The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt Seema on 13 August, 2025

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Madhya Pradesh High Court

The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt Seema on 13 August, 2025

                                                             1                                MA-6776-2023
                              IN     THE     HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
                                                    AT INDORE
                                                        BEFORE
                                      HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI
                                                 ON THE 13th OF AUGUST, 2025
                                                 MISC. APPEAL No. 6776 of 2023
                                            THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.
                                                         Versus
                                                 SMT SEEMA AND OTHERS
                           Appearance:
                                   Shri Monesh Jindal, learned counsel for the appellant / Insurance
                           Company.
                                   Shri Romil Malpani, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

                                                                 ORDER

The appellant / Insurance Company has filed this Misc. Appeal under
Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the award dated
15.03.2023 passed by the Additional Member, Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Dharampuri, District Dhar (M.P.) in MACC No.13/2020 on the
ground of false implication of the vehicle.

2. The facts giving rise to the case are that on 29.10.2019 at around

9:30 PM, the deceased Sunil was going on his motorcycle bearing
registration number MP-09-NL-3935 to Indore via Manpur, when he reached
near Bhondiya Talab, an Eicher vehicle bearing registration number MP-09-
GE-9694, which was being driven by respondent No.5 in a rash and
negligent manner, collided with the motorcycle of the Sunil. The driver of
the Eicher dismounted from the vehicle and examining Sunil but when

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bystanders began approaching, he fled the scene towards Pithampur.
Thereafter, eyewitnesses to the accident informed the police.

2.1 The respondents No.1 to 4 / claimants filed a claim petition under
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation for the
death of Sunil. The Claims Tribunal, after considering the evidence on
record, concluded that the insured offending vehicle was being driven in a
rash and negligent manner, which caused the accident and resulted in Sunil’s
death. Consequently, a total compensation of Rs.20,15,152/- was awarded to
respondents No.1 to 4 / claimants along with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant / Insurance Company submits that
the present case involves false implication of the insured vehicle, with the

sole objective of extracting unwarranted compensation from the Insurance
Company. He refers to Exh.P-2 (FIR), which was registered on 03.11.2019
for an accident that occurred on 29.10.2019 and points out that the FIR
mentions that the accident was caused by an unknown vehicle.

3.1 He further submits that the FIR refers to the statement of one
Deepak, who was claimed to be an eyewitness to the incident. Referring to
Exh. P-4 (the seizure memo), he states that the vehicle in question was seized
only on 26.11.2019, i.e., after 28 days of the accident.

3.2 He then refers to the statement of Abhilash Verma (DW-1), an
Officer of the Insurance Company and submits that DW-1 explained the
falsity of the claim and the false implication of the vehicle during his
deposition.

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3.3 The learned counsel also refers to the testimony of Seema (PW-1)
and submits that in paras 10 to 12 of her cross-examination, she yielded
under the scrutiny of the Insurance Company and contradictions emerged in
her statement. She admitted that the FIR does not mention any specific
vehicle including the Eicher vehicle. As such, her statement itself
demonstrates that the vehicle in question was not involved in the accident.

3.4 He then refers to the testimony of the so-called eye witness Sabur
(PW-2) and by referring to para 1 submits that although PW-2 stated he
informed the police, he was not the person, who lodged the FIR. In para 2 of
his statement, he falsely claimed that the Police called him 2-3 times and that
he provided them with the registration number of the offending vehicle.
However, there is no record with the Police to show that such interaction
occurred.

3.5 By referring to paras 6 to 8 of the said witness’s statement, learned
counsel submits that PW-2 made false statements before the Claims
Tribunal.

3.6 In view of the above, learned counsel submits that the conclusion
drawn by the Claims Tribunal regarding the involvement of the insured
vehicle is erroneous and solely on this ground, he prays for the award to be
set aside.

3.7 In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant /
Insurance Company relied on the following cases :

( i ) Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Shahbano and

Others. decided in M.A. No.22/2023 by this Court.

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(ii) National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Setubai reported in 2008 0
ILR (MP) 2367 .

4 . Per contra, learned counsel for respondents No.1 to 4 / claimants
supports the findings of the award. By relying on the observations recorded
in para 19 of the award, he points out that the learned Claims Tribunal has
duly considered all relevant aspects of the matter.

4.1 He submits that the accident occurred on 29.10.2019 at around
9:30 PM, and the Merg intimation report was lodged the very next day, i.e.,
on 30.10.2019 as Merg No.62/2019 under Section 174 of the
Cr.P.C. Therefore, there was no delay in reporting the incident to the police.

