Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
The Rajasthan State Indus. Deve. And … vs Mohnish Golechha … on 17 January, 2025
Author: Manindra Mohan Shrivastava
Bench: Manindra Mohan Shrivastava
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 45/2021
1. The Rajasthan State Indus. Deve. And Invest.corp. Ltd.,
Udhyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur Through Its Managing
Director, Rajasthan State Industrial Development And
Investment Corporation Ltd. Udhyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg,
Jaipur.
2. The Regional Manager, Riico Ltd., Boranada, Jodhpur.
----Appellants
Versus
1. Mohnish Golechha S/o Late Shri Narendra Kumar
Golechha, Aged About 25 Years, B/c Jain, R/o 25, Vikas
Colony, Paota C Road, Jodhpur , District Jodhpur (Raj.)
2. The State Of Rajasthan, Through The Principal Secretary,
Industries Department, Government Of Rajasthan,
Secretariat, Jaipur.
3. The Land Acquisition Officer, Sub Divisional Officer, Tehsil
And District Jodhpur.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Devi Singh Rathore for
Mr. Sanjeet Purohit
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Pradeep Swami
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
Order
17/01/2025
1. Mr. Devi Singh Rathore for Mr. Sanjeet Purohit, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the similar
controversy has been decided by a coordinate Bench of this Court
vide order dated 06.07.2020, passed in batch of appeals led by
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.173/2019 (The Rajasthan State
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. & Anr.
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (2 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
Vs. Jawari Lal Jain & Ors.) and the present matter is squarely
covered by the said judgment.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent is not in a
position to dispute this position.
3. The order dated 06.07.2020, passed in the case of Jawari Lal
Jain reads thus:-
“1. These intra court appeals are directed against
the orders dated 5.5.2018 and 14.5.2018 passed by
the learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby the
writ petitions preferred by the respondents-writ
petitioners seeking directions to the appellants herein
to redetermine the amount of compensation payable
for the acquisition of the land, adhering to the
provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short “the Act of2013”)
have been allowed.
2. The facts relevant are that the agriculture land
of the respondents/khatedar tenants situated at
villages Boranada, Salawas, Heera Khera, Tehsil-Luni,
District-Jodhpur were acquired by the State
Government under the provisions of Rajasthan Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act of 1894”) for
establishment of Rajasthan Industrial Development
and Investment Corporation Limited (RIICO)
Industrial Area. The notification under Section 4 of
the Act of 1894 for proposed acquisition was issued
on 16.8.2010. The declaration under Section 6 was
issued vide notification dated 10.8.2011. After
following the procedure laid down and prior approval
of the State Government, the award determining the
compensation payable inter alia to the respondents-
writ petitioners was passed by the Land Acquisition
Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Officer on 24.9.2013.The
Land Acquisition Officer issued notice of the award
under Section 12 of the Act of 1894 to the persons
interested on 28.12.2015. The respondents-writ
petitioners made representation claiming that as the
amount of compensation has not been deposited/paid
in respect of a majority of land holdings in the
account of beneficiaries and therefore, by virtue of
proviso to Section 24, they are entitled to
compensation in accordance with provisions of the Act
of 2013. However, the amount of compensation
offered to the respondents-writ petitioners by
cheques was accepted by them under protest. The
prayer for re-determination of the compensation
made as aforesaid was not acceded to by the Land(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (3 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]Acquisition Officer and therefore, while claiming the
relief as aforesaid, the respondents preferred writ
petitions before this Court, which stand allowed by
the learned Single Judge. Hence, these appeals.
3. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ
petitions relying upon a coordinate Bench decision
dated 22.1.2018rendered in S.B.C.Writ Petition
No.11688/2016 (Vikas Construction Company vs.
Union of India & Ors.) and other connected petitions,
the operative portion whereof reads as under:
“As observed earlier, the admitted position in
these cases is that though the award was
passed on 20.11.2014 but the sanction of
compensation amount was received only
on05.01.2015 and, therefore, it is clear that
the compensation to the petitioners was not
paid on or before 31.12.2014 and in that
situation as per the latest guidelines issued by
the MoRTH on 28.12.2017, compensation
would be payable to the petitioners in
accordance with the First Schedule of
Acquisition Act of 2013.
In view of the above discussions, these writ
petitions are disposed of with the direction to
the respondents to redetermine the
compensation amount, awarded to the
petitioners, and revise the award dated
20.11.2014 as per the First Schedule of the
Acquisition Act of 2013 within a period of three
months from the date of production of certified
copy of this order.”
