Delhi High Court
University Of Delhi vs Neeraj & Anr on 25 August, 2025
Author: Sachin Datta
Bench: Sachin Datta
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment pronounced on: 25.08.2025
+ W.P.(C) 600/2017
and CM APPLs.6048/2018, 7942/2018, 18395/2018, 34218/2023
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI .....Petitioner
versus
NEERAJ & ANR .....Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 1051/2017 and CM APPL.4783/2017
CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION .....Petitioner
versus
MOHD NAUSHADUDIN AND ORS. .....Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 1077/2017 and CM APPL.4945/2017
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI .....Petitioner
versus
MOHD IRSAD AND ANR .....Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 1091/2017 and CM APPL.5003/2017
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI .....Petitioner
versus
R K JAIN AND ANR .....Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 1095/2017 and CM APPL.5012/2017
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI .....Petitioner
versus
SANJAY SINGH AND ANR .....Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 13568/2023
MOHD. IRSAD .....Petitioner
W.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 1 of 175
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versus
CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER & ANR.
.....Respondents
Presence:
Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General (SG) along with Mr. Anil Soni, Sr.
Advocate and Mr. Rajat Nair, Mr. Dhruv Pande, Mr. Devvrat Yadav, Ms.
Akshaja Singh and Mr. Alok Dubey, Advocates for petitioners in W.P.(C)
600/2017, W.P.(C) 1051/2017, W.P.(C) 1077/2017, W.P.(C) 1091/2017 and
W.P.(C) 1095/2017.
Mr. Sanjay Hegde, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Rishikesh Kumar, Ms.
Sheenu Priya and Mr. Aman Kumar, Advocates for R-1 in W.P.(C)
600/2017.
Mr. Rahul Mehra, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Shadan Farasat, Sr. Advocate, Mr.
Rishikesh Kumar, Mr. Chaitanya Gosain, Mr. Pranny Dhawan and Ms.
Sheenu Priya, Advocates for R-1 in W.P.(C) 1077/2017.
Mr. Rahul Mehra, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Rishikesh Kumar, Mr. Chaitanya
Gosain and Ms. Sheenu Priya, Advocates for R-1 in W.P.(C) 1095/2017.
Mr. Shadan Farasat, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Rishikesh Kumar, Mr.
Pranav Dhawan and Ms. Sheenu Priya, Adv. for petitioner in W.P.(C)
13568/2023.
Mr. Trideep Pias, Sr. Advocate along with Ms. Seema Misra, Advocate for
Intervenors in W.P.(C) 600/2017.
Ms. Sheenu Priya, Advocate for R-1 in W.P.(C) 600/2017, W.P.(C)
1077/2017, W.P.(C) 1095/2017.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
CM APPL.16060/2017 (Application for intervention)
1. The present application for intervention is filed in W.P. (C) No. 600
of 2017, wherein the petitioner has challenged the order dated 21.12.2016
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passed by the Central Information Commission (CIC). The applicants seek
to intervene in order to assist the Court in the adjudication of the legal issues
arising in the context of the concerned RTI application in that case.
2. It is submitted that the applicants are eminent RTI activists. It is
submitted that the present case raises questions of significant public
importance, hence the applicants seek an opportunity to be heard in the
present matter.
3. Reliance has been placed on Shri J. R. Anand v. Delhi Transport
Corporation, 1981 SCC OnLine Del 43, orders dated 08.11.2016 and
29.11.2016 passed in RFA(OS) 81/2016 titled as The Chancellor, Masters
& Scholars of University of Oxford & Ors v. Rameshwari Photocopy
Services & Ors , order dated 01.09.2015 passed in W.P.(C) 6010/2014, titled
as Vinita Singla v. Union of India & Ors, order dated 21.05.2015 and
judgment dated 06.11.2015 passed in W.P.(C) 3386/2015, titled as R.K.
Jain & Ors v. Union of India, order dated 14.07.2017 passed in Civil
Appeal No. 6083 of 2017 in Indian Wind Power Association (NRC) v.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Anr. and Novartis AG v.
Union of India and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 1.
4. While objecting to the intervention application the petitioner has
averred that the applicants, contrary to their assertions, fall in the category of
“busybody” or “meddlesome interloper”, seeking to intervene for extraneous
reasons rather than to assist the Court on question/s of law. Reliance is
placed on Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed
and Others, 1976 1 SCC 671, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as
under –
“37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of
W.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 3 of 175
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certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i)
“person aggrieved”; (ii) “stranger”; (iii) busybody or meddlesome
interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in
things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for
justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they
have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge
in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit
or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win
notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants
in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of
administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of
such busybodies at the threshold.”
5. It is submitted that the applicants have no locus standi to intervene in
the present proceedings, either on the basis of their averments or the
documents relied upon. The applicants are neither aggrieved/interested
persons nor necessary or proper parties, but are acting with oblique motives.
6. It is submitted that the mere assertion that the applicants are public-
spirited persons interested in the implementation of the Right to Information
Act is insufficient to constitute grounds for intervention, as the present lis is
in personam and not of a public nature.
7. Having considered the submissions advanced, this Court finds no
cogent legal basis or rationale to allow the applicants to intervene in the
present case. The petition in question involves a challenge to order/s passed
by the CIC in the context of certain RTI application/s. Only the concerned
parties would be entitled to agitate the issue of legality (or otherwise) of the
impugned order/s. The present petitions do not partake the character of
‘public interest litigation’. The applicants cannot be permitted to join these
proceedings since no personal cause of action has accrued in their favour.
8. This Court is, therefore, of the view that the applicants have no locus
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standi to intervene and that the application has been filed only to project
themselves into a lis in which they have neither a legal right nor any
enforceable interest. Allowing such an intervention would unduly expand
the scope of the proceedings and open the floodgates to unconnected third
parties.
9. As to the reliance placed on Shri J.R. Anand v. Delhi Transport
Corporation (supra), this Court finds that the said decision, far from
supporting the applicants, negates their prayer/s seeking intervention.
10. In that case, the issue was whether a relator in ongoing quo warranto
proceedings could be permitted to intervene in connected certiorari
proceeding. While dealing with the said controversy, the Court observed as
under –
“A few principles regarding intervention can be reduced from these
illustrative cases:
(1) Intervention as well as its extent and scope is a matter of discretion of a
writ Court.
(2) Intervention is permissible where two or more connected proceedings
are pending in the High Court.
(3) Two or more proceedings should be so connected that decision in one is
likely to conclude other proceedings.
(4) Importance of the questions involved is a necessary consideration in the
exercise of the discretion.
(5) Discretion has to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of cash
case.