4.2 As regards the eye witness Sabur (PW-2), learned counsel submits
that he is not only a witness in the present claim case but also an eyewitness
in the criminal prosecution against the driver of the vehicle in the criminal
case regarding the same accident.

4.3 He submits that the Insurance Company did not call the
Investigating Officer as a witness to support their claim that the insured
vehicle was not involved in the accident. Moreover, neither the owner nor the
driver of the alleged offending vehicle was examined before the Claims
Tribunal, even though their testimony could have clarified whether the said
vehicle was involved in the accident.

4.4 In rebuttal, learned counsel for the appellant / Insurance Company
submits that even the Merg intimation does not mention the registration
number of the offending vehicle. He further submits that there was collusion
between the owner, driver and the claimants; therefore, there was no point in

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examining them as witnesses.

5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the
record.

6. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it would be
profitable to refer the law regarding the degree of proof required in a claim
case. The Division Bench of this court in the case of Mohd. Nasir vs. Angad
Prasad
reported in 2003 (4) MPLJ 95 (D.B.) has held in para 3 as under :

“3. Through this appeal, findings of the Claims Tribunal have
been challenged. Substance of evidence clearly points out that the
claimant was travelling by tourist bus No. MP 09-S/0125 from
Sagar to Bhopal. The Claimant states that it was being driven
rashly and negligently, therefore, caused accident. He is
corroborated by Mahendra Kumar (AW 2), co-passenger in this
bus, sitting by side of the driver. Read carefully, he states that the
bus was being driven rashly and negligently at a speed of 60/70
kms. per hour. He further says that there was collision between
two vehicles. He also states that the truck was being driven as a
normal speed. Therefore, it can be understood clearly from the
evidence what he intends to say is that the bus was being driven
rashly and negligently at a high speed of 60/70 kms. per hour and
the accident took place, otherwise the truck was moving at a
normal speed. The truck driven, who could say otherwise, has not
appeared in evidence. Therefore, it can be concluded that he had
no defence against the allegation of rash and negligent driving of
the bus. Two FIRs were lodged by the drivers against each other,
namely, 78/93 (Criminal Case No. 221/93) and 79/93 (Criminal
Case No. 224/93). The Claims Tribunal has not analysed and
appreciated the evidence in correct perspectives. It seems to be
under erroneous belief that the case has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, principle applicable in criminal trials forgetting
that claim cases are to be proved and decided on preponderance of
probabilities and strict rules of evidence are not applicable to trial
of claim cases. Therefore, finding is set aside and it is held that
driver of bus No. MP 09-S/0125 was responsible for committing
the accident.” (Emphasis supplied)

6.1 Again another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manful
vs. Mehmood
reported in 2003 (4) MPLJ 174 (D.B.) held in para 19 as
under :

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“19. As has already been held by long catena of cases that in the
case of motor accident strict rule of evidence is not applicable. It is
to be established prima facie that accident had taken place with a
motor vehicle and out of the use of said motor vehicle, either
injury has been caused, or, it had resulted into death of a victim. If
this much is established by the claimants, then, nothing more
is required to be proved. The underlying purpose of this is, that
innocent victims of road accidents should not suffer for want of
strict proof of accident and drivers and owners do not go scot-free
on account of this. If some doubt or obscurity is there, then,
benefit should accrue to the victims. In the case in hand, it has
been quite successfully established that it was aforesaid Tanker
only, which, had caused the accident on account of its rash and
negligent driving, thus, cutting short life of a young Army Officer.

Thus, it would be fairly reasonable to infer the culpability by the
driver, in the sequence of events mentioned above.”

6.2 The Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the dispute
regarding proof of evidence in an accident in the case of N.K.V. Bros (P)
Ltd. vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Others
reported in (1980) 3 SCC 457 has
held in para 3 as under :

” 3 . Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country,
specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This
proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been
observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial
presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that
innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not
escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some
obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred
from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court
should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes.
We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by
transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity,
despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary
control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy
economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must
bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour.
Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by
legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of
the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We
must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article
41
of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State
relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no
justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor
which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident

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cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed
by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of
tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals
so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be
magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are
unjustly indifferent in this regard.”

