Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Tilak Raj vs Darshana Devi W/O Tilak Raj on 21 August, 2025
Sr. No. 63
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on: 04.08.2025
Pronounced on: 21.08.2025
CRM(M) No.864/2023
Tilak Raj, Age 41years
S/O Pardeep Kumar
R/O Mukhyala, Tehsil Akhnoor
District Jammu ............Petitioner
Through: Mr. C. M. Koul, Sr. Adv with
Mr. A R Bhat, Advocate
VS
Darshana Devi W/O Tilak Raj
R/O Chak Morh, Tehsil Akhnoor
District Jammu.
........Respondent
Through: Mr. Ajay Bakshi, Advocate.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M A CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Petitioner, through the medium of this petition under Section 482 of
CrPC seeks quashment of Complaint titled “Darshana Devi V. Tilak Raj”under
Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for
short ‘the DV Act‘) being time barred, and in repugnance to Section 31 of the
DV Act read with Section 468 CrPC. Besides the above complaint, petitioner
also seeks setting aside of the application filed along with the above complaint
under Section 23 of the DV Act, pending before the court of learned Judicial
Magistrate (Munsiff), Akhnoor.
2. Brief facts which led to the filing of this petition, are that a complaint
under Section 12 of the DV Act along with application under Section 23 of the
DV Act came to be filed by the respondent Darshana Devi against Tilak Raj
2 CRM(M) No.864/2023
(petitioner herein) before the court of learned Judicial Magistrate (Munsiff),
Akhnoor, alleging, inter alia, that, she was allegedly assaulted by the petitioner,
thrown out of her matrimonial house on 20.07.2019 and threatened of dire
consequences if she comes back; that on 22.07.2019, the mother and brother of
the respondent was asked for dowry by the petitioner; that the complainant and
her minor son have no source of income and are left to fend for themselves; that
the petitioner has committed domestic violence upon the complainant and made
to suffer cruel acts of the petitioner; that the complainant has also filed petition
under Section 488 CrPC, against the petitioner, which is pending before the
Family Court.
3. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that petitioner
was falsely implicated by the respondent, in a complaint under Section 12 of the
DV Act, as also in application filed in terms of Section 23 of the DV Act; that
the said complaint is time barred in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex court in various pronouncements that limitation is applicable to
cases/complaints under the provisions of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In support of his contentions, he has placed
reliance on the judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in ‘Japani Sahoo V.
Chandra Sekhar Mohanty‘ reported as AIR 2007 SC 2762 and ‘Inderjeet Singh
Grewal V. State of Punjab’, reported as (2011) 12 SCC 588.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent, ex adverso, argued that limitation
period under Section 468 CrPC is not applicable to application under Section 12
of DV Act. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on judgments of
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of ‘Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan’
3 CRM(M) No.864/2023
reported as (2022) 15 SCC 50 dated 13.04.2022 and of Hon’ble Patna High
Court in the case of ‘Punit Agarwal @ Puneet Agarwal Versus Ankita Jain’
dated 10.04.2024 passed in Criminal Revision No.734/2021.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused the file and
considered.
6. The indisputable facts arising out of the pleadings of the parties are
that the respondent filed a complaint under the DV Act against the petitioner on
12.02.2022 with the allegations that on 20.07.2019, the complainant was
assaulted, thrown out from the matrimonial house/rented accommodation,
threatened that if she will come back, the respondent would kill her and that on
22.07.2019, the respondent also demanded dowry from the mother and brother
of the complainant with the threat if the same is not given, he would not allow
the complainant to reside with him. The respondent has also sworn an affidavit
with regard to ‘assets and liabilities’ stating that the couple has separated since
20.07.2019. The admitted facts of the case thus are that the allegations of
subjecting the respondent to domestic violence were only up to 22.07.2019.
7. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was
enacted with the object of providing more effective protection to the rights of
women granted under the Constitution who are the victims of violence of any
kind occurring within the family. The DV Act, 2005 has been enacted to tackle
the menace of domestic violence faced by women in our society. A very wide
meaning has been assigned to the term ‘domestic violence’ as provided under
Section 3 of the Act, such as physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional
abuse, humiliation, repeated threats to cause physical pain, economic abuse,
4 CRM(M) No.864/2023
deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources, disposal of household
effects, prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities.
8. The domestic relationship has been defined widely under clause (f) of
Section (2) of DV Act, 2005 as relationship between the two groups who live or
have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are
related by consanguinity, marriage or through relationship in the nature of
marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. An
aggrieved person has been defined in clause (a) of Section 2 which reads any
woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and
who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent.
9. Chapter IV of the DV Act, 2005 lays down what kind of reliefs can be
granted to a person aggrieved who has been subjected to any act of domestic
violence. There are different categories of reliefs which can be granted under the
DV Act, 2005. These reliefs are broadly categorized as right to reside in a shared
household, protection orders, residence orders, monetary reliefs, custody orders,
and compensation orders. These reliefs can be sought either by making an
application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 or by making an application
in pending legal proceedings affecting aggrieved person before a Civil Court,
Family Court or a Criminal Court.
10. As can be seen from the scheme of DV Act, 2005 and, in particular,
Section 12, it is not a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC or Section 223 of
the BNSS. An application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be
equated with a complaint within the meaning of Section 200 of the CrPC
5 CRM(M) No.864/2023
(Section 223 of the BNSS). As provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 12, read
with Sub-section (1) of Section 13, the normal rule is that a notice of hearing
must be issued on the application. The scheme of Section 12 is, therefore,
completely different from Section 200 of the CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS.
