Gujarat High Court
The State Of Gujarat vs Shailesh Labhshankar Pandya on 3 June, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2172/2006 JUDGMENT DATED: 03/06/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2172 of 2006
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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THE STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
SHAILESH LABHSHANKAR PANDYA & ANR.
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Appearance:
MS. JIRGA JAVERI, ADDL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR. BC DAVE(245) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. ARSH R SHAIKH(6726) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
MR. RZ SHAIKH(6888) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 03/06/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present Acquittal Appeal has been filed by the State
under Section-378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
challenging the judgment and order dated 07/09/2006 passed
by learned Special Judge and 2nd Additional Sessions Judge,
Jamnagar at Khambhalia (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial
Court”) in Special Case No.4 of 2000. By way of the
impugned judgment and order, the accused have been
acquitted of all the charges levelled against them under
Sections-7, 9 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as “Corruption Act“).
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2. The short facts emerging from the record are read as under:-
2.1 It is the case of complainant namely Mansukh Thakarshi
Vithlani that there was quarrel took place between him with
his neighbour Dineshkumar Jamnalal Lohana at about 09:00
PM on 10/04/1991. So, his neighbour Dineshkumar had
registered an F.I.R. against the complainant and his daughter
at Okha Police Station.
2.2 After the aforesaid incident, the complainant was admitted in
the hospital on 11/04/1991 and was discharged on
15/04/1991. Thereafter, with the help of advocate, he had
also registered a private complaint against his neighbour-
Dineshbhai in Dwarka Court on 15/04/1991. However, as he
had not fully recovered, he was again hospitalised in Dwarka
Government Hospital on 16/04/1991, and therefore, was
discharged on 19/04/1991.
2.3 As the complainant was under apprehension of being
arrested, he was stayed at the residence of his brother
Narshidas Gokaldas. During this period, he came to know
that accused No.1 namely Shailesh Labhshankar Pandya, who
was serving as P.S.I. at Dwarka Police Station, having charge
of Okha Police Station, was conducting the investigation in
relation to F.I.R. registered by his neighbour against him. On
24/04/1991, the complainant also came to know that accused
No.2 namely Ramaniklal Tulsidas Samani, who was having a
shop in Dwarka under the name and style of “Swastik Vastu
Bhandal”, having good relations with accused No.1. So, the
complainant contacted accused No.2 to find out some
solution in the case registered against him. After involvement
of accused No.2, he contacted accused No.1 by telephone and
informed the complainant that the matter could be settled by
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paying Rs.1,000/- to accused No.1.
2.4 So, the complainant went to Dwarka Police Station and met
accused No.1 where he demanded Rs.1,000/- and advised the
complainant to come next day in the morning i.e. 25/04/1991.
When the complainant visited the office of accused No.1 in
the morning hours of 25/04/1991, accused No.1 had informed
complainant that his brothers were also involved in
commission of crime for which an additional Rs.1,000/- would
required to be paid by complainant. Despite requesting
accused No.1 to take a reasonable amount, but he was not
agreed for the same, but advised the complainant to come
next day i.e. 26/04/1991.
2.5 Thus, undergoing aforesaid facts and circumstances, the
complainant having approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau
Office at Jamnagar, where met Officer Mavani, who had
received his written complaint and arranged for the trap.
2.6 After completing all the necessary procedural formalities,
including the arrangement of panch-witnesses and giving all
necessary guidance in relation to successful trap, all went to
the office of accused No.1. The accused No.1 had advised the
complainant to pay amount to accused No.2 at his shop. So,
all went to the shop of accused No.2, where he had received
amount of Rs.1,000/- towards bribe. Thereafter, the Trap
Officer and panch-witnesses gathered at the spot, and
Rs.1,000/- was recovered from accused No.2, and other
necessary formalities were completed, thereby successfully
conducted the raid.
2.7 After completion of the panchnama, the accused was booked
for the offence and arrested. Further, upon completion of
investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the accused
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for the alleged offence of demand and acceptance of bribe
and a Special Case was registered with the Trial Court after
obtaining sanction from the competent authority of the
concerned department where the accused was working.
3. The prosecution led following oral and documentary evidence
in support of it’s case and to bring home the charges against
accused.
