The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd vs State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 24 July, 2025

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Uttarakhand High Court

The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd vs State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 24 July, 2025

                                                                  2025:UHC:6557-DB



     IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
                AT NAINITAL
                   HON'BLE MR. G. NARENDAR, C.J.
                  HON'BLE MR. ASHISH NAITHANI, J


              WRIT PETITION (S/B) No.341 of 2023

The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd.
                                                                        ...Petitioner
                                     Versus

State of Uttarakhand & others                                       ...Respondents


Counsel for the Petitioner             :       Mr. B.D. Upadhyay, learned Senior
                                               Counsel assisted by Mr. Maneesh
                                               Bisht, learned counsel.


Counsel for    State/   respondent     :       Mr. Amarendra Pratap Singh, learned
nos.1 and 2                                    Additional Advocate General.

Counsel for Respondent No.3            :       Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel.

Counsel for the caveator               :       Mr. A.K. Tripathi,    learned    counsel
                                               through VC.

JUDGMENT :

(per HON’BLE MR. G. NARENDAR, C.J.)
Heard learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioner, Mr. Amarendra Pratap Singh, learned

Additional Advocate General for the State and Mr. Aditya

Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.3.

2. The case in a nutshell is that the services of

the third respondent came to be terminated by the

petitioner, on the premise that the respondent no.3 had

tendered her resignation, and that the said resignation

came to be accepted in terms of Rule 26 of The

Kurmanchal Nagar Bank Ltd. Staff Service Rules 1993,

(for short “The Rules”), produced at running Page No.

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292 of the paper-book. Rule 26 of the Rules reads as

under:-

“26. RESIGNATION:

(a) A permanent employee who desires to leave the service
of the Bank shall give three month’s clear notice in writing
of his intention to do so. In the absence of such notice, he
shall be liable to pay three months salary in lieu of such
notice.

Provided that when an employee gives notice for leaving
the service of the Bank, the Bank may at its discretion
accept it with immediate effect or any time before expiry of
the notice period, without paying wages for the remaining
period of notice.

Provided further that, an employee’s resignation will not be
effective during the pendency of disciplinary proceeding
against him, unless accepted by the Bank in writing.

(b) In case an employee leaves the service of the Bank
without giving such notice or before the expiry of the
notice period, the Bank will be entitled to recover from the
employee, amount pertaining to the notice period or
unexpired notice period, from any salary or provident fund
or bonus or any other amount due to him, as the case may
be.

In case an employee who has been sent for any training/
course by the Bank, resigns within five years from the date
on which he joins back his duties in the Bank, after his
training, he shall be liable to refund the pay or allowance
or both, if any drawn during the course of his training and
also make good the training expenses. In case of any
contract having been signed by the employee with the
Bank before going on training, the terms and conditions of
the contract shall prevail.

The employee shall however be entitled for the pay for the
period specified in the order of acceptance of resignation
for making over charge of records, books and property of
the Bank in his custody but if he makes delay in handing
over complete charge he shall not be entitled to the pay for
the excess period

d) If any book or property of the Bank are found to have
been detained by the employee he shall continue to be
liable for the same in spite of the acceptance of his
resignation

Note: The expression ‘month’ used in this rule shall be
period of thirty days commencing on the date immediately
following the date on which the notice is received by the
appointing authority.”

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3. We have extracted the Rule for a better and

more convenient appreciation of the alleged letter of the

resignation dated 15.07.2015, which reads as under:-

“To,
The Secretary, The Kurmanchal Sahkari Bank Ltd.,
HO, Tallital, Nainital

Through: The Chairman
Subject: Resignation from the Service of the Bank

Dear Sir,
This has reference to the subject
It was my privilege to join this esteemed team and with
great enthusiasm I joined in HR function to work through
mutual learning and experience.

However, as experienced the role that was expected was
more in IR than HR and accordingly since my joining I
was entrusted with the assignments related to IR with
having very little opportunity to add value in HR function
which questioned the function credibility in the system.
The role delivered as per Management directives had
further infuriated the team to the extent that I received
derogatory letters from some of the employees, my
personal credentials that were shared with the bank
while taking employment were all made public throught
press release which really harassed me personally and
socially. However still as a professional, without getting
deterred and in spite of my nascent tenure with the
bank, I tried my best to put in all efforts towards
resolving old employee related issues. But as observed
since last 3-4 months the way I am being treated by you
is not at all acceptable as it is against professional
culture and dignity. I am even left confused about the
job clarity as without even my knowledge employees are
inducted and assigned task pertaining to HR and as
HOD-HR. I have no clue to it. At the end, the job which
is not even in my notice I am held accountable for the
same for which then I am harassed by you in front of
other employees for no fault of mine. This really makes
me tensed and put in embarrassing situation and as a
result I am not able to concentrate on my work.

