Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
The State Of A.P. vs Kuruva Byella Govindu on 7 August, 2025
1
APHC010046702009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1077/2009
Between:
1. THE STATE OF A.P., REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH
COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD.
...APELLANT
AND
1. KURUVA BYELLA GOVINDU, S/o. K. Venkata Ramudu P. Kothapalli
Village of Garladinne Mandal, Ananthapur.
...RESPODENT
Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High
Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal
against the order of the acquittal of the accused / respondent in S.C.No.425 of
2004 on the file of the Hon’ble Additional Assista Assistant
nt Sessions Judge,
th
Anantapur, dated 15 day of February, 2007 and prays that this Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused
/(Respondents) for the offences with which he was charged for the following
among others.
IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLAMP 499 OF 2009
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
condone the delay of “190” days in presenting the appe appeal
al against the order of
acquittal of the accused / respondents in S.C.No.425/2004 on the file of the
Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur dated 15 15-2-2007.
Counsel for the Appellant:
ellant:
2
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. KATA SAMBASIVA RAO
The court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.425 of 2004 on
the file of Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur (for short, ‘the
Sessions Court’) by its judgment dated 15.02.2007, acquitted the accused for
the offences punishable under section 376 and 450 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, ‘IPC‘).
2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions
Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of
PWs.1 to 9, documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.10 and material objects i.e.,
MOs.1 to 3.
3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as
follows:
Around 5:30 AM, while PW1 and her small children were at home,
the accused unlawfully entered the house with the intent to have
sexual intercourse with PW1. He latched the door, solicited her, and,
upon her protests, forcibly restrained her, gagged her mouth, tied
her hands, and committed rape. He threatened her with death if she
reported the incident. Subsequently, PW4 observed the accused
leaving the house hurriedly, and PW1, visibly distressed, disclosed
the assault to PW3 and PW4. Initially fearful, PW1 later reported the
matter to the police upon advice from a women’s organization. An
investigation followed, leading to the accused’s arrest, medical
examination of PW1, and forensic confirmation of sexual assault.
The accused was found to have criminally trespassed into PW1’s
3residence with the intent to commit rape and did so, thereby
committing aggravated offences under the law.
4. The Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Anantapur, vide order
dated 07.05.2004 in PRC No.31 of 2004, has committed the accused to the
court of Sessions, Anantapur, to take up the trial for the offences punishable
under Sections 376 and 450 of the IPC, against the accused.
5. The learned Sessions Judge of Anantapur Division has taken up the
case on file under Sections 376 and 450 of the IPC against the accused and
referred the case to the Court of the Additional Assistant Sessions Judge,
Anantapur, for disposal according to law. Subsequently, the case in Sessions
Case No.425 of 2004 has been numbered. After hearing the charges
presented by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the Sessions
court framed charges against the accused, punishable under Sections 450
and 376 of IPC against the accused, which were read over and explained to
him in Telugu, as required under sub section (2) of section 228 of Cr.P.C. The
accused did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried.
6. The learned Sessions Judge examined the accused as required under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., to enable him to consider the evidence that had been
led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against him. However,
the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and
reported no defence witnesses on his behalf.
7. After considering the available material on record, the learned Sessions
Judge found the accused not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections
376 and 450 of the IPC and acquitted him.
8. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State
contends that the prosecution has made out the necessary ingredients to
constitute offences punishable under sections 376 and 450 of IPC against the
accused; the learned Sessions judge failed to properly appreciate the
4evidence on record, which demonstrates that the accused committed rape on
the victim while she was in her house; the testimony of PW.1 (the victim) is
reliable, and the evidence of PWs.2 to 4 corroborates her version; the learned
judge ought to have held that the sole testimony of the victim is sufficient to
sustain a conviction; the other reasons assigned by the Sessions Court for
acquitting the accused are unsustainable, both in law and on facts.
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the accused
supported the findings and conclusions recorded by the Sessions Court.
