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Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Yashoda Singh on 18 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A No.617 of 2024
-----
1.The State of Jharkhand
2. The Director General of Police, Jharkhand Ranchi, Project Bhawan,
HEC Building, Dhurwa, PO & PS Dhurwa, District Ranchi
3. The Superintendent of Police, Giridih, PO & PS Giridih, District
Giridih.
4.The Deputy Inspector General of Police, North Chotanagpur
Hazaribagh, PO & PS Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh.
5. The Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand Armed Police, Jharkhand
Ranchi at Nepal House, Raja Rani Khoti, PO and PS Doranda, District
Ranchi. … … Appellants
Versus
Yashoda Singh, W/o late Ram Nath Singh, R/o VillageBamangora, PS
Parsudih, PO Sarjand, District East Singhbhum…. … Respondent
—–
CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
——-
For the Appellant(s) : Mr.Indranil Bhaduri,S.C.-IV
For the Respondent :
——
th
Order No.05/Dated: 18 August, 2025I.A. No. 12990 of 2024
The present interlocutory application has been filed under
section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 174
days in filing of the instant Letters Patent Appeal.
2. Having been satisfied with the reasons stated in paragraph Nos.
3 onwards to the present Interlocutory Application stating therein that
the substituted petitioner in W.P.(S) No.564/2019 submitted her
representation through speed post on 10.4.2024. Thereafter, matter was
examined and direction was sought from the higher authorities for
further action. Accordingly, matter was placed before competent
authorities at different stages in the office of the Director General of
Police, Jharkhand, whereby, it was decided to obtain opinion of Law
1
2025:JHHC:24266-DBDepartment, Govt. of Jharkhand who sent the file to the Learned
Advocate General for his opinion and the Learned Advocate General
gave his opinion that L.P.A. be filed in the instant case through the office
of Standing Counsel-IV. Thereafter, it was provided to the office of the
concerned advocate and thereafter it was placed for approval of the
competent authority and thereafter present L.P.A. was filed 27.09.2024.
However, till then certified copy of the impugned order could not have
been obtained which was subsequently filed on 17.10.2024 and thus the
delay in filing the appeal is due to procedural technicalities and was not
deliberate, we hereby condone the delay of 174 days’ in filing the appeal.
3. Accordingly, the present Interlocutory Application stands
allowed.
L.P.A. No. 617 of 2024
1. The present Appeal has been filed under Clause-10 of the
Letters Patent against the order dated 06.03.2024 passed by the learned
Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 564 of 2019, whereby and
whereunder, the learned Single Judge has been pleased to allow the writ
petition by quashing the order of dismissal from service dated 21.2.2018
with further direction to release the death-cum-retiral benefits of the
original petitioner by treating him in service at the time of his death,
however, without any back wages on the principle of ‘no work no pay’.
2. The brief facts, as per the writ petition is that the original
petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police at Tisri Police Station in
District-Giridih and he was made the Investigating Officer of Tisri P.S.
Case No. 37/16 registered under Sections 147/148/149//354/379/307/436
2
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
of 1.P.C and Tisri P.S. Case No. 38/2016 registered under Sections
147/148/149/354/379/307 of IPC, both instituted on 09.10.2016. The
original petitioner was arrested by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) on
the allegation made by one Naresh Yadav that the I.O. of the aforesaid
cases had demanded Rs.3,000/- from each of the accused persons of Tisri
P.S. Case No. 38/2016 on the pretext of deleting their names from the
said case. Subsequently, on verification of the allegation, A.C.B
Dhanbad P.S. Case No. 15 of 2016 was registered on 30.11.2016 against
the original petitioner. It was further alleged that the original petitioner
was caught red handed by a team of ACB on 01.12.2016 while receiving
bribe of Rs.10,000/- and he was remanded to judicial custody on
02.12.2016. Thereafter, he was suspended from service with immediate
effect vide Giridih District Order No. 2623/2016 as contained in memo
No. 6078 dated 02.12.2016 issued by the respondent No.3. A memo of
charge was issued by the respondent No.3 to the original petitioner vide
D.O. No. 2703/16 on 08.12.2016 for showing extreme lethargy,
dereliction of duty, indiscipline, masterfulness, arbitrariness, inaction,
violation of order, being caught red handed by Anti-Corruption Bureau
while taking bribe of Rs.10,000/-, involvement in corruption and being
an incompetent police officer.