Given this attitude and the environment I feel that you
do not want me continue in the Bank hence I am finding
it very difficult to perform my job. With this I am left
with no other option so regretfully it is to state that in
the interest of my professional and personal dignity, it
will be appropriate to resign from the services of the
bank and prefer sitting at home till I had a suitable
opportunity for myself. I am thankful to the Chairman

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and Directors for having faith in me and giving me an
opportunity and support to serve the Bank

With Regards,

(Seema Rehman)
HOD-HR
15.07.2015

4. The concluding paragraph is relied upon by

the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner to contend

that the same constitutes a desire to resign, and hence

the invocation of Rule 26 is fully justified.

5. A reading of the above would show that there

is neither a notice period mentioned, nor a categorical

tendering of resignation. If the letter is read in toto, the

impression it gives, is that, it is not a letter tendering

resignation, but a letter complaining of the harassment

the lady employee was facing in the workplace. The

third respondent has stated that, if the situation does

not improve, she would be better off, and it would also

be in the interest of professional and personal dignity to

resign from the bank, and it does not state that she is

resigning from the services of the Bank. This opinion of

ours is fortified by the reminder letter dated 06.11.2015.

The said letter reads as under:-

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06/11/2015
To.

The Secretary,
The Kurmanchal Sahkari Bank Limited,
HO, Tallital, Nainital

Subject: Letter dated 15/07/2015

Dear Sir,
This has reference to the subject please.
Through the said letter, I had mentioned my
grievances to your good self which still I am facing
being employee of the bank and due to which I
submitted my conditional resignation. As already
mentioned in my said letter, there is no
improvement and on the contrary the prevailing
situations are further deteriorated which is
detrimental to my professionalism and personal
dignity and I strongly feel apprehensive for my
professional safety and credibility.

It is humbly reminded that even after lapse of more
than three and a half months time period post
submitting my said letter, I have not received your
reply against it and same is still awaited please.

Thanking you in anticipation please

Kind Regards,

(Seema Rehman)
Manager-HR,
The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd.
HO, Tallital, Nainital
Enclosure – As mentioned above the said Letter dated
15/07/2015

6. Another reminder letter dated 21.11.2015

reads as under:-

To,
The Secretary,
The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd.,
HO, Nainital.

21-11-2015
Dear Sir,
This has reference to the time period that the
undersigned had spent till date in the Bank and the
experience that I had undergone during the tenure. Sir,
with due respect if is humbly submitted that basically as
an employer you are also not only responsible to see
your employees by way of payment of salary but also
his/her welfare. The Human Relation aspect is also to be
take in account in particular while dealing with a female
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employee but it is unfortunate that in my case it did not
happen so. The modesty of a lady which has got highest
marks in the society has not been maintained by you
which has given me irreparable losses.

I had joined with you in January, 2015 and I was more
or less all the times engaged in Industrial Relations work
(though, it was not my job). As already brought in your
kind notice from time to time, that at times the jobs to
be done with the aspect of HR (which was my job) are
being delivered without my notice and consent. Further,
the jobs which were being performed by me in the
interest of the employees and Bank towards streamlining
the function in terms of legalities and legacies have not
been appreciated and on the reverse my explanations
had been called from time to time for no reasons
therefor.

Considering all these facts, I had tendered my
resignation on 15-07-2015 and according to the service
conditions a decision was a must on my letter on your
part by 14-10-2015 but it was not done so because of
the reasons best known to you. Hence vide my letter
dated 06-11-2015 I had again requested you for an
appropriate decision on my letter which is still awaited
on your part.

Atlast, I submit that till I am in the job I must be allowed
to work peacefully on the HR aspect peacefully so that
harmony is created and better results are delivered.

Thanking you.

Kind regards,

(Seema Rehman)
Manager- Human Resource
The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkarı Bank Limited
HO, Nainital”

7. A plain reading of the above letter would state

that there is no improvement in the condition, and in the

concluding paragraph, the third respondent has stated

that she is yet to receive a reply, and she has nowhere

stated, nor asked for a letter of acceptance. A

resignation is complete with tendering and acceptance.
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8. On the other hand, the letter speaks that the

third respondent-employee is expecting a reply, i.e.

regarding her statement/ complaint about the vitiated

atmosphere and the environment in the work place.

