Jharkhand High Court
Umaayush Multicom Private Limited vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The … on 17 April, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
I.A. No. 12847 of 2024
In/and
Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024
Umaayush Multicom Private Limited, through one of its Directors, Shri
Lalan Singh, aged about 58 years, son of late Chandradeo Singh, having
its registered office at Indrapuri, Raja Bazar, New Capital Patna, P.O.
Veterinary College & P.S. Shastri Nagar, Patna, District - Bihar (800014)
...... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Department of
Forest, Environment & Climate Change, Govt. of Jharkhand having
office at Secretariat Building, Nepal House, PO & P.S-Doranda, Ranchi.
2. Shri Rajnish Kumar, presently the Divisional Forest Officer,
Environment and Climate Change, Block A, Van Bhawan, Purulia Road,
Chas, P.O. & P.S.-Chas, District-Bokaro, Pin Code - 827 001.
3. The State of Jharkhand.
4. Shri D. Venkateswarla, presently, the Regional Chief Conservator
of Forest, Environment & Climate Change, Block A, Van Bhawan,
Purulia Road, Chas, Bokaro, Pin Code - 827 001
... Opposite Parties
---------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
---------
For the Petitioner: Mr. Vimal Kirti Singh, Advocate
Mr. Srikant Swaroop, Advocate
Mr. Raunak Sahay, Advocate
For Opp. Party Nos.1, 3 & 4: Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III
Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, A.C. to AAG-III
For Opp. Party No.2: Mr. Ninad Laud, Advocate
Mr. Aditya, Advocate
Mrs. Shwati Shalini, Advocate
Mr. Siddharth Jain, Advocate
Mr. Rajnish Kumar, D.F.O. Bokaro.
---------
Reserved on: 27.02.2025 Pronounced on: 17. 4 .2025
M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.(Oral)
1) This Contempt Case was filed by the petitioner herein complaining
of willful disobedience of the judgment dt. 05.11.2020 in LPA
No.786/2018 of a Division Bench of this Court by the opposite
-1 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
party/respondent No.2 as he had issued letters dt. 23.04.2024 and
29.04.2024.
2) After hearing the counsel for the parties on 24.10.2024, this Court
was prima facie in agreement with the contention of the petitioner that
issuance of above two letters constituted contempt of the judgment passed
in the said LPA and advised respondent No.2 to consider withdrawing the
said letters and adjourned the matter to 28.10.2024.
3) On 28.10.2024, the respondent No.2 produced a letter dt.
28.10.2024 issued by the Regional Chief Conservator of Forests,
Environment and Climate Change, Chas, District Bokaro, under whom he
works, stating that the said letters cannot be withdrawn due to certain
reasons.
4) So on 28.10.2024, Regional Chief Conservator of Forests,
Environment and Climate Change, Chas, District Bokaro was suo motu
impleaded as party in the Contempt Case by the Court and notice was
issued to him. He is respondent No.4 in the Contempt Case.
5) The said respondents then approached the Supreme Court of India
by filing SLP (C) No. 31127 of 2024.
6) The said SLP was disposed off on 06.01.2025 noticing that the
Contempt Case was still pending in this Court in the following terms:
“1. We have heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners as well
as learned counsel for the respondent, who is the petitioner in the
Contempt Case before the High Court.
2. Since the contempt proceedings are still pending before the High
Court and no final view has been taken so far, we deem it appropriate to
dispose of the Special Leave Petition in the following terms:
-2 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
(i) The parties shall be at liberty to raise their all contentions
before the High Court;
(ii) The High Court may proceed to decide the contempt
proceedings without insisting the petitioners to withdraw the
letters they have issued to the respondent and which are claimed to
be advisory in nature. In other words, the High Court will
determine as to whether these letters are advisory in nature and/or
amount to contempt of court.
(iii) The petitioners shall be permitted to produce the relevant
records to substantiate their plea that the subject land is a private
forest land. The High Court is requested to examine this issue for
the limited purpose as to whether there is a wilful and deliberate
breach of the directions issued earlier by this Court.
(iv) In case the High Court finds the petitioners guilty of
contempt, no order of sentence shall be passed for a period of
eight weeks, to enable the petitioners to approach this Court.
3. It is clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits
of the case.
4. As a result, the present Special Leave Petition stands disposed of.
Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, also stands disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)
7) Counsel for the parties were heard at length on 27.2.2025 and
judgment was reserved.
8) In the discussion made hereafter we shall show how this plea now
raised by the respondent Nos. 2 and 4 in the Supreme Court that the land
was “private forest land” was never raised by the State Government in
proceedings before it’s Revenue Officials, or in the W.P.(C) No.593 of
2017 filed by petitioner’s predecessor in title Izhar Hussain, or in the
LPA No. 786 of 2018 filed by the State, both of which the State lost and
which judgments were confirmed in the Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.
8108 of 2021.
-3 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024. 9) Before we consider the contentions of the parties and the directions
of the Supreme Court in the SLP, we shall briefly set out the background
facts.
The Background facts
10) The petitioner company had purchased 74 acres 38 decimals of
land under a registered sale deed No.719 dt. 10.02.2021 in Village
Tetulia, Khata No.158 (Old Khata No.59), Plot No. 1268 and 1287 (Old
Plot Nos. 426 and 450) from Izhar Hussain and Akhtar Hussain.
The order dt. 9.9.2016 of the Additional Collector, Bokaro under Section 4(h) of
the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950
11) A dispute initially arose out between Izhar Hussain and officials of
the Revenue Department of the State of Jharkhand when a notice dt.
30.05.2016 was issued by the Circle Officer, Chas stating that a
Jamabandi No. 1665 in relation to Mouja Tetulia, Thana No. 38, Sector
12, Khata No. 59, Plot No. 426 and 450 of extent acre 103 is illegal and
doubtful and asking Izhar Hussain to appear before him with all available
documents.
12) Thereafter a Misc (4h) Case No. 110/2016-17 was registered under
Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 by Addl. Collector,
Bokaro and a notice dt. 12.06.2016 (Annexure-7) was issued alleging that
the Jamabandi No.1665 and it’s main Jamabandi No. 70 were illegal and
doubtful and asking Izhar Hussain to appear before the said authority on
29.08.2016.
13) Izhar Hussain contended that in a Certificate Case No.191/1933,
the then Deputy Collector, Purulia settled the above land in favor of his
-4 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
ancestor Samir Mahat @ Samir Mahto, S/o Bhuran Mahto for an annual
rent of Rs.35/- and that Samir Mahto thereafter came into possession of
the said land and after Samir Mahto, he is in possession of the land.
14) Izhar Hussain contended that on 26.06.2012 also a certificate was
issued by the Circle Officer, Chas that the above land was settled in favor
of Samir Mahto through Auction Certificate No.191/1933.
