Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Thota Anji Banu, vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 22 July, 2025
APHC010353782025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
TUESDAY,THE TWENTY SECOND DAY OF JULY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 7324/2025
Between:
THOTA ANJI BANU,, S/O. SUBBA RAJU, MALE, AGED 32 YEARS, R/O.
D. NO.4-53, VINAYAKA STREET, PATHA PATTISEEMA, POLAVARAM
MANDAL, ELURU DISTRICT (ERNST WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT).
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor, High
Court Buildings, Amaravathi.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Petition under Section 437/438/439/482 of Cr.P.C and 528 of BNSS
praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of
Criminal Petition, the High Courtmay be pleased to enlarge the petitioner on
Bail in the event of his arrest in Crime No. 133/2024 on the file of Kakaluru
Police Station, in the interest of justice and pass
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. GANDHAM SR PRASAD
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
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ORDER:
The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by
the petitioner/Accused No.3 for granting of pre-arrest bail in connection
with Crime No.133 of 2023 of Kaikaluru Police Station, Eluru District,
registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 468, 471
& 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the IPC‘).
2. The case of the prosecution is that on 02.09.2023, in Kaikaluru,
the Accused No.1/Gantasala Mohan Krishna from Srungavarappadu
Village fraudulently purchased an insurance policy from ACKO General
Insurance Company by paying Rs.2,471/- through Amazon Pay using
Mobile No.9441171020, falsely declaring the vehicle No.AP 39 TB 7791
as a Maruti Alto K10. The policy was issued, but during verification on
the Parivahan portal, the company found that the vehicle was actually a
Bolero Goods Vehicle, which is not eligible for coverage and hence
cancelled the policy. Later, a fatal accident involving the same vehicle
occurred on 30.11.2023, resulting in the death of Yarlagadda
Nancharayya. A case was registered in Crime No.363 of 2023 under
Section 304(A) of the ‘IPC‘. The victim’s family filed M.V.O.P.No.109 of
2024 seeking compensation of Rs.30,00,000/- on the file of the
Vijayawada District Court against the vehicle owner and insurance
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company. Upon receiving the summons, ACKO General Insurance
Company confirmed that the policy had been cancelled due to false
information and alleged that the accused submitted forged documents,
cheating the company, police and transport authorities.
3. Sri Gandham S.R. Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner,
submits that the petitioner has not committed any offence; he was falsely
implicated in this case; he is ready to abide any conditions to be
imposed by this Court; and it is urged to grant pre-arrest bail to the
petitioner/Accused No.3.
4. Per contra, Ms.P.Akila Naidu, the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor, opposed in granting of pre-arrest bail stating that
investigation is not completed; if the petitioner is enlarged on pre-arrest
bail, he would not be available for the investigation and he will repeat the
same offence; and it is urged to dismiss the bail application.
5. Perused the record.
6. The allegations against the petitioner/Accused No.3 are that with
the active aid of Accused Nos.1 and 2, falsification of insurance policy
was done to cause damage to the Insurance Company.
7. As seen from the record, based on the confession of Accused
Nos.1 to 3 added in this case except that confession no material record
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is available to implicate the Accused No.3 in this case.
Petitioner/Accused No.3 has got a permanent residence in Polavaram
Mandal.
8. In this context, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh1,
at Para Nos.27, 45, 46, 47, 50, 53 (iv) it is held as under:
“27. To some extent, the petitioners could be said to have made out a
prima facie case of political bias or mala fides but that by itself is not
sufficient to grant anticipatory bail overlooking the other prima facie
materials on record. Political vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant
considerations while considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The courts
should keep one thing in mind, more particularly, while considering the plea
of anticipatory bail that when two groups of rival political parties are at war
which may ultimately lead to litigations, more particularly, criminal
prosecutions there is bound to be some element of political bias or vendetta
involved in the same. However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient
for the grant of anticipatory bail. The courts should not just look into the
aspect of political vendetta and ignore the other materials on record
constituting a prima facie case as alleged by the State. It is only when the
court is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous
and baseless, that the court may bring into the element of political vendetta
into consideration for the purpose of considering the plea of anticipatory
bail. The frivolity in the entire case that the court may look into should be
attributed to political bias or vendetta.