9. In both the petitions before me important question for decision is whether
the two decisions of the DTC are vitiated because of the extraneous political
considerations. As stated earlier the allegations in this regard are two sides
of the same coin. They are inextricably connected. The importance of the
question does not lie in the political facts as alleged. But the question is
whether public utilities affecting very large number of its employees and
citizens generally, can in law take vital decisions on extraneous
considerations. This question if of paramount importance to the working
and administration of public utilities. The incidental question is where the
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Vigilence Commissioner finds that an high official commits misconduct
involving turpitude, a public utility like DTC can re-appoint such an official
on an equivalent high post. In Anand’s petition the DTC now wants to play a
role of spectator. It had earlier filed a counter affidavit justifying the action
of removal of Anand. It is also heavily relyin on Anand’s allegation in his
petition, for contesting the qua warranto petition. There is no doubt that if
Anand’s petition is allowed to go un-contesting and inevitably succeeded,
the quo warranto proceedings would gravely suffer. If Anand succeeds in
his petition in these circumstances, the DTC will on its own showing re-
instate him as a Traffic Manager. The counsel for the DTC in the qua
warranto proceeding has already submitted that on re-instatement of Anand
the present appointment of Anand as a Deputy General Manager would be
cancelled. In such any eventually qua warranto petition may become
infractuous. These circumstances impel me to exercise discretion in favour
of the petitioner in the qua qarranto proceeding. The said petitioner is the
President of the Association of the workers and employees of the DTC. The
Association is also a petitioner in the qua warranto proceedings. It cannot
be said that the entire body of workers and employees of the DTC are
merely busy bodies or professional litigants or ‘middle-some interlopers’
particularly when the principal of worker’s participation in management is
accepted by Government.
xxx xxx xxx
10……..The serious difficulties faced on a question of impleading a third
party is voiced by the Supreme Court in (1973) 2 SCC 696 : AIR 1973 SC
2720 (supra). After reviewing some decisions the Supreme Court observed:
“In respect of persons who are strangers and who seek to invoke the
jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, difficulty sometimes arises
because of the nature and extent of the right or interest which is said to have
been infringed, and whether the infringement in some way affects such
persons. On this aspect there is no clear enunciation of principles on which
the Court will exercise its jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court, however,
referred to the practice of the English Courts where the matter is left to the
discretion of the Court. The Supreme Court observed: “In England also the
Courts have taken the view that when the application is made by a party or
by a person aggrieved the Court will intervene ex debito justitias, in justice
to the applicant, and when it is made by a stranger the Court considerrs
whether the public interest demands its intervention. In either case it is a
matter which rests ultimately in the discretion of the Court.”
11. In Shri J.R. Anand v. Delhi Transport Corporation (supra), the
Court allowed intervention because the concerned matters therein were
inextricably linked, and the outcome of one would directly impact the other.
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No such situation exists in the present case.
12. The other judgments/orders relied upon by the applicants are also of
no avail to them.
13. The application is consequently dismissed.
14. Nevertheless, this Court has taken into account the submissions
advanced by the applicants to the extent they bear upon the legal issues in
controversy. Such consideration, however, does not and cannot cure the
fundamental defect of lack of locus standi that vitiates the application.
W.P.(C) 600/2017, W.P.(C) 1051/2017, W.P.(C) 1077/2017, W.P.(C)
1091/2017, W.P.(C) 1095/2017 and W.P.(C) 13568/2023
15. The present petitions have been filed by the petitioners in W.P.(C)
600/2017, W.P.(C) 1051/2017, W.P.(C) 1077/2017, W.P.(C) 1091/2017,
W.P.(C) 1095/2017 and W.P.(C) 13568/2023, inter alia, challenging the
orders dated 21.12.2016, 17.01.2017, 27.12.2016, 23.12.2016, 22.12.2016
and 08.09.2017 respectively, passed by the Central Information Commission
(CIC).
16. The factual background in each of the petitions is elucidated
hereunder:-
A. Brief Facts in W.P.(C) 600/2017
i. Respondent no. 1/ Neeraj filed an application under the Right to
Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) on 27.08.2015, bearing no. OA 1560
of 2015, before the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) of the
petitioner. The application, inter alia, seeks the “result of all students
appeared in Bachelor of ARTS, Year1978 with Roll no, name of the
student with Father name, marks & result pass or failed”.
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ii. The CPIO, vide reply dated 22.09.2015, rejected the request for
information made by respondent no. 1/ Neeraj. The denial was based
on the reasoning that the information sought pertained to the personal
data of individual students. The CPIO further noted that there was no
larger public interest demonstrated by respondent no. 1/ Neeraj that
could override the protection granted to such personal information
under the law. Accordingly, the CPIO invoked the exemption under
Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, to justify the refusal to disclose the
requested data. The reply dated 22.09.2015 is reproduced as under –
“Subject: Sir, Original Application (OA) No. 1560 of 2015 under
the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Sir,
This has reference to the above original application, which
has been numbered as 1560 of 2015 as specified in the subject
cited above. The applicant is required to quote the original
application number in all future correspondence for proper
correlation of the documentsThe information sought by the applicant was endorsed to
the Assistant Controller of Examination (Conduct, Assistant
Controller of Examination (Results) and Statistical Officer
(Planning Unit) of the University, who are the deemed PIOs under
section 5(4) & 5(5) of the Act.
1,2&3. On perusal of the original application, it appears that the
requests of the applicant is non-specific in terms of college, specific
discipline subject, part etc., whereas the request for information is
required to be specific as per Section 6(1) of the Act. However,
Relevant input received from the Assistant Controller of
Examination (Conduct) and Assistant Controller of Examination
(Results) is enclosed in this regard. Applicant may go through and
draw his conclusion accordingly.
4. Relevant input received from the Assistant Controller of
Examination (Results) is enclosed in this regard. On perusal of the
request and on the basis of the input received from the deemed
PIO, it appears that the Information requested by the applicant isW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 8 of 175
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treated as personal information of the students concerned, the
disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or
interest. Further, it does not appear that any larger public interest
would be served by disclosure of this information in the public
domain. Disclosure of such information is exempt under section
8(1)(j) of the Act. Therefore, the request of the applicant attracts
section 8(1)(j) of the Act.
The applicant can prefer an appeal against the decision before the
Appellate Authority within 30 days. The name and particulars of
the Appellate Authority are as under:
Shri. Z.V.S Prasad
Finance Officer,
University of Delhi,
Delhi-110007
Telephone: 27667878Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Meenakshi Sahay)
Deputy Registrar (Recruitment) & CPIOEncl: As Above”
iii. Aggrieved by the response of the CPIO, respondent no. 1/ Neeraj filed
a First Appeal dated 08.10.2015, bearing no. 255 of 2015, before the
First Appellate Authority of the petitioner. The appeal reiterated the
request for disclosure and challenged the denial as being contrary to
the object and spirit of the RTI Act.
iv. The First Appellate Authority, after considering the matter, passed an
order dated 18.12.2015 wherein it upheld the decision of the CPIO.
