Telangana High Court
Unisankyo Limited vs Ashok Kumar Jaiswal And 2 Others on 11 March, 2025
Author: G.Radha Rani
Bench: G.Radha Rani
THE HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3072 of 2022
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioners – defendants 1 and
2 aggrieved by the order dated 09.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.218 of 2022 in
O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad in allowing the petition filed by the respondent No.1 – plaintiff under
Order XVI Rule 14 read with Section 151 of CPC to summon the Managing
Director of the petitioner No.1 Company.
2. The brief facts of the case are that O.S.No.316 of 2009 was filed by the
respondent No.1 – plaintiff seeking the relief of declaration that the enquiry
proceedings conducted against him on the basis of the charge sheet issued by
petitioner No.2 and the termination order dated 03.12.2010 issued by the Chief
Finance Officer and Secretary of Defendant No.1 Company, as without
jurisdiction, illegal, null and void and in gross violation of principles of natural
justice and to grant decree for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants
from conducting the enquiry proceedings against the plaintiff and for mandatory
injunction directing the defendants 1 to 3 to pay net monthly salary from the
month of September, 2008 to February, 2009 along with all other attendant
service benefits and to continue to pay future net monthly salary.
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3. During the course of trial, PWs.1 to 10 were examined on behalf of the
plaintiff. On behalf of the defendants, the defendant No.2 was examined as
DW.1 and he was cross-examined on several dates and the same was not yet
completed. While the case was at that stage, the respondent No.1 – plaintiff
filed I.A.No.218 of 2022 to issue witness summons to the Managing Director of
the defendant No.1 Company by name Mr.Jay Soman. The petitioners herein
filed their counter opposing the said application. The trial court on considering
the contentions of both the learned counsel, allowed the petition issuing witness
summons to the Managing Director of the petitioner No.1 Company.
4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners preferred this revision.
5. Heard Smt. Manjari S.Ganu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri
Narendar Jalli, learned counsel for the respondents.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that as per the averments of
the plaint and the documents filed along with the plaint, the appointment letter
dated 15.11.1984 and the other letters placing the plaintiff on probation, order
of confirmation, re-designation and subsequent promotion letters were issued by
either the Secretary or the Manager / Authorized Signatory of the Company.
None of the said letters were issued by the Managing Director of the Company.
The charge sheet dated 29.11.2008 was issued by the petitioner No.2 –
defendant No.2. The appointment of defendant No.4 as Inquiry Officer was
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also made by the General Manager, Finance and Secretary of the defendant
No.1 Company through his letter dated 24.12.2008. The defendant No.1
Company being juridical person, could be represented by its employees by
virtue of authority given to them and it was not necessary that only the
Managing Director of the Company had to represent in all matters in person.
The Managing Director was not in picture in person at any point of time either
during the appointment of the plaintiff in defendant No.1 Company or issuance
of charge sheet and also during the inquiry proceedings, which were conducted
by authorized representatives, who were employees of the Company working in
different capacities. The petitioner No.2 was authorized to represent the
Company in the suit and the General Power of Attorney given to him was
marked as Ex.B12. The petitioner No.2 was given power for initiation of the
disciplinary proceedings against the erring employees and to take all necessary
action including issuing charge sheet, show cause notices and to represent the
Company before the inquiry proceedings, Courts, Tribunals, etc. The Board
Resolution dated 13.03.1999 of the defendant Company evidencing powers of
Mr.Jay Soman and power to sub-delegate his powers to Senior Managers of the
Company, was marked as Ex.B16. The petitioner No.2 was authorized by the
defendant Company through its Board Resolution dated 21.06.2008 to represent
the Company and to lodge necessary petitions, complaints, applications, appeals
and cases before various Courts against its employees, ex-employees, etc. and
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the said resolution was marked as Ex.B17. After de-merger of the petitioner