15) According to him, one Niraj Mohan then gave an application to the
Additional Collector, Bokaro for verifying the above land as it was shown
as “Gair Abadi Malik” in Khatian.
16) On the said application Misc. Case No.56/2015-16 was registered
and a final order was passed on 17.03.2016 opining that Izhar Hussain
and Akhtar Hussain are recorded raiyats of Register II in Thoka (Lot)
No.1665, that the said entry is correct and Niraj Mohan’s claim is false.
17) Izhar Hussain filed reply in Misc (4h) Case No. 110/2016-17
denying the allegations levelled in the show cause notice.
18) On 09.09.2016 an order was passed by the Addl. Collector, Bokaro
canceling the Jamabandi under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms
Act, 1950. Translation of the said order into English has been supplied by
counsel for petitioner.
19) In the said order dt. 09.09.2016 passed by the Addl. Collector,
Bokaro it is stated:
(i) that the Circle Officer, Chas reported that the Jamabandi
No.70 running in the name of Izhar Hussain’s grandfather Samir
Mahto was opened without approval of any competent authority;
-5 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
(ii) pen used was a ball point pen and such pens were not in use
in 1965-66;
(iii) as per Survey Khatian, the land was recorded as “Gair
Aabadi Malik- Kism Jungle Saal”;
(iv) that this was notified as Protected Forest under Forest
Department’s notification No. C/F 17014/58-142698 dt.14.5.1958;
(v) for verification of the deed/Auction Certificate Case No.
191/1933 issued by the Deputy Collector, Purulia to Samir Mahto
produced by Izhar Hussain, a letter dt. 29.06.2016 was sent to Sub-
Registrar, Purulia but no authentication report was received yet.
20) The Addl. Collector, Bokaro further held in his order dt.
09.09.2016 that the Jamabandi recorded under Jamabandi No. 1665 in the
names of Izhar Hussain and Akhtar Hussain (for the subject land of acre
103) is illegal and invalid and is cancelled under Section 4(h) of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1950 for the following reasons:
(a) As per Khatian, the land measuring 40.60 acres and
66.60 acres in Mouza (revenue Village) Tetulia, P.S. No. 38,
Khata No.59, Plot No. 426 and 450 is recorded as “Gair
Mazarua Malik Kism Jungle-Jhaadi”;
(b) The Auction Certificate No. 191/1933 does not appear to
be authentic because only those land in respect of which rents
are not paid were auctioned. This implies that before 1932, the
land must have been auctioned only due to non-payment of
-6 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
assessed rent. For rectification of the entry of “Gair Mazarua
Malik Kism Jungle-Jhaadi” made in 1932 in the Khatian, steps
must have been taken by the Raiyat before the competent court
for rectification of the same under the provision of Survey
settlement. However, no such evidence of prior Raiyati
ownership before 1932 was found during the investigation.
Therefore the claim that Samir Mahto, son of Bhuvan Mahto,
acquired the land through an auction in 1933 is nothing but a
forgery.
(c) After the abolition of the Zamindari, the land vested in
the Government. Therefore it was expected that the former
Zamindar should have filed a return in the year 1955-56 based
on which the Jamabandi (Land record) would have been created
in Register-II. However this was not done.
(d) The then Circle officer, Chas, for personal gains, carried
out the mutation of land in question in favor of the opposite
party through Mutation Case No.1317(VIII)/2012-13 and
recorded the Jamabandi accordingly. Since the Jamabandi was
created without an order from a competent authority and was
written using a ball point pen, it raises serious doubts as ball
point pens were not in use in 1962. Additionally, the date
mentioned below the signature is in English numerals, whereas
all other entries are in Hindi numerals, further indicating
-7 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
irregularities. So the creation of Jamabandi No.70 appears to be
a forged act.
(e) The said land was also registered as protected Forest in
the Bihar Gazette published on 9.7.1958. Additionally, the
Divisional Forest Officer, Bokaro in his official letter No.1856
dt. 12.6.2016 has reported that 95.65 acres of this land is forest
land. This clearly establishes that the subject land is
Government owned land.
(f) While conducting mutation proceeding, the then Circle
officer ought to have kept in mind the land mark judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Godavarman
Thirumulkpad v. Union of India and others1. However, this
was not taken into account, despite the fact that the judgment
directs that: “The term ‘forest land’ occurring in Section 2 will
not only include forest as understood in the dictionary sense but
also any area recorded as forest in the Government record
irrespective of ownership”.
(g) The certificate related to the land in reference was issued
by the then Circle Officer. Before issuing the certificate, the
officer should have formally verified the registered documents
from Purulia (West Bengal) located outside the State, and
thereafter prior to the issuance of the certificate,
approval/orders of competent authority should have been
1
(1997) 2 SCC 267
-8 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
obtained. Since the power to create Jamabandi of 103 acres of
land is not within the authority of Circle Officer therefore, it is
evident that the Jamabandi was opened through collusion.
(h) From a physical examination of the land, it is clear that
the land neither was under any private possession, nor is there
any current occupation by any individual or any Sign of Jot-
Abad. As for the applicant’s claim of possession over the land,
it was found that there has been no trace of occupation, even as
far back as 1993. Regarding cultivation and possession since
1933, it can be conclusively stated that this entire land was a
dense forest 80-85 years ago, making any settlement completely
unjustifiable.
(i) The opposite party fraudulently secured the Jamabandi
for the land by presenting false documents, misinterpreting
records, and colluding with the then Circle Officer, Chas. The
opposite party further claims that the Additional Collector
approved the order passed by the then Circle Officer, Chas.
However, this is entirely baseless and incorrect. The Additional
Collector neither approved the order of the then Circle Officer,
Chas, nor confirmed the opposite party’s claim. No order what
so ever was issued by the Additional Collector to confirm the
claim of opposite party (Izhar Hussain).
(j) The Government appointed inquiry team has reported
that there has been no possession on the subject land, and even
-9 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
as of now there is no evidence of possession on the aforesaid
land by any person and there is also no evidence of tillage on
the said land. The said land is essentially foothill of a hillock
and the remains are essentially rocky in nature. With regard to
applicant’s claim for possession, it was clearly established that
no trace of occupation existed, even as far back as 1933. It is
premised that since 1933, in the context of evidence of tillage
and possession that the said land would have remained a dense
forest for 80-85 years, making any settlement is unjustifiable.
(k) Thus the opposite party (Izhar Hussain and others) failed
to present any authentic documents, records, or credible
evidence before the Court that could support their claim over
the subject land. It is evident that the opposite party attempted
to unlawfully seize government land by fabricating false claims
and engaging in serious conspiracy.