An explanation was asked from the original petitioner vide memo
No. 2726/Confidential dated 12.09.2017 issued under the signature of
the respondent No.3. He submitted his explanation on 24.09.2017
before the respondent No.3 requesting inter alia to stay the
departmental proceeding till the final order was passed in the criminal
3
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
case instituted against him. However, the enquiry officer proceeded
with the enquiry and submitted report observing that the aforesaid
charges against the original petitioner stood proved and also
recommended for his dismissal from service. Thereafter, the
respondent No.4 dismissed the original petitioner from service vide
the impugned order dated 21.02.2018. The original petitioner then
preferred an appeal against the said order of “dismissal from service”
before the respondent No.2, however, the same was also rejected vide
the impugned order dated 06.11.2018.
3. It is evident from the facts that the original writ petitioner,
husband of the present writ petitioner, while working as Sub-Inspector of
Police at Tisri Police Station has been trapped while taking amount of
gratification and, thereafter, criminal case was instituted against him and
he was taken into custody. A departmental proceeding has also been
initiated against himwhich was concluded with an order of dismissal
from service while the deceased employee was in service.
4. The husband of the writ petitioner, the deceased employee, has
preferred a writ petition challenging the order of dismissal mainly on the
ground that the complainant, namely, Naresh Yadav on whose behest the
complaint was instituted before the Anti Corruption Bureau has not been
examinednor Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, Police Inspector-cum-investigating
officer, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Dhanbad, was examined during the
departmental enquiry. All the witnesses examined during the
departmental proceeding were hearsay witnesses who neither proved the
factum of demand nor the acceptance of illegal gratification. Further the
4
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
ground was taken that during pendency of the criminal charge the
departmental proceeding ought to have been stayed till the conclusion of
criminal case.
5. The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid aspect of
the matter and has come to a conclusion that the allegation against the
petitioner in criminal case and in departmental proceeding was identical
and further by taking into consideration the non-adherence of Principle
of Natural Justice by the authority concerned, has allowed the writ
petition. Accordingly, the writ petition has been allowed by interfering
with the order of dismissal with a direction to release all the post death-
cum- retiral benefits without any back wages on the principle of ‘no
work no pay’ due to demise of the original petitioner which is the subject
matter of the present appeal.
The arguments advanced on behalf of the State-appellant:
6. The learned counsel for the State-appellant has taken the
following grounds:
(i) That the learned Single Judge while proceeding on the
premise that the departmental proceeding and criminal
case should not be allowed to be proceeded
simultaneously, has interfered with the order of
punishment of dismissal which cannot be said to be just
and proper due to the reason that the departmental
proceeding and the criminal case can go simultaneously
as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of ” Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines
5
2025:JHHC:24266-DBLimited &Anrreported in (1993) 3 SCC 679which has
not been properly appreciated.
(ii) It is also submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Ors.
Vs. Sarvesh Berry [S.L.P (Civil) No. 24560 of 2003] has
held that criminal case and departmental proceeding can
proceed simultaneously.
(iii) Further, it has been submitted that Letter No. 8000 dated
2.9.2015 issued by Secretary, Department of Personnel,
Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of
Jharkhand does not prohibit the initiation of departmental
proceeding during the pendency of a criminal case. It is
only when the criminal case of a grave nature which
involves complicated questions of law and facts it is
desirable to stay the departmental proceeding till the
conclusion of the criminal case. There is no strait jacket
formula that in each and every case where a criminal case
is pending the departmental proceeding should be stayed.
(iv) The learned counsel for the State based upon the
aforesaid ground has submitted that the impugned
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, therefore,
suffers from error and, hence, it is fit to be quashed and
set-aside.