45. However, the aforesaid observations cannot be singled out and
construed devoid of its context. While it is permissible for the courts to
examine the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. for the
purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out
against the accused and the nature or gravity of the allegations, the same
applies only insofar as such police statements are of witnesses and not
accused persons.
46. Both Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held
that in deciding the question of grant of bail, it is the statements of witness
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. that has to be looked into. Nowhere has
this Court held that even the police statements of the accused person
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. must also be looked into at the stage of
grant of anticipatory or regular bail.
47. This is because a statement of an accused under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C stands on a different footing from a police statement of any ordinary
witness. Statements of an accused person under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C. by virtue of ordinarily being in the form of either an admission or a
confession cannot be looked into qua another co-accused, as to say
otherwise would be to ignore the substantive provisions of Section(s) 17,1
2025 SCC Online SC 1157
521, 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and the well settled cannons of law of
evidence. However, the aforesaid does not apply, where the statement of
an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C is exculpatory in nature, which
we shall discuss later.
50. Even where the police statement of an accused person under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C is neither an admission nor a confession, i.e., it is
exculpatory in nature and not inculpatory, such statements can be looked
into by the courts only for the limited purpose of culling out the stance of the
accused person qua the allegations. An exculpatory police statement of an
accused person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C which at the same time
implicates another co- accused, cannot be relied upon, merely because
such statement is not hit by the safeguards and rigours that apply in
respect of inculpatory statements in the form of an admissions or
confessions under the Evidence Act. The fundamental cannon of criminal
jurisprudence is that a statement of one accused person cannot be used
against another co-accused person. The limited exception to this aforesaid
general principle is inculpatory confessions, where the accused person in
his confessional statement not only admits his own guilt but also implicates
another co-accused. The rationale behind this limited exception as
explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), is that an admission by an accused
person of his own guilt affords some sort of credibility or sanction in support
of the truth of his confession against others as-well as himself. An
exculpatory statement is an affront to the aforesaid principle. Thus, an
exculpatory statement of an accused person under Section 161 of the
Cr.P.C. can only be looked into for the limited purpose of either culling out
the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting
the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms
of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C. However, such exculpatory statement insofar
as it implicates another co-accused person can in no manner be relied
upon by the courts as against such co-accused as such statements by their
nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person
declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C.,
and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility.
53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges:
(iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional
statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all
its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if
it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the
provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively.
In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a
confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be
placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since
such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of
Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no
avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an
accused to implicate another co-accused.”
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Krishna Mohan Reddy supra, held that a
confessing statement of co-accused per se inadmissible and no relevance
whatsoever can be placed on such statement at the stage of bail or through
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bail inasmuch as such confession statements are rendered by virtue of
Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Act’). The provision
of Section 30 of ‘the Act’ would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed
on such a statement as a cause of action to implicate another co-accused.
10. Considering the nature of the allegations leveled against the
petitioner, his alleged role in this case and the validity of the co-accused
confession, this Court deems it fit to grant pre-arrest bail to the
petitioner/Accused No.3 with certain stringent conditions.
11. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following
conditions:
i. In the event of her arrest, the petitioner/Accused No.3
shall be enlarged on bail subject to he executing a personal
bond for a sum of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand
only), with two sureties for the like sum each to the
satisfaction of the arresting police officials;
ii. The petitioner/Accused No.3 shall make himself
available for investigation as and when required;
iii. The petitioner/Accused No.3 shall not cause any
threat, inducement or promise to the prosecution witnesses;
iv. The petitioner/Accused No.3 shall appear before the
Station House Officer concerned once in a week i.e., on
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every Saturday between 10.00 a.m. and 5.00 p.m., till
filing of the charge sheet.
v. The petitioner/Accused No.3 shall not leave the district
limits without the express permission from the Station House
Officer concerned.
_________________________
DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Date: 22.07.2025
SCS
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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7324 of 2025
Date:22.07.2025
SCS