Finding of this Court on the stand of the State Government in the proceedings
issued by the Revenue Authorities
21) As can be seen from the above, the claim of the State was that title
to the land belonged to it, that it was a forest land notified as a protected
forest in the Bihar Gazette published on 09.07.1958.
22) No plea was ever raised that it was a “private forest land” in the
above referred litigation, which is a new case now set up by the Forest
Department of the State Government in the Supreme Court.
23) After the order dt. 09.09.2016 was passed by the Additional
Collector, Bokaro, the Joint Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand in Memo No.
-10 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
6387 dt.15.12.2016 gave consent for cancellation of the Jamabandi of
Izhar Hussain with a direction to take possession of the Land.
24) This was followed by a letter No. 80/Revenue dt.18.1.2017 issued
by the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro directing the Circle Officer, Chas
to delete the name of Izhar Hussain in Register II at page 1665 by
cancelling the Jamabandi and to take possession of the land.
The W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017 and order dt. 14.6.2018 therein
25) Challenging the order dt. 09.09.2016 passed by the Additional
Collector, Bokaro, the consequential Memo No.6387 dt.15.12.2016 of
the Joint Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand and the letter No. 80/Revenue dt.
18.01.2017 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro, Izhar Hussain
filed W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017 in this High Court.
26) The High Court on 14.06.2018 allowed the said Writ Petition and
set aside all the above proceedings, but granted liberty to the Government
to take recourse to the Civil Court having competent jurisdiction if they
claim title of the Government over the said land.
27) To this Writ Petition, the Chief Secretary of the State of
Jharkhand was the respondent No.1 and the other respondents were
the Revenue Department Officials.
28) Though the Forest Department of the Govt. of Jharkhand was not a
party thereto, still since the Chief Secretary of the State is a party, and the
Forest Department reports to him, even the said Department is bound the
judgment in the W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017.
29) In the Writ Petition, the learned Single Judge held that the Circle
Officer, Chas had held in an order dt.17.3.2016 in Misc. Case No.56 of
-11 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
2015-16 that the land was acquired by Izhar Hussain’s ancestors in an
auction proceeding vide Certificate Case No.191 of 1933 and the
Jamabandi was also opened in their name and they paid rent to the State
Government. But thereafter the impugned orders/ proceedings had been
issued doubting the Jamabandi; that since the transfer of land was made
prior to 1.1.1946, the initiation of proceedings under Section 4(h) of the
Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 to cancel the Jamabandi was without
jurisdiction; and that in State of Jharkhand v. Chancla Devi2, a Division
Bench of this Court had held that if the State Government is claiming the
ownership of property which is in possession of the tenant/raiyat and
his/her predecessors in title since 9.6.1942, filing of a Civil suit is the
only remedy of the State Government.
30) The learned Single Judge referred to plea of the respondents in the
Writ Petition that the land is ‘protected forest land’ declared under section
29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 but rejected it on the ground that there
was no prior inquiry under Sub Section (3) thereof regarding the nature
and extent of the right of the State Government and of private persons
upon the forest land; and even the notification dt.9.7.1958 issued by the
Government stated that there was no such an inquiry under Section 29(3)
of the said Act yet, and because such inquiry will take much time, the
notification was being issued subject to all existing rights of individuals.
31) Though the learned Single Judge quoted Section 2 of the Forest
Conservation Act, 1980 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.N.
Godavarman (1 supra), he held that they cannot be applied by the
2
Judgment in LPA No.142 of 2010 and LPA No.307 of 2009
-12 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
respondents in the Writ Petition for cancellation of Jamabandi of Izhar
Hussain, much less a long running one.
Finding of this Court on the stand of the State Government in the Writ Petition
32) Even in the Writ Petition, the claim of the State was that title to the
land belonged to it and that it was a “forest land” notified as a protected
forest in the Bihar Gazette published on 9.7.1958.
33) No plea was ever raised that it was a “private forest land” in the
Writ Petition, which is a new case now set up by the Forest Department
of the State Government in the Supreme Court in the SLP.
LPA No.786 of 2018
34) The judgment in the W.P. (C) No.593 of 2017 was challenged by
the respondents in the Writ Petition before the Division Bench in LPA
No.786 of 2018, but the said LPA was also dismissed on 5.11.2020.
35) The Division Bench held that a long running Jamabandi cannot be
cancelled save and except by filing a suit before the competent Court of
Civil jurisdiction in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Ramayan Yadav & Ors v. State of Bihar & Ors3.
36) It reiterated the view of the learned Single Judge that no
notification can be issued under Section 29(1) of the Indian Forest Act,
1927 without conducting an inquiry under Sub-section (3) as to the nature
and extent of rights of the Government and of private citizens in or over
the forest land or waste land comprised therein, and without recording the
same at a survey and settlement or in such other manner as the State
Government thinks sufficient.
3
(2013) 3 PLJR 533
-13 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
37) The Division Bench noted that the claim of the State Government’s
Revenue Department was a claim of proprietary right over the land on the
ground that the same is “Gair Abad Malik” (Jungle-jhari) and that by
reason of the promulgation of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 it would
vest to the Government. They had also contended that the land was
admittedly notified as ‘forest land’ on 09.07.1958.
38) The Division Bench also noted that the predecessors of the
petitioner i.e., Izhar Hussain disputed the plea of the Government and
contended that even before the issuance of the said notifications, the land
was already acquired by his ancestors vide a Certificate Case No.
191/1933.
39) The Division Bench then held that the learned Single Judge had, on
the basis of reasoning given by him, rightly held that the provision of
Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 or the judgment
rendered in the case of T.N. Godavarman (1 supra) cannot be applied by
the Revenue Department of the State Government for cancellation of the
Jamabandi much less, a long running one, and that there was no reason to
differ from the view/opinion of the learned Single Judge.
40) It also held that when the Additional Collector passed an order in
Misc. Case No. 56/2015-16 on 17.03.2016 holding that Izhar Hussain and
Akhtar Hussain are the recorded raiyats of Register-II in Thoka (Lot) No.
1665, without the said order being questioned or reversed, a fresh
proceeding cannot be initiated under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land
Reforms Act, 1950, and that a long running Jamabandi cannot be
cancelled save and except by instituting a litigation before the Civil Court
of competent jurisdiction.
-14 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
Finding of Court on Stand of State Govt. in LPA
41) A perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench in the L.P.A. also
shows that no contention was advanced by the Revenue Department of
the State Government of Jharkhand that the subject land is a ‘private
forest land’. It had contended only that it was Government owned land
which was a “protected forest” by virtue of notification dt. 09.07.1958
under Indian Forest Act, 1927.