Analysis:
7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
6
2025:JHHC:24266-DBgonethrough the impugned judgment and also to the materials available
on record. The main limb of argument as has been advanced on behalf
of the State, the appellant herein, is that the judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat
Gold Mines Limited &Anr.(supra)has not properly been appreciated.
8. This Court, therefore, is proceeding to consider the aforesaid
arguments in the premise of legal proposition settled by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines
Limited &Anr. (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down
the following guidelines as to in which case the departmental proceeding
and the criminal case will allow to go parallel and in which case the
departmental proceeding will have to wait for outcome of criminal case.
For ready reference the paragraph of aforesaid judgment is being quoted
herein under:
“22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this
Court referred to above are:
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can
proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted
simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on
identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case
against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves
complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the
departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and
whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case,
will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched
against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected
against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in
isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be
given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly7
2025:JHHC:24266-DBdelayed.
(v.) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly
delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on
account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and
proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the
employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he
is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.”
9. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that if the allegation against the criminal case and
the departmental proceeding is so complex that it cannot be segregated
then in such circumstances, the departmental proceeding has to wait for
outcome of the criminal proceeding.
We, on consideration of the aforesaid judgment and adverting
to the factual aspect particularly by comparing with the accusation made
in the First Information Report and the departmental proceedings, have
found that the fact of the case is not so complex that it cannot be
segregated reason being that the charge framed in the departmental
proceeding pertains to the dereliction in duty, indiscipline,
masterfulness, arbitrariness, inaction, violation of order and the
involvement in the corruption while the charge in the criminal case is of
accepting the gratification, hence, the law as laid down in the case of
Capt. M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited &Anr. (supra)
the case is not so complex so that it cannot be segregated but this aspect
has not been taken into consideration by the learned writ court.
10. This Court therefore is of the view that the findings recorded by
the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that the facts pertaining
to criminal case and the departmental proceeding are identical, this
8
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
Court is of the view that the said findings cannot be said to be proper.
11. The fact remains, as would appear from comparison of the
memorandum of charge and the imputation made in the First
Information Report based upon the complaint made by the informant,
namely, Naresh Yadav, the charge cannot be said to be similar, since in
the departmental proceeding the question of moral turpitude and the lack
of confidence have also been taken as a charge which is evident from
the bare perusal of memorandum of charge compared with the criminal
proceeding wherein the allegation has been leveled for accepting
gratification leading to institution of a case under section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. For reference the charge as available in
the FIR and the memorandum of charge pertaining to the Departmental
Proceeding are as under:
The charge as per First Information Report:
” ाथिमकी (F.I.R.)
(द० ०सं०कीधारा 154 केअधीन)
1. िजला – धनबाद, अनुमंडल…..थाना-ितसरीवष-2016 ाथिमकीसं 0 15/16 * ितिथ-30.11.2016
2. (1) • अिधिनयम (Act)- भ०िन०अिध० 1988…….*धाराएं (Section) 7/13(2)
(I)) अिधिनयम (Act)-…..धाराएं (Section)
(III) अिधिनयम (Act)……..धाराएं (Section)
(iv)• अ अिधिनयमएवंधाराएं (Other Acts and Sections)
3. (क) अपराधकीघटना……..िदन…..ितिथसे .. 25.11.16 ितिथतक.. 31.11.16
समयाविध (पहर)… अंिकतनही*ं बजेसे…..बजे तक….
(ख) थानाम ा सुचनाितिथ-30.11.2016समय- 15.00 बजे
(ग) ाथिमकीदजकरनेकीितिथ- 30.11.2016समय- 15.00 बजे
(घ) थानादै िनकीसंदभ- िवि सं ०… थानादै िनकीकेअनुसारसमय- 15:00 बजे
4. सुचनाका कार (type of Information) िल खत……*िल खत/मौ खक (Written/Oral)
5. घटना ल (क) थानासे िदशाएवदु री- उ रपि मलगभग 140 िक0 मी० * ग स०
(ख) *पता- ितसरीथाना-िग रिडह
9
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
(ग) थानाकीसीमासे बाहरहोने कीदशामथानाकानाम…… िजला…..