6.3 Again while considering the question of delay in lodging the FIR,
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ravi vs Badrinarayan and Others .
reported in (2011) 4 SCC 693 has held in para 17 to 19 as under : –

“17. It is well settled that delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a
ground to doubt the claimant’s case. Knowing the Indian
conditions as they are, we cannot expect a common man to first
rush to the police station immediately after an accident. Human
nature and family responsibilities occupy the mind of kith and kin
to such an extent that they give more importance to get the victim
treated rather than to rush to the police station. Under such
circumstances, they are not expected to act mechanically with
promptitude in lodging the FIR with the police. Delay in lodging
the FIR thus, cannot be the ground to deny justice to the victim.
1 8 . In cases of delay, the courts are required to examine the
evidence with a closer scrutiny and in doing so the contents of the
FIR should also be scrutinised more carefully. If the court finds
that there is no indication of fabrication or it has not been
concocted or engineered to implicate innocent persons then, even
if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the claim case cannot be
dismissed merely on that ground. The purpose of lodging the FIR
in such type of cases is primarily to intimate the police to initiate
investigation of criminal offences.

19. Lodging of FIR certainly proves the factum of accident so that
the victim is able to lodge a case for compensation but delay in
doing so cannot be the main ground for rejecting the claim
petition. In other words, although lodging of FIR is vital in
deciding motor accident claim cases, delay in lodging the same
should not be treated as fatal for such proceedings, if claimant has
been able to demonstrate satisfactory and cogent reasons for it.
There could be a variety of reasons in genuine cases for delayed
lodgement of FIR. Unless kith and kin of the victim are able to
regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind and are composed to
lodge it, even if, there is delay, the same deserves to be condoned.
In such circumstances, the authenticity of the FIR assumes much
more significance than delay in lodging thereof supported by
cogent reasons.”

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6.4 The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Asha Devi and Others vs.
Assistant Director, State Insurance and Provident Fund Department and
Others
reported in 2021 ACJ 2679 has held in para 4 as under :

” 4 . The deceased – Ummed Singh was an employee of the
Municipal Council. As per the appellant, the accident occurred due
to the negligent driving of the Tractor. However, the driver of the
tractor namely, Hariprakash was not produced as a witness. He
was the witness who could depose in respect of the manner of
accident and to prove that he was not negligent in driving tractor.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will come into play as the
respondents have failed to discharge onus on them to prove that
the accident was not on account of any negligent driving of the
Tractor. This Court in Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974)
1 SCC 690 held that the maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to
when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the
accident is primarily within the knowledge of the defendant.”

6.5 Recently the Honble Apex Court in the case of Geeta Dubey &
Ors. vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.
reported in I (2025) ACC 74
(SC) in para 19 to 23 has held as under :

“19. Except for a bare assertion that the vehicle has been wrongly
involved, the insurance company which has setup a plea of
collusion has done nothing to make good its case. We find that the
judgment of the High Court is wholly untenable. We say so for the
following reasons.

20. Firstly, it is well settled that in claim cases, in case the
accident is disputed or the involvement of the vehicle concerned is
put in issue, the claimant is only expected to prove the same on a
preponderance of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt.
[See Sajeena Ikhbal and Others, V. Mini Babu George and Others,
(2024) SCC OnLine SC 2883].
We also deem it appropriate to
extract the following paragraphs from the judgment of this Court
in Bimla Devi & Ors. V. Himachal Road Transport Corporation &
Ors.
, (2009) 13 SCC 530. Repelling similar contentions raised
challenging the accident and the involvement of the vehicle in
question, this Court held as follows: (Emphasis supplied)
“14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant’s
witnesses might have occurred but the core question before
the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as
to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident
or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the

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Court was required to apply the principle underlying the
burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped
in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour,
which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3.

15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken
a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in
mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular
bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by
the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their
case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have
been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should
have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth
by both the parties. (Emphasis supplied)

16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent is based
on conjectures and surmises. While holding that the police
might have implicated the respondents, no reason has been
assigned in support thereof. No material brought on record
has been referred to for the said purpose.”

21. Secondly, applying the test of preponderance of probability,
we find that the claimants have established their case that it was
the truck bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 which was
involved in the accident with car bearing no. MP-19-CB-5879
wherein the deceased was travelling. We say so for the
following reasons:-

a. The accident occurred on 18.06.2018 and the FIR was
lodged on 21.06.2018 clearly giving the date, time and the
place where the accident happened. It was also mentioned
that it was an unknown truck which came from behind in
high speed and hit the car as at that point the claimants were
unaware of the number of the truck. It referred to the injuries
suffered by the deceased.

b. It is also beyond dispute that the husband of the claimant
no. 1, the deceased Chakradhar Dubey was treated at Nagpur
Arneja Institute of Cardiology Private Limited and he died
on 28.06.2018.