The Authority reaffirmed that educational results of individual
students constitute personal information protected under Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and that disclosure was unwarranted in the
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absence of larger public interest. The order dated 18.12.2015 is
reproduced as under –
“Facts:-
1. The Appellant Shri Neeraj Sharma has filed an appeal against the
reply of the Original Application (OA) No.1560 of 2015 before the First
Appellate Authority of the University under the Right to Information Act,
2005 (hereinafter the Act). The appellant states that he is not satisfied
with the reply of the CPIO.
2. The Appellant, Shri Neeraj Sharma had filed the original
application dated 27.08.2015, received by the CPIO, University of Delhi
on 01.09.2015 seeking information regarding Bachelor of Arts
examination in the year 1978 and other related matters. The CPIO
replied to the OA on 22.09.2015.
3. On perusal of the reply of the CPIO. It appears that the CPIO had
endorsed the original Application to Assistant Controller of Examination
(Conduct), Assistant Controller of Examination (Results) and Statistical
Officer (Planning Unit who are the deemed PIOs under section 5(4) and
5(5) of the Act.
Decision:-
1. The Original Application and First Appeal have been perused vis-
a-vis the input provided by the deemed PIO and the decision of the CPIO
in this matter. On perusal of the file, it has been noticed that the CPIO
has decided the matter based on the input of deemed PIO where the
information is held as well as, as per relevant provisions of the Act,
which is in order.
2. On perusal of the OA, input received from the deemed PIOs and
decision of the CPIO, it has been observed that the CPIO has right
decided the matter based on the input received from the deemed PIO as
he has rightly invoked section 8(1) (j) of the Act as the result of the
individual student is treated as personal information of the student
concerned. Further, there is no larger public interest involved in
disclosure of such information in the public domain. Therefore, no
further relief can be granted to the Appellant under the Act and the
decision of the CPIO is upheld in this matter.
3. The appeal is decided accordingly.”
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v. Not satisfied with the outcome, respondent no. 1/Neeraj proceeded to
file a Second Appeal/Complaint before the CIC on 04.03.2016,
bearing no. CIC/SA/C/2016/900122.
vi. The CIC issued a notice of hearing dated 12.07.2016, which was
received by the petitioner on 18.07.2016. The notice fixed the hearing
for 20.07.2016 and directed respondent no. 1/ Neeraj to serve a copy
of the appeal upon the petitioner within three (3) days of receiving the
notice. However, it is submitted by the petitioner that no such copy
was ever served.
vii. It is submitted that the petitioner, in compliance with the notice,
appeared before the CIC on the scheduled date through its
representative. It is further submitted that CIC neither provided a
copy of the appeal nor granted any time to the petitioner for filing its
response.
viii. Subsequently, the CIC passed the impugned order dated 21.12.2016.
The relevant portion of the impugned order is reproduced as under –
“Analysis:
8. There are two frequent questions coming up before the
Commission: whether degree related information of a particular
student is his or her personal information or third party
information, and whether such information was given to University
in fiduciary capacity, as contented by public authority?
9. A University that conducts various courses of education openly,
registers the graduation of candidates is a public activity. Like
registration of transfer of land or registration of a society, the
registration of graduation details/degree details forms part of
public record like the register. The purpose of register is to
maintain a public record, and whenever there is a need, refer the
register and the details could be accessed. Acquiring education
qualification through process of registration, from admission to
graduation with an authorised university is similar to acquiringW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 11 of 175
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property through authorised registration process. Like land or
property documents, the degrees and related information is also in
public domain. Though original degree certificate is given to the
candidate, the authentication of the same along with details is
available in the register. There is no provision, rule or regulation
made by the university authorizing it to keep the degree related
information as secret and prohibit the access to register. If the
degree related Information sought is about an celebrity or an
ordinary man, the access to information has to be provided by the
public authority. The PIO did not come up with any basis for
considering the degree related information of the students as third
party information, except claiming so.
10. The Commission finds neither merit nor legality in the
contention of the University that the degree related information
about students was third party Information. The PIO of public
authority should have applied his mind, understood the aims and
objects of RTI Act before flatly denying the request.
11. It is relevant to refer to the judgment of Supreme Court Bench
of Justice A R Dave and Justice L Nageswara Rao in Civil Appeal
No. 2649 of 2016; in Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem Sharat
Chandra Singh, quashing the election of Manipur Congress MLA,
Mairembam Prithviraj for falsely declaring in his nomination
papers that he had an MBA degree. The Supreme Court held that
right to vote would be meaningless unless citizens were well
informed about the antecedents of candidates, including their
educational qualification. It said all information about a candidate
contesting elections must be available in public domain as
exposure to public scrutiny was one of the surest means to cleanse
the democratic governing system and have competent legislators.
The apex court has held that every voter has a fundamental right to
know the educational qualifications of a candidate. The bench
dismissed the appeals filed by Mairembam Prithviraj Singh and
Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh. Both of them contested the
Manipur Legislative Assembly elections from the Moirang
constituency. While Mairembam who contested on a Nationalist
Congress Party ticket won, his election was declared void by the
High Court of Manipur. Both the appeals challenged the judgement
of the High Court. The High Court said:
A voter is first citizen of this country and apart from statutory
rights, he is having fundamental rights conferred by the
Constitution. Members of a democratic society should be
sufficiently informed so that they may cast their votesW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 12 of 175
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intelligently in favour of persons who are to govern them. Right
to vote would be meaningless unless the citizens are well
informed about the antecedents of a candidate. There can be
little doubt that exposure to public gaze and scrutiny is one of
the surest means to cleanse our democratic governing system
and to have competent legislatures.
It is also clear from the provisions of the Representation of the
People Act 1951, Rules and Form 26 that there is a duty cast on
the candidates to give correct information about their
educational qualifications.
12. The Congress MLA, in this case contended that there was a
“clerical error” on the part of his lawyer and agent who had filed
the nomination papers in 2012 and pleaded to the court not to
quash his election as the defect was not of substantial nature. Mr.