9. In support of our view, we draw sustenance

from the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Union of

India and others v. Gopal Chandra Misra and

others, reported in (1978) 2 SCC 301″, wherein at

paragraph nos. 23 to 26 & 33, the Hon’ble Apex Court

has observed as under :

“23. Well then, what is the correct connotation of
the expression “resign his office” used by the founding
fathers in proviso (a) to Article 217(1)?

24. “Resignation” in the dictionary sense, means
the spontaneous relinquishment of one’s own right. This is
conveyed by the maxim : Resionatio est juris propii
spontanea refutatio (See Earl Jowitt’s Dictionary of
English Law). In relation to an office, it connotes the act
of giving up or relinquishing the office. To “relinquish an
office” means to “cease to hold” the office, or to “loose
hold of the office (cf. Shorter Oxford Dictionary); and to
“loose hold of office”, implies to “detach”, “unfasten”,
“undo or untie the binding knot or link” which holds one
to the office and the obligations and privileges that go
with it.

25. In the general juristic sense, also, the meaning
of “resigning office” is not different. There also, as a rule,
both, the intention to give up or relinquish the
office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment, are
necessary to constitute a complete and operative
resignation (see, e.g. American Jurisprudence, Second
Edn., Vol. 15-A, p. 80), although the act of relinquishment
may take different forms or assume a unilateral or
bilateral character, depending on the nature of the office
and the conditions governing it. Thus, resigning office
necessarily involves relinquishment of the office, which
implies cessation or termination of, or cutting as under

from the office. Indeed, the completion of the resignation

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and the vacation of the office, are the causal and effectual
aspects of one and the same event.

26. From the above dissertation, it emerges that a
complete and effective act of resigning office is, one which
severs the link of the resignor with his office and
terminates its tenure. In the context of Article 217(1),
this test assumes the character of a decisive test, because
the expression “resign his office” — the construction of
which is under consideration — occurs in a proviso which
excepts or qualifies the substantive clause fixing the
office-tenure of a Judge up to the age of 62 years.

33. Thus considered, it is clear that merely by
writing the letter to the President on May 7, 1977,
proposing to resign with effect from August 1, 1977, the
Judge had not done all which he was required to do to
determine his tenure, of his own volition, under proviso

(a) to Article 217(1). He had not, as yet, resigned his
office on May 7, 1977, itself, he had not done everything
which was necessary to complete the requirement of the
expression “resign his office”. He had not relinquished his
office and thus delinked himself from it. He had not — as
the learned Judges of the High Court have erroneously
assumed — crossed the Rubicon — Rubicon was still afar,
85 days away in the hazy future. At any time, before that
deadline (August 1, 1977) was reached, the Judge could
change his mind and choose not to resign, and withdraw
the communication dated May 7, 1977.

10. In the case on hand also, it is apparent that

the employee intended to resign, if the workplace

atmosphere and environment did not improve, and if the

harassment, she was suffering at the workplace, did not

stop. In fact, in the letter dated 06.11.2015, she

categorically speaks about her “conditional resignation”,

indicating thereby that she would be left with no option,

but to resign from her post, if the harassment at the

workplace did not stop. Further, in the letter dated

21.11.2015, she goes to the extent of complaining of

her modesty not being regarded and respected. In other

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words, she is complaining of sexual harassment at the

workplace. From a reading of the abovementioned

paragraphs of the citation referred to supra, it is

apparent that a resignation should be voluntary, and out

of the person’s own free will. The above letters, if

appreciated in the backdrop of the complaints narrated

therein would only go to demonstrate that it is not a

letter of resignation, but a threat to resign, if the

environment in the workplace did not alter.

11. The above reminder letter/representation is

followed by the letter dated 09.05.2016, by the

petitioner’s Management. The letter is signed by the

Secretary of the petitioner-bank, and the same reads as

under:-

Date 09/05/2016

Smt. Seema Rehman

Manager HR,

The Kurmanchal Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd.

HO Tallital, Nainital

Ref: Resignation dated 15/07/2015 and reminder
dated 06/11/2015 and 21/11/2015

Your letter of resignation along with the
reminders was perused by the competent
authority.

