Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
The State Of A.P., vs Voppangi Rama Rao on 31 July, 2025
1
APHC010056732009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, THE THIRTY FIRST DAY OF JULY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1067/2009
Between:
1. THE STATE OF A.P., PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P.,
HYDERABAD.
...APELLANT
AND
1. VOPPANGI RAMA RAO, S/O. LATCHAYYA MALA BY CASTE, R/O.
KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL, SRIKAKULAM DIST.
2. VOPPANGI CHAKRADHARAO CHAKRADHAR, S/O. LATCHAYYA
MALA BY CASTE, R/O. KORLAM VILLAGE, GARA MANDAL,
SRIKAKULAM DIST.
...RESPODENT(S):
Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High
Court may be pleased to The Addl. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.,
begs leave of this Hon'ble Court to present this Memorandum of Criminal
Appeal against the order of acquittal of accused / respondents in CC No. 203
of 2006 on the file of the Hon’ble Spl. Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Prohibition
& Excise, Srikakulam : Dated 11th day of April 2007 and prays that this
Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict
the accused / ( Respondents ) for the offenc
offencee with which they were charged
for the following among others.
IA NO: 1 OF 2009 (CRLAMP 424 OF 2009
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
2
condone the delay of 486 days in presenting the appeal against the order of
acquittal of the accused / respondents in C.C. No. 203 / 2006 on the file of the
Special Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Prohibition and Excise, Srikakulam,
dated 11.04.2007 and pass
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. UMASANKAR LOKANADHAM
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This appeal, filed under section 378(3) & (1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C‘) is preferred by the appellant / State against the
judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of
First Class, Prohibition and Excise, Srikakulam (for short, ‘Trial Court’) in
Calendar Case No.203 of 2006. By its judgment dated 11.04.2007, the Trial
Court acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under section 353 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC‘).
2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial
Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of
PWs.1 to 6 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.4 and contradictory
statements i.e., Exs.D.1 to D.4 which were elicited during the cross-
examination of PWs.2 to 4.
3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the appeal, are as under:
On 06.12.2005 at around 02.15 PM, while the de facto complainant
was discharging his official duties, A.1 and A.2 approached him in the
court verandah, called him aside, and engaged in argument
concerning a land dispute. During the altercation, A.1 grabbed the shift
collar of the de facto complainant, while A.2 assaulted him by slapping
and kicking him, thereby obstructing him from performing his duties. As
3such, the accused committed an offence punishable under section 353
r/w 34 of IPC.
4. The Trial Court took cognizance of the offence under Section 353 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused. Upon their
appearance before the Court, copies of the relevant documents were
furnished to them as mandated under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. After hearing the submissions made by the Public Prosecutor and
the defence counsel on the question of charge, the Trial Court framed charges
against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 353 read with
Section 34 of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. The Trial Court examined the accused as required under Section 313
Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence that had been led on the part
of the prosecution and also appeared against them. But the accused denied
the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. After conclusion of
arguments and upon perusal of the material, the Trial Court found the accused
not guilty and acquitted them.
6. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, representing the
appellant/State, submits that the learned Magistrate failed to properly
appreciate that PWs.1 to 5 are court employees and that the incident occurred
on 06.02.2005 at approximately 2:15 PM in the verandah of the court building;
the Magistrate should have considered the evidence showing that A.1 caught
hold the PW.1’s shirt collar, and A.2 assaulted him by striking him on the back
and kicking him. The reasons provided by the Trial Court for acquitting the
accused are legally and factually untenable. The Trial Court erred in
disregarding the prosecution evidence, rendering the impugned judgment
inconsistent and liable to be set aside.
7. The learned counsel for the respondents/accused contends that the
case has been fabricated against the respondents owing to a land dispute; the
PW.1’s testimony lacks corroboration from other prosecution witnesses, and
4
that the Trial Court rightly disbelieved the prosecution’s version. The learned
counsel accordingly supports the findings and conclusions recorded by the
Trial Court.
8. I have heard learned counsel on either side and carefully perused the
material available on record, including the oral and documentary evidence
produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court.
9. Point for determination is:
Whether the Trial Court was justified in acquitting the
accused?
P O I N T:
10. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to
mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1 , at
paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows:
“26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the
appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the
judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the
court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court
below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in
dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to
miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate
court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and
further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his
innocence.”
11. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. 2, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal
against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has
concluded as under:
“16…..while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal
the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal1
(2011) 6 SCC 279
2
(2007) 3 SCC 755
5unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as
perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal
would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the
court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is
perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored
the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in
such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any
of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged
with.”
12. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering
the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate
court to re-appreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the
order of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme court, reiterated the principles laid
down in the above decisions and further held that:
“42…..The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court
while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good
and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in
the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court
to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,
there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption
of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
3
(2007) 4 SCC 415
6(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded
by the trial court.”
13. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity
in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted.
