Madhya Pradesh High Court
Udaybhan Dahiya vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 27 January, 2025
Author: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
Bench: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
1 CRR-900-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL
th
ON THE 27 OF JANUARY, 2025
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 900 of 2024
UDAYBHAN DAHIYA AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Shri Sandeep Kumar Jain - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Pradeep Gupta - Government Advocate for the respondent.
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ORDER
This criminal revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) has been filed assailing the order
dated 25.01.2024 passed by learned Special Judge, NDPS Act, Umaria (M.P.) in
Special Case No.07/2023 (State of M.P. Vs. Ravi Dahiya and others) whereby
applicants’ application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. seeking default bail on
the ground that incomplete charge sheet has been filed as it was filed without
FSL report, has been dismissed by the learned trial Court.
2. It is averred in the petition that applicants were arrested on 12.01.2023 in
connection with alleged recovery of 180 Rexous Plus cough syrup bottles
2 CRR-900-2024
having codeine phosphate from the possession of applicants. In this revision
petition, the singular and pivotal question raised by learned counsel for the
applicants is that while filing the charge sheet, the prosecution could not file a
report of Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) regarding the substance recovered
from the applicants, thus the applicants became entitled to get the benefit of
default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. but the learned Magistrate
without abiding with the provisions of law, dismissed their application.
Therefore, he has prayed to set aside the impugned order dated 25.01.2024
passed by learned Special Judge.
3. Shri Sandeep Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the applicants, submits that
180 Rexous Plus cough syrup bottles having codeine phosphate were seized
from the possession of the present applicant. Thus, complete challan should
have been filed within period of 180 days. The challan was filed within the
aforesaid time but in view of bail order dated 16.02.2024 passed by Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Bablu Singh Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh in
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.631/2024, the applicants are entitled to get
the benefit of default bail. Shri Jain argued that FSL report regarding the nature
of substance is integral part of charge sheet and it should have been filed with
the charge sheet itself. Since it is not filed within the stipulated period, the
applicants deserve the default bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has opposed grant of
default bail and has submitted that learned trial Court has not committed any
error. It is submitted that contraband cough syrup was seized from the
possession of the present applicants on 12.01.2023. The seized quantity was
more than the required commercial quantity. Charge sheet was filed before the
learned trial Court well within time, therefore, learned trial Court has not
3 CRR-900-2024
committed any error in dismissing bail application of the applicant under
Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length.
6. In the case of Bablu Singh (supra), which is a bail order, Hon’ble Apex
Court has granted interim bail on the ground that case was registered on
11.09.2020, charge sheet was filed on 07.03.2021 and charges were framed on
16.10.2021 and in a period of about three years and five months, not even a
single witness has been examined and in that case, counsel for the State had
admitted before the Apex Court that FSL report has not been filed. In the
aforesaid circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court had granted interim bail. In
bail order, no law has been laid down with regard to the fact that if FSL report
was not filed with the charge sheet, same shall be treated as incomplete charge
sheet and applicant shall be entitled to be released on bail under the provisions
of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. On the contrary, it is well known that the question
with regard to the law that if charge sheet is filed without the FSL report,
whether it would be incomplete charge sheet?, is pending for adjudication.
7. The argument by learned counsel for the applicants has to be examined in
the light of relevant statutory provisions and judgments delivered by Hon’ble
Supreme Court and High Courts. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dinesh
Dalamiya vs. CBI (2007) 8 SCC 770, while dealing with the question of right
to bail under Section 167(2) proviso in a situation where the accused was
absconding and was yet to be arrested, held that investigating agency was within
his right to submit charge-sheet notwithstanding the pendency of further
investigation under Section 173(8). The Apex Court held as under:-
“It is true that ordinarily all documents accompany the charge-
sheet. But, in this case, some documents could not be filed
4 CRR-900-2024which were not in the possession of CBI and the same were with
GEQD. As indicated hereinbefore, the said documents are said
to have been filed on 20-1-2006 whereas the appellant was
arrested on 12-2-2006. The appellant does not contend that he
has been prejudiced by not filing of such documents with the
charge-sheet. No such plea in fact had been taken. Even if all
the documents had not been filed, by reason thereof submission
of charge-sheet itself does not become vitiated in law. The
charge-sheet has been acted upon as an order of cognizance
had been passed on the basis thereof. The appellant has not
questioned the said order taking cognizance of the offence.
