Delhi High Court – Orders
The Management Of Patel Integrated … vs Satbir Singh & Anr on 11 March, 2025
Author: C.Hari Shankar
Bench: C.Hari Shankar
$~90
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 1084/2024, CM APPLs. 63850/2024, 63853/2024 &
10171/2025
THE MANAGEMENT OF PATEL INTEGRATED
LOGISTICS LIMITED .....Appellant
Through: Dr. M.Y. Khan, Adv.
versus
SATBIR SINGH & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ram Kumar and Ms.
Jyotsana, Advs. with Mr. Satbir Singh,
Respondent in Person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
ORDER
% 11.03.2025
CM APPL. 10171/2025
1. We have heard Dr. Khan, who presses for stay of the execution
proceedings initiated by Respondent 1 by way of Execution Petition
130/20241 before the learned District Judge, Patiala House Court, as
well as of order dated 7 February 2025, passed by the learned District
Judge, whereby the Managing Director/Director of the appellant has
been directed to show cause as to why he be not detained in civil
prison under Order XXI Rule 41(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, and has also directed to be personally present on the next date of
1 Satbir Singh v Patel Integrated Logistics Ltd
LPA 1084/2024 Page 1 of 10
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hearing.
2. Essentially, therefore, the appellant seeks stay of operation of
the impugned judgment dated 27 May 2024 passed by the learned
Single Judge.
3. The appellant has, against it, concurrent findings of fact by the
learned Industrial Tribunal and the learned Single Judge. The scope
of interference, under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
against awards passed by Industrial Tribunals, is limited, and the
scope of interference in an intra-court court is still more restricted.
Ordinarily, therefore, there would be little, if any scope, for grant of
an interim injunction in favour of the appellant, who has been
unsuccessful at two stages.
4. Nonetheless, we have heard Mr Khan, and considered his
prayer for stay, strictly at a prima facie level.
5. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has upheld
the award dated 27 May 2005, passed by the learned Industrial
Tribunal in ID 229/2001.
6. ID 229/2001 was instituted by Respondent 1 challenging his
transfer from Delhi to Lucknow. Respondent 1, who was working as
Operation Supervisor at the time, contended that the transfer was mala
fide and punitive, as the appellant was incensed at the respondent’s
trade union activities, especially the fact that he was elected as Vice
President of the Rastriya Trade Employees Congress in 1996.
LPA 1084/2024 Page 2 of 10
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7. The learned Industrial Tribunal framed, as an issue arising
before it for consideration, the question of whether the action of the
appellant in transferring Respondent 1 Delhi to Lucknow was illegal
and unjustified.
8. The learned Industrial Tribunal, found the action of the
appellant in transferring Respondent 1 from Delhi to Lucknow to be
actuated by mala fide. Paras 10 to 13 of the award of the learned
Industrial Tribunal read thus:
“10. To appreciate the case of the parties, I have gone through
the material available on record. The case of the workman is that
he has been raising the demands of workers. The stand taken by the
workman is that due to his trade union activities, the management
became annoyed and transferred him from Delhi to Lucknow. The
case of the workman is that there is no vacancy at Lucknow against
which he was transferred and the work at Lucknow was being done
through contractor and apart from the posting of claimant, no other
employee was transferred to Lucknow. He further submitted that
he was transferred under the garb of promotion just to victimize
him and placing him out of Delhi with the mala fide intention.
Whereas the management has claimed that the transfer was due to
administrative exigencies against the vacant post at Lucknow
without any mala fide intention to victimize the claimant, rather the
claimant was sent to Lucknow on the promotion by giving the
posting at Lucknow without any intention to victimize or to punish
the claimant.
11. The perusal of the record shows that no employee was
working at Lucknow against whom or whose vacancy the claimant
was transferred nor any administrative exigency has been shown
which compel the management to transfer / post the claimant at
Lucknow. Admittedly, the work of the management has been got
gone through the contractor of Lucknow.