c. The claimants have explained the delay by clearly stating
that after the death, they took time to regroup themselves and
set about investigating and collecting information about the
accident.

d. No sooner they obtained information, the claimant no. 1
submitted an application to the Superintendent of Police
giving the list of persons including the name of PW-2

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Sonu Shukla who had witnessed the accident.

e. Based on the application, the investigation which was
originally closed was taken up again as per the order of
S.D.O.P., Maihar and after recording the statements of
witnesses, a charge-sheet was filed for offences under
Sections 279, 337, 338 & 304A, and the case is still pending
against respondent no. 2- the driver.

f. It is also on record that after the application was given by
claimant no. 1, a notice under Section 133 of the Motor
Vehicles Act was issued to the owner and the vehicle was
seized under Exh.P-16 by the police. It has also come on
record that the truck was thereafter given on supurdnama by
the court to the owner.

g. Sonu Shukla was examined as PW-2 and he has clearly
deposed that on 18.06.2018, when he was going from
Sarlanagar to Maihar with his colleague Kapil Pandey when
respondent no. 2, who was driving the truck bearing
registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 in a rash and negligent
manner, at around 08:15 PM hit the car bearing registration
no. MP-19-CB-5879 in which the deceased was travelling.
No doubt, the witness states that he gave the information to
claimant no. 1. The witness also states that he had taken
Chakradhar Dubey to Civil Hospital, Maihar and on the same
day informed the claimant’s family about the incident.
However, he states that he did not inform the police and went
back home. The witness admits that his statement was
recorded only on 20.04.2019. The witness, however, does not
mention that he mentioned the truck number to the
family when he conveyed the news of the accident. The
witness was cross-examined but he stood by his statement.
The witness also stated that on a specific question in cross
that the front part of the vehicle bearing registration no. MP-
19-HA-1197 was of white colour and the body was of red
colour and the vehicle was of 12 wheels. The witness also
stated that the truck belonged to Sanjeev Kumar Vyasi and
denied that the said owner was his relative.

h. The insurance company examined Op.W.-1 Raj Kumar
Kachhwah who admitted that till the date of his deposition,
no information or complaint was given to the senior police
officers stating that an attempt is being made by the
claimants and the owner and driver of the vehicle to wrongly
include the vehicle bearing No. MP-19-HA-1197 in the case.
The witness also admitted that no steps to cancel the
investigation of the police has been taken and no enquiry has
been done into the veracity of the claim.

i. The MACT, on appreciation of the overall conspectus,

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particularly impressed by the fact that the insurance company
did not lodge any complaint of collusion and about the
involvement of the truck in an illegal manner concluded that
it was truck bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197 which
hit the car bearing no. MP-19-CB-5879 from behind.

22. Thirdly, the claimants having discharged the initial onus, if the
insurance company had a case that there was collusion between the
driver/owner of the truck and the claimants, it ought to discharge
that burden. It is candidly admitted by the witness Raj Kumar
Kachhwah that they had taken no steps in this regard. (Emphasis
supplied)

23. As held in Sajeena Ikhbal (supra) and Bimla Devi (supra), we
are convinced that on the principle of preponderance of
probability, the claimants have established the involvement of
vehicle bearing registration no. MP-19-HA-1197. The insurance
company having set up a specific plea of collusion has not
established the same.
As was held in Bimla Devi (supra), here too,
we feel that there was no reason for the police to falsely implicate
the vehicle concerned in the matter and launch prosecution against
the driver. If the insurance company had suspected collusion, they
would have taken steps to file appropriate complaints including
moving the higher police authorities or the court to order an
investigation into the alleged wrongful involvement of the vehicle.
There is no case for the insurance company that the police officer
also colluded. The investigation by the police has resulted in
charge-sheet being filed.

7. In view of the above stated position of law, it is preponderance of
probabilities that has to be kept in mind while considering the respective
stories set forth by the claimnt as well as the respondent Insurance Company.

7.1 Now returing back to the facts of this case, the accident occured
on 29.10.2019 at around 9.30 in the night, the Merg intimation report was
lodged on the very next day on 30.10.2019 at Merg No. 62/2019 in terms of
the provisions of Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. The police after the investigation
of the case registed the FIR on 03.11.2019 and unltimately siezed vehicle on
26.11.2019. First of all, as far as the reporting of the incident is concerned
the same was done promptly and there was no delay in the same. Secondly,
had there been any intention of involving any vehicle falsely then the same

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could have been done at the stage of registration of FIR itself. The police
after due investigation of Merg intimation found the case of accident thus
registered FIR and after further investigation found involvement of the
vehicle nubmer MP-09-GE-9894 thus charge sheet was filed agaisnt it. It is
not the case of the Insurace Company that the investigation officer also
colluded with the claimants. In fact, in the circumstances of the present case
the seizure of the vehicle after 28 days rather fortifies the story of the
claimants, as the vehilce has fled from the spot of accident, had there been
collusion then it could have been provided earlier also.