6. प रवादी/सूचनादाता :
(क) नाम- नरे शयादव
(ख) िपताकानाम- धने रयादव
(ग) ज -ितिथ………… (घ) रा ीयताभारतीय
(3) पारप सं ०. ………िनगतितिथ……..िनगम ान……..
(च) पेशा ………………..
(छ) पता ामपो०गु मगी, थानाितसरी, िजला- िग रिडह
वतमान ाम- ल ीपुर, थानाजामा, िजलादु मका———————–”
Memorandum of Charge in Departmental Proceeding:
Annexure-2
1912-16
आरोप ा प
DONO-2703/16
िनलंिबतपु०अ०िन०रामनाथिसं ह, त ालीनपु०अ०िन०ितसरीथानावतमान ाियकिहरासत,
धनबादमंडलकाराकेिव कत केदौरानबरतीगईघोरिशिथलता, कत हीनता, अनु शासनहीनता,
े ाचा रता, गनमानेपन, अकम ता, आदे शो ंधन, र तके पम 10,000
पयालेते एरं गे हाथ ाचारिनरोधक ूरोकेधावादलकेसद ोंके ारापकड़े जाने,
ाचारमिल होनेएवं एकअयो पुिलसपदािधकारीहोनेकाआरोपलगायाजाताहै िक :-
1. नरे शयादबिपता-धने रयादव, ामपो -गु मगी, थाना-ितसरी, िजला-िग रडीहके ारापु िलसअधी क,
ाचारिनरोधक ूरो, धनबादकोआवे दनसमिपतिकयागयाथा.
िजसमउ ेखिकयागयाथािकइनकेगाँ वकासोनूकुमारिपताअिनलयादवने इ एवं ज 10
योंकेिव ितसरीथानामितसरीथानाकां डसं ा 38/16, िदनां क 09.10.16
दजकरायाहै ।इसकां डकेअनुसंधानकताआपकोबनायागयाथा।आपके ाराउकाकां डकेअिभयु ोंसे ित
3000 पये कीगॉगकीगईथीऔरनहीद ं े नेपरसभीकोिगरफ्
तारकरजेलभे जदे नेकीधमकीदीगईथी।इसकीजाँ चक ै या सादिसं ह, पु०िन०सहजॉचकता ाचारिनरोधक ूरो,
धनबादके ारािकयागया।जाँ चमयहत उभरकरआयािककुल 39, 000 पयातीन-
चारिक ोंमदे नेकीबातपरआपराजीहोगयेथे।
2. प रवादीनरे शयादविपता-धने रयादव, ाम-पो -गु मगी, थाना-ितसरी.
िजलािग रडीहकेआवे दनकेस ापनोपरां त ाचारिनरोधक ूरो, धनबादथानाकाडसं ा 15/16 िदनाक
30.11.16 आपकेिव पंजीकृतिकयागयाहैऔरिदनां क 02.12.16 को ाियकिहरासतमभे जागयाहै ।
3. थाना भारी, ितसरीके ाराथानाडी०आर०सं ा 600/16, िदनाक 02.12.16
के ाराएक ितवे दनसमिपतिकयागयाहै , िजसमउ े खिकयागयाहै िकआपकोिदनां क 01. 12.16 कोलगभग
11.00 बजेपूवा मितसरीथानाकेओ०डी०क से 10,000
पया र तलेते एरं गे हाथ ाचारिनरोधक ूरोकेधावादलकेसद ोंके ारािगरफ्तारकरले जायागयाहै ।
4.
