict with sections 73 and 74 of The Indian
Contract Act, 1872 ?
46. The appellant has sought to make out a case of the
Arbitral Tribunal awarding damages to the respondent
No.1/Visaka without considering the settled legal principles of
sections 73 and 74 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872. The
appellant argues that the Arbitral Tribunal failed to provide
reasons for treating the amount specified in Clause 6(v) of the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004 as a genuine pre-estimate of
damages. According to Senior Counsel, liquidated damages can
only be recovered if an actual loss has been suffered and not
otherwise. Senior Counsel has also argued that the party
alleging breach is under an obligation to lead evidence
substantiating the compensation being claimed.
47. The intention of the parties, particularly HCA, as reflected
in the Agreement dated 16.10.2004, is crucial for our decision
under the captioned heading.
48. Clause 6(v) of the Agreement clearly stipulates that HCA
shall be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages equivalent to
29
six times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA. The specific
words of Clause 6(v) of the Agreement is set out below:
‘In the event respondent fails to provide to the
petitioner in any year during the currency of the agreement
advertisement and publicity and display place or space or
any one or more of the facilities, privileges and benefits
aforesaid, the respondent shall all be liable to pay to the
company liquidated damages of an amount equal to six times
the consideration paid by the company to the association.’
49. It is undisputed that HCA entered into the Agreement
with Visaka unequivocally agreeing to this clause. It is also
undisputed that HCA neither raised any complaint nor objection
to any clause thereof during or after signing the Agreement for
almost four years thereafter. Hence, HCA’s objection to the
award of damages to Visaka which is stipulated within the
parameters of Clause 6(v) of the Agreement is not only an
afterthought but also contrary to section 74 of the Act, as
discussed in the following paragraphs.
50. Section 74 of the 1872 Act is relevant to the present
proceeding. Section 74 provides for compensation for breach of
contract where the penalty has been stipulated, following the
allegation of breach alleged by the claiming party. Section 73,
on the other hand, provides for compensation for loss or
30
damage caused by a breach of a contract entitling the aggrieved
party to receive compensation from the party in breach.
Compensation for the loss suffered by the first party naturally
arises in the course of events following such a breach. The key
difference between the two sections lies in the quantification or
stipulation of the penalty which is to be paid by the party
committing the breach to the other.
51. The present case falls under section 74 of the 1872 Act
since Clause 6(v) of the Agreement clearly stipulates that HCA
shall be liable to pay Visaka liquidated damages equal to six
times the consideration paid by Visaka to HCA. Considering the
intention of the parties, as reflected in Clause 6(v) of the
Agreement, the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal to award
Rs.25.92 Crores (i.e., Rs.4.32 Crores x 6) is straightforward and
strictly in accordance with the contractual terms. The award
does not constitute any deviation from the Agreement nor any
reflection of an unreasonable quantum arrived at by the Arbitral
Tribunal. We accordingly do not find the amount of Rs.25.92
Crores awarded towards damages as unfounded or arbitrary.
52. We also wish to reiterate that section 74 of the Act
specifies, inter alia, that the party complaining of the breach is
31
entitled to receive reasonable compensation from the other
party whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have
been caused thereby (underlined for emphasis). In other words,
section 74 does not require the complaining party to adduce
evidence of loss, provided the contract stipulates the quantum
of damages to be payable in the event of a breach.
53. We should briefly refer to the nature of the rights granted
to Visaka under the Agreement in this context and the near-
impossible task of quantifying the damages. Clause 2A(ix) of the
Agreement dated 16.10.2004 specifically records that the
rights/facilities extended to Visaka under the Agreement shall
be reserved for the exclusive use of Visaka at all times,
irrespective of whether any matches or other events are being
held or conducted in the Stadium or at any part thereof. Clause
2A specifically provides for exclusive development/promotion
space for the use of Visaka’s name, products, logo, trademark
and other promotional material for advertisement and publicity.
The extent of the space provided to Visaka for in-stadia
advertisement would show that Visaka’s right cannot be
restricted to designated places but must be measured in terms
of the visibility of its advertisements in relation to the viewers
32
present in the stadium seeing advertisement at a given point of
time.
54. The broadcast coverage of the IPL matches would have
ensured that the advertisements were viewed by millions of
eyeballs during the telecast of the match with shots of the
Cricket Stadium in the background prominently displaying
Visaka’s branding. In essence, Visaka’s in-stadia rights were
secured for the lifetime of the stadium, regardless of the nature
of the match being played.