4. Mr. Sandeep Shah, learned Additional Advocate
General and Mr. Sanjeet Purohit, learned counsel
appearing for RIICO submitted that indisputably, the
award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on
24.9.2013, however, the compensation was
paid/deposited to the beneficiaries after coming into
force of the Act of 2013 w.e.f. 1.1.2014. But since,
the award passed in favour of the writ petitioners and
other beneficiaries is covered by the provisions of
Section 24 (1)(b) of the Act of 2013, all proceedings
in respect of the award passed under Section 11 of
the Act of1894 shall continue under the provisions of
the said Act and the proviso appended to Section 24
(2) of the Act of 2013 is not attracted in the matter.
Learned counsel submitted that under the Scheme of
Section 24, the proviso cannot be treated as part of
Section 24(1)(b) rather, it is appended to the
exception carved out in Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013. Learned counsel submitted that where the
award has been passed within five years preceding to
the date of commencement of the Act of 2013 i.e.
1.1.2014,further proceedings of taking possession
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (4 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
and payment compensation by virtue of provisions of
Section 24(1)(b) shall continue under the Act of 1894
as if it has not been repealed and therefore, the
beneficiaries covered by the award in question which
is passed on 24.9.2013 cannot claim re-determination
of compensation under the provisions of the Act of
2013. Learned counsel submitted that as a matter of
fact, the controversy raised by the writ petitioners
regarding the applicability of the proviso to Section
24(2) stands set at rest by a Constitution Bench
decision of the Supreme Court in Indore Development
Authority vs. Manoharlal & Ors. Etc. [S.L.P.(C)
No.9036-9038 of 2016 & other connected SLPs],
decided on 6.3.2020 and therefore, the impugned
order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to
be set aside and the writ petitions preferred by the
respondents-writ petitioners deserve to be dismissed.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents-writ petitioners while reiterating
the contention raised before the learned Single Judge,
submitted that the proviso appended to Section 24
covers both sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 24 and
therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the award in
favour of the writ petitioners was passed by the Land
Acquisition Officer prior to commencement of the Act
of 2013, the appellants having failed to deposit the
amount of compensation in the accounts of a majority
of beneficiaries, the writ petitioners were entitled for
enhanced compensation under the provisions of the
Act of 2013. However, learned counsel fairly not
disputed that the position of law stands settled by a
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Indore
Development Authority‘s case (supra). Learned
counsel submitted that admittedly, the amount of
compensation pursuant to the award passed was
deposited/paid by the RIICO in the year 2016
whereas, even under the Scheme of the Act of 1894,
the Collector must be armed with the amount of
compensation payable to the persons interested as
soon as the award is made and thus, the failure on
the part of RIICO in depositing the amount of
compensation soon after the award is passed vitiates
the proceedings subsequent thereto and the
acceptance of the amount of compensation by the
respondents-writ petitioners under protest shall not
come in their way.
6 .We have considered the rival submissions and
perused the material on record.
7. Indubitably, the controversy raised in the instant
appeals rolls around the provisions of Section 24 of
the Act of 2013, which may be beneficially quoted:
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1
of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (5 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]certain cases.-(1)Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act, in any case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),-
(a) where no award under section 11 of the
said Land Acquisition Act has been made,
then, all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11
has been made, then such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said Land
Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been
repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an
award under the said section 11 has been
made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical
possession of the land has not been taken or
the compensation has not been paid the said
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed
and the appropriate Government, if it so
chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such
land acquisition afresh in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
Provided that where an award has been
made and compensation in respect of a
majority of land holdings has not been
deposited in the account of the beneficiaries
then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under Section 4 of
the said Land Acquisition Act, shall been titled
to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.”
8. A bare perusal of Section 24(1) makes it
abundantly clear that it covers two situations arising
in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under
the Act of 1894 prior to commencement of the Act of
2013; (i) where no award has been passed under
Section 11 of the Act of 1894 as on the date of the
commencement of the Act of 2013 and (ii) where an
award had already been passed under Section 11 of
the Act of 1894 prior to commencement of the Act of
2013. Apparently, where no award is passed as per
provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1894, by virtue
of provisions of Section 24(1)(a), all provisions of the
Act of2013 relating to the determination of
compensation shall be applicable, but in case where
the award has already been passed under Section 11
of the Act then, the proceedings subsequent thereto
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (6 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
shall be governed by the Act of 1894 as if the same is
not repealed.