11. It is true as contended by the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner that
as per Section 28 of the DV Act, 2005, the proceedings under Sections 12, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the further stipulation that
this will not prevent the Court for laying down its own procedure for disposal of
an application under Section 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23. There is
no doubt that, notwithstanding, the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31
and 33 of Chapter V the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act,
2005 are predominantly of a civil nature. A breach of protection order, or of an
interim order by the respondent, is a punishable offence, under Section 31 of DV
Act, which is cognizable and non-bailable U/S 32 of the DV Act, whereas, if a
protection officer fails or refuses to discharge his duties as directed by the
Magistrate in the protection order, without any sufficient cause, it shall be also
be a punishable offence, under Section 33 of DV Act.
12. On examination of the areas, where the DV Act or DV Rules have
specifically set out the procedure, thereby excluding the operation of the CrPC
as contemplated under Section 28(1) of the Act, the application under Section 12
not being a complaint as defined under Section 2(d) of the CrPC. The procedure
for taking cognizance set out under Section 190(1) of the Code followed by the
procedure set out in Chapter XV of the Code for taking cognizance will have no
6 CRM(M) No.864/2023
application to the proceedings under the DV Act. To reiterate Section 190(1)(a)
of the Code and the procedure set out in the subsequent Chapter XV of the Code
will apply only in cases of complaints under Section 2(d) of CrPC given to a
Magistrate and not to an application under Section 12 of the Act. It is, thus, clear
that the contention made on behalf of the petitioner wrongly equated filing of an
application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of
a prosecution, so as to hold that the application under Section 12 of the Act,
ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of
domestic violence.
13. In Japani Sahoo V. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, reported as AIR
2007 SC 2762, and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, key
issue before Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether criminal proceedings could be
quashed as being barred under Section 468 CrPC when there was a delay in
taking cognizance by the Magistrate, even though the complaint was filed within
the prescribed limitation period, the Supreme Court ruled that the crucial date
for calculating the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC is the date of filing
of the complaint or initiation of proceedings-not the date on which the
Magistrate takes cognizance. In ‘Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab &
Anr‘ reported as (2011) 12 SCC 588, hon’ble the Apex Court has held the
following:
“24. Submissions made by Shri Ranjit Kumar on the issue of
limitation, in view of the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., that the
complaint could be filed only within a period of one year from the
date of the incident seem to be preponderous in view of the provisions
of Sections 28 and 32 of the Act 2005 read with Rule 15(6) of The
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 which
7 CRM(M) No.864/2023make the provisions of Cr.P.C. applicable and stand fortified by the
judgments of this court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar
Mohanty, AIR 2007 SC 2762; and Noida Entrepreneurs Association
v. Noida & Ors., (2011) 6 SCC 508.”
14. The contention made on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the bar
to take cognizance as contained under Section 468 CrPC is that the respondent
was allegedly subjected to the domestic violence on 20.07.2019 or 22.07.2019,
whereafter the parties have separated as per the affidavit sworn in by the
respondent and, therefore, in view of the applicability of the CrPC provisions,
the cognizance in the complaint cannot be taken. The short controversy involved
in this petition is as to whether limitation prescribed and provided under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, is applicable to the applications/complaints filed
under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In the
considered opinion of this court, the bar of the period of limitation will be
applicable only to the penal proceedings under Section 31 of the Act seeking
punishment for the breach of the protection order or an interim protection order
which shall be punishable with either description of imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one year or fine which may extend to Rs.20,000/- or with
both. Such penal proceedings cannot be initiated, if the same are not brought up
within the period of limitation as contained in Section 468 CrPC or its
corresponding provision under the new Penal Code, U/S 514 of BNSS 2023.
However, there cannot be any bar to maintaining an application under other
provisions including Sections 12 and 23 of the DV Act. Since respondent’s case
was not with regard to breach of any protection order or of an interim protection
order so as to attract the bar of limitation. The impugned applications are thus
maintainable before the Court below.
8 CRM(M) No.864/2023
15. This court, in the aforestated opinion, finds support from the judgment
of the Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the case titled ‘Kamatchi v. Lakshmi
Narayan‘ reported as (2022) 15 SCC 50, wherein the Apex Court has been
pleased to hold that the limitation period under Section 468 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not apply to applications made under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Supreme Court
further held that limitation under Section 468 CrPC only applies to actual
offences i.e. breaches of protection orders under Section 31. It further held that
Section 12 is not akin to a criminal complaint, and procedural safeguards or
limitation rules applicable to criminal proceedings (like cognizance under CrPC)
do not apply at that stage.
16. The Apex Court in the case of ‘Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi V. Vidhi
Rawal‘ reported at 2025 INSC 734, held that a petition under Section 482 CrPC
for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act,
2005 despite those proceedings being predominantly civil in nature is
maintainable with the caution that the High Court should exercise such power
considering the object of the DV Act, 2005 with circumspection while dealing
with an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act and that normally
interference under Section 482 is warranted only, in the case of gross illegality
or injustice.
17. In such a situation of the matter, when the bar of limitation is not
applicable to a complaint/application under Section 12 or under Section 23 of
the DV Act, the plea raised with regard to limitation is not tenable in the case, as
the provision under Section 468 CrPC regarding limitation can be made
9 CRM(M) No.864/2023
applicable to a complaint under penal provisions of Sections 31 and 33 of the
DV Act, and not to any other application under the DV Act.
18. Viewed thus, the petition is found to be misconceived, devoid of any
merit and substance and is liable to be dismissed. As a result, the petition is
dismissed, along with connected application(s). Interim direction, if any, shall
stand vacated.
19. Copy of this order be forwarded to the Trial Court, with direction to
proceed further in the matter, expeditiously.
( ( M A Chowdhary )
Judge
Jammu
21.08.2025
Raj Kumar
Whether order is speaking? Yes.
Whether order is speaking? Yes.
Raj Kumar
2025.08.22 10:45
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
JAMMU