55. Therefore, by being deprived of its contractual right to air
its advertisements to millions of viewers during the telecast of
IPL matches, Visaka suffered damages for an unquantifiable
sum. The visibility of Visaka’s advertisements during the
broadcast would have depended on the number of shots and
camera angles shown on the screen making it virtually
impossible to quantify the injury suffered by Visaka due to the
termination of the contract by HCA. Moreover, it is undeniable
that at least three seasons of IPL Matches, T20 Championship
League Matches, Test Matches and 1-Day Internationals would
have been played in the Stadium each year, reinforcing Visaka’s
entitlement to reasonable damages for being deprived of its
33
rights under the Agreement. The reasonableness of the amount
specified in Clause 6(v) of the Agreement is further supported in
the context of Visaka’s rights under the Agreement.
56. We, therefore, do not find any reason to hold that the
award of damages, made strictly within the Clause 6(v) of the
Agreement, was unreasonably quantified and there is no scope
of coming to any finding contrary to the record.
57. The law as settled by the Supreme Court is that the terms
of the contract are required to be taken into consideration
before arriving at any conclusion regarding a party’s entitlement
to damages particularly when the terms of the contract are clear
and unambiguous. The Court is also competent to award
reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual
damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the
breach of a contract: Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Saw
Pipes Ltd. 5 The fact that damages are difficult to assess with
precision strengthens the position that a sum agreed to between
the parties represents a genuine attempt to estimate it and to
overcome difficulties of proof at the trial: Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited Vs. Reliance Communication Limited 6.
5
(2003) 5 SCC 705
6
(2011) 1 SCC 394
34
58. In Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Delhi Development
Authority 7 , the Supreme Court held that the requirement to
prove actual damage or loss is not dispensed with where it is
possible to prove such damage or loss. However, the liquidated
amount named in the contract, as a genuine pre-estimate of
damage or loss, can be awarded when the damage or loss is
difficult or impossible to prove. A similar view was taken in
Larsen & Toubro Limited Vs. Puri Construction Private Limited 8,
where it was held that the correct method of computing
damages would be to determine the prevailing market rate at
the time of the breach and the proceeds which the party would
have received from the sale of its shares at the relevant point of
time.
59. The above reasons persuade us to reject the argument
that the Award is contrary to sections 73 and 74 of The Indian
Contract Act,1872.
7
(2015) 4 SCC 136
8
2025 SCC OnLine SC 830
35
The Impugned Order dated 19.07.2024
60. The appellant/HCA (the petitioner before the Commercial
Court in the application under section 34 of the 1996 Act for
setting aside of the Award dated 15.03.2016), raised several
objections with regard to the illegality in the constitution of the
Arbitral Tribunal, denial of equal treatment to the appellant and
the procedure adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal.
61. We do not find it necessary to deal with these points since
the appellant has limited the scope of the present Appeal only to
the captioned headings, i.e., undue influence exerted by
Mr.G.Vinod and Dr.G. Vivekanand, conflict of interest involving
Mr.M.R. Vikram and the award of damages being contrary to
The Indian Contract Act, 1872. We, accordingly propose to
examine only the view taken by the Commercial Court on these
three issues.
62. The Commercial Court relied on the Notice issued by
Mr.M.R.Vikram on 08.10.2010 wherein Mr.Vikram had
disclosed his position in M/s.Anandam & Co. and the fact that
HCA failed to raise any objection before the Arbitral Tribunal
regarding his appointment or participation as an Arbitrator.
The Commercial Court also noted that HCA raised this objection
36
only in an I.A. filed in 2017 under Order VII Rule 14 of The Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, for deciding the point as a preliminary
issue. The Commercial Court relied on section 12 of the 1996
Act, as it stood prior to the 2015 Amendment, and held that
HCA’s failure to establish justifiable doubt on Mr.M.R.Vikram’s
independence could not amount to a challenge to his
appointment.
63. On the ground of financial duress exerted by Mr. Vinod
and Dr.G.Vivekanand, the Commercial Court found that HCA
failed to raise any such objection after the execution of the
Agreement on 16.10.2004. The Commercial Court noted that
the Arbitral Tribunal found no evidence suggesting that the
Agreement was either unenforceable or obtained under financial
duress. The Commercial Court also noted that HCA adhered to
the terms and conditions of the Agreement from 2004 to 2011,
granting Visaka in-stadia advertisement rights for all matches
which were to be held in the stadium but had failed to mention
the ground of economic duress or undue influence in its
termination notice dated 16.07.2011.
37
64. The Commercial Court further found that after having
honoured the terms and conditions of the Agreement dated
16.10.2004 for seven years till 2011, HCA cannot now take the
stand of impossibility of performance as a justification for
terminating the Agreement. The Commercial Court also held
that HCA had agreed to discuss the matter with BCCI to protect
the interest of Visaka in its letter dated 19.04.2009 but
admitted in the cross-examination that it had failed to bring
existing rights of Visaka under the Agreement to the notice of
BCCI.
65. The Commercial Court also relied on sections 73 and 74
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which provides for
compensation for loss or damage caused as a result of breach of
contract and relied on Clause 6(v) of the Agreement to hold that
the parties had already specified the amount to be paid as
liquidated damages in case of breach.