However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of
fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review
the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe
any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the
appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal
provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of
innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every
person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two
reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no
limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate
court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court concerning
both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred
by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence on record
and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of
acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are
“compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly
unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.
14. With the above principles in mind, this will court analyze the reasoning
and ultimate conclusion of the Trial Court in interfering with the judgment of
acquittal.
15. According to the prosecution, the incident in question occurred on
06.12.2005 at around 2:15 PM in the verandah of the Court at Narasannapeta.
It is not in dispute that PW.1 (V. Chinnavadu) was working as a Process
7
Server in the Junior Civil Judge’s Court, Narasannapeta, on the date of the
alleged incident. As per the testimony of PW.1, while he was in the verandah
of the Court, both accused approached him and questioned him as to why he
had laid bunds in their fields. In response, PW.1 stated that if they wanted any
information regarding the matter, they should approach the Mandal Revenue
Officer. The evidence of PW.1 primarily indicates that the altercation arose
due to a land dispute between the parties, which had no direct connection with
his official duties. It is not the version of PW.1 that he was discharging any
official duty at the time of the incident. Although the alleged incident is said to
have occurred around 2:15 PM in the court verandah, neither PW.1 nor the
other witnesses stated that the accused obstructed PW.1 while he was
discharging his official duties.
16. Therefore, in order to reach a logical conclusion regarding the guilt of
the accused under Section 353 of the IPC, it is essential to consider and
analyze the necessary ingredients of this section, which addresses the
offence of assault or the use of criminal force to prevent a public servant from
discharging their official duties.
17. At this stage, it is profitable to refer to the provision of section 353 of
IPC :
353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his
duty.- Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public
servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to
prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public
servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by
such person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
18. Legally, to prove the charge under Section 353 Indian Penal Code it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the following ingredients of the
offence:
(i) There must be assault or use of criminal force;
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(ii) Such assault or use of criminal force must have been made on a public
servant, and
(iii) It must have been on a public servant-
(iv) While he was acting in the execution of his duty or,
(v) With intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his discharge of
duty, or
(vi) In consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by him in
duty.
19. In Durgacharan V. State of Orissa4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, the ingredients of assault or
use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is
necessary.
20. In Manik Taneja vs. State of Karnataka5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
while analyzing the scope and applicability of section 353 of IPC, made the
following observations:
12. A reading of the above provision shows that the essential ingredients of
the offence Under Section 353 Indian Penal Code are that the person
accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used
criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from
discharging his duty as such public servant.
21. Section 353 of IPC is very categorically provides that in order to attract
the offence it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that there was assault or
use of criminal force restraining public servant from performing his official
duties or causing any act with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging
his duty. Therefore, it is evident that to make out a case under section 353 of
IPC, the prosecution must meet essential requirements that a public servant
must be assaulted or subjected to criminal force when he was carrying out his
responsibilities; or with the goal of preventing or discouraging him from doing
his duties. The execution of the public duty is the sine qua non for the
application of the aforesaid section.
4
AIR 1966 SC 1775 (Crl) 537
5
MANU/SC/0056/2015
9
22. The Trial Court also noted a discrepancy regarding the delay in lodging
the report. As evident from the record, Ex.P1 was lodged on 08.12.2005,
whereas the incident took place on 06.12.2005. During cross-examination,
PW.1 stated that he had gone to the police station immediately after the
incident and submitted a written report. This raises an inference that an earlier
report may have been given by PW.1 but was not placed on record, thereby
creating doubt about the prosecution’s version and the authenticity of Ex.P1.
23. In Apren Joseph @ Current Kunjukunju and others vs. State of
Kerala6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“It is always better that the F.I.R. is rendered before there in time and
opportunity to embellish or before the informant’s memory fades. Undue or
unreasonable delay in lodging the F.I.R., therefore, inevitably gives rise to
suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and
the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness
or otherwise of the prosecution version. Effect of delay in lodging the F.I.R.,
would always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case.”
24. In State of M.P. vs. Kriparan7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
“Inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to the case
of the prosecution particularly when the facts and circumstances of the
case demonstrate such an inference”.
25. It is a settled proposition of law that in a criminal trial, suspicion,
however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution must prove its
case and establish the charge by adducing convincing evidence to ward off
any reasonable doubt about the accused’s complicity.
26. For this, the prosecution case has to be in the category of “must be
true” and not “may be true”. In Rajiv Singh V. State of Bihar and another8
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that :
“It is the well-entrenched principle of criminal jurisprudence that a charge
can be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence to warrant6
AIR 1973 SC 1
7
(2003) 12 SCC 675
8
(2015) 16 SCC 369
10legal conviction and that no person can be held guilty on pure moral
conviction. Howsoever grave the alleged offence may be, otherwise stirring
the conscience of any court, suspicion alone cannot take the place of legal
proof. The well-established cannon of criminal justice is “fouler the crime,
higher the proof”. In unmistakable terms, it is the mandate of law that the
prosecution, in order to succeed in a criminal trial, has to prove the
charge(s) beyond all reasonable doubt”.