No.1 Company and its divesting into M/S.Sanzyme Biologics Private Limited in
pursuance of the order of the Hon’ble NCLT, Hyderabad Bench dated
23.08.2017, M/S.Sanzyme Biologics Private Limited authorized DW.1 to
represent the Company before the Courts vide its Board Resolution dated
28.08.2018. The same was marked as Ex.B18.
6.1. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the trial court erred in
assuming that there was an allegation of fraud made against the petitioner No.2 /
DW.1. The averments made in the affidavit filed along with the petition would
only speak about deposing falsehood and producing forged and fabricated and
fictitious document by DW.1. The observation of the trial court that the
complaint of one department head against the respondent No.1 – plaintiff was
not filed before the Court and the same was in the custody of the Company, was
erroneous. The same was marked as Ex.M2 in the inquiry proceedings filed as
Ex.B1 and the report of the Inquiry Officer was filed as Ex.B2. The observation
of the trial court that DW.1 was not giving evidence properly and as such it was
necessary to call for the Managing Director of the Company to give evidence,
was contrary to facts. The trial court committed an error in allowing the
petition. If the authorization given to DW.1 was not proper, it was for the
plaintiff to take advantage of the same while arguing the matter. For that reason,
it was not necessary to call for the Managing Director of the Company to give
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evidence, especially, when his evidence was not necessary for effective
adjudication of the dispute involved in the matter. The trial court though
referred several judgments cited by both the parties, failed to apply the ratio of
the said judgments while passing the impugned order and relied upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v. Hartar
Singh Sangha 1, of the High Court of Kerala in M/S.Kaliyara Estates Private
Limited v. State of Kerala and Others 2 and of the High Court of Delhi in
Atul Kumar Singh v. Nitish Kumar and Others 3 and prayed to allow the
revision by setting aside the order dated 09.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.218 of
2022 in O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil
Court, Hyderabad.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 – plaintiff on the other hand
contended that the respondent was appointed on 15.11.1984 as a Laboratory
Technician. Thereafter he received various promotions and finally he was
discharging duty as Manager (Production) in the petitioner No.1 Company.
Without there being any reason, the petitioner No.2 issued show cause notice
calling explanation from the respondent No.1- plaintiff. The respondent No.1 –
plaintiff submitted his detailed explanation including lacking of power with the
petitioner No.2 for initiating disciplinary proceedings against him. However,
1
2010 (96) AIC 245
2
2012 (3) KHC 386
3
2019 DHC 5897
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the petitioners proceeded with the conduct of inquiry and thereafter issued the
impugned order of termination. The same was questioned in O.S.No.316 of
2009 on the file of the learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad. The respondent No.1 – plaintiff filed I.A.No.218 of 2022
specifically to establish his termination as bad, as the person, who did not have
any power to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, had initiated the same. The
trial court after considering the bye-laws, the board resolutions and the
decisions cited by both the parties allowed the petition filed by the respondent –
plaintiff. The Board passed a resolution delegating the power to the Executive
Director and re-designated the post of Executive Director as Managing Director.
As per the resolution, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings also would need
to be conducted by the Executive Director / Managing Director. DW.1 admitted
that Exs.B1 to B22 were not signed by the Managing Director, as such the
petitioner No.2 was not authorized for initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
DW.1 further admitted that he would examine the Managing Director, but as he
failed to take necessary steps, the respondent No.1 – plaintiff filed the I.A. to
issue summons to the Managing Director. It was further submitted that on a
perusal of the material available on record, the trial court rightly passed the
orders. There was no illegality or impropriety in the said order. The petitioner
No.2 intentionally created a false story for initiation of disciplinary proceedings
without the consent of the Managing Director, due to which the respondent
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No.1 – plaintiff had undergone mental harassment as well as agony, which could
not be compensated in any manner. The petitioner No.2 retired from service in
the year 2017 and he was given extension up to 2020. Thereafter, there was no
relation to him with the Company. It was not permissible for him to endorse his
signature in the vakalat. The petitioner No.2 approached the Court with unclean
hands. The petitioner No.2 himself admitted that the charge sheet was issued
against the respondents on his own accord, but not with the consent of the
Managing Director and relied upon the Division Bench judgment of High Court
of Kerala in Jortin Antony v. Padmanabha Dasa Marthanda Varma 4 and
prayed to dismiss the revision.
8. Order XVI Rule 14 of CPC pertains to summoning the witnesses. It reads
as follows:
“14. Court may of its own accord summon as witnesses strangers to suit.-
Subject to the provisions of this Code as to attendance and appearance and to any
law for the time being in force, where the Court at any time thinks it necessary (to
examine any person, including a party to the suit), and not called as a witness by a
party to the suit, the Court may, of its own motion, cause such person to be
summoned as a witness to give evidence, or to produce any documents in his
possession on a day to be appointed, and may examine him as a witness or require
him to produce such document.”
9. Order XVI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the Court to
summon witnesses, who are not parties to the suit, when the Court believes it is
4
2000 Law Suit (KER) 237
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necessary in the interest of justice or when a party to the suit provides
information that convinces the Court to exercise its powers. But under this rule,
the Court cannot summon the party as a witness. But, by virtue of the
amendment of the Code in the year 1976, the power of the Court was enlarged
to include the power to summon a party to the suit also to give evidence, if it
felt that it was necessary.