66. The Commercial Court accordingly found that HCA had
failed to make out valid grounds for setting aside the Award
dated 15.03.2016 and that the Award did not call for
interference. The Commercial Court accordingly dismissed
38
HCA’s application (COP.No.83 of 2016) under section 34 of the
1996 Act for setting aside of the Award dated 15.03.2016.
67. We have given a comprehensive narration of the Arbitral
Award as well as the impugned order for a complete
understanding of the reasons given by the Arbitral Tribunal for
awarding damages to the claimant/Visaka and for declaring
that HCA’s termination of the Agreement to be void ab initio.
The reasons given by the Commercial Court for upholding the
Arbitral Award would show that both the Award as well as the
impugned order are not only replete with reasons but also
articulate Visaka’s entitlement to damages and a declaration
against the termination of the Agreement. The reasons are
strictly within the statutory parameters including of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 and within the interference-barriers under
the scheme of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
68. We have no doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal considered
the entire material before it including the evidence given by the
witnesses for HCA for coming to just conclusions. There is no
scope for holding that the Arbitral Tribunal took into account
irrelevant considerations or ignored the actual issues brought
before it. Likewise, the Commercial Court in the application for
39
setting aside of the Award, gave due weightage to the findings of
the Arbitral Tribunal as the Master of facts and refused to
interfere with the Award since there was, in fact, no scope for
interference in the findings arrived at by the Arbitral Tribunal.
In other words, we do not find the Award or the impugned order
to be patently illegal, perverse or contrary to the law of the land.
Curtailment of Interference
69. We started the judgment with the important caveat of the
limited powers of the Appeal Court in re-appraising the factual
conspectus before the Arbitral Tribunal. This restriction is an
inalienable part of section 34(2)(b) and the Explanation 2
thereto. The proviso to 34(2)(a) of the 1996 Act only strengthens
the position.
70. Section 34(2)(b) of the 1996 Act and the Explanation 2
thereto are set out below:
‘(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if –
(a)…………….
(b) the Court finds that –
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being
in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy
of India.
40
…..
Explanation 2.–For the avoidance of doubt, the test as
to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the
merits of the dispute.’
71. The scope of interference of the Appeal Court under
section 37 is a continuation of proceedings from section 34 of
the said Act and hence puts further fetters on a re-assessment
of the decision of the setting-aside proceeding. In other words,
the Act contemplates tightening the contours of interference as
the Award travels up the litigation-ladder.
72. The consensus which can be gleaned from the cited cases
is that interference in an appeal under section 37 of the 1996
Act cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under
section 34 of the 1996 Act i.e., the Court cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the merits of the award and must
only ascertain whether the power exercised by the section 34
Court had exceeded beyond the recourse under the said
provision: MMTC Limited Vs. Vedanta Limited 9. The Supreme
Court expressed its agreement with the aforesaid view in S.V.
Samudram Vs. State of Karnataka 10 and relied upon UHL Power
9
(2019) 4 SCC 163
10
(2024) 3 SCC 623
41
Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh 11 to emphasize the
circumscribed nature of the exercise of power under sections 34
and 37 of the Act unless the award is found to be perverse or
contrary to public policy. The hands-off approach of the Court
in a section 37 appeal was again reiterated by the Supreme
Court in C&C Constructions Ltd. Vs. IRCON International Ltd. 12
and in Somdatt Builders – NCC – NEC(JV) Vs. National Highways
Cases cited on behalf of the Appellant/Award-debtor
73. Vinod Bhaiyalal Jain Vs. Wadhwani Parmeshwari Cold
Storage Private Limited (supra) involved a case where the
Arbitrator had filed a Vakalath to represent one of the parties to
the arbitration but appeared as the Arbitrator in the dispute two
years thereafter. The Supreme Court found that the Arbitrator
had failed to disclose that he had appeared as counsel for one of
the parties in another case. In V.K.Dewan and Company Vs.
Delhi Jal Board (supra) the respondent – Delhi Jal Board had
appointed the Arbitrator as a full-time consultant on a
stipulated salary during the course of Arbitration.
11
(2022) 4 SCC 116
12
2025 SCC OnLine SC 218
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 170
42
74. Central Organisation (supra) involved a clear case of
denying equal participation to the other party by limiting the
choice to a panel curated by the Railways. A majority of the 5-
Judge Bench accordingly found the clause to be in violation of
equal rights enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
75. Ellora Paper Mills Limited Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh 14was a case of actual bias since the Arbitral Tribunal
consisted of the Stationery Purchase Committee comprising of
the officers of the respondent State. The Supreme Court thus
found the Arbitral Tribunal to be ineligible under section 12(5)
of the 1996 Act read with Seventh Schedule.