आपके ारा दिशतकीगईघृिणतहरकतसे ानीयपुिलसकीग रमापरठे सप ँ चीहै औरआमजनताकािव ास ानीय
पुिलस शासनपरसे सठनेजठनेसेकदािपइ ारनहीिं कयाजासकताहै ।ितसरीथानाकेओ०डी०क से ाचारिनरोध
क ूरोकेघावादलकेसद ोंके ारा 10, 000 पया र तलेते एरं गे हाथिदनाक 01.12.2016
कोिगर ारकरिदनां क 02.12.2016 को ाियकिहरासतमभेजागयाहै ।आपके ाराकत केदौरानकत हीनता,
अनुशासनहीनता, े ाचा रता, गनमानेपन, उद ताकीघोरपराका ा, अकम ता, आदे शो ंघन, 10, 000
पया र तलेते एरं गे हाथ ाचारिनरोधककेघावादलके ारापकड़े जाने ,
ाचारमिल होते एवं एकअयो पुिलसपदािधकारीहोनेकाघोरप रचायकहै ।
5. आरोपकीगं भीरताकोदे खते एआपकोिग रडीहिजलादे शसं ा 2623/2016 कायालयझापां क 6078/ गो०,
10
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
िदनां क 02.12.2016 के ारासामा जीवनयापनभ ापरिनलंिबतिकयागयाहै ।
6.
उपरो विणतआरोपोंकेआधारपरआपकेिव िवभागीयकायवाही ारं भकरने हेतुआरोप ा पगिठतिकयाजाता
है ।
दश :- 1. पुिलसअधी क, अ०िन० ूरो, धनबादकेप ां क 608/16, िदनां क 02.12.16 फीमू ल ित।
2. ०िन० ूरो, धनबादथानाकां डसं ा 15/16. िदनां क 30.11.16. भ०िन०अिध० 1988 केधारा 7/13 (2)
की ाथिमकीकीछाया ित।
3. नरे शयादवके ारािदनां क 25.11.16 कोपुिलसअधी क, ०िन० ूरो, धनबादको
‘समिपतआवे दनकीछाया ित।
4 थाना भारी, ितसरीके ारासमिपतथानाडी०आर०न0 600/16. िदनां क 02.12.16 कीछाया ित।
5. िग रडीहिजलादे शसं ा 2623/16. झापां क 6078/ गो०, िदनां क 02.12.16 कीछाया ित।
गवाह –
1. क ै या सादिसं ह, पु०िन०सहजाँ चकता, ०िन० ूरो, धनबाद।
2. ०िन० ूरो, धनबादकेधावादलकेसद ।
3. स०अ०िन०भोलािसंह, ितसरीथाना।
4. हवलदारग ूपासवान, ितसरीथाना।
5 हललदारबालबा ी, ितसरीथाना
6. चालकआर ी 379 राजकुमारराम, ितसरीथाना।
7. रसोईयाबाबुलालिक ू , ितसरीथाना।
ापां क१४९/२०का०,
पुिलसअधी क, िग रडीह।
पुिलसअधी ककाकायालय, िग रडीह।िग रडीह, िदनाक 08/12/16
ितिलिप
1. २०अ०िन० थम, िग रडीहकोिजलादे शअंिकतकरनेहेतु ेिषत !
2. िनलंिबतपु०अ०िन०रामनाथिसं ह ाियकिहरासत, मंडलकारा,
धनबादकोआरोपएवं दशकी ितकीसाथह गतएवंिनदशिदयाजाताहै िकिवभागीयकायवाहीकेिव अपना
ीकरणप ा केसातिदनोंकेअंदरइसकायालयमसमिपतकर।िनधा रतसमयाविधकेअं दर ीकरणअ ा रहा
तीबा होकरिवभागीयकायवाही ारं भकरदीजाये गी।
3. प रचारी वर, पुिलसके िग रडीहकोसू चनाथएवं आव किकयाथ।
4. पुिलसअधी क, ाचारिनरोधक ूरो, धनबादकोउनकेप ां क 608/16,
िदनां क 02.12.16 केकममसूचनाथ ेिषत।
पुिलस 12/16 िग रडीह।
12. It is the admitted case that the complainant has not been
examined during course of departmental proceeding.