10. The Division Bench judgment of High Court of Kerala relied by the
learned counsel for the respondent No.1 – plaintiff in Jortin Antony v.
Padmanabha Dasa Marthanda Varma (cited supra), held that:
“13. It is clear from Rule 14 of Order XVI of the Code as amended that the Court
has the power when it thinks it necessary to examine a party to the suit or to
compel a party to the suit to give evidence so as to enable the Court to take a
decision satisfactory to its conscience. But this power available to the Court and
made specifically available by the amendment brought to Rule 14 cannot be
confused with the right of a party to call upon an opposite party to give evidence
on his behalf. Clearly, when a party to the suit does not mount the box to speak in
support of his case’ in the pleading, that can be a circumstance which would
enable the Court to accept the case of the opposite party. That can also be a
circumstance where the Court can draw an adverse inference against the party
who has withheld himself from the witness-box. But those consequences arising
out of non-appearance of a party as a witness cannot confer a right on a party to
the suit to cite his opponent as his own witness. The power available to the Court
under Rule 14 of Order XVI cannot be confused with a right to a party to the suit.
Whereas Rule 7 enables the Court to call on any person whether a party to the suit
or a non-parry to the suit who is present in Court to give evidence and provides
the consequences for the failure of that person to give evidence, Rule 14 also
enables the Court to summon a person to give evidence even if he is not present
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crp_3072_2022in Court whether he be a party or only a witness of its own accord and in
furtherance of its quest to give a just decision in the cause. As regards a party to
the suit even this power was not available until the year 1976 and this power
becomes available only after the insertion of the amendment of 1976. All that
Rule 21 says is that in case where the Court thinks that it is necessary to direct a
party to give evidence, the procedure regarding a witness could be applied by the
Court regarding that party as well. As recognized by Shamsuddin, J. in Mary
Francis v. Kesavan [(1993) 1 Ker LT 4], the Court is not powerless in
summoning an opposite party if there are suitable reasons and that summoning
could be in exercise of its power under Rule 14 of Order XVI of the Code.”
11. The Company represented by its Managing Director was shown as
defendant No.1 and the respondent No.1 – plaintiff had filed an application
seeking summons to examine the Managing Director of the Company. Though
the Court has power to summon him as a witness, there should be justifiable
reasons to compel him to give evidence.
12. As seen from the documents filed along with the plaint, the appointment
letter of respondent No.1 – plaintiff dated 15.11.1984 was issued by the
Secretary of the Company by name Sri C.Subrahmanyam. Placing the
respondent No.1 – plaintiff on probation marked under Ex.A2 dated 08.05.1985
was also signed by the Secretary of the Company Sri C.Subrahmanyam. The
confirmation of probation marked under Ex.A3 dated 31.03.1986 was also
signed by the Secretary Sri C.Subrahmanyam. The re-designation of the
petitioner from the post of Laboratory Technician as Manufacturing Chemist
marked under Ex.A4 dated 10.08.1989 was signed by the Manager of the
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Company by name S.Dora Babu. The promotion orders issued to the
respondent No.1 – plaintiff marked under Ex.A5 dated 19.01.1993 was signed
by the Authorized Signatory of the Company Sri S.Dora Babu. The further
promotion given to the respondent No.1 – plaintiff as Senior Executive of the
Company, marked under Ex.A6, was also signed by the General Manager
(Finance & Personnel) of the Company Sri S.Dora Babu. The re-designation of
the post of the respondent No.1 – plaintiff as Unit Manager, M/S.Sanzyme &
Sporlac, marked under Ex.A7 dated 31.12.1995 was also signed by the General
Manager (Finance & Personnel) Sri S.Dora Babu. The re-designation of the
post of the respondent No.1 – plaintiff as Manager (Production), marked under
Ex.A8 dated 28.04.2003, was signed by the General Manager (Operations) by
name Sri A.A.Hublikar.
13. Thus, none of the above letters were issued by the Managing Director of
the Company. The charge sheet dated 29.11.2008 was issued by the petitioner
No.2 herein. The appointment of defendant No.4 as Inquiry Officer was made
by the General Manager (Finance) and Secretary of the petitioner No.1 /
Defendant No.1 – Company. Thus, the Managing Director Sri Jay Soman was
not in picture at any point of time either during the appointment of the
respondent No.1 – plaintiff in defendant No.1 Company or issuance of charge
sheet or during the inquiry proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings were
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conducted by the authorized representatives, the employees of the Company
working in different capacities.