9. Sub-section (2) carves out an exception to
Section 24(1) and provides that where the land
acquisition proceedings has been initiated under the
Act of 1894 and award under Section 11 has been
made five years or more prior to the commencement
of the Act but the physical possession of the land has
not been taken or the compensation has not been
paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have
lapsed and the appropriate Government shall beat
liberty to initiate the proceedings of such land
acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of
the Act of 2013. The proviso to Section 24(2)
provides for payment of higher compensation to the
beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of the
Act of2013 where the compensation in respect of a
majority of the landholdings has not been deposited
in account of the beneficiaries.
10. Admittedly, notwithstanding the fact that award
in favour of the writ petitioners has already been
passed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 before the
commencement of the Act of 2013, the higher
compensation in terms of provisions of the Act of
2013 is claimed by the writ petitioners solely on the
ground that the proviso to Section 24 is applicable to
the situations envisaged under Sections 24(1) and
24(2) both. In other words, the contention of the writ
petitioners is that the proviso needs to be read not
only along with the main provision of Section 24
(2)rather, it needs to be read along with Section 24
(1)(b) as well.
11. In Indore Development Authority‘s case (supra),
a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while
considering the issue as to whether under the
Scheme of Section 24, the proviso is treated as part
of Section 24(1)(b) or it is part of the exceptions
cared out in Section 24(2), held:
“171. The main question is whether
under the scheme of section 24 the proviso is
treated as part of Section 24(1)(b)or it is
part of the exception carved out in section
24(2)particularly in view of the fact that the
word ‘or’ has been interpreted by us as ‘and’.
In that context, when Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors as
well as when the question was considered in
Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal
Bahri & Ors., [SLP[C]No.37375/2016], the
question did not come up for consideration in
any of the matters whether ‘or’ in two
negative conditions in Section 24(2) has to
be read conjunctively or disjunctively. When(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (7 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]we read the word “or”as ‘and’ in the main
part of section 24(2), it is clear that the
proviso has to stay as part of section 24(2)
where it has been placed by the legislature,
and only then it makes sense. If ‘or’ used in-
between two negative conditions of
'possession has not been taken' or
'compensation has not been paid',
disjunctively, in that case, the proviso cannot
be operative and would become otiose and
would make no sense as part of Section
24(2). In case of amount not having been
paid the acquisition has to lapse, though
possession (of the land) has been taken
would not be the proper interpretation of the
main part as mentioned above, when “or” is
read conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for
lapse in a case where possession has not
been taken, nor compensation has been paid,
in such a case proviso becomes operative in
given exigency of not depositing amount with
respect to majority of landholdings.
172. A reading of section 24(2) shows that in
case possession has been taken even if the
compensation has not been paid, the
proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment
has not been made nor deposited with
respect to the majority of the holdings in the
accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the
beneficiaries specified in the notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get
the enhanced compensation under the
provisions of the Act of 2013.Section 24(2)
not only deals with failure to take physical
possession but also failure to make payment
of compensation. If both things have not
been done, there is lapse of the acquisition
proceedings. But where payment has been
made though possession has been taken or
payment has been made to some of the
persons but not to all, and it has also not
been deposited as envisaged in the proviso,
in that event all beneficiaries (under the
same award) shall get higher compensation.
This is because once possession is been
taken, there can be no lapse of the
proceedings, and higher compensation is
intended on failure to deposit the
compensation. Once an award has been
passed and possession has been taken, there
is absolute vesting of the land, as such
higher compensation follows under the
proviso, which is beneficial to holders. In a(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (8 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]case where both the negative conditions have
not been fulfilled, as mentioned in section
24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso, in
our opinion is a wholesome provision and is,
in fact, a part of section 24(2); it fits in the
context of section24(2) as deposit is related
with the payment of compensation and lapse
is provided due to non-payment along with
not taking possession for five years or more
whereas for non-deposit higher
compensation is provided. Thus, when one of
the conditions has been satisfied in case
payment has been made, or possession has
not been taken, there is no lapse of the
proceedings as both the negative conditions
must co-exist.