Validity of the said charge-sheet is also not in question.”
It was further observed that,
“The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard
to an investigation leading to filing of final form under
subsection (2) of Section 173 and further investigation
contemplated under subsection (8) thereof. Whereas only when
a charge-sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending,
benefit of proviso appended to subsection (2) of Section 167 of
the Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a
chargesheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not
revive only because a further investigation remains pending
within the meaning of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the
Code.
8. In the aforesaid Dinesh Dalamiya case (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court has
made it clear that even if all the documents have not been filed, by reason
thereof submission of charge-sheet itself does not become vitiated in law.
9. The same question crop up before the Single Bench of this Court in the
case of Khilan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh order dated 18.08.2022
passed in M.Cr.C.No.35379 of 2022 the Coordinate Bench considered various
case laws and observed as under:-
5 CRR-900-2024
“9. The Rajasthan High Court considered the similar aspect
and considered the order of Punjab & Haryana High Court in
the case of Manmohan Singh @ Goldi. The Rajasthan High
Court in Gaurav Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2013 SCC Online
Rajasthan 3865 opined as under:
“8. When the Hon’ble Single Judge of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court was considering the
case of Manmohan Singh @ Goldi he was not
made aware of the earlier Full Bench Judgment of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court rendered in
Mehal Singh‘s case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble
Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court
held as below :-
“15. Since a report to qualify itself to be a ‘police
report’ is required to contain only such facts as are
mentioned in sub-section (2) of S. 173, so if once it
is found that the police report contained all those
facts, then so far as the investigation is concerned
the name has to be considered to have been
completed. For this view, we receive authoritative
backing from the decision of the Supreme Court in
Tara Singh v. The State, AIR 1951 SC 441. That
was a case in which the accused was arrested on
September 30, on the very day of occurrence, he
was produced before a Magistrate. On October 1,
the police was granted police remand till October
2. The accused was produced on October 3 before
the Magistrate, on which date the police handed
over to the Magistrate what they called in
‘incomplete challan’ dated October 2, 1949, and
also produced certain prosecution witnesses.
Amount the witnesses so produced were witness
who were said to have witnessed the occurrence.
The Magistrate examined those witnesses and
recorded their statements, although the accused at
that time was not represented by a counsel. On
October 5 the police put in what they called a
‘complete challan’ and on the 19th they put in a
6 CRR-900-2024supplementary challan. The Magistrate committed
the accused for trial on November 12, 1949.
15-A. It was argued in the first instance on behalf
of the accused that the Magistrate on October 3
had no power to take cognizance of the case. It
was contended that cognizance of an offence could
only be taken on a police report of the kind
envisaged in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 190
of the old Code. It was urged, on the strength of the
provisions of Section 173(1) of the old Code, which
is in the following terms and which is also pari
materia with the provisions of sub-section (2) of
173 of the new Code, that the police were not
permitted to send in an incomplete report:
“173. (1) Every investigation under this Chapter
shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and
as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of
the police station shall
(a) forward to a Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence on a police report, a
report, in the form prescribed by the State
Government, setting forth the names of the, parties
the nature of the information and the names of the
persons who appears to be acquainted with the
circumstances of the case, and stating whether the
accused (if arrested) has been forwarded in
custody or has been released on his bond, and, if
so, whether with or without sureties, and
(b) communicate, in such manner as may be
prescribed by the State Government, the action
taken by him to the person, if any, by whom thee
information relating to the commission of the
offence was first given.”