14. Ex.B16 would disclose that Mr.Jay Soman, the Managing Director of the
Company can sub-delegate his power to Senior Manager of the Company.
Under Ex.B12, the Power of Attorney was given by the Managing Director to
the petitioner No.2 – defendant No.2 for initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against the erring employees. The Board Resolution authorizes the petitioner
No.2 – defendant No.2 to represent the Company to lodge necessary petitions,
complaints, applications, appeals and cases before various Courts against its
employees and ex-employees. The same was marked as Ex.B17.
15. Thus, the Managing Director of the Company was not a necessary
witness to call for to give evidence and his evidence was absolutely not
necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute involved in the matter.
16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Man Kaur (dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh
Sangha (cited supra) had summarized the position, as to who can give evidence
in regard to matters involving personal knowledge as thus:
(a) An attorney holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no
personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the
validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit.
(b) If the attorney holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in
pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined
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crp_3072_2022as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney holder alone has
personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the
attorney holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be
proved.
(c) The attorney holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal
for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of
which principal alone has personal knowledge.
(d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with
or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the
transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney
holder, necessarily the attorney holder alone can give evidence in regard to the
transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business
through authorized managers/attorney holders or persons residing abroad
managing their affairs through their attorney holders.
(e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular
attorney holder, the principal has to examine that attorney holder to prove
the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney holder.
(f) Where different attorney holders had dealt with the matter at different stages
of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different
stages, all the attorney holders will have to be examined.
(g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a
proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his `state of mind’
or `conduct’, normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an
attorney holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his
`bona fide’ need and a purchaser seeking specific performance, who has to show
his `readiness and willingness’ fall under this category. There is however a
recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are
completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may
happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of
such attorney even with reference to bona fides or `readiness and willingness’.
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Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the
affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an
old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a
son/daughter living abroad.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, an attorney holder, who had personal knowledge of the acts and
transactions performed by him, is the right person to give evidence in regard to
the said transactions.
18. The High Court of Kerala in M/S.Kalliyara Estates Private Limited v.
State of Kerala and Others (cited supra) deprecated the practice of
summoning the opposite party as a witness and held that:
“5. Summoning the opposite party as a witness is deprecated by this Court in
various decisions. See Jortin Antony v. S.P.D Marthanda Varma [2000 (2)
KLT 680]; Narayana Pillai v. Kalliyani Amma [1963 KLT 537]; Muhammed
Kunju v. Shahabudeen [1969 KLT 170]; Syed Mohammed v. Aziz [1990 (2)
KLT 952] and Mary Francis v. Kesavan [1993 (1) KLT 4]. A party to the suit is
entitled to examine himself and give evidence. He is also entitled to adduce such
other relevant evidence by examining other witnesses. The Court has power to
summon any witness whose evidence appears to be relevant. Section 30(b) of the
Code of Civil Procedure confers vast powers on the civil court to issue summons
to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or to produce
documents or such other objects as mentioned in clause (a). The power vested in
a Court under Section 30 is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be
prescribed. The power under Section 30 can be exercised either on its own motion
or on the application of any party. The conditions and limitations prescribed
occur in Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure. No right is vested in a party
to summon the opposite party as a witness. The Court is entitled to ascertain
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crp_3072_2022whether the purpose of summoning witnesses is for adducing relevant evidence or
whether it is an attempt to cause inconvenience and embarrassment to the
opposite party. It is not the absolute right of a party to summon any person as a
witness or to examine any number of witnesses. The Court is not powerless in the
matter of regulating the proceedings for taking evidence in the case. The court
below was justified in dismissing the application, if the evidence sought to be
adduced is not relevant. The persons sought to be examined are the second
defendant and officials of the Forest Department, who satisfy the term “opposite
party”. No grounds are made out for exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order passed by the court below.”
19. The High Court of Delhi in Atul Kumar Singh v. Nitish Kumar and
Others (cited supra) while referring to the judgments passed by various other
High Courts deprecated the practice of summoning the Senior Officers of the
Company, who were not required to be examined only with an object to harass
or embarrass them and held that:
“16. Similarly, the Madras High Court in Kaliaperumal v. Pankajavalli and
Others [(1999) 1 MLJ 97] held as follows:- Paras 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9;
“5. I do not think that the submission made by the learned Counsel for the
petitioner could be accepted. In Pirgonda v. Viswanath:
[MANU/MH/0163/1956 : AIR 1956 Bom 251], His Lordship followed the
decision of Privy Council reported in Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal
[MANU/PR/0040/1908 : 31 All. 116], wherein it was held thus:
“Mr. Datar has also relied upon Circular No. 161 of the Circulars
issued by this Court in the Civil Manual. This circular has invited the
attention of the subordinate Judges to the observations of the Privy
Council in Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal [I.L.R. 31 All. 116 (A)], their
Lordships of the Privy Council have referred to the practice which
sometimes seemed to obtain in some of the Courts in India of calling
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crp_3072_2022the party’s opponent as a witness and they have observed that this
practice is highly objectionable. ‘Such a practice’, said their Lordships,
ought never to be permitted in the result to embarrass judicial
investigation as it is sometimes allowed to be done.”