Prithviraj had mentioned in the nomination papers that he had
passed MBA in 2004 from Mysore University. The bench, however,
rejected his plea saying that the election result was materially
affected by the false declaration and it had to be quashed. The
court noted that,He had made the false declaration in the 2008 assembly
election as well. The contention of the appellant that the
declaration relating to his educational qualification in the
affidavit is a clerical error cannot be accepted. It is not an
error committed once. Since 2008, he was making the
statement that he has an MBA degree. The information
provided by him in the affidavit filed in form 26 would amount
to a false declaration. The said false declaration cannot be
said to be a defect which is not substantial. An educated
person cannot hide his education. He will necessarily
incorporate his academic qualifications, as his achievements
and if he secures any gold medal or rank, he will definitely
display that in his bio-data papers. Education being a
qualification concerning the society in general, can never be
treated as personal information. If someone chooses not to
disclose his educational qualifications, it could be his personal
choice, but if he uses those qualifications for achieving an
employment or higher education or a position, that becomes
public information. It is no more res integra (issue not decided
by the court) that every candidate has to disclose his
educational qualification to subserve the right to information
of the voter. Having made a false declaration relating to hisW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 13 of 175
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educational qualification, he cannot be permitted to contend
that the declaration is not of a substantial character.
13. The educational qualification of an individual is conferred to
that individual in convocation, meaning thereby that such a
qualification is publicly celebrated and there is nothing which
affects the privacy of an individual by such disclosure. The
Commission has in its earlier order dated 01-11-2016,
CIC/SA/A/2016/001065, Harkrishan Das Nijhawan v. Dept of
Legal Affairs, GOI held that the eligibility & educational
qualification required for a post, and other information showing
merit for appointment etc, cannot be considered as personal and
access to that cannot be denied. Every University celebrates
Convocation each year, where degrees to the qualified students are
awarded by the hands of the Chancellor, who generally is the
Governor of the State. Every graduate is expected to attend the
ceremony and take an oath that he/she would conduct as worthy of
the education/degree. The Governor administers the oath to
students, like he administers to the Chief Ministers and Ministers.
The graduation ceremony i.e. Convocation is, thus, an open public
activity. The people who attended convocation are supposed to take
notice of the graduation of young persons, who are going into the
society as educated citizen. The registration of public activity in a
register makes that register a public document and access to that
cannot be denied. Registering itself means notice to public in
general about a public activity. The oath makes the celebration of
convocation very significant one, reminding the educated person of
his responsibility.
14. For instance, the National Academy of Legal Studies and
Research, (NALSAR) University of Law, Hyderabad, administers
oath as follows:
The Chancellor, NALSAR University of Law … says: “Let the
candidates for other Degrees and Diplomas stand forward.”
All the candidates standing, the Chancellor puts to them the
following question: “Do you sincerely promise and declare
that, If admitted to the Degree or Diploma for which you are
candidates, and for which you have been recommended, you
will in your daily life and conversation conduct yourselves as
worthy members of this University?”
All the candidates will collectively answer: “I do promise.
With this, the candidates resume their seats. Then the
Chancellor says: “Let the candidates be now presented.
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15. If one could not attend the degree in absentia, for which he has
to sign an under taking that he would live worthy of education
attained, in a mandatory declaration. NALSAR prescribed
following declaration degree/diploma in absentia):
I hereby solemnly declare and promise that if admitted to the
Degree / Diploma of ____________ for which I have been
recommended, I shall in my professional as well as personal
life and conversation conduct myself as befits member of this
University; that I shall, to the utmost of my capacity and
opportunity, support the cause of justice, fairness and peace;
and that as far as in me lies, I shall uphold and advance the
social order constitutionally established and well being of all
human beings everywhere and rule of law within the country
and outside.
16. The parents, relatives and friends will attend the ceremony and
bless/greet the graduate. This being a public function, the society
will come to know that a particular person became a graduate and
took an oath to live worthy of that degree/education. The people
will get a chance to check whether such a graduate is living up to
the expectation or is he worthy of the degree he possessed.
17. Thus, the Commission finds no basis for considering the
educational qualification related information as personal to the
particular candidate.
18. The present CPIO has not verified his own record before
contending that the information sought was third party
information. Once a student passes an examination and qualifies to
secure a degree, the degree and passing details cannot be treated
as private or third party information. Passing an examination is a
qualification and awarding the degree such as 10th Class, 12th
Class or Intermediate, graduation or post graduation, is a public
activity and that certificate is a public document generated by a
public institution. The academic institutions awarding such degrees
under a statutory authority are discharging their statutory duties
such as registering the qualification details and degree related
information.
19. The Commission has earlier in file no. CIC/SA/A/2016/001451,
Subhash Chandra Tyagi vs CBSE on 21 July, 2016 observed that
“when there is an apprehension or doubt about validity or
existence of a qualification, it is necessary to verify genuineness of
the same. If verification proves that it is a genuine degree, it
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vindicates the qualification of the candidate. If it is proved to be a
wrong degree, it will serve a larger public interest. Hence the
degree or academic qualification related information need to be
accessible to the citizen. If a student fails in an examination and
attempts again to finally clear the test and secure qualification,
there are two kinds of information one, public information i.e. the
tested qualification, two, private information i.e. the details of
failure or disqualification, which is personal to the candidate
which has nothing to do with public activity, disclosure of which
would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy and thus it has to be
treated as third party information.”
20. Whoever claims a benefit of restriction under section 8 of RTI
Act has a duty to substantiate or justify withholding of the
information sought, which was clearly stated in section 19(5): “In
any appeal proceedings, the onus to prove that a denial of a
request was justified shall be on the Central Public Information
Officer or State Public Information Officer, as the case may be,
who denied the request.”
21. Generally every student who graduated will use the degree of
graduation for pursuing post graduate studies or for any
employment which required graduation as an eligibility criterion.
For instance: If BA degree is a requirement for studying MA, the
student who wants to study MA has to prove that he graduated. If
he does not have that qualifying degree and manipulates to secure
admission MA or an employment where it is prescribed as
qualification, it has to be checked. For higher education or
employment, he has to reveal his details of education details. If a
candidate wants to treat the patients as doctor, he has to prove
medical graduation. In such cases, it is the duty of the student to
disclose or share details of his graduation with the concerned
authorities etc. The record of this educational qualification is
maintained for the general information of public and for
verification of the genuineness of the degree, if needed. Any
competing student whose opportunity in higher studies or
employment is expected to share his degree related information
and see the competitor’s degree related information. All this is
happening in routine. It was never considered as private or
personal information. Another important factor is that every
student aspiring for career advancement will necessarily disclose
his qualifications, percentage of marks, distinctions or awards if
any, in his CV or Bio data voluntarily. Only the information
relating to failure or when marks obtained were less than required
for passing or qualifying, is not disclosed by the concerned
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candidate, because none likes to project that he failed in
examination. If a candidate passed his examination and obtained
graduation degree, his earlier failures become irrelevant, unless
they are specifically declared as disqualifications for any specific
purpose. (For instance, candidate needs to obtain distinction in the
first instance itself for claiming a gold medal or rank).