Vivian Bose, J., who delivered the opinion for the
Bench, without going into the question as to
7 CRR-900-2024
whether the police were entitled to submit an
incomplete report or not, held that the report dated
October 2, 1949, which the police referred to an
‘incomplete challan’ , was, in fact, a complete
report within the meaning of S. 190(1)(b) read with
S. 173(1) of the old Code. The following
observations of his Lordship are instructive on the
point (at P. 442):
“When the police drew up their challan of
2.10.1949 and submitted it to the Court on the 3rd,
they had in fact completed their investigation
except for the report of the Imperial Serologist and
drawing of the sketch map of the occurrence. It is
always permissible for the Magistrate to take
additional evidence not set out in the challan.
Therefore, the mere fact that a second challan was
put in on 5th October would not necessarily vitiate
the first . All that S. 173(1)(a) requires is that as
soon as the police investigation under Chap.14 of
the Code is complete, there should be forwarded to
the Magistrate a report in the prescribed form:
“Setting forth the names of the parties, the nature
of the information and the names of the persons
who appears to be acquainted with the
circumstances of the case.”
All that appears to have been done in the report of
2nd October which the police called their
incomplete challan. The witnesses named in the
second challan of 5th October were not witnesses
who were ‘acquainted with the circumstances of
the case.’ They were merely formal witnesses on
other matters. So also in the supplementary
challan of the 19th. The witnesses named are the
1st Class Magistrate, Amritsar, who recorded the
dying declaration, and the Assistant Civil Surgeon.
They are not witnesses who were ‘acquainted with
8 CRR-900-2024
the circumstances of the case’. Accordingly, the
challan which the police called an incomplete
challan was in fact a completed report of the kind
which S. 173(1) of the Code contemplates. There is
no force in this argument, and we hold that the
magistrate took proper cognizance of the matter.”
The learned counsel for the accused petitioners,
however, contended that in the old Code the
provisions, like the one contained in sub-section
(5) of S. 173 of the new Code, were not there and,
therefore the authority of the Supreme Court
decision in Tara Singh‘s case (supra) would not be
applicable in the context of the changed situation
brought about by the incorporation in the new
Code of sub-section (5) of S. 173 thereof. The
learned counsel for the accused-petitioners laid
emphasis on the fact that the investigation in terms
of the definition thereof shall not be considered
complete unless the police had collected all the
evidence and formed their opinion thereon and
since in cases, where the experts’ report was
awaited, obviously it could not be said that all
evidence had been collected, nor in its absence the
investigating officer would be in a position to form
an opinion. In order to show that the aforesaid
steps are the necessary ingredients of the
investigation, reliance has been placed on the
following observations of Jagannadhadas, J., who
delivered the judgment for the Bench in H.N.
Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 (at p.
201):
“If, upon the completion of the investigation it
appears to the officer in charge of the police
station that there is no sufficient evidence or
reasonable ground, he may decide to release the
suspected accused, if in custody, on his excluding a
bond. If, however, it appears to him that there is
9 CRR-900-2024
sufficient evidence or reasonable ground, to place
the accused on trial, he is to take the necessary
steps therefor under S. 170 of the Code. In either
case, on the completion of the investigation he has
to submit a report to the Magistrate under S. 173
of the Code in the prescribed form furnishing
various details.
Thus, under the Code investigation consists
generally of the following steps: (1) Proceeding to
the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery and arrest
of the suspected offender, (4) Collection of
evidence relating to the commission of the offence
which may consist of 9a) the examination of
various persons (including the accused) and the
reduction or their statements into writing, if the
officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places or seizure
of thinks considered necessary for the investigation
and to be produced at the trial and (5) Formation
of the opinion as to whether on the material
collected there is a case to place the accused
before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the
necessary steps for the same by the filing of a
charge-sheet under S. 173.”
