THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU V GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU (2025) 4 SCC 123

1. According Article 200 of the Indian Constitution, what power or course of action does the governor have ?
2. Can the governor reserve a bill after being reconsidered by the state legislature under article 200, when he had not reserved the bill for the consideration of the President at the first instance and had declared withholding of asset thereto ?
3. Whether any time limit is given in which the Governor has to act under Article 200 of the Constitution?
4. Does the Governor have to act only on the advice of State Council of Ministers or whether the governor has some discretion to perform his functions independently under Article 200?
5. Performance of functions by Governor under Article 200 could be subject to judicial review? If yes, then what are conditions for such judicial review ?
6. What is the President’s primary act under Article 201 of the Indian Constitution when the bill has been reserved by governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?

CONTENTIONS

PETITIONER CONTENDED (GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU)

1. Violation of Article 200: The state government argued that the Governor’s infinite time of reservation of bills for assent violates the Article 200 of the Constitution, which obligates the Governor to act “as soon as possible” on bills presented to him. The prolonged delay was argued to be unconstitutional and detrimental to the legislative process.
2. No Discretion to Withhold Assent: When the bills were to sent again to Governor then the Governor does not have any power to reserve the bill. First proviso of Article 200 mentions that if the bill is presented again, the Governor “shall not with hold assent therefrom”.
3. Unconstitutional Referral to the President: The state challenged the Governor’s action of referring the re-passed bills to the President, asserting that such a referral was unconstitutional after the bills had been re-presented by the assembly. The Governor’s action was viewed as an attempt to bypass the constitutional mandate.
4. Political Motivation: The state alleged that the Governor’s actions were politically motivated, aimed at undermining the democratically elected state legislature and its legislative agenda.

RESPONDENT CONTENDED (GOVERNOR OF TAMIL NADU)

1. Discretionary Powers: The Governor contended that under Article 200, he had the discretion to withhold assent to bills, especially those concerning matters of significant importance or those that could affect the federal balance. 
2. Reservation for Presidential Assent: In order to maintain consistency in national legislation, the Governor contended that some bills, especially those that affected the Governor’s authority, should be reserved for the consideration and assent of the President.
3. Constitutional Obligation: The Governor maintained that his actions were in line with his constitutional duties to ensure that state laws do not conflict with national interests or the Constitution.

RATIONALE AND JUDGEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT

Upholding the constitutional mandate under Article 200 and supporting the federal structure envisioned by the Constitution are at the heart of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in this historic case. As a constitutional authority, the Governor must act on bills “as soon as possible” after the state legislature passes them, the Court noted. In a parliamentary democracy, it is not acceptable to withhold assent indefinitely, as was done in this instance. This is known as a “pocket veto.” The Governor may withhold assent, return the bill, or reserve it for the President’s consideration under Article 200, the Court stressed, but these measures must be taken within a reasonable amount of time and cannot be used to permanently stall legislation.

More significantly, the Court read the proviso to Article 200, which specifies that where a bill is sent back and re-passed by the legislature, the Governor “shall not withhold assent.” This then makes it explicitly clear that once the legislative assembly reiterates its intention, there is no discretion left with the Governor. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Governor’s referral of the re-passed bills to the President subsequently was constitutionally not permissible and was an abuse of process. The Governor is supposed to serve as a constitutional figurehead, not as an opponent to the elected government. His actions in this regard, the Court found, eroded the federal balance and democratic will of the state legislature.
The Court also exercised its powers under Article 142 to complete justice by deeming that the bills had obtained assent on the date of re-submission. This action was intended to avoid constitutional subversion by inaction on the part of the executive. In sum, the rationale of the Court emphasizes that the Governors have to act within constitutional bounds and not hinder the operation of elected governments in a federal system.

DEFECTS OF LAW

The Government of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu case revealed a number of major flaws in the constitutional and legal arrangement concerning the role of Governors in India. One of the main shortcomings is found in Article 200 of the Constitution, which does not specify any particular time limit within which the Governor should take action on a bill tabled before him. This lack of specific timeliness enables Governors to defer action indefinitely, essentially creating a “pocket veto” that degrades the legislative process. Furthermore, the Constitution makes no enforceable recourse available to the legislature if the Governor will not act, leading to a dearth of accountability. Another fundamental flaw is the uncertainty of the Governor’s discretionary powers, especially in regard to holding bills pending for the President’s consideration. Here, the Governor abused this provision by sending re-passed bills to the President, although Article 200 clearly mandates assent to such bills by the Governor. Also, the constitutional framework does not provide any penalty or consequence for such inaction or non-obedience by the Governor, leaving room for whimsical and politically oriented decisions. These anomalies bring to the fore the compelling necessity of constitutional and legislative changes to ensure that the Governor’s role continues to be confined to its prescribed constitutional limits and does not interfere with the smooth functioning of democratically elected state governments.

INFERENCE

It was argued from this case that the Governor, as a constitutional head, cannot act unilaterally or indefinitely keep bills passed by an elected legislature in suspension. The Supreme Court held that the Governor is bound by a duty to act within a reasonable time under Article 200 and delay in acting will be a failure of constitutional obligation. The judgment also made it clear that once a bill is re-adopted by the state legislature, the Governor has no discretion left and must accord assent; keeping such bills pending for the President is not constitutionally valid. The judgment reasserted the federal nature of India, upholding that the Governors should act as neutral facilitators and not political agents. It also revealed legal loopholes—like no time limit for gubernatorial assent and no mechanisms for accountability—that need to be addressed urgently by legislation. On the whole, the case reasserted the paramountcy of the elected legislature and reiterated that the constitutional offices have to act in consonance with democratic values and within their defined limits.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Government of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu serves as a significant affirmation of constitutional principles governing the relationship between the state legislature and the Governor. By delineating the limits of gubernatorial discretion and emphasizing the need for timely action on bills, the Court has reinforced the democratic process and the autonomy of state legislatures. However, the subsequent developments in the Madras High Court suggest that the resolution of this constitutional issue may require further judicial scrutiny to ensure the effective implementation of the Court’s directives.

REFERENCE

1. Indian Constitution Article 200
2. Pendency of bills before Tamil Nadu Governor | Judgement Summary, Supreme Court Observer (Apr. 17, 2025), https://www.scobserver.in/reports/pendency-of-bills-before-tamil-nadu-governor-judgement-summary/.
3. (May 5, 2025) ,    https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/45314/45314_2023_11_1501_60770_Judgement_08-Apr-2025.pdf.
4. Suchitra Kalyan Mohanty, Explainer, Supreme Court landmark ruling on Governor Vs State (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Apr/14/explainer-supreme-court-landmark-ruling-on-governor-vs-state.
5. SC Verdict on Governors’ Powers over State Bills, (Apr. 8, 2025), https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/sc-verdict-on-governors-powers-over-state-bills.
6. Indian Constitution Article 142

SUBMITTED BY ANANYA AGGARWAL    COLLEGE NAME: KCC INSTITUTE OF LEGAL AND HIGHER EDUCATION