10. I have heard learned counsel on either side and perused the material on
record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the
prosecution before the Sessions Court.
11. The point for determination is:
Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused?
P O I N T:
12. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to
mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1 , at
paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows:
“26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the
appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the
judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the
court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court
below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in
dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to
miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate
court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and
further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his
innocence.”
1
(2011) 6 SCC 279
5
13. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. 2, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal
against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has
concluded as under:
“16…..while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal
the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal
unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as
perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal
would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the
court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is
perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored
the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in
such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any
of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged
with.”
14. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering
the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate
court to re-appreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the
order of acquittal, this court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above
decisions and further held that:
“42…..The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the
evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”,
“good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted
conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such2
(2007) 3 SCC 755
3
(2007) 4 SCC 415
6phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to
emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal
than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to
its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to
be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial
court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”
15. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity
in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted.
However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of
fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review
the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe
any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the
appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal
provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of
innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every
person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two
reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no
limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate
court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the Sessions Court
concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal
preferred by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence
on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the
judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
7
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is
“clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.
16. With the above principles in mind, this court analyze the reasoning and
ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of
acquittal.
17. PW.1 is stated to be the victim at the hands of the accused. PW.2
(Peddakka) is her mother-in-law, while her parents were examined as PW.3
(K.G. Sangamma) and PW.5 (K.G. Govindu). The familial relationships as
outlined are not in dispute. According to the prosecution, on 31.03.2003, the
accused took advantage of PW.1 being alone at home, criminally trespassed
into her house, and committed rape by gagging her mouth, restraining her
hands with a towel, and threatening to kill her if she raised any alarm. The
prosecution primarily relied on the testimony of PW.1 to prove that the
accused committed the offence. It is generally understood that such incidents
are unlikely to have direct eyewitnesses.
18. It is well settled through judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that the victim of a sexual assault is the most competent
witness, and her testimony is entitled to great weight. In the absence of any
infirmity, a conviction can be based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix,
even without corroboration from medical evidence, provided her testimony
inspires confidence.
19. The prosecution examined PW.2, the mother-in-law of PW.1, to
establish that she witnessed the accused leaving PW.1’s house at the time of
the incident. Dr. C.R. Rama Subba Rao, who medically examined PW.1, was
examined as PW.7. His testimony indicates that he collected vaginal smears,
cervical smears, pubic hair, and swabs, which were sent to the Regional
Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis. As per Ex.P5, the certificate issued
by the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory dated 01.11.2003, there was
evidence of sexual intercourse with the victim. The defence primarily contends
8
that the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2, as well as the medical evidence, do not
withstand legal scrutiny due to several inconsistencies and subsequent
improvements in their statements. Therefore, it is argued that their evidence
should not be relied upon.
20. It can be seen from the evidence of PW.2 that she testified that the
accused gagged her mouth, tying her both hands with rope and tying off legs
by uniting them with lungi. The prosecution has not provided any cogent or
plausible explanation as to how the accused could have managed to gag the
victim’s mouth, tie both of her hands with a rope, and bind her legs together
using a lungi, all by himself, without encountering any form of resistance from
the victim. It is contrary to the normal course of human conduct to expect that
a woman subjected to such acts, more particularly in her house when done
against her will, would remain passive and offer no resistance whatsoever.
The inherent improbability of the victim not reacting or resisting during such a
prolonged and physically restraining assault has not been clarified. In the
absence of any evidence indicating that the victim was either unconscious,
incapacitated, or otherwise restrained beforehand, the prosecution’s failure to
explain the lack of resistance raises serious doubts about the veracity and
credibility of its version of events.