27. The pivotal question, however, is whether, at the time of the alleged
assault, PW.1 was acting in the discharge of his duties as a public servant, or
whether the assault or use of criminal force was intended to prevent or deter
him from performing such duties, or was in consequence of any act done or
attempted to be done by him in the lawful discharge of his official functions.
For the offence under Section 353 of the IPC to be made out, it must be
clearly established that the public servant was, at the relevant time, engaged
in performing a duty imposed upon him by virtue of his office. In the present
case, the evidence indicates that, at the time of the alleged assault or use of
criminal force, PW.1 was not engaged in any act so integrally connected with
the functions of his office as to constitute an official duty.
28. The record reveals that PW.2 (S. Kantha Rao) was working as a
Copyist, PW.3 (P. Viswanadham) as a Junior Assistant, PW.4 (D. Butchi) as a
Record Assistant, and PW.5 (B. Lokanadham) as the Head Clerk of the same
Court. However, their testimonies did not support the prosecution’s case.
According to their testimony, upon hearing some altercations, they exited their
respective rooms and observed the accused and PW.1 involved in a physical
altercation, pushing each other. However, none of the witnesses attributed any
specific acts of obstruction or assault by the accused that would substantiate
the charge under Section 353 IPC.
29. The material on record indicates that there is neither any allegation nor
evidence to suggest that the accused assaulted PW.1 or used criminal force
against him with the intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duties
as a public servant, or that the act was in consequence of anything done or
11
attempted by PW.1 in the lawful discharge of such duties. Accordingly, this
Court is of the view that the alleged assault bears no real nexus, causal
connection, or consequential relation to the performance of his official
functions. There is not even a scintilla of evidence from which it can be
reasonably inferred that the accused intended to obstruct or deter PW.1 in the
discharge of his official duties.
30. It is undisputed that PW.1, a Process Server, was not engaged in the
discharge of his official duties at the time of the incident. The altercation
clearly arose from a private land dispute between PW.1 and the accused, and
not in the context of any official function. The mere occurrence of the incident
during lunch hour within the court premises does not, by itself, attract the
provisions of Section 353 IPC. The Trial Court rightly observed that the
prosecution failed to prove that the accused obstructed PW.1 in the
performance of his duties. The testimony of PW.1, uncorroborated by other
court staff (PWs.2 to 5), lacks independent support. Moreover, no explanation
was offered for the delay in lodging the complaint, despite PW.1 being a court
employee. Though he claims to have reported the incident immediately, the
record does not reflect prompt disclosure. Given the admitted pre-existing land
disputes between the parties, the unsubstantiated and inconsistent evidence
of PW.1 does not inspire confidence. There is no material on record indicating
that the accused assaulted PW.1 or used criminal force to deter him from
performing official duties. Accordingly, the essential ingredients of the offence
under Section 353 IPC are not made out, and the prosecution has failed to
establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
31. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal
appeal, if another view is possible, then also the appellate court cannot
substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into conviction unless the findings
of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably
wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable.
12
32. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of
Karnataka9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section
378 of the Code as under:
“Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order
of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be
exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision
by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength
before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution
becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence.
Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its
verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The
Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of
not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether
the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When
two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal
is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having
seen the witnesses.
33. In State of Gujarat V. Thanabhai Ganeshbhai Rajput 10 , the High
Court of Gujarat held that as per the settled legal position when two views are
possible, the judgment and order of the acquittal passed by the trial Court
should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for special
reasons. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of
Rajasthan V. Ram Niwas11 can be relied on in this regard.
34. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is
well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated
time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh
V. Sheeshpal 12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that
another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to
reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the
acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of
decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not9
2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184
10
2022 Latest Caselaw 3827 Guj
11
(2010) 15 SCC 463
12
(2017) CriLJ 169
13made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide
powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is
reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on
the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with
specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been
rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is
reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of
the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of
the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein
after:
“10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of
judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a
comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136
of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of
the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or
mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could
also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for
reversing an order of acquittal.
11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of
proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and
it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the
accused should be adopted.
35. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it
should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by
the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, taking the facts and
circumstances of the case into consideration, this court is not inclined to
reverse the Trial Court’s finding.
36. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the
conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on
record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out
14no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondents / accused. Taking the
uncontroverted allegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence
under section 353 of IPC are not made out. Consequently, the prosecution
has failed to establish the material elements necessary to sustain a charge
under section 353 of IPC.
37. The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and
justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks
merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or
misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no
flaw in the findings of fact by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, the acquittal
of the respondents cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against
the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed and there is
no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the
point is answered.
38. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
Criminal Appeal No.1067 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed
and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by
the learned Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Prohibition and Excise,
Srikakulam, in Calendar Case No.203 of 2006, dated 11.04.2007, stands
confirmed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
_______________________
T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, JDate: 31.07.2025
SAK
15THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1067/2009
Date: 31.07.2025
SAK