12. I have carefully gone through the material supplied by the
parties. The admitted position is that the management passed the
order of the transfer posting the claimant by giving the promotion
in the scale of Grade SR against the vacant post. I am of the
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considered opinion that no unionist/ trade union leader or the office
bearer of the Union should be forcibly given the promotion and
then to post out of place of working i.e. Delhi in the present case.
The management has failed to establish that the claimant has
accepted the promotion order with the transfer in any other place
than Delhi. The claimed service rule was never made the part of the
appointment or the term of the appointment in the case of claimant
and it was never conveyed to the claimant. In such a situation,
there can hardly be any legality and justification in the transfer of
the claimant.
13. So, keeping in view discussion made above, it is held that
the transfer of workman from Delhi to Lucknow is illegal and
unjustified. Issue is accordingly decided in favour of the
workman.”
9. The findings in the afore-extracted paragraphs are pure findings
of facts, which have been affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the
judgment under challenge. There are, therefore, concurrent findings of
fact against the appellant. Interference with concurrent findings of
fact, especially in industrial disputes between the management and the
workmen, has to be circumspect. One of us (C. Hari Shankar, J.) has
had occasioned to examine this aspect in DDA v Mool Chand2, and
the following passages from the said decision may be reproduced:
“27. The law, with respect to the scope of inquiry and
interference, under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, with respect to awards/orders of labour courts and industrial
tribunals is well settled, and invariably takes a leaf from the
principles, relating to the scope of certiorari and the circumstances
in which it can be issued, as enunciated by the following words of
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through
P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was), in Syed
Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan3, which have, since, become locus
classicus:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has2 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9249
3 AIR 1964 SC 477LPA 1084/2024 Page 4 of 10
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been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal
position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of
certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases
where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals
without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of
failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the
Court or Tribunal acts illegally or in properly, as for
instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity to be heard, to the party affected by the order,
or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute
is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is,
however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court.
This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact
reached the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an
error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard
to finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the
said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on
no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing
with this category of cases, however, we must always bear
in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari
on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate
to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of
fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points
cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these
limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised.
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately
describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the
record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an
LPA 1084/2024 Page 5 of 10This is a digitally signed order.
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error of law; it must be such an error of law as can be
regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record.
Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law
recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an
obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory
provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even
in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which
are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a
writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned
conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the
relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced
by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is
apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in
some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious
or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court
may need an argument to discover the said error; but there
can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the
whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it
is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a
statutory provision is reasonably capable of two
constructions and one construction has been adopted by the
inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not
necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of
certiorari. In our opinion, it neither possible nor desirable to
attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases
of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of
law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an
impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which
is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the
nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to
have been misconducted or contravened.
28. Relying on the principles enunciated in the above decision,
a catena of pronouncements of the Supreme Court,
including Management of Madurantakam Cooperative Sugar
Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan4 , P.G.I. of Medical Education and
Research, Chandigarh v. Raj Kumar5 and M.P. State Electricity
Board v. Jarina Bee6, followed, which may be regarded as having
laid down, authoritatively, the following principles:
(i) The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is the final
fact finding authority.
4 (2005) 3 SCC 193
5 (2001) 2 SCC 54
6 (2003) 6 SSC 141
LPA 1084/2024 Page 6 of 10
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(ii) The High Court, in exercise of its powers under
Article 226/227, would not interfere with the findings of
fact recorded by the Labour Court, unless the said findings
are perverse, based on no evidence or based on
illegal/unacceptable evidence.
(iii) In the event that, for any of these reasons, the High
Court feels that a case for interference is made out, it is
mandatory for the High Court to record reasons for
interfering with the findings of fact of the Labour
Courts/Industrial Tribunal, before proceeding to do so.
(iv) Adequacy of evidence cannot be looked into, while
examining, in writ jurisdiction, the evidence of the Labour
Court.