21. Furthermore, the Sessions Court observed that these specific facts
were not mentioned in the First Information Report and appear to be
subsequent improvements introduced during the course of evidence,
seemingly to create an impression that the victim was unable to resist the
alleged rape. If such acts had indeed occurred as alleged, it would be
reasonable to expect that the victim would have sustained at least minor
injuries during her attempt to resist. The absence of such injuries, along with
the lack of any plausible explanation from either the victim or the prosecution
regarding the absence of resistance, casts serious doubt on the prosecution’s
version and raises concerns about the overall credibility of the allegations.
9
22. The Sessions Court has rightly observed that the acts of gagging the
mouth and tying the hands and legs during the commission of rape are not
minor details that a prudent person would overlook while lodging a report. The
Sessions Court correctly held that the omission of these crucial facts from the
First Information Report, and their subsequent inclusion during the witness’s
testimony, clearly amounts to an improvement. As these details were not
mentioned in the report, the testimony of PW.1 in this regard must be treated
as a deliberate embellishment, and no evidentiary value can be attached to
such improved statements.
23. In Shashidhar Purandhar Hegde V. State of Karnataka4, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
12. The word “contradiction” is of a wide connotation which takes within its
ambit all material omissions and under the circumstances of a case, a court
can decide whether there is one such omission as to amount to
contradiction.
24. It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence,
the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions
were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. In S. Govidaraju
vs. State of Karnataka 5 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the
omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the
truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material
improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it
would not be safe to rely upon such evidence.
25. Although PW.1 claimed to have sustained minor injuries while resisting
the alleged act of the accused, there is no supporting medical evidence to
substantiate this claim, no injuries were noted on her back, buttocks, feet, or
private parts. The Sessions Court relied upon the judgment in A.P. Kota
Tirupathaiah v. Satte 6 , wherein it was held that the presence of struggle
4
(2004) 12 SCC 492
5
MANU/SC/0839/2013
6
1999 (2) ALT Crl.133
10
marks and resistance by the victim played a crucial role in affirming the
occurrence of rape. In that case, the court observed:
“she was overpoured by using force by the accused. In that case it would
have expected that the victim should have received at least minor injuries
or at least scratches during struggle, but the medical evidence completely
negative to this fact”.
26. The Sessions Court observed that the absence of any injuries on PW.1,
coupled with the omission of crucial facts in the Ex.P1 complaint, clearly
undermines and falsifies her version of events. Upon evaluating the overall
probabilities, the Sessions Court disbelieved PW.1’s version that, after
committing the rape, the accused untied the rope from her hands and then
fled the scene. If really the accused committed rape against the consent of the
PW.1 by showing knife and by tying her legs, etc., the accused must be in a
hurried manner to leave that place after committing the rape. The Sessions
Court further pointed out that there is no plausible explanation as to how the
act of rape could have been physically possible when the victim’s legs were
allegedly tied at the ankles by crossing them and securing them with a lungi.
The testimony of PW.1 indicates that the accused allegedly parted her thighs
using his hands. The Sessions Court observed that, considering the
smoothness of thigh skin, any forcible separation would likely result in visible
scratches or abrasions. However, neither medical nor oral evidence indicated
the presence of such injuries. In light of these factors, the Sessions Court
expressed doubt as to whether the accused had committed rape against PW1
and was therefore inclined to disbelieve this aspect of her version.
27. Upon considering the material on record, it is evident that the house of
PW.1 is located in a residential locality. PW.1 herself deposed that she raised
cries during the incident and that her home is surrounded by several other
houses, with a public tap situated nearby. If PW.1 had indeed raised an alarm,
it is reasonable to expect that nearby residents would have heard her cries
and come to her aid, potentially rescuing her from the alleged assault. This
raises a significant doubt regarding the occurrence of the incident as narrated.
11
28. As seen from the record, except PWs.1 and 2, the prosecution did not
choose to examine any other witnesses. The Sessions Court has also taken
into consideration that it is in PW.1’s evidence that she did not go to her
parents until the afternoon. In this regard, PW.3, the mother of PW.1 stated
that she was sitting in her house with her two sons on 31.08.2003 in the
morning, her daughter came crying. Thus, the evidence of PW.3 shows that
she was very much present in her house during the morning. At that time,
PW.1 came and informed the same about the incident of rape. The Sessions
Court has pointed out this portion of the evidence as PW.2 stated in her
evidence that immediately after the incident, she went to the parents of PW.1,
but they were not found, and she came back.