Hence, the degree or academic-qualification-related-information
needs to be accessible to the citizen. If student fails and attempts
again to finally clear the test and secure qualification, final result
could be public information. Every academic/educational
qualification at land mark stages like 10th class, Intermediate,
Graduation, Post Graduation or Ph.D. and clearing of every
annual examination that promotes the student into next year,
cannot be stated to be private information, they are in public
domain. Keeping this degree related information secret might lead
to manipulations and frauds.
22. Thus, every university is a public body and the activity of
awarding degrees is a public activity and it can be concluded that
all degree related information as available in the permanent
register of the university is accessible public document. This basic
principle of public record was laid down in the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872. The right to information was made available in Section
76 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Further, section 74 of Evidence
Act, gave list of “public documents”:
(1) The following documents are public documents: (i) of the
sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any
part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country;
(2) public records kept in India or private documents.
23. Section 76 provides for right to inspect and to obtain certified
copies, as now provided by the RTI Act. Section 76 says:
Every public officer having the custody of a public document,
which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person
on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefore,
together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that
it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case
may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by
such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be
sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make useW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 17 of 175
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of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified
copies.
24. The degree related information of students is considered as
directory information in the United States of America and it is
disclosable. It was not considered as personal information. The
United States has a law called the Family Educational Rights
Protection Act (FERPA) relating to the disclosure of Student
related information. The FERPA is aimed at protecting information
related to students. The FERPA has clearly put three distinctions
on the information of a student: educational information,
personally identifiable information, and directory information.
Each of which will vary in the limitations subjected to by the
FERPA.
25. Cases involving request for disclosure of educational records
fall under the ambit of directory information which is defined as
“information contained in an education record of a student that
would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of
privacy if disclosed.” Directory information is public information
and will be made available to the public unless the student has
restricted it. In no way does the disclosure of the information of a
student’s educational records or his achievements or honours
during his tenure at the institution, amounts to his breach of
privacy.
26. In Zumbrun v. University of Southern California, 101 Cal. Rptr.
499, 506 (Ct. App. 1972) (https://casetext.com/case/zumbrun-v-
university-of-southern-california) the Court of Appeal in
California, Second District, Division Five, [25 Cal.App.3d 1
(Cal.Ct.App.1972)] held that “finding that facts giving rise to a
fiduciary duty had not been pleaded and that “[t]he mere placing of
trust in another person does not create a fiduciary relationship”.
And in paragraph 10 it held: “(10) The basic legal relation between
a student and a private university or college is contractual in
nature. The catalogues, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of the
Institution made available to the matriculant become a part of the
contract.” (This conclusion was based on following cases: Carrv.
St. John’s University, New York (1962) 17 A.D.2d 632, 633 [231
N.Y.S.2d 410, 413], affd. 12 N.Y.2d 802 [235 N YS.2d 834];
Anthony v. Syracuse University (1928) 224 App. Div. 487, 489- 490
[231 N.Y.S. 435, 438-439]; Goldstein v. New York University
(1902) 76 App. Div. 80, 82- 83 [78 N.Y.S. 739, 740]; People ex rel.
Cecil v. Bellevue Hospital Medical College (1891) 60 Hun 107 [14
N.Y.S. 490], affd. 128 Ν.Υ. 621 [28 Ν.Ε. 253]; John B. Stetson
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University v. Hunt (1925) 88 Fla. 510, 517 [102 So. 637, 640];
University of Miami v. Militana (Fla.App. 1966) 184 So.2d 701,
703-704; Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College (1923) 278 Pa.
121, 122 [122 A. 220, 221]; Greene v. Howard University (D.C.
Dist. Col. 1967) 271 F. Supp. 609, 613; see Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education (5th Cir. 1961) 294 F.2d 150,157, cert. den.
368 U.S. 930 [7L.Ed. 2d193, 82 S.Ct. 368]; Searlev. Regents of the
University of California (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 448, 452 [100
Cal.Rptr. 194].) Kaus, P.J., and Reppy, J., concurred.
27. In Shapiro v. Butterfield, 921 S.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996) it was held that that no fiduciary relationship between
faculty advisor and student existed; In Nigro v. Research College
of Nursing, 876 S.W.2d 681, 686-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) it was
held that “there is no fiduciary relationship between an educational
institution and its applicants”. Similar judicial orders were given in
following cases: President and Bd. of Trustees v. Smith, 1999 WL
51799, at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1999) (finding that there was no
support for the existence of a “fiduciary relationship between an
educational institution and a prospective student”); Ho v.
University of Tex., 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding,
as a matter of law, that no fiduciary duty between student and
faculty member/advisor existed); Abrams v. Mary Washington
College, 1994 WL 1031166, at 4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1994)
(finding no basis in common law for creating a fiduciary
relationship between senior college officials and students).
28. The Central Information Commissioner Smt. Annapurna Dixit
in Case No: CIC/AD/A/2012/000256, stated, “In relation to the
marks obtained by a principal, it was held that: “The educational
qualifications cannot be considered as personal in nature ……”
29. The Commission verified official website of Delhi University
and found declaration of results of B.A. Honors (Humanities and
Social Sciences), Part II (Semester IV) examination 2016, Sr.No /
SEM / 2016 / 530 available at http: //www .du. ac.in /du
/uploads/Examination/Result/2016/UG/03102016_HUMA NITIES-
IV-SEM.pdf (accessed on 09.12.2016 at 16:44 hrs), which shows
the roll no, name of the candidate, marks, passed or failed at a
particular center. This shows the contention of the CPIO is totally
wrong as the Delhi University is placing the result of every
candidate in public domain so, that each student or any citizen can
verify the marks/result of students along with their name and roll
number. There is a merit in the contention of the appellant that the
CPIO invented these contentions only to deny the information in
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this case and they are totally in conflict with their own practice of
publication of results.
30. Thus the contention of the CPIO that ‘the information of
students is personal’ is not correct. Other contention that ‘the
information furnished by the students to the public authority in
fiduciary capacity’ is also not correct, because the marks obtained
by students, whether passed or not is the information generated by
the university, and that was not given by the students. Father’s
name will be necessary to identify the degree-holding student as
there might be several students with the same name; students’ roll
numbers and other ancillary details are also essential for specific
identification of the degree-holder.
31. The identification details of the graduates are in the public
domain. They should be made available for verification and the
results and marks obtained is also relevant public information,
which is necessary for the society to know whether a particular
candidate is an eligible graduate or not.
32. With regard to question whether disclosure of such
identification related information causes invasion of privacy, or is
that unwarranted invasion of privacy, the PIO has not put forward
any evidence or explained possibility to show that disclosure of
degree related information infringes the privacy or causes
unwarranted invasion of privacy. If name and father’s name,
degree obtained, the date or the marks or the roll number are
revealed, how can that cause invasion of privacy? The Commission
observes that the disclosure of details of educational records of a
student, maintained at University in no way Infringes his/her right
to privacy, hence there cannot be any violation of section 8(1)(j) of
the Right to Information Act, 2005. This is primarily because the
matters relating to educational qualifications of a student
(former/current) fall under the public domain.