Oral Evidences of Prosecution
Sr. Name and Particulars Exh.
No.
1. Mansukh Thakarshi Vithlani 13
2. Jaysukhbhai Kanjibhai Chauhan 15
3. Jaysukhbhai Kevaldas Agravat 16
4. Ghanshyamsinh Bhaghubha Jadeja 18
5. Chandulal Gordhandas 23
6. Jogeshwar Vishwesvar Mahapatra 24
7. Kashyapkumar Ghimantprasad Bhatt 30
8. Ravisinh Kesarisinh Jadav 31
9. Girirajsinh Ghanshyamsinh Zala 32
Documentary Evidences
Sr. Document Particulars Exh.
No.
1. Original Complaint 19
2. Panchnama regarding bribery trap 20
3. Seizure Memo of muddamal seized from the 21
accused No.2
4. The original sanction order issued for 25
prosecuting Accused No.1 in a criminal case
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5. Xerox copy of register of five-year-old record 28
of Class-‘G’
6. Xerox copy of notice dated 16/12/1991 29
7. Certified copy of the wireless message 33
containing the order issued by the D.S.P.,
Jamnagar, dated 18/04/1991 to 22/04/1991,
assigning the charge of Okha Police Station
to the Dwarka Police P.S.I.
8. Copy of the letter written by P.I. Shri A.C.B. 34
to the D.S.P. for sending information
regarding Accused No. 1
9. Forwarding letter regarding the information 35
sent to the D.S.P. about accused Shailesh
Pandya
10 Certified copy of the first page of the service 36
book showing the initial appointment of
accused Shailesh Pandya
11. Certified copy of the order of last 37
appointment of accused Shailesh Pandya
4. After conducting the Trial and appreciating the evidence on
record, the Trial Court has found that prosecution has failed
to establish the case and not able to prove the charges
beyond doubt, thereby acquitted the accused from all the
charges levelled against him.
5. I have heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ms.Jirga
Javeri for the State at length and learned Advocate Mr.Arsh
R. Shaikh for the accused No.1. Both the learned Advocates
have taken me through various oral as well as documentary
evidence, which are on record of the case. I have also
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independently examined and re-appreciated evidence of
witnesses examined by the prosecution.
6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ms.Jirga Javeri would
submit that the findings of acquittal are contrary to law and
evidence on record and the findings recorded by the Trial
Court are erroneous and based on irrelevant material.
6.1 Learned APP would submit that the prosecution has
successfully established on record that accused has
demanded and accepted Rs.1,000/- from complainant,
thereby, proved the ingredients of Section-7 read with
Section-13 of Corruption Act.
6.2 Learned APP would submit that Trial Court has erroneously
observed that accused has not demanded bribe from
complainant and erroneously came to the conclusion that
prosecution has failed to prove charges beyond doubt.
6.3 Learned APP would further submit that the oral evidence on
record, more particularly the evidence of complainant,
supports the case of the prosecution, who has categorically
deposed that the accused had demanded Rs.1,000/- to
facilitate process of loan by accused and so, raid was
conducted by following due process as envisaged under law.
6.4 Learned APP would submit that complainant might not have
supported the case of the prosecution, but that would not
ipso facto entitled the accused to get acquittal, as the
prosecution has successfully established the guilt of accused
by leading other independent evidences, which are
completely brushed aside by the Trial Court.
6.5 Learned APP would submit that when demand and
acceptance of money by accused, the charges levelled against
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accused ought to have been considered as successfully
proved by the prosecution and in such circumstances, the
accused are required to be held guilty for commission of such
serious crime affecting public at large.
6.6 Learned APP would further submit that merely because the
sanctioning authority has given his sanction to prosecute
accused No.1 for the offence under Section-13(2) of the
Corruption Act, it would not automatically absolve accused
No.1, having beneficiary of amount of bribe received by
accused No.2 at the instance of accused No.1.
6.7 Thus, the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court while
acquitting the accused are unjust, improper, perverse and
unwarranted to the facts of the prosecution case and thereby,
has committed an error in acquitting the accused. It is
further submitted that the prosecution has established the
guilt of the accused and learned Trial Court has committed
an error both on law and facts.