173. When we consider the provisions of
section 24(1)(b)where an award has been
passed under section 11 of the Act of 1894,
then such proceedings shall continue under
the provisions of the said Act as if it has not
been repealed. The only exception carved out
is the period of 5 years or more and that too
by providing a non-obstante clause in
Section24(2) to anything contained in section
24(1). The non-obstante clause qualifies the
proviso also to Section 24(2).It has to be
read as part of Section 24(2) as it is an
exception to Section 24(1)(b). In our opinion,
Section 24(1)(b) is a self-contained
provision, and is also a part of the non-
obstante clause to the other provisions of the
Act as provided in sub-section (1).
Parliament worked out an exception, by
providing a non-obstante clause in
section24(2), to Section 24(1).
Compensation is to be paid under Section
24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and not
under the Act of 2013. As such Section 24(2)
is an exception to section 24(1)(b) and the
proviso is also an exception which fits in with
non-obstante clause of Section 24(2) only.
Any other interpretation will be derogatory to
the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b)
which provides that the pending proceedings
shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it
had not been repealed, that would include
the part relating to compensation too. Even if
there is no lapse of proceedings under
section 24(1)(a), only higher compensation
follows under Section 24(1)(a). Section
24(2)deals with the award having been made
five years or before the commencement of(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (9 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]the new Act. The legislative history also
indicates/it was intended that five years’
period should be adequate to make payment
of compensation and to take possession. In
that spirit, the proviso has been carved out
as part of section 24(2). Thus when
Parliament has placed it at a particular place,
by a process of reasoning, there can be no
lifting and relocation of the provision. To
bodily lift it would be an impermissible
exercise. Unless it produces absurd results
and does not fit in the scheme of the Act and
the provisions to which it is attached such an
interpretation, doing violence to the express
provision, is not a legitimate interpretative
exercise. There is no need to add it as the
proviso to Section 24(1)(b) as it has not
been done by the legislature, and it makes
sense where it has been placed. It need not
be lifted.
……….xxx…………….xxxxxxx………………..
182. The present case involves placement of
colon preceding to the Proviso to Section
24(2) and not Section24(1), which ends with
a full stop, and it makes sense and the true
meaning where Parliament has placed it. The
proviso is part of section 24(2). It is not
permissible to alter the provision and to read
it as a proviso to section 24(1)(b),mainly
when it makes sense where Parliament so
placed it. To read the proviso as part of
section 24(1)(b), will create repugnancy
which the provisions contained in section
24(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is
provided to complete the acquisition
proceedings where the award has been
passed, and the provisions of the Act of 1894
shall be applied as if it has not been
repealed. Section 24(2) starts with a non-
obtante clause; it plainly is notwithstanding
Section 24(1), and the proviso to section
24(2) enlarges the scope of section 24(2).
When the window period has been provided
under section 24(1)(b), i.e., section 24(2)
and its proviso, higher compensation cannot
follow in case of an award which has been
passed within 5 years of the enactment of
the Act of 2013 otherwise anomalous results
shall accrue. In case proviso is read as a part
of section24(1)(b), it would be repugnant to
the consideration of the provision which has
been carved out saving acquisition and
providing window period of 5 years to(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (10 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]complete the acquisition proceedings. There
were cases under the Act of 1894, in which
award may have been made in December,
2013, a few days before the Act was
enforced on 1.1.2014. As the provisions of
the Act of 1894 are applicable to such
awards, obviously notice of the award has to
be given under Section 12 of the said Act.
There is no question of outright deposit. In
such event as the deposit is to be made
when the Collector is prevented by the
exigencies specified in Section 31(2) from
making payment. The deposit is not
contemplated directly either in the court or
the treasury, as the case may be as provided
in section 31(2), corresponding to section
77(2) of the Act of 2013.
183. The proviso relates to the non-payment.
Compensation is deposited when the
Collector is prevented from making payment.
It is the obligation made under section 31(1)
to tender the amount and pay unless
prevented by the contingencies specified in
section 31(2). Thus, the deposit has a co-
relation with the expression “payment has
not been made”, and the proviso makes
sense with Section24(2) only. In case of non-
payment or prevention from payment,
compensation is required to be deposited as
the case may be in the Reference Court or
otherwise in Treasury, if permissible.