33. Having examined the case, the synonymous legislations and
previous decisions, the Commission states that matters relating to
education of a student (current/former) fall under the public
domain and hence order the relevant public authority to disclose
information accordingly.
34. In view of above observations, the Commission directs the
respondent authority, Delhi University to facilitate inspection of
relevant register where complete information about result of all
students who passed in Bachelor of Arts, in year 1978 along with
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roll number, names of the students, father’s name and marks
obtained as available with the University and provide certified
copy of the extract of relevant pages from the register, free of cost,
before 30.12.2016.
Sd/-
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner”
ix. It is submitted that despite the passage of considerable time since the
order was purportedly passed on 21.12.2016, the petitioner has not
been served with a certified or even an uncertified copy of the second
appeal or the impugned order.
x. Being aggrieved with the order dated 21.12.2016, the petitioner has
filed the present petition challenging the same.
B. Brief Facts in W.P.(C) 1051/2017
i. On 27.08.2015, the respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Naushadudin submitted
an application under the RTI Act, seeking certain information from
the petitioner/ the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE).
The English translated version of the same (annexed with the petition)
reads as under –
“1. Whether the Union HRD Minister Smt. Smriti Irani has
cleared the Matriculation Examination in the year 1991 and
Intermediate Examination in the year 1993 from your Board?
2. If yes, then I want Xerox Copies of her Class X and XII admit
card (hall ticket) and mark-sheet.”
ii. The Public Information Officer (PIO) of the petitioner, vide reply
dated 20.10.2015, denied the requested information. The denial was
primarily on two grounds; (i) invoking Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act,
the PIO stated that the information sought pertained to confidential
third-party data held by the Board, the disclosure of which required
the third party’s consent; and (ii) it was pointed out that the records
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maintained by CBSE were organized on the basis of Roll Number,
Class, and Year. Since these specific details were not provided by the
applicant, the PIO expressed the Board’s inability to retrieve and
provide the information. The English translated version of the reply
dated 20.10.2015 (annexed with the petition) is reproduced as under –
“Sub:- Application received under Right to Information Act, 2005.
Sir/Madam,
This has reference to your letter dated 27.08.2015 which was received in
this office on 28.09.2015 through Public Information Officer, Delhi, the
information in the light of information sought, mentioned purpose is as
follows:-
S. No. Information sought Reply
1. Whether the Union HRD
The information
Minister Smt. Smriti Irani
sought under Right
has cleared the
to Information Act,
Matriculation Examination
2005 is confidential
in the year 1991 and
information in
Intermediate Examination
respect of the party,
in the year 1993 from your
no information can
Board?
be supplied without
2. If yes, then I want Xerox the prior
Copies of her Class X and permission/consent
XII admit card (hall ticket) of the third party.
and mark-sheet. Hence, the
application is
In respect of which the rejected under
following information:- Section 8(1)(e) of
RTI Act. Further it
Name : Smriti Irani is also informed that
"All the records and
Father: Ajay Kumar
Malhotra documents in this
office are organized
DOB: 23 March 1976 according to Roll
No. Class and
School: Holy Child Year" Therefore,
Auxilium, Vasant Vihar, any type of
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New Delhi information is not
possible without
Class or passing year : 10th these.
-1991, Inter - 1993
Accordingly your application received under Right to Information Act,
2005 is disposed off with the above.
If you are not satisfied with the reply, you can file an appeal under
Section 19 of Right to Information Act, 2005 before the First Appellate
Authority (FAA) within 30 days as per rules, whose address is given
below:
Regional Director/Appellate Authority
Central Board of Secondary Education,
Todarmal Marg, Ajmer
Rajasthan – 305030
Yours faithfully,Sd/-
(Vikas Arora)
Public Information Officer”
iii. Aggrieved by the denial, respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Naushadudin filed
a First Appeal on 27.10.2015 before the First Appellate Authority of
CBSE. However, vide order dated 20.11.2015, the First Appellate
Authority upheld the PIO’s decision. The English translated version
of Order dated 20.11.2015 (annexed with the petition) is reproduced
as under –
“Sub: – First Appeal dated 27.10.2015 received under Right to
Information Act, 2005 from Mohd. Naushadudin, Dhanbad
(Jharkhand).
Matter- The applicant Mohd. Naushadudin sent an application
dated 27.08.2015 received in this office on 28.09.2015 through
Public Information Officer, Delhi, in continuation of which the
following information was given vide this office letter dated
20.10.2015:-
S. No. Information sought Reply
1. Whether the Union HRD Minister Smt. The information
Smriti Irani has cleared the
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Matriculation Examination in the year sought under Right
1991 and Intermediate Examination in to Information Act,
the year 1993 from your Board? 2005 is confidential
2. If yes, then I want Xerox Copies of her information in
Class X and XII admit card (hall ticket) respect of the party,
and mark-sheet. no information can
In respect of which the following be supplied without
information:- – the prior
Name : Smriti Irani permission/consent
Father: Ajay Kumar Malhotra of the third party.
DOB: 23 March 1976 Hence, the
School: Holy Child Auxilium, Vasant application is
Vihar, New Delhi rejected under
Class or passing year: 10th - 1991, Section 8(1)(e) of
Inter - 1993 RTI Act. Further it is
also informed that
"All the records and
documents in this
office are organized
according to Roll
No., Class and
Year" Therefore,
any type of
information is not
possible without
these.
Facts:- Applicant Sh. Mohd. Naushadudin, Dhanbad in his first
application dated 27.08.2015 which was received in this office on
28.09.2015 through Public Information Officer, CBSE, Delhi. In
response to which the applicant while showing his dissatisfaction
preferred an appeal against this office letter dated 20.10.2015
raised following objections:-
1. The information sought was not given as per Section 8(1)(j) of
RTI Act. The information sought pertains to the public interest and
can be given and the detailed information is enclosed.
Decision:- After looking at complete facts i.e., your first
application dated 27.08.2015, reply of Public Information Officer
dated 20.10.2015 and your First Appeal dated 27.10.2015 the
conclusion is drawn that the reply given by PIO, CBSE, Ajmer vide
letter dated 20.10.2015 is complete. Further it is also informed that
all the old result records and documents are organized in this
office according to Roll No., Class and Year, without the
availability of these records, it is difficult to provide the
information.