The law is settled that non-examination of the complainant in a
departmental proceeding amounts to violation of principles of natural
11
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
justice and if there is violation of principles of natural justice then the
decision so taken by the disciplinary authority, on conclusion of the
departmental proceeding, cannot be said to be proper.
13. We are conscious that the proposition of law is that the High
Court while exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India may wish to interfere with the administrative
decision taken by the disciplinary authority, as has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran,
AIR 2015 SC 545, in particular to paragraph 13, laying down following
guidelines which are self-explanatory:
“13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note
that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the
enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is
not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High
Court can only see whether:
a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf;
c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the
proceedings;
d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case;
e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such
conclusion;
g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
12
2025:JHHC:24266-DBadmissible and material evidence;
h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which influenced the finding;
i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall
not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has
been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be
based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii)go
into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Management of State Bank of
India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr., (2017) 4 SCC 75, has
laid down that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court
sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly
interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found
disproportionate to the gravity of offence.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Central Industrial Security Force
and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali, AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down following
guidelines at paragraph 8 for interference by the High Court in the
matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental
proceeding, which is quoted herein below:
“8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court
accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being
treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held
by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical
facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was
really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did
not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High
Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which
tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-
appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of13
2025:JHHC:24266-DBjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya,
reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : (AIR 2011 SC 1931, Para 6), this
Court held as follows:
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry,
nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the
material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held
and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of
the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds
for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore,
courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental
enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or
where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to
see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will
however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if
principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been
violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide
or based on extraneous considerations.
In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported
in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note
that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the
inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is
not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court,
in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High
Court can only see whether:
(a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting
the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by
14
2025:JHHC:24266-DBirrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such
conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
shall not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has
been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be
based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii)go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
14. It would be evident from the aforesaid judgment that if in a case
of violation of principles of natural justice, the decision taken by the
disciplinary authority, on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, is
to be interfered exercising the power of judicial review under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The non-examination of the
complainant amounts to violation of principles of natural justice which
has been settled and has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi Ors. Vs. Jai Bhagwan reported
in (2011) 6 SCC 376. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment are being quoted hereunder:
“16. .. Non-examination of the complainant and P.S. Narang during the
departmental proceeding has denied the respondent of his right of cross-15
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
examination and thus caused violation of Rule 16(iii) of the Delhi Police (F&A)
Rules, 1980.
17. In the absence of such a definite/clear proof supporting the case of the
appellants it is difficult to draw a finding of taking illegal gratification by the
respondent from the complainant. Therefore, as rightly held by the High Court
the present case is a case of no evidence.”
15. This Court therefore taking into consideration the admitted fact
that the complainant has not been examined which has also been taken
note in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge at paragraph
No. 17 wherein reference has been made that ” it is evident from the
enquiry report annexed as Annexure-A to the supplementary counter
affidavit dated 132.12.2023 that neither the complainant, Naresh Yadav,
on whose complaint ACB, Dhanbad PS Case No. 15 of 2016 was
lodged, nor Kanhaiya Prasad Singh, Police Inspector-cum-Investigating
Officer, Anti- Corruption Bureau, Dhanbad, was examined during the
departmental enquiry”. Therefore, the learned Single Judge is correct in
considering the non-examination of the complainant coupled with the
Investigating Officer of the criminal case and, as such, the learned
Single Judge has come to the conclusion that enquiry cannot be said to
be fair.
16. Therefore, the aforesaid findings of the learned Single Judge,
according to our considered view, cannot be said to be suffers from
error.
17. Therefore, this Court is of the view that impugned judgment
passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 564 of 2019 requires
no interference. Thus, the appeal fails and it is dismissed.
18. The appellants, herein, are directed to disburse the death-cum-
retiral benefits in favour of the writ petitioner, positively within a period
16
2025:JHHC:24266-DB
of two months, from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
KNR/
AFR
17
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