7.2 It is seen from the statement of Sabur (PW-2) that he clearly
stated he and his friend Akash were walking on the road after having food at
Rajput Dhaba. He further stated that an Eicher vehicle bearing registration
number MP-09-GE-9894 came and collided with the motorcycle of the
deceased, who died on the spot. He also mentioned that he took the purse
from the pocket of the deceased and informed the deceased’s family
members. He additionally stated that the “गाड़ वाला” (meaning the driver) had
dismounted from the vehicle and went down the road and when they
attempted to catch him, he fled away with the Eicher vehicle towards

Pithampur. This version of Sabur (PW-2) clearly proves the involvement of
the vehicle.

7.3 As regards the difference between the contents of the FIR and
the deposition of (PW-2), it is to be seen that the FIR was lodged by one
Shweta. Therefore, the absence of the vehicle registration number in the FIR
cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of PW-2. As regards the

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contention of the learned counsel of the appellant that Sabur stated in his
deposition that he called the police but he is not the person who lodged the
FIR, it is not necessary that each and every person who called after an
accident shall be named in the FIR as the informent. As stated earlier,
initially Merg intimation was registered and then FIR was lodged. As regards
the contention of the counsel of the appellant that he stated in his deposition
that police called him two/three times and he gave the registration number of
the offending vehicle but there is no record of the same, it was for the
Insurance Company to call the police personnel in the witness box and
question about the same but nothing of this sort was done by the appellant
company.

8. Furthermore, even the Investigating Officer in the criminal case was
not examined by the Insurance Company, though he could have provided
material infromation about the facts contained in the FIR as well as the
charge sheet filed by the police.

9. The Counsel of the appellant company placed heavy reliance of the
testimony of Abhilash Verma (DW-1), an Officer of the Insurance Company,
but the fact remains that even the report of the investigator appointed by the
Insurance Company was not produced before the Claims Tribunal. Thus the
testimony of DW-1 lost all of its sheen and cannot be relied upon.

10. It was the burden of the Insurance Company to prove that the
insured vehicle was not involved in the accident. Once the statements of
PW-1 and PW-2 were recorded, it was incumbent upon the Insurance
Company to bring the driver and owner of the vehicle into the witness

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box. However, this was not done.

11. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant / Insurance
Company that the driver and owner were in collusion with the claimants and
hence were not examined does not hold water. At the very least, the
Insurance Company could have filed an application to summon them as
witnesses. Had they turned hostile, the Insurance Company could have
brought the true facts on record through their cross-examination. However,
the Insurance Company did not make any effort to bring these witnesses
before the Tribunal.

12. Thus, it is evident that the Claims Tribunal, while analyzing the
issue of involvement of the vehicle in paras 11, 12 and 16 of the impugned
award, has rightly concluded that the insured vehicle was involved in the
accident.

13. As regards the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellant / Insurance Company, the facts of the case in Smt. Shahbano
(Supra) were distinguishable. In that case, the so called eyewitnesses found
to be not the eyewitnesses in fact and they even denied having seen the
accident. Considering this, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the
accident was not proved.

14. Similarly, in the case of Setubai (Supra), the facts were totally
different. In that case, the initially FIR was lodged by an eyewitness
mentioning that the accident was cause by a Truck but the police after
investigation filed chargeshee against a bus. The claimants therein filed
claim against bus, in these circumstances the court held that it was for the

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claimant to explain why truck was mentioned in the FIR and when they
wanted to rely on the chargesheet they should have explained this
contradiction by bringing the IO into the witness box. But in the present case
there is no such dispute. However, in the present case, there is an
independent eyewitness, who has clearly deposed before the Claims Tribunal
regarding the involvement of the insured vehicle and in the police
investigation also same vehicle was found to be involved.

15. As such, in the considered view of this Court, the conclusion of the
Claims Tribunal regarding the involvement of the insured vehicle is neither
perverse nor illegal in the light of the evidence available on record.

16. Consequently, the present Misc. Appeal fails and is hereby
dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Certified copy as per rules.

(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)
JUDGE

Anushree

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANUSHREE
PANDEY
Signing time: 20-08-2025
15:19:20



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