29. The Sessions Court pointed out several discrepancies in the evidence
of PWs.1, 2, and 3, and observed that there is no satisfactory explanation as
to why PW.1 failed to inform her parents about the incident until the afternoon.
From the evidence of PW.6 (Rage Ramanjaneyulu), the Panchayat Secretary,
it is evident that the police seized MOs.1 to 4 under the cover of a mahazar
marked as Ex.P4. He further stated that PW.1 brought the material objects
and handed them over to the police. The Sessions Court further noted a
discrepancy, albeit a minor one, regarding the recovery of material objects.
While PW.1 did not depose that she handed over MOs.1 to 4 (saree, petty
coat, blouse and bangle pieces respectively) to the police, the mahazar
reflects that these items were handed over to the police by her. This
inconsistency, although not substantial in itself, contributes to the overall doubt
cast on the prosecution’s version when considered alongside other
contradictions.
30. The Sessions Court also observed that PW.1 did not mention whether
her wearing apparel was torn. In contrast, the Regional Forensic Science
Laboratory report, marked as Ex.P5, reflects that a torn white petticoat, a
snuff-colored designed blouse, and a torn red blouse were examined. Based
on this, the Sessions Court questioned whether the clothing of PW.1 was sent
12
to the laboratory for examination. Furthermore, while the mahazar (Ex.P4)
records that the wearing apparel was washed, the Regional Forensic Science
Laboratory report indicates the presence of human semen and spermatozoa
on the said clothing. The medical certificate (Ex.P6) and the opinion of the
doctor who testified as PW.7 reveal signs of sexual intercourse with PW.1.
However, the evidence on record also establishes that PW.1 and her husband
were residing together in the same house on the date of the alleged offence.
Therefore, the possibility of consensual sexual intercourse between PW.1 and
her husband on the same night cannot be ruled out. The Sessions Court
rightly noted this possibility, which further weakens the prosecution’s case.
31. Moreover, the Sessions Court noted that, since the prosecution failed to
substantiate the allegation of rape, PW1’s version that the accused entered
her house and assaulted her lacks credibility. Ultimately, the Sessions Court
held that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of an
offence under section 450 of the IPC.
32. Another circumstance considered by the Sessions Court in disbelieving
the prosecution’s version is the unexplained delay in lodging the report with
the police. Notably, there was a five-day delay in filing the complaint, and the
prosecution failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for this delay.
According to the prosecution’s case, the incident allegedly occurred on
31.08.2003, whereas the report, as recorded in Ex.P1, was submitted to the
police at 7:30 PM on 05.09.2003. In an attempt to justify the delay, the
prosecution relied on Exs.P2 and P3, letters dated 21.01.2003 and
06.03.2006 respectively, purportedly written by the relatives of the accused.
However, the Sessions Court was not convinced that these documents
adequately explained the delay in reporting the incident, thereby casting
further doubt on the credibility of the prosecution’s case.
13
33. In Apren Joseph @ Current Kunjukunju and others vs. State of
Kerala7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“It is always better that the F.I.R. is rendered before there in time and
opportunity to embellish or before the informant’s memory fades. Undue or
unreasonable delay in lodging the F.I.R., therefore, inevitably gives rise to
suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and
the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness
or otherwise of the prosecution version. Effect of delay in lodging the F.I.R.,
would always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case.”
34. In State of M.P. vs. Kriparan8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“Inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to the case
of the prosecution particularly when the facts and circumstances of the
case demonstrate such an inference”.