(v) Neither would interference, by the writ court, with
the findings of fact of the Labour Court, be justified on the
ground that a different view might possibly be taken on the
said facts.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. The learned Industrial Tribunal, as is apparent from the afore-
extracted paragraphs has, in arriving at a finding that the transfer of
Respondent 1 from Delhi to Lucknow was not bona fide, noted that
(i) there was no vacancy at Lucknow, against which
Respondent 1 was transferred,
(ii) the work at Lucknow was being done through a
contractor,
(iii) except for Respondent 1, no other employee was
transferred to Lucknow,
(iv) no employee was working at Lucknow, against whose
vacancy Respondent 1 was transferred, and
(v) no administrative exigency had been demonstrated,
which compelled the appellant to transfer Respondent 1.
LPA 1084/2024 Page 7 of 10
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11. On the attention of Dr. Khan, learned Counsel for the appellant,
being drawn to the aforesaid findings of the learned Industrial
Tribunal, he submits that MW-1, has, in this regard, testified during
the course of examination before the learned Industrial Tribunal, that
though it was true that the work at Lucknow was being carried out
through a franchisee, the said franchisee had to report to a Supervisor.
Respondent 1, according to MW-1, was being sent to Lucknow as the
Supervisor to whom the franchisee would report. Prior thereto,
according to MW-1, he, as a Regional Manager in Delhi, was
doubling as the Supervisor to whom the franchise in Lucknow
reported. It was in order to reduce the burden of work that Respondent
1 was transferred to Lucknow.
12. To a query from the Court as to whether there was any
documentary material on record to support the above assertions of
MW-1 in his deposition before the learned Industrial Tribunal, Dr.
Khan candidly acknowledges that there is none, but submits that the
assertions of MW-1 when in the witness box would suffice. There is,
in fact, nothing to indicate that the franchisee in Lucknow was
reporting to any Supervisor, or that there was any earlier Supervisor to
whom the franchisee was reporting, or that MW-1 was performing a
dual duty of Regional Manager in Delhi and Supervisor at Lucknow,
or that he had been paid any additional remuneration in that regard.
There is, in fact, not a single scrap of paper – metaphorically speaking,
as we are moving towards a paperless world – which would bear out
the assertions of MW-1 in the witness box.
LPA 1084/2024 Page 8 of 10
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13. No documentary material evidencing any communication
between the franchise at Lucknow and MW-1 is on record. Nor is
there any document by which MW-1 was asked to function as the
Supervisor to whom the franchise at Lucknow would report.
14. In any event, these are disputed questions of fact, regarding
which, as already noted, there are concurrent findings by the learned
Industrial Tribunal and the learned Single Judge.
15. Given the limited scope of writ jurisdiction in such matters, and
the still more limited scope of appellate jurisdiction over the decision
of the writ court, we are of the opinion that no absolute stay of
operation of the impugned award, or of the judgment of the learned
Single Judge, can be granted.
16. Accordingly, we dispose of this stay application with a direction
to the appellant to deposit, with the Registry of this Court, 75% of the
principal amount payable by the appellant to Respondent 1-workman,
within a period of eight weeks from today. The execution proceedings
initiated by Respondent 1 against the appellant, for execution of the
aforenoted award passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, shall be
adjourned to a date after eight weeks. In the event of deposit being
made as aforesaid, the execution proceedings shall stand stayed till
further orders. In the event that the appellant does not make such
deposit, Respondent 1 would be at liberty to proceed with the
execution proceedings.
LPA 1084/2024 Page 9 of 10
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17. This order is purely interim in nature, and is not intended in any
manner to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the matter.
The observations contained in this order, needless to say, shall have
no bearing on the final hearing of the present appeal.
18. The application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
19. Let a copy of this order be given dasti to the learned Counsel
for both sides.
LPA 1084/2024, CM APPLs. 63850/2024 & 63853/2024
20. Re-notify on 4 August 2025 for disposal.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
MARCH 11, 2025/aky
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LPA 1084/2024 Page 10 of 10
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 13/03/2025 at 22:01:20