S.L.P. (C) No. 8108 of 2021
42) Challenging this judgment dt. 5.11.2020 in L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018
of the Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court confirming the
judgment dt. 14.06.2018 in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017, the State of
Jharkhand and its Revenue officials filed S.L.P. (C) No. 8108 of 2021.
43) The said S.L.P. was dismissed on 6.7.2021 holding that the
Supreme Court was not inclined to interfere with the impugned final
judgment and order passed by the High Court.
Findings
44) Thus, the State of Jharkhand had not succeeded in its claim of title
to the subject land in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017, L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018
and S.L.P. (C) No. 8108 of 2021.
45) In all these three orders/judgments it’s pleas that the land is
Government land and is ‘protected forest’ by virtue of the notification
issued on 09.07.1958 under the Indian Forest Act, 1927, were rejected.
46) Nowhere did the State of Jharkhand and its Revenue officials
including the Chief Secretary, who was also a party to the said
proceedings, pleaded that the subject land is ‘private forest land’ at all.
-15 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
47) We hold that once a direct attack was made on the judgment in
W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017 by the State of Jharkhand which was
represented by it’s Chief Secretary and Revenue Officials in LPA No.
786 of 2018 and SLP(C) No.8108 of 2021 and it failed, no collateral
attack is permissible on the judgment in W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017 by
raising new plea that the subject land is “private forest land” which had
not been raised in that Writ Petition by State of Jharkhand.
48) In Omprakash Verma and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
others4, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of Constructive res
judicata applies to Writ Petitions and a judgment in a Writ Petition which
has attained finality, cannot be collaterally challenged on new grounds
which were available at the time when the previous Writ Petition was
decided but not raised. No collateral attack is permissible on the said
previous judgment on the ground that certain facts had not been placed
before the Court when it decided it. It declared:
“68. The learned Attorney General submitted that a judgment rendered
by this Court cannot be collaterally challenged as is sought to be done by
the appellants in these appeals. For the said proposition, he relied on the
following. In Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police5
Diplock, L.J. delivering his opinion in the House of Lords enunciated the
doctrine of “collateral attack” on a judgment and observed thus : (AC p.
541 B-C)
“The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies is the
initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of
mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the
intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of
competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the4
(2010) 13 SCC 158
5
1982 AC 529
-16 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision
in the court by which it was made.”
69. Quoting Halsbury, the learned Judge observed : (Hunter case, AC
p. 542 C-D)
“… ‘… I think it would be a scandal to the administration of
justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case,
the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the
proceedings to set up the same case again.’*”
70. This Court has approved this well-settled principle that a judgment
of the Supreme Court cannot be collaterally challenged on the ground that
certain points had not been considered. This Court in Anil Kumar Neotia
v. Union of India6 held that it is not open to contend that certain points
had not been urged or argued before the Supreme Court and thereby seek
to reopen the issue. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:
(SCC p. 600, paras 17-18)
“17. … This Court further observed that to contend that the
conclusion therein applied only to the parties before this Court
was to destroy the efficacy and integrity of the judgment and to
make the mandate of Article 141 illusory.**
18. … It is also no longer open to the petitioners to contend that
certain points had not been urged and the effect of the judgment
cannot be collaterally challenged.”
71. In Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat7 this Court
reiterated the principle that a judgment of this Court is binding on all and
it is not open to contend that the full facts had not been placed before the
Court. In this regard, para 62 of the judgment reads as follows : (SCC p.
665)
“62. It is well settled that the judgments of this Court are
binding on all the authorities under Article 141 of the Constitution
and it is not open to any authority to ignore a binding judgment of
this Court on the ground that the full facts had not been placed
before this Court and/or the judgment of this Court in the earlier
proceedings had only collaterally or incidentally decided the
issues….” (emphasis supplied)
6
(1988) 2 SCC 587
7
(2004) 12 SCC 645
-17 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
49) The stand taken in the supplementary counter affidavit
dt.23.10.2024 by the respondent No.2 that he was not a party to W.P. (C)
No. 593 of 2017 filed by petitioner and so complete facts could not be
brought to the notice of this Court when it decided the said Writ Petition,
cannot be countenanced because the State Government in that case was
represented by the Chief Secretary to the Government (as respondent
No.1) and he is the Head of the State Civil service. He is deemed to have
represented all departments of the State Government and so the decision
in W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017, LPA No.786 of 2018 and SLP(C) No. 8108
of 2021 binds the respondent No.2. He cannot be allowed to contend that
full facts were not placed before the said Court and that the judgments
passed by this Court and the Supreme Court should therefore, be ignored.
50) Moreover, as permitted in the judgment of the learned Single Judge
in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017, the State of Jharkhand had filed original
Title Suit No. 614 of 2024 on 5.10.2024 before the Court of Civil Judge,
Sr. Division-I, Bokaro for declaration of it’s right, title and interest over
the land in question and the said suit is still pending.
51) Admittedly, during pendency of the case before the Supreme Court
in S.L.P.(C) No. 8108 of 2021 the petitioner in the Contempt Case
purchased under a sale deed No. 719 dt. 10.02.2021 land measuring 74
acres 38 decimals forming part of the land which was subject matter in
W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017.
52) It is also not in dispute that letter No. 895 was issued by the then
Divisional Forest Officer, Chas asking the District Sub Registrar, Bokaro
to show cause as to why penal action be not initiated for alleged
-18 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
commission of offence under Section 3A and 3B of the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 for executing the sale deed in favour of the
petitioner herein in this Contempt Case with regard to plot Nos. 426 and
450 which allegedly fell in the notified list of forest land.
53) The petitioner had filed Contempt Case (Civil) No. 214 of 2021
alleging that the issuance of this letter amounts to contempt of the
judgment in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017.
In that contempt case, the said Divisional Forest Officer, on being
summoned appeared in person, filed a show cause dt. 16.08.2021
tendering an unqualified apology and withdrew the letter No. 895 dt.
12.03.2021 and prayed for dropping of the said contempt proceedings.
Therefore, taking a lenient view of the matter, the Division Bench
of this Court accepted the apology and dropped the contempt
proceedings.
54) Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued another letter No. 828 dt.
29.04.2024 identical to the previous letter No. 895 dt. 12.03.2021
contending that the land purchased by the petitioner referred to above in
village Tetulia is “unbroken forest land”.
The instant Contempt Case
55) Therefore, the instant contempt case has been filed by the petitioner
alleging willful disobedience of the order passed in W.P.(C) No. 593 of
2017 dt. 14.06.2018 as confirmed in L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018 on
15.11.2020 and in S.L.P. (C) No. 8108 of 2021 dt. 6.7.2021.
56) In this letter No. 828 dt. 29.04.2024, the 2nd respondent states that
as regards the Jamabandi, that it is disputed.
-19 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
We are unable to understand how he can make such a statement
when the order cancelling the Jamabandi was set aside in W.P.(C) No.