184. The proviso uses the expression that
the amount is to be deposited in the account
of beneficiaries. Earlier under the Act of
1894, there was no such provision for
depositing the amount in the bank account of
beneficiaries but the method which was used
as per the forms which were prescribed to
deposit the amount, it was credited to the
Reference Court or in the Treasury in the
names of the beneficiaries and as against the
award. It was not a separate account but an
account of the Reference Court or set apart
in the treasury. The proviso has to be
interpreted and given the meaning with
Section 24(2) as an amount was required to
be paid and on being prevented had to be
deposited as envisaged under the Act of
1894.
185. If we hold that even if the award has
been passed within 5 years and the
compensation amount has not been
deposited with respect to such an award(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (11 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]passed in the window period, higher
compensation to follow if it is not deposited
with respect to the majority of the holdings
would amount to re-writing the statute. The
provision of section24(1)(a) is clear if an
award has not been passed, higher
compensation to follow. No lapse is provided.
In case award has been passed within the
window period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia,
the provisions for compensation would be
that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to
section 24(1)is created by the non-obstance
clause in section 24(2) by providing that in
case the requisite steps have not been taken
for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a
negative condition. The proviso contemplates
higher compensation,in case compensation
has not been paid, and the amount has not
been deposited with respect to the majority
of the holdings, to all the beneficiaries under
the Act of 2013, who were holding land on
the date of notification under Section4. If the
proviso is added, section 24(1)(b) will
destroy the very provision of section 24(1)(b)
providing proceedings to continue under the
Act of 1894, which is not the function of the
proviso to substitute the main Section but to
explain it. It is not to cause repugnancy with
the main provision. The function of the
proviso is to explain or widen the scope. It is
a settled proposition of law that the proviso
cannot travel beyond the provision to which it
is attached. The proviso would travel beyond
the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of
section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern
by the Act of1894. Thus, the proviso has no
space to exist with section24(1)(b), and it
has rightly not been attached by Parliament,
with Section 24(2) and has been placed at
the right place where it should have been.
…………xxxx………..xxx
187. The fundamental consideration is that
the proviso cannot supersede the main
provision of section 24(1)(b)and destroy it.
The function of the proviso is to except out
the pressing provisions to which it is
attached. In case possession has been taken,
but only a few beneficiaries have been paid,
there is no lapse, but higher compensation to
all the beneficiaries has to follow. The
provision provides equal treatment to all, not
only to a few-and, in effect, his similar to
Section 28A of the Act of 1894-in case the(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (12 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]obligation to pay or deposit has not been
discharged and there is no arrangement of
money to discharge the obligation either by
paying or depositing in the Reference Court
and, if permissible, in the treasury. Section
24(2)saves land which has been vested in
the State, once award has been passed and
possession of land. However, in case
compensation has not been deposited with
respect to majority of landowners, in any
given award, all beneficiaries have to be paid
higher compensation under the new Act.
188. It was urged that section 24(1) and
24(2) deal with different subjects. It was
submitted that Section 24(1) deals with
compensation, whereas section 24(2) deals
with the lapsing of the acquisition. We are
unable to accept the submission. Section
24(2) also deals with payment of
compensation and taking of possession.
Section 24(1)(a) is concerning a situation
where no award has been made, higher
compensation under the new Act to follow. In
section24(1)(b) where the award is made (at
the time of coming into force of the new Act)
further proceedings would be under the new
law; subject to Section 24(2), the provisions
of the Act of 1894 would apply to such an
award. Thus, the main part of section 24(2)
deals with payment of compensation; also
the proviso which provides for higher
compensation to be paid to all is in the
context of section24(2) and cannot be lifted
and added to Section 24(1)(b) in the
aforesaid circumstances. What would be the
majority of the landholdings has to be seen
in the context, what has been acquired in the
case of a single plot being acquired, and in
case compensation has not been deposited
with respect to that, it will constitute the
majority. The majority does not depend upon
the number of holdings acquired, but what
constitutes the majority as per the acquired
area under the notification.