The allegation made by you in your letter of
resignation dated 15/07/2015 was considered
and after due diligence, it was observed that the
allegations leveled by you have lost relevance for
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the reasons that during various communications,
you have in writing accepted that you want to
withdraw the letter of complaint against the
employees leveling derogatory remarks against
you as such the issue raised by you no longer
subsists.

That taking into consideration the letters dated
15/07/2015, 06/11/2015 and 21/11/2015
submitted by you, we are of the firm opinion that
you are no more interested in rendering the
services to the bank.

That keeping the interest of the bank, your
resignation is accepted w.e.f. 09/05/2016.

That in view of acceptance of you resignation
your lien in the bank as Manager HR ceases w.e.f.
09/05/2016.

Signature

Secretary”

12. In the un-numbered first paragraph of

Annexure No.13, it is stated that the letter of

resignation, along with reminders, were perused by the

Competent Authority. The reference is to the letters of

resignation dated 15.07.2015 and the reminder letter

dated 06.11.2015 and 21.11.2015, which have been

reproduced above.

13. By the said statement, the Secretary accepts

that he is not the competent authority to terminate the

services of an employee. In the second un-numbered

paragraph, it is stated that the third respondent had

submitted her resignation under the letter dated

15.07.2015. It is further stated that the allegations

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leveled by her in the letter dated 15.07.2015 have lost

relevance because subsequently she has accepted to

withdraw the allegations. In the un-numbered third

paragraph, it is stated that, after taking into

consideration letters dated 15.07.2015, 06.11.2015 and

21.11.2015, it is recorded that “we are of the firm

opinion that you are no more interested in rendering the

services to the bank”. The letter is not counter signed

by anybody else, other than the Secretary, and it is

further stated in the un-numbered fourth paragraph that

in the interest of the bank, the resignation dated

09.05.2016 is accepted with effect from 09.05.2016.

14. A plain reading of the letter would disclose

that there is no reference to any resolution of the

governing body or of the staff service committee, which

the learned Senior Counsel would contend is invested

with the powers to appoint and terminate the services of

the bank employees. The letter is as bald as one could

be. No provision – neither in the by-laws, nor in the Act,

or Rules is pointed out, which enables or empowers the

Secretary to terminate the services by accepting a letter

of resignation.

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15. Learned Senior Counsel has not been able to

point out any provision, which vests any such powers or

authority in the Secretary to determine the services of

any employee. Be that as it may, as pointed out above,

the alleged letter of resignation, in our opinion, does not

constitute an offer to resign. Resignation is contractual,

and is in two parts: (i) an offer of the employee to

resign and (ii) acceptance of that offer and termination

of the services of the employee.

16. In the instant case, the letter of resignation is

not addressed to the Competent Authority, nor is the

acceptance of the competent authority placed on record.

It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel, that

notwithstanding the fact that the acceptance of

resignation was illegal or irregular, the same could not

have been intervened by the Registrar, and that no

authority is vested under the Act in the Registrar to

intervene with the orders of the bank, be it either rightly

or wrongly passed, and set aside the same. He would

take the Court through the provisions of Sections 99(C)

and 126 of the Uttarakhand Cooperative Societies Act,

and would also place reliance on the judgment of a

Coordinate Bench of this Court rendered in Special

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Appeal No.47 of 2013, “The Uttarakhand Co-

operative Bank Limited Versus State of Uttaranchal

and others”, wherein it has been held that the Registrar

cannot invoke the provisions of Section 126 to

determine and annul any proceedings of the bank, on

the premise that by-laws or regulations have not been

framed.

17. We have no quarrel with the said proposition,

though we are constrained to disagree with the

reasoning set out therein. Be that as it may, a reading

of Section 70 would clearly negate the stand adopted by

the learned Senior Counsel. Sub-section (1) (c) of

Section 70, reads as under:-

“70. Dispute which may be referred to
arbitration.- (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force. If
any dispute relating to the constitution,
management or the business of a co-operative
society other than a dispute regarding disciplinary
action taken against a paid servant of a society
arises –

(a)…….

(b)…….

(c) between the society or its committee and any
past committee, any officer, agent or employee or
any past officer, past agent or past employee or
the nominee, heir or legal representative of any
deceased office, deceased agent or deceased
employee of the society; or a.”

18. The dispute between the management and an

officer or employee, or a past employee, is arbitrable by

the Registrar under Section 70. The exception to sub-

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section (1) of Section 70, is that the dispute should not

relate to a disciplinary action. The disputes arising out

of the disciplinary action have been taken out of the

ambit of Section 70.