6. In Mallangowda v. Gavisiddangowda [AIR 1959 Kant 194], it is held
thus:
“Practice of calling the opposite party as a witness should not be
countenanced as it is not in the interests of justice.”
7. In Narayana Pillai v. Kalyani Ammal [1963 K.L.T. 537], it is held that
the practice of party causing his opponent to be summoned as witness was
disapproved in rather strong terms by the Lordships of Privy Council and
that as a matter of right, the party cannot have the opposite party as witness.
8. The above decision was follows by Kerala High Court in a case between
Muhammed Kunji v. Shahabudeen [1969 K.L.T. 170], wherein it is held
thus:
“The practice of a party causing his opponent to be summoned as a
witness has to be disapproved. As a matter of right a party cannot
have the opposite party examined as a witness.”
9. In view of the settled legal position, I do not think that the petitioner can
compel the second defendant to be examined as a witness for him.”
17. I may notice the issues which have been framed in the present case, The
issues read as follows:-
“i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the damages and claims as prayed for
in the suit? OPP
ii) Whether the plaintiff sustained loss of reputation, business opportunity
and financial loss on account of the ban order dated 14.11.2006 passed by
defendant? OPP
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iii) Whether the ban order dated 14.11.2006 was passed legally and for any
valid reason by the defendant? OPD”
18. Factually what follows is the respondent have failed to give any cogent
reasons as to why these senior officers of the petitioner are being summoned,
other than stating that they are necessary to prove the case of the respondent. That
apart, normally the Courts as noted above have frowned upon a party summoning
the opposite party or its officers for the purpose of recording of evidence. It is
clear in the present case that the only object appears to be to harass or embarrass
the officers of the petitioner.”
22. He further relied upon Amitabha Sen (supra) another judgment by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court wherein it was held as under:
“13. After having considered the arguments advanced by the counsel for the
parties and having examined the decisions cited by them, it is abundantly
clear that while there is no bar to a party seeking the summoning of another
party in the same suit as his witness, it is also clear that such an act is
unusual and that it should only be permitted if the application for
summoning the opposite party is bona fide and is not vexatious or an abuse
of the process of the Court. Apart from this, there is the standard question
which the Court has to consider in the case of summoning any witness as to
whether it is necessary to summon the witness for which the application has
been moved. Order XVI Rule 1 (2) CPC clearly stipulates that the party
desirous of obtaining any summons for the attendance of any person shall
file in Court an application stating therein the purpose for which the witness
is proposed to be summoned. This in itself indicates that it is not as if the
Court has to allow every application for summoning of a witness. The party
seeking the summoning of a person as a witness has to specifically indicate
the purpose for which he or she is proposed to be summoned. It is obvious
that the Court has to apply its mind and exercise discretion in a judicial
manner.”
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23. He relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India (UOI) (supra) to contend that an application filed for summoning witness
on vexatious or frivolous grounds should not be entertained by this Court.
24. Similarly, he referred to another Supreme Court judgment, Kokkanda B.
Poondacha & Ors. (supra), wherein it was held that oblique motives of parties
should be looked into by the Court while deciding application for summoning of
witnesses under Order XVI Rule 1.”
20. As the affidavit filed by the respondent No.1 – plaintiff in I.A.No.218 of
2022 would not disclose valid reasons for summoning the Managing Director of
the petitioner No.1 Company by name Mr.Jay Soman, except stating that he was
hiding and purposefully avoiding to appear before the Court and the order of the
trial court also would not disclose as to how the evidence of the Managing
Director was necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute, it is considered
that the trial court erred in allowing the petition to summon the Managing
Director of the Company by name Mr.Jay Soman. As such, it is considered fit
to set aside the order dated 09.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.218 of 2022 in
O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad.
21. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the order
dated 09.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.218 of 2022 in O.S.No.316 of 2009 by the
learned IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. No order as to
costs.
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As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in this petition, if any,
shall stand closed.
____________________
Dr. G.RADHA RANI, J
Date: 11th March, 2025
Nsk