189. Section 24(1)(a) operates where no
award is made in a pending acquisition
proceedings; in such event all provisions of
the new Act relating to determination of
compensation would apply. Section 24(1) (b)
logically continues with the second situation,
i.e. where the award has been passed, and
states that in such event, proceedings would
continue under the Act of 1894. Section(Downloaded on 31/01/2025 at 10:47:40 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (13 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]24(2)- byway of an exception, states that
where an award is made but requisite steps
have not been taken for five years or more to
take possession nor compensation has been
paid then there is lapse of acquisition. If one
of the steps has been taken, then the proviso
can operate. Time is the essence. It is on the
basis of time-lag that the lapse is provided
and in default of payment for five years as
provided on failure to deposit higher
compensation is to be paid. It is based on
that time-lag higher compensation has to
follow. It is not the mere use of colon under
section 24(2)but the placement of the
proviso next to Section 24(2) and not below
Section 24(1)(b). Thus, it is not permissible
to alter a placement of proviso more so when
it is fully in consonance with the provisions of
section 24(2). Section24(2) completely
obliterates the old regime to the effect of its
field of operation. Under section 24(1)(a),
there is a partial lapse of the old regime
because all proceedings, till the stage of
award are preserved. The award, in such
proceedings, made after coming into force of
the Act of 2013 has to take into account its
provisions, for determination of
compensation. Thus, proceedings upto the
stage of award are deemed final under the
old Act. In the case under section 24(1)(b),
the old regime prevails. The proviso is an
exception to section 24(2) and in part the
new regime for payment of higher
compensation in case of default for 5 years
or more after award.
190. A proviso has to be construed as a part
of the clause to which it is appended. A
proviso is added to a principal provision to
which it is attached. It does not enlarge the
enactment. In case the provision is
repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso
cannot prevail. Though in absolute terms of a
later Act. Its placement has been considered,
and purpose has been considered in the
following decisions. It was observed in State
of Rajasthan v. Leela Jain & Ors. That:
“14…..So far as a general principle of
constructino of a proviso is concerned, it
has been broadly stated that the function
of a proviso is to limit the main part of
the section and carve out something
which but for the proviso would have
been within the operative part …..”
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (14 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this court in Sales-tax Officer,
Circle 1, Jabalpur v. Hanuman Prasad
stated that :
” 5…. It is well-recognised that a proviso
is added to a principal clause primarily
with the object of taking out of the scope
of that principal clause what is included
in it and what the Legislature desires
should be excluded.”
(emphasis supplied)
In Commissioner of Commercial Taxes,
Board of Revenue, Madras and Anr. vs.
Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver etc it was
observed:
“8…..Generally speaking, it is true that
the proviso is an exception to the main
part of the section; but it is recognised
that in exceptional cases a proviso may
be a substantive provision itself……”
(emphasis supplied)
……………..xxxx…………………………
195. The proviso thus, is not foreign to
compensation to be paid under section 24(2).
It provides what is dealt with in Section
24(2) and takes to its logical conclusion, and
provides for higher compensation, where
there is and can be no lapsing of acquisition
proceedings. The rule of construction-as is
clear from the preceding case law discussed,
is that the proviso should be limited in its
operation to the subject-matter in a clause. A
proviso is ordinarily a proviso and has to be
harmoniously construed with the provisions.
In our opinion, the proviso is capable of
being harmoniously construed with Section
24(2) and not with section 24(1)(b), once we
interpret the word ‘or’ as ‘not’ in section
24(2).
196. In keeping with the ratio in the
aforesaid decisions, this court is of the
considered view that the proviso cannot
nullify the provision of Section 24(1)(b)nor
can it set at naught the real object of the
enactment, but it can further by providing
higher compensation, thus dealing with
matters in Section24(2). Therefore, in effect,
where award is not made[Section 24(1)(a)]
as well as where award is made but
compensation is not deposited in respect of
majority of the landowners in a notification
(for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (15 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
24(2)] compensation is payable in terms of
the new Act, i.e. Act of 2013.
197. For the aforesaid reasons, considering
the placement of the proviso, semi-colon
having been used at the end of section
24(2), considering the interpretation of
section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy which
would be caused in case the proviso is lifted
which is not permissible and particularly
when we read the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section
24(2), it has to be placed where the
legislature has legislated it, it has not been
wrongly placed as part of section 24(2) but is
intended for beneficial results of higher
compensation for one and all where there is
no lapse, but amount not deposited as
required. Higher compensation is
contemplated by the At of 2013, which
intention is fully carried forward by the
placement and interpretation.”
(emphasis added)
12. The Supreme Court answered the questions
referred for consideration as under:
“363. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we answer the questions as under:
1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a)
in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014
the date of commencement of Act of 2013,
there is no lapse of proceedings.
Compensation has to be determined under
the provisions of Act of 2013.
2. In case the award has been passed
within the window period of five years
excluding the period covered by an interim
order of the court, then proceedings shall
continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b)
of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if
it has not been repealed.