It is no doubt true that the definition of
‘investigation’ in terms conceives within
‘investigation’ in terms conceives within its scope
the collection of the evidence and formation of the
opinion by the investigating officer, but the
question arises as to what do we mean by the
‘collection of evidence and formation of opinion
thereon.’ Does the collection of evidence
necessarily envisage that the investigating officer
must record the statements of the witnesses who
are to be cited to prove the prosecution case or
must that investigating officer receive the reports
of the experts which reports are admissible in
10 CRR-900-2024
evidence by virtue of S. 293 of the old Code? It has
been authoritatively held at the highest judicial
level in Noor Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964
SC, 286, that sub-section (3) of S. 161 does not
oblige the police officer to reduce in writing the
statements of witnesses examined by him in the
course of the investigation, but if he does record in
writing any such statements, he is obliged to make
copies of those statements available to the accused
before the commencement of proceedings in the
Court so that the accused may know the details
and particulars of the case against him and how
the case is intended to be proved….”
From the above observations of their Lordships of
the Supreme Court, it is clearly deducible that it is
not incumbent on the investigating officer to
reduce in writing the statements of the witnesses he
may merely include their names in the list of
witnesses in support of the prosecution case when
submitting the charge – sheet. Surely, if the charge-
sheet thus submitted would be complete as
enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the
offence, there is no rational basis for holding that
similar charge-sheet would not be a police report
of the requisite kind if the statements of the
witnesses although had been recorded under S.
161(3), but either by design or by inadvertence are
not appended with the report and that the
investigation of the case for that reason alone
would be considered to be incomplete thus entitling
the accused to claim release on bail in view of the
proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 167 of the Code if
his detention had exceeded sixty days.
20. For the reasons stated, I hold that the
investigation of an offence cannot be considered to
be inconclusive merely for the reason that the
investigating officer, when he submitted his report
11 CRR-900-2024
in terms of sub-section (2) of S. 173 of the Code to
the Magistrate, still awaited the reports of the
experts or by some chance, either inadvertently or
by design, he failed to append to the police report
such documents or the statements under S. 161 of
the Code, although these were available with him
when he submitted the police report to the
Magistrate.”
[Emphasis supplied]
10. In para 10 of the judgment of Gaurav (Supra), the
Rajasthan High Court opined that view taken in Manmohan
Singh @ Goldi by Punjab & Haryana High Court is per
incuriam and is in total contravention of view taken by the Full
Bench of the same High Court in Mehal Singh‘s case. The
Rajasthan High Court recorded its conclusion as under :-
“14. This Court is also of the opinion that Section
173(8) of the Cr.P.C. permits the prosecution to file
documents and evidence in addition to what has
already been submitted alongwith the charge-sheet
under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. when a
document in the nature of FSL report is filed by the
learned Public Prosecutor under Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C., it need not even be supplemented by an
additional charge-sheet. The document in the
nature of FSL report is otherwise also admissible
in evidence under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. Thus,
no additional charge-sheet is needed to file such a
document in the Court. The Court itself is
empowered to summon the expert’s report at any
stage of the trial.
15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court
is of the opinion that as charge-sheets have been
filed in these cases within the permissible period as
provided in Section 36A(4) of the Cr.P.C. (sic
N.D.P.S. Act), therefore, the right of the accused to
12 CRR-900-2024be released on bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
on ground of charge-sheet not having been filed
within the statutory period does not survive.”
[Emphasis supplied]
11. Pausing here for a moment, it is noteworthy that in the
instant case, the challan has been filed within statutory time
limit of 60 days. But it does not contain the FSL report
regarding the nature of substance. Interestingly, the same
question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of
Bombay High Court at Goa, reported in 2021 SCC Online
Bombay 2955 ( Manas Krishna T.K. vs. State) decided on
September, 17, 2021.
12. Pertinently, the Full Bench judgment of Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Mehal Singh and others (AIR 1978
PLR 480) was also considered by the Bombay High Court in
Manas Krishana T.K (supra). After considering the said
judgment and other Supreme Court Judgments, the Bombay
High Court poignantly held as under :-
25. The above precise contention has already been
rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Narendra Kumar Amin (supra), CBI v. R.S. Pai
(supra), and Narayan Rao (supra). These
decisions, in terms, hold that the provisions of
Section 173(5) are only directory
notwithstanding the use of the expression
“shall” therein. This means that even if there is
any omission or failure on the part of the police
officer to forward the documents and statements
as contemplated by Section 173(5) along with the
police report under Section 173(2), there is no
scope to hold that the police report under Section
173(2) is either incomplete or that the same was
filed without the completion of investigations by
the police officer.