6.8 Thus, the learned Trial Court has wrongly recorded the order
of acquittal, which deserves to be quashed and appropriate
sentences for the offences be passed against all the accused
and he urged this Court to allow the captioned appeal.
7. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr.Arsh R. Shaikh would
submit that there is no error, much less any gross error,
committed by the Trial Court while acquitting the accused
and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the well-
reasoned order passed by the Trial Court while exercising its
appellate power under Section-378 of Cr.P.C.
7.1 Mr.Shaikh, learned Advocate would further submit that the
complainant turned hostile and did not support the case of
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the prosecution and from bare reading of other evidence
which came on record, would indicate that the entire case
submitted by prosecution is nothing but a false suit, whereby
the accused were falsely implicated for alleged commission of
crime.
7.2 Mr.Shaikh, learned Advocate would further submit that the
concerned PSI of Okha Police Station, where the F.I.R. came
to be registered against the complainant by his neighbour
and which could have been investigated, was on leave for
only five days between 18/04/1991 to 22/04/1991. As such,
accused No.1 was having charge of Okha Police Station
between 18/04/1991 to 22/04/1991 only. Therefore, there was
no reason for accused No.1 to demand any gratification from
the complainant on 25/04/1991, as alleged.
7.3 Learned Advocate Mr.Shaikh would further submit that
despite the reasoned and clear observation made by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Raghuvirsinh
V/s. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1976 page 91
(para-11), directing the use of ‘anthlin powder’ while
conducting a trap, the ACB has not used such powder while
conducting raid, which vitiates the entire raid having not
successfully undertaken by the trapping officer.
7.4 Mr.Shaikh, learned Advocate would further submit that the
Trial Court has correctly observed other discrepancies in the
evidence led by the prosecution, including the time of
commission of offence so observed in the F.I.R. produced at
Exh.19.
7.5 Mr.Shaikh, learned Advocate would further submit that the
sanctioning authority had granted sanction only for the
alleged offence under Section-13(2) of the Corruption Act qua
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accused No1, and therefore, he could not have been tried for
other offences. The trial stands vitiated as no sanction was
granted by the sanctioning authority for such offences, which
is mandatory in nature.
8. Before dealing with merit of the appeal, at this stage, I would
first like to remind myself the position of law propounded by
Supreme Court of India in its various decisions, whereby it
has laid down several criteria while deciding acquittal appeal
especially in Anti-Corruption cases.
9. It would be apt to refer and rely upon the decision of the
Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of
India in a case of Neeraj Dutta V/s. State (Govt. of N.C.T.
of Delhi) reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731 wherein it held as
under.
“88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
88.1 (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt
of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)
(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.
88.2 (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of
fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct
evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.
88.3 (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
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demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be
proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct
oral and documentary evidence.
88.4 (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public
servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there
being any demand from the public servant and the latter
simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of
the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand
by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand
and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is received by the
public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of
obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under
Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe
giver and the demand by the public servant respectively
have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In
other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more would not make it
an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and
(ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7
of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there
must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver
which is accepted by the public servant which would
make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by thePage 10 of 20
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public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and
inturn there is a payment made which is received by
the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment
under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5 (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal
gratification may be made by a court of law by way of
an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary
evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis
of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to
raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the
fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not.
Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by
the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption
stands.
88.6 (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’,
or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting
in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in
evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence.
The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of
acquittal of the accused public servant.
88.7 (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on
the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the
court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was
for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the
said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the
court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of
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course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal.
Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of
the Act.
88.8 (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact
referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory
presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.1 It would be also appropriate to refer and rely upon the
decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Mallappa and Ors. V/s. State of Karnataka reported in
(2024) 3 SCC 544 wherein scope of acquittal is succinctly
discussed and elaborated held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law regarding the
scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the
foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour
of the accused, unless proven guilty. The presumption continues
at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when
the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets
concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because
once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record,
finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the
same in appeal.”
“25. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and there
is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the
exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High
Court to re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record.
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However, the power of the High Court to re-appreciate the
evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under
challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be
asked is whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the
evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material
pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is
whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an
error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the
view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view. A decision
of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of
opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity.”