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Your appeal is disposed off according to above facts and rules. If
you are not satisfied with the reply, you can file an appeal before
the Second Appellate Authority as per rules, whose address is given
below;
Central Information Commissioner,
Central Information Commission,
Room No.326, 2nd Floor,
August Kranti Bhawan,
Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi-110066
(Kamal Pathak)
Appellate Officer/Regional Director”
iv. Dissatisfied with the outcome, respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Naushadudin
filed a Second Appeal on 18.01.2016 before the Central Information
Commission (CIC), registered as CIC/SA/A/2016/000591. It is
submitted that the petitioner was never served a copy of the Second
Appeal, neither by respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Naushadudin nor by the
Commission.
v. On 29.12.2016, the CIC issued a notice scheduling a hearing on
11.01.2017. The notice, received by the petitioner on 04.01.2017,
directed the petitioner to appear for the hearing and further directed
respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Naushadudin to provide a copy of any
written submission at least seven days prior to the hearing date.
However, it is submitted that no copy of the Second Appeal was
served upon the petitioner by the stipulated date or at any time
thereafter.
vi. It is submitted that in compliance with the notice, the petitioner
appeared before the Commission on 11.01.2017
vii. Subsequently, the CIC had passed an order dated 17.01.2017 directing
CBSE to “facilitate inspection of relevant records and provideW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 25 of 175
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certified copies of documents selected by the appellant free of cost,
except personal details in admit card and mark sheet…”. Order dated
17.01.2017 is reproduced as under –
“Analysis & Decision:
4. The excuse of the practical difficulty in searching from huge
volume of records for the year 1991 and 1993 to furnish the
information sought by the appellant is not valid. The PIO cannot
make RTI applicant to wait until the digitization of 1991 records.
They have to adhere to 30 days timeline as per RTI Act to provide
information sought.
5. This right to information was provided as well in section 74 and
76 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 wherein the basic principle of
public record was laid down. Section 74 of Evidence Act, gave list
of “public documents”:
(1) The following documents are public documents: (i) of the
sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and (iii)
of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part
of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country; (2)
public records kept in India or private documents.
6. Section 76 provides for right to inspect and to obtain certified
copies, as now provided by the RTI Act. Section 76 says:
Every public officer having the custody of a public document,
which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person
on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefore,
together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it
is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may
be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such
officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed,
whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a
seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified
copies.
7. The official website says that “the main objectives of the Central
Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) were those of: serving the
educational institutions more effectively and to be responsive to the
educational needs of those students whose parents were employed
in the Central Government services and had frequently transferable
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jobs across the country. The CBSE was formed officially in 1962
with the sole purpose to make a common standard and platform for
every student in the country. From only 302 affiliated schools in
1962 CBSE is today affiliated with a whooping 18000+ schools in
the country. The CBSE in all these years has set a good standard of
education in India. With its influential educational policies, the
CBSE has reformed the education system of the country,
(http://www.indiaeducation.net/cbse/objectives.aspx). Today the
Board has 5119 schools affiliated to it, which include 784 Kendriya
Vidyalayas, 1381 Government schools, 2486 independent schools,
355 Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya and 13 Adhoc schools”. Its
objectives and functions are:
1. To prescribe conditions of examinations and conduct public
examinations at the end of Class X and XII. To grant qualifying
certificates to successful candidates of the affiliated schools,
2. To fulfil the educational requirements of those students,
whose parents were employed in transferable jobs.
3. To prescribe and update the courses of instructions for
examinations.
4. To affiliate institutions for the purpose of examination and
raise the academic standards of the country.
8. Thus the CBSE is involved in a public activity like affiliating the
institutions prescribing the courses of instructions, conducting
examinations and certifying results of candidates. Applicants need
to follow an open procedure to secure admission and thereafter,
instruction and examination is processed by the CBSE resulting in
certification of the result. Every such information or certification is
generated by the CBSE in public domain through common process.
It maintains a register recording the details of all admitted
students, their results whether passed or failure and awarding of
certificates. This register is a public record supposed to be
accessed whenever necessary and also used for verification. As per
Section 74 and 76 of Evidence Act, this register is a public
document, wherein all degree related information is authentically
available as permanent register of CBSE.
9. It is not correct to say that once a student passes an examination
and qualifies to secure a certificate or degree, information about
result will be his personal information. Disclosure of the details of
a particular candidate contained in the degree or certificate
register cannot cause any unwarranted invasion of privacy of the
certificate holder. The CPIO has not put forward any material or
justification to say that such disclosure of academic qualification
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related information shall cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of
Ms. Smriti Irani in this case. In fact, that information about her
CBSE certificate was already in public domain, when CBSE
announced results, documented in the register, and also because
the candidate, the Minister has submitted same in the form of
affidavits along with nomination whenever she had contested
elections.
10. Next question is: Is it third party information given in fiduciary
capacity by the students to the educational institution? As
explained above, it cannot be defended as information given in
‘fiduciary capacity” because the result of examination given after
securing education through a public admission process is the
information generated and given by public authority to the student
and not vice versa. Except the answer-sheet given in response to
question paper in examination no other information is given by the
student to the public authority in fiduciary capacity. Hence, except
the answer sheets of the candidates, no information can be
withheld from disclosure. It cannot also be considered as third
party information. Public authority has a statutory function to
process answer-sheets and declare the result. Through declaration
of results, the institution is not disclosing any private information
or information of third party’
11. Now we need to deal with admit card or marks sheet, if they
contain some information given by the individual candidate which
could be personal. If admit card contains personal information like
address, contact number and email id, it is the personal
information of the candidate and need not be given. Even in marks
sheet, if any such information is incorporated, it could be denied.
But result or contents of certificate, division acquired, year and
number along with father’s name cannot be treated as personal or
third party information. The academic institutions while awarding
such academic qualification certificate for class 10th and 12th are
discharging their statutory duties and registering the qualification
details.
12. The Commission held in Subhash Chandra Tyagi vs CBSE on
21 July, 2016 that when there was an apprehension or doubt about
validity or existence of a qualification or degree, it is necessary to
verify genuineness of the same. If verification proves that it is a
genuine degree, it vindicates the qualification of the candidate. If it
is proved to be a wrong degree, it will be essential to probe the
matter further to take it to logical consequences as per law. In that
way it will serve a larger public interest. Especially when fake
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certificates and degrees are increasing, transparency to facilitate
verification is essential.
13. If it is proved that elected public representative has given
wrong information about their education, financial status and
crimes, in the affidavits, it would invalidate the election. This was
held in Hon’ble Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice Anil
Dave and Justice L Nageshwar Rao in case of Mairembam
Prithviraj Singh vs. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh in November
2016, held:
A voter is first citizen of this country and apart from statutory
rights; he is having fundamental rights conferred by the
Constitution. Members of a democratic society should be
sufficiently informed so that they may cast their votes
intelligently in favour of persons who are to govern them. Right
to vote would be meaningless unless the citizens are well
informed about the antecedents of a candidate. There can be
little doubt that exposure to public gaze and scrutiny is one of
the surest means to cleanse our democratic governing system
and to have competent legislatures….It is also clear from the
provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1951, Rules
and Form 26 that there is a duty cast on the candidates to give
correct information about their educational qualifications.