13 CRR-900-2024
27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court upon analyzing
the provisions in Sections 173, 190, and 309
rejected the aforesaid contention of the accused.
The Court enumerated the information that must
be detailed in the police report forwarded to the
magistrate by the Investigating Officer as
provided under Section 173(2). The Court then
noted that even Section 190(1) (b) Cr.PC refers
only to a police report under 173(2) for taking
cognizance. The Court then referred to the three
judge bench judgment in CBI v. R.S. Pai (supra)
wherein it was held that omission in not producing
relevant documents at the time of submitting the
police report can always be made good by the
police officer after seeking leave to produce the
same. In R.S. Pai (supra), the three-judge bench
had proceeded to observe that if further
investigation is not precluded under Section
173(8), then, there is no question of not permitting
the prosecution to produce additional documents
which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the
investigation and the word ‘shall’ used in Section
173(5) cannot be regarded as mandatory but is
only directory.
[Emphasis supplied]
13. The conclusion drawn by the Bombay High Court is
recorded in para-42 which reads thus :-
42. Therefore, on the analysis of the statutory
provisions, as also the decisions that have
analyzed various shades of such statutory
provisions, we believe that a police report or a
charge sheet containing the details specified in
Section 173(2), if filed within the period
prescribed under Section 167(2) is not vitiated or
incomplete simply because the same was not
14 CRR-900-2024
accompanied by a CA/FSL report and, based
thereon, there is no question of the accused
insisting on default bail.
[Emphasis supplied]
14. The Delhi High Court in Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi),
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2317 on the same issue recently opined
as under :-
9. The present case, the petitioner has been
arrested on 07.09.2021. The issue whether a
person is entitled to default bail on account of
the charge sheet having been filed without FSL
report is still yet to be determined by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
10. This Court in Mehabub Rehman (supra) has
taken a view which reads as under:
“19. Applying the ratio of decision in Kishan Lal
(Supra) to the present case, I find that the
learned trial court has rightly dismissed
petitioner’s bail application while holding that
though the FSL report has been filed after filing
of bail application and after completion of 180
days of investigation, but the charge-sheet
cannot be held to be incomplete because of the
pendency of FSL report over voice sample, as
preparation of report on voice sample is not in
the hands of IO….”
11. For the above reasons, I am of the view that
the petitioner does not automatically gets a right
of default bail in the absence of FSL report
accompanying charge sheet. The same has also
been made clear by the judgments of Mehabub
Rehman(supra).
[Emphasis supplied]
15 CRR-900-2024
15. The Gujrat High Court in Narendra K. Amin v. Central
Bureau of Investigation, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj 8611 also
considered an aspect relating to release of applicant on default
bail under Section 167 (2) of the Cr.P.C. The High Court
recorded its finding as under :-
7.7 In Dinesh Dalamiya v. CBI [(2007) 8 SCC
770], the Supreme Court while dealing with
question of right to bail under Section 167(2)
proviso in a situation where the accused was
absconding and was yet to be arrested, held that
investigating agency was within his right to
submit charge-sheet notwithstanding the
pendency of further investigation under Section
173(8). The Apex Court stated,“It is true that ordinarily all documents
accompany the charge-sheet. But, in this case,
some documents could not be filed which were
not in the possession of CBI and the same were
with GEQD. As indicated hereinbefore, the said
documents are said to have been filed on 20-1-
2006 whereas the appellant was arrested on 12-
2-2006. The appellant does not contend that he
has been prejudiced by not filing of such
documents with the charge-sheet. No such plea
in fact had been taken. Even if all the
documents had not been filed, by reason
thereof submission of charge-sheet itself does
not become vitiated in law. The charge-sheet
has been acted upon as an order of cognizance
had been passed on the basis thereof. The
appellant has not questioned the said order
taking cognizance of the offence. Validity of the
said charge-sheet is also not in question.”