“26. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal
case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The ‘two-views
theory’ has been judicially recognized by the Courts and it
comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results into
two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be
resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an
equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused is in
itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution.
Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. And
therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in
favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of
action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the Trial
Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for
the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the
evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it
practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the
eyes of law. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, 2015 10 SCC 230“13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on
appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view takenPage 13 of 20
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by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court
should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This
Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., 2002 9 SCC 639
has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the
trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is
not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court
while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court,
thus:
“9. We are constrained to observe that the High Court was
dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal
with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to
dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles
while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been
overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by
the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has
been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of
acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the
learned trial court was a reasonable view and even if by any
stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was
possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an
order of acquittal.””
(emphasis supplied)
In Sanjeev v. State of H.P., 2022 6 SCC 294 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court analyzed the relevant decisions and summarized
the approach of the appellate Court while deciding an appeal
from the order of acquittal. It observed thus:
“7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons
which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accusedPage 14 of 20
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must be dealt with, in case the appellate court is of the view that
the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned
(see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, 2019 5 SCC 436
Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., 2020 10 SCC 166)7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal
presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced
(see Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 AIR(SC) 807)7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the
appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the
appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala,
1998 5 SCC 412)”
(emphasis supplied)
9.2 The law on the issue germen in the present appeal has also
been succinctly discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in its recent judgment in the case of State of
Lokayuktha Police, Devanagere V/s. C. B. Nagaraj
delivered on 19th May, 2005 in Criminal Appeal
No.1157/2015 [2025 INSC 736], wherein held as under:
“25. It is pertinent to note that till 05.02.2007, when the
Respondent had conducted the physical/spot inspection, there is
not even a whisper of there being any demand of bribe.
Moreover, when the Complainant went back to the Respondent’s
office at 5:30 PM with the money, the prosecution case itself as
per the deposition of its witnesses makes it clear that the
Respondent had informed the Complainant that he had already
forwarded the concerned file. Thus, if the same is accepted,
there was no occasion for the Complainant to go ahead with
paying the amount, which he claims to be in the nature of bribe
demanded by the Respondent, after the work for which the bribePage 15 of 20
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was purportedly sought, had already been done. The
observation of the High Court to this extent is correct that
just because money changed hands, in cases like the
present, it cannot be ipso facto presumed that the same
was pursuant to a demand, for the law requires that for
conviction under the Act, an entire chain – beginning from
demand, acceptance, and recovery has to be completed. In
the case at hand, when the initial demand itself is
suspicious, even if the two other components – of payment
and recovery can be held to have been proved, the chain
would not be complete. A penal law has to be strictly
construed [Md. Rahim Ali v State of Assam, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1695 @ Paragraph 45 and Jay Kishan v State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 296 @ Paragraph 24]. While we
will advert to the presumption under Section 20 of the Act
hereinafter, there is no cavil that while a reverse onus under
specific statute can be placed on an accused, even then, there
cannot be a presumption which casts an uncalled for onus on
the accused. Chandrasha (supra) would not apply as demand
has not been proven. In Paritala Sudhakar v State of Telangana,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1072, it was stated thus:
’21. As far as the submission of the State is that the presumption
under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was, would operate
against the Appellant is concerned, our analysis supra would
indicate that the factum of demand, in the backdrop of an
element of animus between the Appellant and complainant, is
not proved. In such circumstances, the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act would not militate against the Appellant, in
terms of the pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana,
(2006) 2 SCC 250:
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NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2172/2006 JUDGMENT DATED: 03/06/2025
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’22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the
prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence story
set up by the appellant cannot be said to be wholly improbable.
Furthermore, it is not a case where the burden of proof was on
the accused in terms of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise,
where demand has not been proved, Section 20 will also
have no application. (Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas
[(2005) 12 SCC 576: (2005) 8 Scale 246] and T. Subramanian
v. State of T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC 401: (2006) 1 Scale 116])”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Thus, it is now a well-settled legal position of law that a heavy
burden is cast upon the prosecution to prove that the accused
has demanded and accepted the bribe, and the same would
have to be recovered from accused. In a case where any of
these ingredients are missing, the charges levelled against
accused under Section-7 read with Section-13 would not be
attracted.