593 of 2017 and in L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018.
The 2nd respondent is thus showing gross disrespect to the
judgment rendered by this Court which was also confirmed in the
Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 8108 of 2021 on 06.07.2021.
The stand in the Counter affidavit dt.19.10.2024 of the respondent
No.2 that in his letter dt.29.4.2024 he did not question the Jamabandi of
the petitioner is false plea contradicted by the contents of the letter
dt.29.4.2024 itself.
57) In para 25 of the counter affidavit filed by respondent No.2 he
stated that the sale deed executed by Izhar Hussain in favor of the
petitioner has no validity, that title will not pass to the petitioner and it
has no title and that the title holder is the State Government.
When the State Government itself has not proved it’s title to the
subject land and it’s Title Suit No.614 of 2024 filed on 5.10.2024 before
the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Division-I, Bokaro for declaration of it’s
right, title and interest over the land in question is still pending, the
respondent No.2 cannot assume that the State has title and the petitioner
does not have title forgetting that the Jamabandi in petitioner’s
predecessor Izhar Hussain’s favor has been upheld by this Court in W.P.
(C) No.593 of 2017.
The stand of the respondent No.2 indicates his poor knowledge of
law and arrogance in presuming the result of the Title suit in the State
-20 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
Government’s favor even without a trial and without a judgment in it’s
favor.
58) The letter dt. 29.04.2024 prohibits the petitioner from doing non-
forest activities in the subject land while proceeding on the premise that it
is a ‘notified forest land’ and ‘unbroken forest land’ even if it may be not
owned by the Government. Counsel for the respondents contended that
the subject land is ‘private forest land, that ownership of the land will not
make any difference to the application of the Forest (Conservation) Act,
1980, and that it would apply to all types of forest irrespective of
ownership of the land.
Reliance is placed on a three member committee report dated
09.06.2016 submitted by officials of the Department of Revenue,
Registration and Land Reforms to assert that the nature of the land in the
revenue records is “Gair Mazurwa Khas- Jungle Jhari”, but this report
has no bearing on the case after the judgment in LPA No.786 of 2018 and
the judgment of the Supreme Court in SLP(C) No. 8108 of 2021 where
the plea of land being notified ‘forest land’ was rejected.
59) So no restriction can be imposed by the respondents on activities in
the land insisting it to be ‘forest land’. There cannot also be any penalty
or punishment on the petitioner under the Forest (Conservation) Act,
1980.
60) Reliance is also placed in para 17 of the counter affidavit
dt.19.10.2024 of respondent No.2 on notification dt. 24.05.1958 issued
under Indian Forest Act, 1927 which was published on 09.07.1958 which
-21 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
plea had already been rejected in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017 and also in
L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018.
This is a seriously contumacious act on part of the 2nd respondent.
61) It is further contended by the respondents that the said letter dt.
29.04.2024 was advisory in nature.
There is no provision of law under which the State Government
officials are empowered to issue advisories to citizens particularly when
such advisories go against the judgments rendered by this Court which
were also upheld up to the Supreme Court as in the instant case.
The issuance of such alleged advisories by the respondent No.2
also indicates his utter lack of respect to the judgments rendered by this
Court which have been upheld by the Supreme Court. He seems to think
that they can overreach the said judgments by issuing such threatening
letters.
62) It appears that the respondents also contended in the Supreme
Court that they should be permitted to produce relevant records to
substantiate their plea that the subject land is a ‘private forest land’ which
the Supreme Court noted and requested this Court to examine for the
limited purpose as to whether there is a willful and deliberate breach of
the directions issued earlier by this Court.
Normally while dealing with an application for contempt, the Court
is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision, which
has received it’s finality, has been complied with or not; and it would not
be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier
decision and take a view different from what was taken in the earlier
-22 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
decision (Union of India and others Vs. Subedar Devassy PV8, Director
of Education, Uttaranchal and others Vs. Ved Prakash Joshi and
others9, K.G. Derasari and Another Vs. Union of India and others 10
and Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand and others11).
Thus, while dealing with an application for contempt, the Court
cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance with which is alleged.
In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what
should have been done. It cannot test correctness or otherwise of the order
or give additional direction or delete any direction. That would be
exercising review jurisdiction while dealing with an application for
initiation of contempt proceeding and is normally impermissible
[Prithawi Nath Ram (11 supra)]
63) However, in deference to the order passed by the Supreme Court
on 06.01.2025 in S.L.P.(C) No. 31127 of 2024 permitting the respondents
to produce relevant records to substantiate their plea that the subject land
is a ‘private forest land’ (though such a plea was never raised in the
W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017, LPA No.786 of 2018 and SLP(C) No.8108 of
2021), we shall also examine the said aspect for the limited purpose of
determining whether there is a willful and deliberate breach of the
direction issued in W.P.(C)No.593 of 2017/L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018/
S.L.P.(C) No. 8108 of 2021.
64) In this regard, we shall refer to the documents filed along with the
show cause by the 2nd respondent.
8
(2006) 1 SCC 613
9
(2005) 6 SCC 98
10
(2001) 10 SCC 496
11
(2004) 7 SCC 261
-23 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
The said documents had been filed by it in Title Suit No. 84 of
2024 filed before the Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Bokaro seeking
declaration of the title of the State Government to the land of Izhar
Hussain and Akhtar Hussain.
One such document is alleged to be a Continuous Khatian filed at
pages 45-51 of the show cause but this document is a photocopy of a true
copy of a hand written document filed in another suit T.S. 16/86 before a
Sub Judge on 19.12.1995. The name of the Sub Judge’s Court is also not
mentioned therein.
This is not a certified copy of the Continuous Khatian which would
be in the custody of the Revenue Department of the State of Jharkhand.
No reason is assigned why such certified copy of the Continuous
Khatian of the subject land, if available with the Revenue Department of
the State Government, has not been filed.
This document cannot be said to be of any evidentiary value and
cannot be the source of the claim by the respondents that the subject land
is a private forest land.
It is disturbing that the 2nd respondent has gone to such lengths to
prove that the subject land is a ‘private forest land’ even though such a
plea was never raised in the previous round of litigation and shows his
mala fide intention to somehow or the other overreach the order passed
by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017 confirmed in L.P.A. No. 786 of
2018 and in S.L.P. (C) No. 8108 of 2021.
More importantly, when the petitioner applied for the certified
copy of the Continuous Khatian of village Tetulia under the Right to
-24 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
Information Act, 2005, the office of the Deputy Commissioner-cum-
District Magistrate, Bokaro has categorically stated by an endorsement dt.
25.06.2021 that the complete Khatian is in a totally torn condition and it
is not possible to give it’s copy.