35. The evidence on record establishes that PW.1 had informed her
husband and in-laws about the incident shortly after it occurred. In such
circumstances, the Sessions Court found it unreasonable to accept that fear
continued to prevent her from filing a complaint. Furthermore, the prosecution
has not established that the delay was due to an attempt to protect PW.1’s
honour or reputation. In fact, no cogent explanation was provided by the
prosecution for the five-day delay in reporting the offence.
36. It is a settled proposition of law that in a criminal trial, suspicion,
however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution must prove its
case and establish the charge by adducing convincing evidence to ward off
any reasonable doubt about the accused’s complicity.
37. The prosecution placed reliance on Exs.P2 and P3, letters dated
27.01.2006 and 06.03.2006, allegedly containing threats issued by the
relatives of the accused. However, these letters are dated more than three
years after the alleged incident and, even if taken as genuine, they cannot be
relied upon to justify the delay in lodging the complaint. The Sessions Court,
7
AIR 1973 SC 1
8
(2003) 12 SCC 675
14
therefore, rightly rejected PW.1’s explanation that she refrained from
approaching the police due to fear.
38. The Sessions Court also noted inconsistencies in the prosecution’s
evidence regarding the exact time the complaint was reported to the police,
casting further doubt on the reliability of the version presented. In light of these
circumstances, and upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence,
the Sessions Court rightly concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove
the guilt of the accused for the offences under section 376 and 450 of IPC
beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Sessions Court acquitted the
accused of the said charges.
39. In a criminal case, the degree of proof is the standard that is required in
civil proceedings, and if there is the slightest doubt in the mind of the court
regarding the involvement of the accused person, then the court should not
convict the accused person with such a doubt. Rather, it would be proper for
the court to pass a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. When
Sessions Court after proper appreciation of the evidence of witnesses passed
a judgment of the acquittal, it would not be appropriate for the appellate court
to disturb the said judgment, unless the said judgment of acquittal is
unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the appellate court
should not disturb the said judgment, instead, the court should upheld the
view favoured the accused.
40. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal
appeal, if another view is possible, then also the appellate court cannot
substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into a conviction unless the
findings of the Sessions Court are perverse, contrary to the material on
record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable.
15
41. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of
Karnataka9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section
378 of the Code as under:
“Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order
of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be
exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision
by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength
before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution
becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence.
Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its
verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The
Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of
not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether
the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When
two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal
is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having
seen the witnesses.
42. In State of Gujarat V. Thanabhai Ganeshbhai Rajput 10 , the High
Court of Gujarat held that as per the settled legal position when two views are
possible, the judgment and order of the acquittal passed by the trial Court
should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for special
reasons. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of
Rajasthan V. Ram Niwas11 can be relied on in this regard.
43. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is
well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated
time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh
V. Sheeshpal 12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that
another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to
reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the
acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of
decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not9
2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184
10
2022 Latest Caselaw 3827 Guj
11
(2010) 15 SCC 463
12
(2017) CriLJ 169
16made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide
powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is
reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on
the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with
specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been
rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is
reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of
the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of
the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein
after:
“10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of
judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a
comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136
of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of
the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or
mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could
also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for
reversing an order of acquittal.
11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of
proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and
it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the
accused should be adopted.
44. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the
conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on
record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out
no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondent / accused.
45. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it
should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by
the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, this court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court’s
finding.
17
46. The Sessions Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and
justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks
merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or
misinterpretation by the Sessions Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is
no flaw in the findings of fact by the Sessions Court. Therefore, the acquittal of
the respondent/accused cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal
against the acquittal is dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal is confirmed,
and there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Sessions Court.
Accordingly, the point is answered.
47. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
Criminal Appeal No.1077 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed
and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by
the learned Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur, in Sessions Case
No.425 of 2004, dated 15.02.2007, stands confirmed.
Miscellaneous applications, pending, if any, shall stand closed.
____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAODate: 07.08.2025
SAK
18THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1077 of 2009
Date: 07.08.2025
SAK