3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2)
between possession and compensation has to
be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse
of land acquisition proceedings under Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where
due to inaction of authorities for five years or
more prior to commencement of the said Act,
the possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. In other words,
in case possession has been taken,
compensation has not been paid then there is
no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been
paid, possession has not been taken then
there is no lapse.
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (16 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not
include a deposit in compensation in court.
The consequence of non-deposit is provided
in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not
been deposited with respect to majority of
land holdings then all beneficiaries
(landowners) as on the date of notification for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of
1894 shall be entitled to compensation in
accordance with the provisions of the Act of
2013. In case the obligation under Section 31
of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not
been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the
said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
compensation (in court) does not result in the
lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case
of non-deposit with respect to the majority of
holdings for five years or more, compensation
under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the
“landowners” as on the date of notification for
land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of
1894.
5. In case a person has been tendered the
compensation as provided under Section
31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him
to claim that acquisition has lapsed under
Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-
deposit of compensation in court. The
obligation to pay is complete by tendering the
amount under Section 31(1). Land owners
who had refused to accept compensation or
who sought reference for higher
compensation, cannot claim that the
acquisition proceedings had lapsed under
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act
of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section
24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).
7. The mode of taking possession under
the Act of1894 and as contemplated under
Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/
memorandum. Once award has been passed
on taking possession under Section 16o f the
Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is
no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of
the Act of2013, as once possession has been
taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
8. The provisions of Section 24(2)
providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings
are applicable in case authorities have failed
due to their inaction to take possession and
pay and pay compensation for five years or
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (17 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
more before the Act of 2013 came into force,
in a proceeding for land acquisition pending
with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The
period of subsistence of interim orders passed
by court has to be excluded in the
computation of five years.
9. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2014 does
not give rise to new cause of action to
question the legality of concluded proceedings
of land acquisition. Section 24applies to a
proceeding pending on the date of
enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e.,
1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-
barred claims and does not reopen concluded
proceedings nor allow landowners to question
the legality of mode of taking possession to
reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court
to invalidate acquisition.”
(emphasis added)
13. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of
the Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority’s
case (supra) that:(i) The proviso is part of Section
24(2) and cannot be read as part of Section 24(1)(b);
(ii) The window period of five years is provided to
complete the acquisition proceedings, where the
award has been passed under Section 11 of the Act of
1894, the provisions of the Act of 1894 shall be
applied as if it has not been repealed; and (iii) In case
where the award is passed during the window period
of five years in terms of Section 24(1)(b), the
compensation is to be paid under the Act of 1894 and
not under the Act of 2013, the only contention raised
by the writ petitioners as aforesaid falls through and
therefore, the order under appeal passed by the
learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside.
14. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel
for the respondents that even under the Scheme of
Act of 1894, as soon as the award is passed, the
Collector must be armed with the amount of
compensation payable to the person interested,
suffice it to say that no such case was ever set out by
the writ petitioners in the writ petition filed or the
present appeals and therefore, the question of
consideration of the abstract contention sought to be
raised by the writ petitioners at this stage, without
any foundation of fact, cannot be entertained by this
Court. Moreover, under Section 31 of the Act of 1894,
on making the award under Section 11, the Collector
shall tender payment of compensation awarded by
him to the persons interested entitled thereto
according to award and shall pay it to them unless
prevented by some one or more of the contingency
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[2025:RJ-JD:3394-DB] (18 of 18) [SAW-45/2021]
mentioned in sub-sections (2), (3) and(4) of Section
31. From the provisions of Section 31, in no manner it
could be inferred that if the award amount is
deposited with some delay, it will vitiate the
acquisition proceedings. It is pertinent to note that
the writ petitioners have already accepted the amount
of compensation with interest and therefore, at this
stage, even otherwise, they are precluded from
raising any issue regarding the legality of land
acquisition proceedings on the ground of alleged
violation of the provisions of the Act of 1894.
15. In the result, the special appeals succeed, the
same are hereby allowed. The orders under appeal
dated 5.5.2018/14.5.2018 passed by the learned
Single Judge of this Court are set aside. The writ
petitions preferred by the writ petitioners are
dismissed. No order as to costs.”
4. In view of the above submission, the present appeal is also
allowed in the same terms of the case of Jawari Lal Jain (supra).
(MUNNURI LAXMAN),J (MANINDRA MOHAN SHRIVASTAVA),CJ
69-PoonamS/SPhophaliya/-
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