19. Here, in the instant case, admittedly it is not a

case of any disciplinary action having been initiated

against the employee. Even according to the bank, it is

a case of voluntary resignation. In that view, the

contention that the employee could not have approached

the Registrar and ought to have approached the Civil

Court, is without foundation. In fact, Section 71 enables

the Registrar to refer the disputes under Section 70 for

adjudication by arbitration. Further, sub-Section (3) of

Section 70 places an embargo on the dispute being

called in question in any Court. In view of Sub-Section

(1) of Section 70, read with Sub-Section (3) of Section

70, the contention that the Registrar has no authority to

adjudicate the issue or the claim of the employee/ past

employee is unsustainable. It is not in dispute that third

respondent has relied upon on other provisions and

preferred a revision before the State Government and it

is the case of the petitioner that no sufficient opportunity

was given to them but it is fairly admitted that notices

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were issued; the records were summoned and the

Government after looking into the records was pleased

to set aside the purported letter of acceptance.

20. The question is whether lack of sufficient

opportunity would be ground enough for this Court to

intervene and set aside the order. From the facts

narrated above, and as demonstrated by the records at

hand, it is clear as daylight that the third respondent

never intended to resign. Rather, it is more in the

nature of a complaint and a threat that if her complaints

are not addressed, she may be forced to explore the

option of a resignation.

21. A reading of Rule 26 of the Rules, as extracted

supra, would demonstrate that a person desiring to

leave the services of the bank is required to convey the

intention, with clear three months’ notice. None of the

letters even speak of putting the bank on notice, much

less a clear three months’ notice. The option to dispense

with the waiting period, or the notice period of three

months, is only conferred on the bank under the first

proviso to Rule 26(a).

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22. In that view, we are unable to comprehend, as

to how the Secretary has construed the same as a letter

of resignation. That apart, as recorded above, we find

that no authority under the Rules is invested in the

Secretary to terminate the services of any employee,

much less accept the alleged letter of acceptance.

23. In that view, the entire proceedings smacks of

gross abuse of power by an individual and by a person,

who was incompetent to exercise such authority. If the

submissions of the learned Senior Counsel that the order

impugned is vitiated on account of lack of proper

opportunity is accepted and the same is set aside, the

same would result in the revival of an order, which, by

itself, has no legs to stand. In other words, an illegal

order – an order without competence and jurisdiction,

would stand revived, which in our considered opinion is

impressible.

24. In this regard, we place reliance on the ruling

of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1966 SC

828, “Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of

Andhra Pradesh and others“. Paragraph 17 of the

same reads as under:

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“17. The result of the discussion may be stated thus:

The Primary Health Centre was not permanently located
at Dharmaji gudem. The representatives of the said
village did not comply with the necessary conditions for
such location. The Panchayat Samithi finally cancelled
its earlier resolutions which they were entitled to do
and passed a resolution for locating the Primary Health
Centre permanently at Lingapalem. Both the orders of
the Government, namely, the order dated March 7,
1962, and that dated April 18, 1963, were not legally
passed: the former, because it was made without
giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter,
because the Government had no power under S. 72 of
the Act to review an order made under S. 62 of the Act
and also because it did not give notice to the
representatives of Dharmajigudem village. In those
circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to
interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the
Government dated April 18, 1963? If the High Court
had quashed the said order, it would have restored an
illegal order – it would have given the Health Centre to
a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the
Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our
view, rightly refused to exercise its extra-ordinary
discretionary power in the circum-stances of the case.”
(underlining by this Court)

25. This position in law has further been reiterated

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “State of

Uttaranchal Vs. Ajit Singh Bhola and another” reported

in 2004 6 SCC 800 in paragraph 9, wherein, the Hon’ble

Apex Court has been pleased to hold in the last sentence

of the above paragraph as under :

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“…….it is well settled that this Court will not
exercise its discretion and quash an order which
appears to be illegal, if its effect is to revive
another illegal order”.

26. In that view of the matter, the writ petition

stands rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.

G. NARENDAR, C.J.

ASHISH NAITHANI, J.

Dt:24th July, 2025
NR/

NITESH
Digitally signed by NITESH RAWAT
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=bea38a9cb7bca67cc3988ad93d563d9
5c70eb77fa0ea4758e401cf436bdce9fb,

RAWAT
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=F691686B3C447434E89897BCDC
0B6567DCE4B7108B324FFED3C8A159F3BDD03
C, cn=NITESH RAWAT
Date: 2025.08.08 14:45:37 +05’30’

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