This document i.e. endorsement dt. 25.06.2021 issued by the office
of the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Bokaro is not
disputed by the respondents.
65) If the original Khatian in respect of the subject land of Tetulia
village is not available, and that can be the only basis for the respondents
to contend that the subject land is a ‘private forest land’, they have to be
held to have absolutely failed to discharge the burden cast on them to
prove that the subject land is a ‘private forest land’.
66) They cannot be permitted to rely on photocopies of some hand
written document filed in a T.S. 16/86 filed by some third party against
another third party in some Sub Judge’s Court which does not even bear
the seal of the Court anywhere and try to circumvent the judgment passed
by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017.
67) It is clearly an attempt to mislead this Court by creating dubious
document.
68) No amount of reliance by the respondents on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in T.N. Godavarman (1 supra) can be of any help to the
respondents in the absence of any material filed by them showing the
existence of “forest” in the petitioner’s property.
-25 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
69) Though in Narinder Singh and others Vs Divesh Bhutani and
others12 relied upon by the respondents, there is an observation (at para
49) that if a land is shown as a ‘forest’ in Government records it will be
governed by Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the
Supreme Court clarified in that case that only such entries made after
following due process can be part of any Government record.
70) In the absence of any authentic evidence in the form of the original
/certified copy of the Khatian in respect of the subject land relied upon by
the respondents and produced by the respondents who are obviously the
custodians of such records, they cannot contend that the entry shown in
the document produced by them from the Sub Judge’s Court is a
Government record showing the land as a ‘forest’ and they can use the
same to circumvent/overreach the judgment passed by this Court in
W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017.
71) In para 8 of the 2nd show cause filed by respondent No.2 it is
contended that the contempt case is not maintainable against the said
official as he is not a party to the W.P.(C) No. 593 of 2017.
In Parents Association of Students v. M.A. Khan and another13
relied on by the respondent No.2, it is stated that ordinarily, a person if
not a party to the lis and no direction having been issued against him, a
contempt petition against him would not lie. In the said judgment it was
also held:
“13. We, however, wish to deal with the basic issue. The appellant
filed the writ petition, inter alia, for a direction upon the State to regulate12
2022 SCC OnLine SC 899
13
(2009) 2 SCC 641
-26 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
professional education so far as it, inter alia, relates to fixation of fee. The
first respondent admittedly runs a professional institution. It, subject to
any law, would be bound by the decision of this Court in T.M.A. Pai. The
contemnor or the institution which he represents, however, was not a
party. If he was not a party, subject to statutory interdict, only in
exceptional cases, he may be proceeded against under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.” (emphasis supplied)
Thus even the said judgment accepts that in exceptional cases,
even a non-party can be held liable for contempt under the Contempt of
Courts Act,1971.
Way back in 1961, in the case of State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati
Kumari14, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in a case where the
question arose as to who is to be punished under Order 39 Rule 2(3) CPC
if there is an injunction order granted by a Civil Court under Order 39
Rule 2(1) CPC in a suit to which the State was a defendant, considered
the matter. It declared:
“24. …… Under the law when an order of injunction is passed, that
order is binding on and enforceable not merely against the persons eo
nomine impleaded as a party to the suit and against whom the order is
passed but against “the agents and servants, etc.” of such a party. If such
were not the law, orders of injunction would be rendered nugatory, by
their being contravened by the agents and servants of parties. For that
reason, the law provides that in order that a plaintiff might seek to enforce
an order against a servant or an agent of the defendant, these latter need
not be added as defendants to the suit and an order obtained specifically
against them — order against the defendant sufficing for this purpose. If
such agents or servants, etc., are proved to have formal notice of the order
and they disobey the injunction, they are liable to be proceeded against
for contempt, without any need for a further order against them under
Order 39 Rule 2(1). This legal position is brought out by the terms of an
injunction order set out in Form 8 of Appendix F to the Code which14
AIR 1961 SC 221
-27 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
reads:”The Court doth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the
defendant C.D., his servants, agents and workmen, from….” It is not
suggested that the form which the order of the Subordinate Judge took in
this case, departed from this model.
25. If such is the scope of an order for injunction, it would be apparent
that the expression “person” has in Order 39 Rule 2(3) been employed
merely compendiously to designate everyone in the group “Defendant, his
agents, servants and workmen” and not for excluding any defendant
against whom the order of injunction has primarily been passed. It would
therefore follow that in cases where the State is the defendant against
whom an order of injunction has been issued, it is “expressly” named in
the clause and not even by necessary implication, and the rule of
construction invoked does not in any manner avail the appellant.”
(emphasis supplied)
72) So since the State of Jharkhand represented by it’s Chief Secretary
was a party to W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017, every official of the State of
Jharkhand as it’s agent/servant is bound by the judgment pronounced
therein.
73) Alternatively, it can also be held that by his conduct in issuing the
letter dt.29.04.2024, the respondent no.2 was aiding and abetting the
violation of the judgment in W.P.(C)No. 593 of 2017 and LPA
No. 786/2018 by the State of Jharkhand, though he is a third party to it,
because he was certainly aware of said judgments which were quoted in
the letter dt.29.04.2024 itself. He is obstructing the course of justice by
trying to overreach it raising new plea that it is a ‘private forest land’ not
raised previously, doubting the Jamabandi which was upheld and
doubting the title of petitioner to the land when the State’s suit for
declaration of it’s title is still at a nascent stage of filing of pleadings.
-28 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
74) In Sita Ram v. Balbir alias Bali15 this aspect was considered by the
Supreme Court in a case where an accused was allowed to stay in a
hospital for more than 500 days by doctors working in it allegedly on
ground of the health inspite of a direction issued by the Supreme Court to
the said accused to surrender forthwith after cancelling his bail resulting
in it’s disobedience. Terming it as an act of obstruction of justice and
contemptuous, the Supreme Court held:
“40. Wilful disobedience to a direction issued by this Court on 24-10-
2013 on the part of the respondent is quite evident. He was party to the
proceedings and bound by the order and as such his liability on that court
stands established. Further, by his defiance of the direction so issued, he
also obstructed administration of justice. He is thus liable for committing
civil contempt as well as criminal contempt. But the medical professionals,
namely, Dr Munish Prabhakar and Dr K.S. Sachdev were not parties to
the matter where the direction in question was passed.
41. As regards the liability of the aforesaid medical professionals,
questions that arise are : (1) whether a person, who is not bound by a
direction issued by the court could be held guilty for committing contempt
of court for his conduct in either directly aiding and abetting violation on
the part of the person who is bound by such direction; and (2) what is the
extent of liability of such person.