It was further observed that,
16 CRR-900-2024
“The statutory scheme does not lead to a
conclusion in regard to an investigation leading
to filing of final form under subsection (2) of
Section 173 and further investigation
contemplated under subsection (8) thereof.
Whereas only when a charge-sheet is not filed
and investigation is kept pending, benefit of
proviso appended to subsection (2) of Section
167 of the Code would be available to an
offender; once, however, a chargesheet is filed,
the said right ceases. Such a right does not
revive only because a further investigation
remains pending within the meaning of sub-
section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.
12. The presentation of challan on 03.07.2013,
took care of the observed of statutory time limit
contemplated for investigation. While right to
investigate further is not closed as observed in
Dinesh Dalamiya(supra), the juncture marked
end of investigation phase, hence, operation of
Section 167(2) and taking of cognizance of
offence by the Magistrate. Resultantly, right of
the applicant-accused to seek default bail under
the said provision no more remained alive. The
challan was filed within 90 days which was a
due compliance as discussed above. After 90
days, Section 167(2) proviso ceased to govern
the rights of the accused and the matter went
out of the province of said Section. The challan
filed was “a police report acted upon” in terms
of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. Non-availability of
accompaniments being the documents or
extracts thereof mentioned in the police report
on 03.07.2013 did not in any way invalidated
the filing of the charge-sheet. It was a charge-
sheet well filed in law as required for the
purpose of Section 167(2) of the Code.
17 CRR-900-2024
16. This judgment of Gujarat High Court was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Narendra K. Amin v. Central Bureau of
Investigation (2015) 3 SCC 417.”
10. In Khilan Singh (supra) Coordinate Bench held as under:-
18. In the considered opinion of this Court, the word ‘shall’
employed in Section 173 (5) of the Cr.P.C. is only directory
in nature in view of the judgment of Supreme Court in
Narendra K. Amin (supra). A conjoint reading of the
provisions aforesaid does not lead this Court to the
conclusion that non-filing of FSL report with the challan
either vitiates the challan or makes the applicant entitled
for the default bail. Thus, I am in agreement with the view
taken by Rajasthan, Gujarat and Bombay High Court in
above mentioned cases and unable to pursuade myself with
the view taken by the Panjab and Haryana High Court.
11. In the case in hand, a commercial quantity of contraband has been seized
from the possession of the applicants. In the instant case, charge sheet has been
filed within statutory time limit but even for the sake of arguments it is
admitted that FSL report regarding the nature of substance was not filed then
the non-filing of FSL report with the challan does not give statutory right of
default bail to the accused as charge sheet has been filed well within time. The
document and the nature of FSL report is admissible in evidence under Section
293 of Cr.P.C. as charge sheet has already been filed within the permissible
period as provided under Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act. Therefore, the right
of the accused to be released on bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. on the
ground of charge sheet not having been filed within the statutory period does
not survive. Non-filing of FSL report with the charge sheet neither vitiate the
charge sheet nor makes the applicants entitled for default bail. I find myself in
18 CRR-900-2024
full agreement with the view taken by this Court in Criminal Revision No.4784
of 2023 (Shubham Mishra Vs. The State of M.P.) and the view taken by the
Coordinate Bench of this court in Khilan Singh (supra) wherein provision and
case laws have been discussed in detail.
12. As a result of aforesaid discussion, no substance is found in the argument
advanced by learned counsel for the applicants for grant of default or
mandatory bail to the applicants and no benefit can be given to the applicants
on the basis of bail orders passed in case of Bablu Singh (supra) by Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
13. Consequently, this revision being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
(DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL)
JUDGE
DV
Digitally signed by
DINESH VERMA
Date: 2025.01.30
10:18:50 +05’30’