76. Thus, it can be seen that the cases relied on by the
appellant/Award-debtor are wholly different on facts and
involved a direct possibility of bias and lack of neutrality. In the
present case, apart from the arbitration being commenced much
before the 2015 amendment to the 1996 Act, there was also a
specific disclosure by the Arbitrator at the time of his
appointment which was received and acknowledged on behalf of
the Award-debtor.
14(2022) 3 SCC 1
43
77. In Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Delhi Development
Authority (supra) the Supreme Court reinforced that damages
can be awarded in cases where the damage or loss is difficult or
impossible to prove and the liquidated amount is named in the
contract. Fateh Chand Vs. Balkishan Dass 15 laid down the legal
position of section 74 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, that the
Court will award the aggrieved party only reasonable
compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated in the
contract where the contract pre-determines the damages or
provides for forfeiture of property by way of penalty. It was
further held that the compensation is to be ascertained having
regard to the conditions existing on the date of the breach. It is
a settled position of law that whether a contractual provision is
to be treated as penalty is a matter of construction which is to
be resolved by asking whether the pre-dominant contractual
function was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to
compensate the innocent party for the breach. The question to
be asked is whether the alleged penalty clause can pass muster
as a genuine pre-estimate of loss: Chitty on Contracts 30thEdn –
paragraphs 26 – 136.
15AIR 1963 SC 1405
44
78. The case law on the subject also lays down that the terms
of the contract are required to be taken into consideration and
that section 74 should be read with section 73 of the 1872 Act
for awarding reasonable compensation in case of breach even if
there is no proof of actual damage being suffered: Oil & Natural
Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd., (supra). Moreover, there
is no general liberty reserved to the Courts to absolve a party
from the liability to perform his/her part of the contract merely
on account of an uncontemplated turn of events: Travancore
Devaswom Board Vs. Thanath International 16.
79. Contrary to the allegations made by the Award-debtor
with regard to undue influence and financial duress on the part
of the Award-holder, there is no evidence of the former
registering any protest before or soon after the Agreement or
taking any steps to avoid the contract at any point of time:
M/s.Unikol Bottlers Ltd. vs. M/s.Dhillon Kool Drinks 17:: Double
Dot Finance Ltd. Vs. Goyal MG Gases Ltd., 18. Indeed, the Award-
debtor has not brought any evidence of the Award-debtor being
left with no other option but to give consent or unable to take
16(2004) 13 SCC 44
17 (1994 (28) DRJ 482)
18
(2005 (80) DRJ 113
45independent action by reason of duress or coercion exerted by
the Award-holder.
80. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Western Geco
International Ltd., dwelt on perversity and irrationality of
decisions on the touchstone of the Wednesbury Principles of
reasonableness and held that decisions which fall short of that
standard are open to challenge in a Court of law. The Supreme
Court however reiterated that the Arbitral Tribunal enjoys
considerable latitude in making awards unless the award is
untenable on the face of it or results in miscarriage of justice.
The Award in the present case does not invite any interference
on the ground of either being unreasonable or perverse as in
ignoring relevant evidence or taking into account irrelevant
matters. The Award contains sufficient reasons to justify the
conclusions.
Conclusion
81. The diverse judgments relied on by the Award-debtor from
2015-2018 and the orders passed by the Supreme Court in
2022 and 2023, in matters involving BCCI and the HCA are
irrelevant to the present dispute. All these judgments/orders
were passed on totally different factual considerations involving,
46
inter alia, the internal affairs of HCA. We fail to see how the
aforesaid judgments can have a bearing on the present matter
where the dispute arises out of the Agreement dated 16.10.2004
and the Award dated 15.03.2016 passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal consisting of three learned Arbitrators. The fact-
situation of the present Appeal filed under section 37 of the
1996 Act is entirely different and the Court must restrict the
adjudication only to the Award and the impugned order.
82. Given the said position of law and the bona fides of
Visaka’s claim against HCA, we do not find any reason to mark
a departure from the Award or the impugned order. We
accordingly hold that HCA has failed to make out any grounds
for interference in the impugned order passed by the
Commercial Court on 19.07.2024 or the Arbitral Award dated
15.03.2016.
83. It is also worthwhile to mention that HCA has blown hot
and cold even in the present Appeal in terms of pursuing the
application for interim stay of the Arbitral Award (after nine
years) and hearing of the main Appeal. HCA was never inclined
to provide statutory security for stay of the Award but tested its
luck at all levels only to get an unfair and shortlived edge over
47
Visaka. In short, HCA exposed its unsportsman-like colours
and whatever game it may have played, it was certainly not
cricket in the fairest sense of the term.
84. COMCA.No.32 of 2024, along with I.A.No.1 of 2025, is
dismissed. All other connected Applications are disposed of.
Interim orders, if any, shall stand vacated.
_________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
____________________________
B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO,J
Date: 25.06.2025
VA/BMS