11. Now, keeping in mind the aforesaid principle laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, first it is required to be
considered as to whether the accused had demanded bribe
from complainant or not and is there any serious error of law
and facts committed by Trial Court while acquitting accused?
12. At the outset, it is required to be observed that as per the
sanction given by the sanctioning authority vide its letter
dated 20/12/1991 (Exh.25), would indicate that sanction was
granted only for Section-13(2) of the Corruption Act, though
F.I.R. was registered for committing alleged offence under
Sections-7, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Corruption Act by
accused No.1.
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NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2172/2006 JUDGMENT DATED: 03/06/2025
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13. As per Section-19 of the Corruption Act, it is a sine qua non
to obtain sanction for conducting trial against accused who is
public servant for the commission of an offence under
discharging his official duty. It is by now well settled legal
position of law that grant of sanction is not an idle formality
or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act
which affords protection to Government Servants against
frivolous prosecutions. [See – State of Maharashtra v/s
Mahesh G Jain reported in (2013) 8 SCC 119 (para-14)].
14. Thus, in the absence of sanction under different provisions of
Corruption Act, the accused No.1 could not have been tried
or held guilty for other offences except could have been tried
for alleged offence under Section-13(2) of the Corruption Act.
15. Apart from the aforesaid aspect, the Trial Court has correctly
appreciated the entire evidence that came on record and
having found several discrepancies in the evidence of
prosecution, which ultimately creates doubt in the mind of
Trial Court which led to acquittal of the accused.
16. The complainant turned hostile and did not support the case
of the prosecution and after going through his entire
testimony, including the cross-examination conducted by
learned APP as well as Advocate for the accused, would
indicate that the story put forward by complainant in his
complaint is doubtful and would not inspire any confidence.
During his examination-in-chief and cross-examination, the
complainant has admitted that he was not fully aware about
the facts of the case and also incident for which he had
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NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2172/2006 JUDGMENT DATED: 03/06/2025
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registered the complaint. It further appears that the
complainant was known as a headstrong person in his area.
He has further admitted that accused No.1 had never called
him in relation to any offence registered at Okha Police
Station. If that is so, there was no reason for the complainant
to first met accused No.2 to get any undue favour from
accused No.1. Moreover, there are other discrepancies also
noticed in his evidence in relation to time of conducting raid,
which have been observed by the Trial Court in its impugned
judgment.
17. It has also come on record that concerned PSI of Okha Police
Station was on leave for five days, as his leave was
sanctioned for the period between 15/04/1991 to 22/04/1991.
So, accused No.1 having given charge of Okha Police Station
for the said period. Therefore, there was no reason either for
the complainant to approach accused No.1 for giving any
undue advantage and or any reason for the accused No.1 to
ask for bribe for the offence which was not going to be
investigated by him. This fact, itself, falsifies in the entire
case of the prosecution about demand of bribe by accused
No.1.
18. So far as discrepancy regarding the timing of
raid/commission of offence observed in the F.I.R. vis-a-vis
other evidence of prosecution is concerned, the concerned
investigating officer was no more (died), thereby such aspect
could not be successfully clarified by the prosecution.
Nonetheless, the Trial Court has specifically observed in
para-17 of its judgment that the timings recorded by the
raiding party/trapping officer for preparation of raid, leaving
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NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2172/2006 JUDGMENT DATED: 03/06/2025
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Jamnagar towards Dwarka and completion of panchnama,
etc., would create reasonable doubt about conducting raid as
alleged.
19. Thus, after going through the entire set of evidence and upon
its re-appreciation, I am unable to take different view than
that taken by the Trial Court, whereby it has acquitted
accused having not found guilty for commission of crime by
giving them the benefit of doubt.
20. Considering these set of evidences on record and in light of
the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as
reproduced hereinabove, which deals with the law on
acquittal so also issue germen in the appeal, I am of the
opinion that no error has been committed by the Trial Court
while acquitting the respondent.
21. Consequently, the appeal is DISMISSED. Resultantly, the
impugned judgment and order of the trial court is hereby
confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record
and proceedings, called for, be sent back to the concerned
Trial Court forthwith.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
Nilesh
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