42. In Seaward v. Paterson16, the landlord of the premises concerned
had obtained an injunction against Paterson i.e. his tenant restraining him
from doing or allowing to be done anything on the premises which would
be a nuisance to the landlord and from using the premises otherwise than
for the purposes of a private club. Alleging that the tenant had committed
contempt of the court by allowing the premises to be used for boxing
matches, the landlord applied for committal of two other persons, namely,
Sheppard and Murray on the ground that they had aided and assisted the
tenant in his disobedience to the injunction. The following passages from15
(2017) 2 SCC 456
16
(1895-99) All ER 1127
-29 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
the judgment of Lindley, L.J. are quite instructive : (All ER pp. 1130 F-G
& 1131 B-D)
“Now, Let us consider what jurisdiction the court has to make
an order against Murray. There is no injunction against him–he is
no more bound by the injunction granted against Paterson than
any other member of the public. He is bound, like other members
of the public, not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the course
of justice; and the case, if any, made against him must be this, not
that he has technically infringed the injunction, which was not
granted against him in any sense of the word, but that he has been
aiding and abetting others in setting the court at defiance, and
deliberately treating the order of the court as unworthy of notice. If
he has so conducted himself, it is perfectly idle to say that there is
no jurisdiction to commit him for contempt as distinguished from a
breach of the injunction, which has a technical meaning.
* * *
A motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is
technically wrong unless he is bound by the injunction, is one
thing; and a motion to commit a man for contempt of court, not
because he is bound by the injunction by being party to the cause,
but because he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of
justice, is another and a totally different thing. The difference is
very marked. In the one case the party who is bound by the
injunction is proceeded against for the purpose of enforcing the
order of the court for the benefit of the person who got it. In the
other case, the court will not allow its process to be set at naught
and treated with contempt.
43. In Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL17 the plaintiff had obtained injunction
against certain defendants and the assets of one such defendant against
whom the injunction was granted, were held by a bank. The bank was
served with a copy of the injunction but the defendant concerned had not
yet been served. While considering the question whether any disposal of
assets belonging to the defendant by the bank would make it liable for
committing contempt of court, it was stated as under : (All ER pp. 566g-j
& 567a-b)
17
(1982) 1 All ER 556
-30 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
“I think that the following propositions may be stated as to the
consequences which ensue when there are acts or omissions which
are contrary to the terms of injunction: (1) The person against
whom the order is made will be liable for contempt of court if he
acts in breach of the order after having notice of it. (2) A third
party will also be liable if he knowingly assists in the breach, that
is to say if knowing the terms of the injunction he wilfully assists
the person to whom it was directed to disobey it. This will be so
whether or not the person enjoined has had notice of the
injunction.
* * *
I will give my reasons for the second proposition and take first
the question of prior notice to the defendant.
It was argued that the liability of the third person arose because
he was treated as aiding and abetting the defendant (i.e. was an
accessory) and as the defendant could himself not be in breach
unless he had notice it followed that there was no offence to which
the third party could be an accessory. In my opinion this argument
misunderstands the true nature of the liability of the third party.
He is liable for contempt of court committed by himself. It is true
that his conduct may very often be seen as possessing a dual
character of contempt of court by himself and aiding and abetting
the contempt by another, but the conduct will always amount to
contempt by himself. It will be conduct which knowingly interferes
with the administration of justice by causing the order of the court
to be thwarted.”
44. The extent of liability of third party in such actions was considered
by the House of Lords in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd.18
In that case the Attorney General had brought action against two
newspapers seeking permanent injunction restraining them from
publishing material from a book written by a person who was formerly a
member of the security service and by terms of his employment was bound
by confidentiality which would stand breached if his memoirs were
published. While the interlocutory injunctions restraining publication of
the material pending trial of such action were granted against those two
newspapers, three other newspapers published extensive extracts and
summaries of the book following which proceedings for criminal contempt
18
(1991) (2) All ER 398
-31 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
against them were brought by the Attorney General. At the trial of those
proceedings those three other newspapers were held to be guilty of
criminal contempt. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook concluded as under: (All
ER pp. 405j & 406a-c)
“… The claims of the Attorney General in the confidentiality
actions were for permanent injunctions restraining the defendants
from publishing what may conveniently be called Spycatcher
material. The purpose of the Millett injunctions was to prevent the
publication of any such material pending the trial of the
confidentiality actions. The consequence of the publication of
Spycatcher material by the publishers and editor of The Sunday
Times before the trial of the confidentiality actions was to nullify, in
part at least, the purpose of such trial, because it put into the public
domain, part of the material which it was claimed by the Attorney
General in the confidentiality actions ought to remain confidential.
It follows that the conduct of the publishers and editor of The
Sunday Times constituted the actus reus of impeding or interfering
with the administration of justice by the court in the confidentiality
actions.”
45. In a separate concurring opinion Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle stated
as under : (Attorney General case, All ER p. 426j)
“I turn to consider whether there is any reason why established
principle should not be applied to the situation in this case. I do
not accept the proposition that to apply established principles in
the foregoing circumstances would effectively be to convert every
injunction from an order in personam to an order contra mundum.
That proposition ignores the distinction between the breach of an
order by the person named therein and interference with the
course of justice resulting from a frustration of the order by the
third party.”
46. In our view, the medical professionals, namely, Dr Munish
Prabhakar and Dr K.S. Sachdev extended medical asylum to the
respondent without there being any reason or medical condition justifying
prolonged admission of the respondent as an indoor patient as a cover to
defeat the orders passed by this Court and the trial court, as stated above
and thereby aided and assisted the respondent in violating the order of
-32 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
this Court. By such conduct these medical professionals have obstructed
administration of justice.” (emphasis supplied)
75) Therefore, the respondent No.2, even if he is treated as a third party
to W.P. (C) No. 593 of 2017, cannot escape the consequences of aiding
and abetting the State for violating the orders rendered in W.P.(C) No.593
of 2017 and LPA No.786 of 2018. He is guilty of willfully committing
Contempt of Court and obstructing the cause of justice in view of his
actions referred to above.
76) That was why this Court during the course of hearing held on
24.10.2024 gave an opportunity to him to purge himself of the prima
facie contempt committed by him by withdrawing the letters dt.23.4.2024
and 29.4.2024, but he not only failed to do so but produced the letter
dt.28.10.2024 of the respondent No.4, his superior, that they cannot be
withdrawn.
77) For the same reasons as the respondent No.2 has been held guilty
of contempt, the respondent No.4 has also to be held in contempt since he
too, by supporting the stand of respondent No.4, is obstructing the course
of justice and overreaching the judgments passed by this Court.
78) The respondent No.4 had filed an I.A. No.12847 of 2024 seeking
modification of the order dt. 28.10.2024 passed by this Court in this
Contempt Case suo motu impleading him as respondent in the Contempt
Case raising certain pleas.
