Madhya Pradesh High Court
Tulsi Devi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 14 August, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:23327
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 14th OF AUGUST, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 17040 of 2025
TULSI DEVI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ayush Agrawal Advocate for the petitioner through V.C.
Shri Santosh Singh Thakur, Govt. Advocate for the
respondent/State.
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ORDER
1. Present petition under section 528 of BNSS, 2023 is filed for
quashing of FIR registered at Crime no.60/2024 dated 12.02.2024 at
Police Station – Shajapur Kotwali, District Shajapur for the offence
punishable under sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC and Sections
3 and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act.
2. The exposition of facts giving rise to present petition is as under :
A) Smt. Aarti Yadav, aged around 27 years reported to
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S.H.O. of Police Station Shajapur kotwali, District Shajapuron 12.02.2024 that she was married to Amit Yadav on
27.04.2024 as per Hindu Rituals and Customs. Amit Yadav
works in Army. They were blessed with daughter presently
aged around 01 year. He husband Amit Yadav, mother-in-law
Kalabai, father-in-law Basant Yadav and aunt of Amit, Tulsibai
used to harass her physically and mentally for demand of
dowry. They used to abuse her and demand money for
purchasing a plot. When her husand was not at home, her
mother-in-law Kalabai, father-in-law Basant and aunt Tusibai
harassed her mentally and physically and manhandled her. She
went to her paternal home at Shajapur. On 07.02.2024, she
went to her matrimonial home for adding name of her daughter
in Samagra ID Card of her husband. Her father-in-law Basant,
mother-in-law Kalabai and aunt Tulsibai abused her in filthy
language. They manhandled her and expelled her from
matrimonial home. Therefore, she returned to her parental
home. On such allegation, P.S. Kotwali, District Shajapur
registered FIR at Crime No.60/2024 for offence punishable
under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 of IPC and Sections 3
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and 4 of The Dowry Prohibition Act. The statement ofcomplainant and her family members have been recorded. The
final report has been submitted on completion of investigation.
The trial is underway.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the facts and
grounds mentioned in the petition contends that the petitioner is falsely
implicated in this matter. The petitioner is paternal aunt of Amit Yadav,
husband of the complainant. She lives separately. She has not
interferencein the day to day affairs of the family of complainant.
General and omnibus allegation have been made against the applicant.
No offence, as alleged, is made out against the petitioner. The
complainant is residing at her parental home for last one year due to
matrimonial discord with her husband. The F.I.R. is lodged with
malafide intention and to pressurrize the family of husband for
settlement. The FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed.
4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the State opposed the petition and
contended that specific allegations have been made with regard to mental
and physical harassment of the complainant in relation to demand of
money. On 07.02.2024 complainant was manhandled and expelled from
her matrimonial home, therefore, no ground is made out for quashment of
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:23327
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proceedings. The petition is meritless and deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the records.
6. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the
law and after referring to various earlier decisions, observed in para 108
as under:-
”108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and
to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
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inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge.”
7. In case of CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175, it was
held by the Supreme Court that FIR is not an encyclopaedia, which must
disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. It was
observed that-
“20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an
encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the
offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission
of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his
assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first
informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to
disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of
significance is that the information given must disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a
basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable
offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the
information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and
not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has
been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information
received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is
bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this
stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the
truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation
that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the
information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the
details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and
collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing theSignature Not Verified
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commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative
machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter
to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the
information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an
offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section
156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record
the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or
depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The
question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details
regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all
matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the
report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the
information does not give full details regarding these matters, the
investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case
and discover the true facts, if he can.”
8. In case of Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Supreme Court laid down
following principles –
13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of
the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945
PC 18, the following principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in
Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence
of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court
will not permit an investigation to go on.
13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The rarest of rare
cases standard in its application for quashing under Section
482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been
formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained
previously by this Court.)
13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is
sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made inSignature Not Verified
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the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial
stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a
rarity than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State
operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power
of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice
or prevent the above of the process by Section 482CrPC.
9. Further, in case of State of M.P. v. Jogendra, (2022) 5 SCC
401, explaining the ambit of the term “Dowry” it was held that-
12. In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and
takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security, in our
opinion, the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of
money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand.
In Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC
721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468] referred to in the impugned judgment
[Jogendra v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 2004, decided on
10-9-2008 (MP)] , this Court had held that a demand for money from the
parents of the deceased woman to purchase manure would not fall within
the purview of “dowry”, thereby strictly interpreting the definition of
dowry. This view has, however, not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singh
case [Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3
SCC (Cri) 225] wherein it has been held that the said decision as also the
one in Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P. [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P.,
(2013) 3 SCC 684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] , do not state the law
correctly. Noting that the aforesaid decisions were distinct from four
other decisions of this Court viz. Bachni Devi v. State of
Haryana [Bachni Devi v. State of Haryana, (2011) 4 SCC 427 : (2011) 2
SCC (Cri) 280] , Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab [Kulwant
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri)
339] , Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana [Surinder Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC 129 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 769] and Raminder
Singh v. State of Punjab [Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 12
SCC 582 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 116], the Court opined that keeping in
mind the fact that Section 304-B was inserted in IPC to combat the
social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming proportions, it
cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language used in the
provision, the same ought to be construed strictly as that would amountSignature Not Verified
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to defeating the very object of the provision. In other words, the Court
leaned in favour of assigning an expansive meaning to the expression
“dowry” and held thus : (Rajinder Singh case [Rajinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 491, para
20)
“20. [Ed. : Para 20 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./16/2015 dated 6-4-2015.] Given that the statute with
which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and
common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to
be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment
in Appasaheb case [Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9
SCC 721 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 468] followed by the judgment
of Vipin Jaiswal [Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P., (2013) 3 SCC
684 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We,
therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable
security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after
the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a
married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in
relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly
and unequivocally point otherwise.” (emphasis supplied)
14. In the facts of the instant case, we are of the opinion that the trial
court has correctly interpreted the demand for money raised by the
respondents on the deceased for construction of a house as falling within
the definition of the word “dowry”. The submission made by the learned
counsel for the respondents that the deceased was also a party to such a
demand as she had on her own asked her mother and maternal uncle to
contribute to the construction of the house, must be understood in the
correct perspective. It cannot be lost sight of that the respondents had
been constantly tormenting the deceased and asking her to approach her
family members for money to build a house and it was only on their
persistence and insistence that she was compelled to ask them to
contribute some amount for constructing a house. The Court must be
sensitive to the social milieu from which the parties hail. The fact that
the marriage of the deceased and Respondent was conducted in a
community marriage organisation where some couples would have tied
the knot goes to show that the parties were financially not so well off.
This position is also borne out from the deposition of PW 1 who had
stated that he used to bear the expenses of the couple. Before the
marriage of the deceased also, PW 1 had stated that he used to bear her
expenses and that of her mother and brother (his sister and nephew) as
her father had abandoned them. In this background, the High Court fell
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:23327
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in an error in drawing an inference that since the deceased had herself
joined her husband and father-in-law, the respondents herein and asked
her mother or uncle to contribute money to construct a house, such
demand cannot be treated as a “dowry demand”. On the contrary, the
evidence brought on record shows that the deceased was pressurised to
make such a request for money to her mother and uncle. It was not a
case of complicity but a case of sheer helplessness faced by the deceased
in such adverse circumstances.
10. A perusal of the complaint and subsequent FIR reveals
specific allegations of cruelty against father-in-law Basant, mother-
in-law Kalabai and aunt Tulsi Devi with regard to inadequacy of
dowry and further demand of money. The complainant has alleged
mental and physical harassment by her husband. The complainant
has alleged specific incidents with relevant details of such incident.
The allegations cannot be said to be inherently improbable or
absurd. At this juncture, it cannot be said that possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to them. The respondent is
pursuing legal remedies available to her, so it cannot be said that
petitioners are unnecessarily harassed by the respondent. Therefore,
no case is made out for quashing the FIR and consequential
proceedings in exercise of inherent jurisdiction in view of the law
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laid down by the Apex court in cases of Bhajan Lal, Neeharika,
Tapan and Jogendra (supra). In view of the above discussion, the
precedents of law relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner
above are of no assistance, as the same are distinguishable on facts.
11. Consequently, the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is
dismissed.
CC as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
pn
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