79) We shall briefly discuss them also in detail.
-33 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
80) Most of the pleas are identical to those raised by respondent No.2
and therefore, what has already been said by us on those aspects need not
be repeated. The same is reiterated.
81) Respondent No. 4 raised a plea that some of the subject land
belongs to Bokaro Steel Plant. But counsel for the petitioner has filed an
order dt. 02.03.2022 issued by the Revenue Officer, Chas under Section
87 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, deleting the area said to be
belonging to the Bokaro Steel Plant after a detailed inquiry in which the
said Steel Plant has also admitted that the said land was not acquired for
it’s use. The Revenue Officer, Chas in view of judgments in W.P.(C)
No.593 of 2017 and LPA.No.786 of 2018 held that the record of rights is
to be rectified, and even the land previously shown as owned by Bokaro
Steel Plant authority has to be deleted, and the same shall be recorded in
favour of the petitioner. Thereafter a Continuous Khatian was also issued
to the petitioner on 09.03.2022 after carrying out the said corrections.
It indicates the land is classified not as ‘forest land’ but as ‘Purani
Parti’ i.e old fallow land /raiyati land only. This is filed at page 116 of his
consolidated reply to the show cause dt. 19.10.2024 and 25.10.2024 filed
by the respondent No.2.
So there is no merit in this plea of respondent No.4 either.
82) We reject the plea taken by the respondent No.4 that petitioner
cannot carry on any non-forest activity on the subject land because it is
‘forest land’ irrespective of ownership. The land being “Purani Parti’ land
as per the Continuous Khatian issued by the Revenue Officer, Chas on
-34 of 39- Cont. Case (Civil) Case No. 956 of 2024.
9.3.2022, no restriction on it’s enjoyment can be put by the respondents
by treating it still as a ‘forest land’.
83) The further plea raised about the amendment to the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 made in 2023 relied on by respondent No.4 is
also to no avail. It merely states that that any land declared or notified as
forest in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 or
any other law for the time being in force, or any land recorded in
Government records as ‘forest’ as on or after 25.10.1980 attracts the
provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.
When the notification issued under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 on
14.05.1958 has been set aside in the W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017 on ground
that there was no enquiry conducted under Sub-section (3) of Section 29
thereof, the amendment to the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 made in
2023 cannot revive the said notification. The plea of the respondent No.4
in para 49 of his I.A. that the said notification is still holding good today
shows the total contempt he also has towards this Court’s judgments in
W.P.(C) No.593 of 2017 and LPA No.786 of 2018 which have rejected
the said notification and held it to be bad in law.
84) Thus, there is no merit in I.A. No. 12847 of 2024 filed by
respondent No.4 and it is dismissed.
85) Counsel for the petitioner had also filed at Annexure-4 to the
consolidated reply dt. 22.11.2024, a Gazette notification dt. 17.07.2014
published on 03.09.2014 by the Government of Jharkhand, Revenue and
Land Reforms Department in exercise of powers conferred under Sub
Section (2) of Section 84 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 by the
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Governor declaring that the record of rights for certain villages including
the subject village certifying that the finally published record of rights
shall be conclusive evidence with immediate effect. The village of Tetulia
is mentioned at serial No. 165 with the final publication date of
16.01.2000.
86) We therefore, reject the pleas raised by respondent Nos. 2 and 4 in
support of their respective actions and hold that there was a deliberate
attempt by both of them to argue that the previous orders passed by this
Court are incorrect by raising the plea that the land is a ‘private forest
land’, which plea was never raised by them in the previous round of
litigation, and though it was not open to them to raise such a plea in the
contempt case initiated against them by the petitioner. Even if there was
any merit in the plea, the principle of constructive res judicata will
prevent them from raising this plea in the contempt case or any other
litigation.
87) The issuance of letters dt. 23.04.2024 and 29.04.2024 by the 2nd
respondent and further letter dt. 28.10.2024 issued by the Regional Chief
Conservator of Forest, Bokaro (respondent No. 4) and their stand that the
said letters issued by the 2nd respondent are only advisory in nature and
cannot be withdrawn, cannot be countenanced.
88) In our opinion, their conduct amounts to willful and deliberate
disobedience of the judgment rendered by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 593
of 2017 confirmed in L.P.A. No. 786 of 2018 and also amounts to
obstruction of the course of justice.
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89) The respondent Nos.2 and 4 or the State of Jharkhand as
contemnors cannot be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their contempt.
90) In Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P)
Ltd and another19, the Supreme Court had held :
“17. The principle that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy
and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well settled. In Mohd. Idris v.
Rustam Jehangir Babuji20 this Court held clearly that undergoing the
punishment for contempt does not mean that the court is not entitled to
give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done
in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking
to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single
Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month’s
imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made
appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was
contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in
giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for
contempt of court. The argument was rejected holding that “the Single
Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach
(of undertaking)”.
18. The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation
of orders of injunction issued by civil courts. In Clarke v. Chadburn21 Sir
Robert Megarry V-C observed:
“I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high
importance that orders of the court should be obeyed. Wilful
disobedience to an order of the court is punishable as a contempt
of court, and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly
be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons
enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the
rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said
that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of court for
doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of
course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out
that it was done in breach of the law. If a meeting is held in breach19
(1996) 4 SCC 622
20
(1984) 4 SCC 216
21
(1985) 1 All ER 211
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of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been
held. But the legal consequences of what has been done in breach
of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It
seems to me on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought
not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good,
and not tainted by the illegality that produced them.”
19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta
High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah22 and Sujit Pal v.
Prabir Kumar Sun23. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. it was held by a Full
Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of
an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set
the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The
inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a
case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of
justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of
injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting
is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood
immediately prior to the service of the interim order.
20. In Sujit Pal a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken
the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in
violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property.
The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the
aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the
court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the
object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory
direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This
was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law.
21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given
effect to by this Court, if necessary, by overruling any procedural or other
technical objections.”
(emphasis supplied)
91) In view of above settled legal position, the respondent No. 2 and
respondent No.4 cannot be allowed to enjoy the fruits of their contempt.
22
AIR 1975 Mad 270
23
AIR 1986 Cal 220
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Therefore, we set aside the letters dt. 23.4.2024 and 29.04.2024 issued by
respondent No.2 and the letter dt.28.10.2024 issued by respondent No.4.
92) However, in the light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court
in clause (iv) of it’s order dt. 06.01.2025 in SLP(C) No. 31127 of 2024,
we are not pronouncing the sentence on respondent Nos. 2 and 4 for a
period of eight weeks to enable respondent Nos. 2 and 4 to approach the
Supreme Court.
93) List on 14.07.2025.
(M. S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
N.A.F.R.
Rakesh/VK
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