14. When a public representative declares his educational
qualifications, the voter has a right to check up that declaration.
The RTI Act has provided right to access which is similar and
supplementary to the voter’s right to information about certificates
and degrees of the contestants upheld by the Supreme Court and
the Parliament in 2002.
15. In Naresh Trehan v Rakesh Kumar Gupta, (2015) 216 DLT
156; Justice Vibhu Bhakru said: “The information provided by an
assessee in its Income tax return is in compliance of the provisions
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and thus, could not be stated to be
information provided in course of a fiduciary relationship”
(Paragraph 16).
16. If there is a statutory duty to provide information that has to be
distinguished from the fiduciary relation. This was explained by
Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India vs. Jayantilal. N. Mistry
and others; T.S (C) No. 91-101/2015;
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58. In the instant case, the RBI does not place itself in a
fiduciary relationship with the Financial institutions (though, in
word it puts itself to be in that position) because, the reports of
the inspections, statements of the bank. Information related to
the business obtained by the RBI are not under the pretext of
confidence or trust. In this case neither the RBI nor the Banks
act in the Interest of each other. By attaching an additional
“fiduciary” label to the statutory duty, the Regulatory authorities
have intentionally or unintentionally created an In terrorem
effect.
17. Ms. Smriti Zubin Irani being an elected MP and holding the
Constitutional office of the Union Minister, is a public authority
under RTI act. Under the RPA, 1951 she must have fulfilled her
statutory responsibility to submit an affidavit declaring educational
status. The information to be furnished under a statute cannot be
claimed to be given in fiduciary capacity.
18. In fulfilment of obligation under Representation of People’s Act
1951, the Minister for Textiles filed affidavits stating that she has
passed class X and XII from the Holy Child Auxilium School (see at
page 10 at http :// docs. myneta .info / affidavits/ raisab09aff /318/
Smriti%20Irani.pdf).
19. Hence, the Commission directs the office of Minister for textiles
(Ms Smriti Zubin Irani) and the Holy Child Auxilium School, Delhi
to provide the roll number or reference number of Ms Smriti Zubin
Irani to CBSE, Ajmer, which possess the records for the years 1991
and 1993 to facilitate search from huge records which is yet to be
digitized, sympathizing the staff for their practical difficulties in the
CBSE, within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.
20. However the defence under Section 8(1)(j) could be available
to deny copies of ‘admit card’ and ‘marks sheet’, if they contain
certain personal details of the student unrelated to public activity
of education, disclosure of which might cause unwarranted
invasion of privacy.
21. The Commission directs the respondent authority, the CBSE to
facilitate inspection of relevant records and provide certified
copies of documents selected by the appellant free of cost, except
personal details in admit card and mark sheet, within 60 days from
the date of receipt of this order.
Sd/-
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(M.Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner”
viii. It is submitted that the petitioner has not been served a copy of the
Second Appeal or the certified copy of the impugned order either by
respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Naushadudin or by the CIC.
ix. Being aggrieved with the order dated 17.01.2017, the petitioner has
filed the present petition.
C. Brief Facts in W.P.(C) 1077/2017
i. The present case arises from a dispute concerning the rejection of two
RTI applications submitted by the respondent no. 1/Mohd. Irsad to the
petitioner, and the consequential penalty imposed upon the CPIO by
the CIC.
ii. On 13.05.2016, the petitioner received two RTI applications bearing
diary nos. 10496 and 10497 both dated 11.05.2016 from the
respondent no. 1/Mohd. Irsad, each accompanied by Indian Postal
Orders (IPOs) of₹10. Application bearing diary no. 10496 dated
11.05.2016 is reproduced as under –
“To,
The Public Information Officer,
New Administrative Building,
University of Delhi,
North campus,
Delhi-110007.
Subject:- Application under Section 2(j) of The RTI Act 2005
Sir,
A. I wish to inspect the following documents of the student with
Enrol no-CC-5594/74 and the registers which contain this enrol
no.:
1. Admission form and enrolment form filled in student’s
handwriting along with all its annexure/enclosures.
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2. Enrolment register which contains this enrol no.
3. ACC register which contains this enrol no.
4. All mark sheets of the student with this enrol no.
5. Did the student ever apply for duplicate copy of his mark sheet
or degree? If yes, I wish to inspect the application with all its
annexure.
6. Degree entry register of Exam IV branch which contains the
entry of the student with this enrol no.
7. Degree entry register of SOL, which contains entry of the student
with this enrol no.
8. Register which contains signature of receipt of degree of the
student with this enrol no.
9. Convocation list of 1979.
10. Signature of the student of receipt of degree at convocation.
11. Photograph of receipt of degree by this student at convocation.
12. Announcement list at convocation of 1979.
B. After inspection, I should be provided copies of all the above
documents.
Note – Postal Order No.244788 has been attached herewith this
application as requisite fee required under RTI Act 2005.”
Application bearing diary no. 10496 dated 11.05.2016 is reproduced
as under –
“To,
The Public Information Officer,
New Administrative Building,
University of Delhi,
North campus,
Delhi-110007.
Subject:- Application under Section 2(j) of The RTI Act 2005
Sir,
A. I wish to inspect the following documents of the student with
Enrol no -CC-2366/74 and the registers which contain this enrol
no.:
1. Admission form and enrolment form filled in student’s
handwriting along with all its annexure/enclosures.
2. Enrolment register which contains this enrol no.
3. ACC register which contains this enrol no.
4. All mark sheets of the student with this enrol no.
5. Did the student ever apply for duplicate copy of his mark sheet
or degree? If yes, I wish to inspect the application with all its
annexure.
6. Degree entry register of Exam IV branch which contains the
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entry of the student with this enrol no.
7. Degree entry register of SOL, which contains entry of the student
with this enrol no.
8. Register which contains signature of receipt of degree of the
student with this enrol no.
9. Convocation list of 1979.
10. Signature of the student of receipt of degree at convocation.
11. Photograph of receipt of degree by this student at convocation.
12. Announcement list at convocation of 1979.
B. After inspection, I should be provided copies of all the above
documents.
Note – Postal Order No.244787 has been attached herewith this
application as requisite fee required under RTI Act 2005.”
iii. It is submitted that following the University’s established internal
procedure, the applications were forwarded to the Cash Section of the
petitioner for verification and generation of fee receipts. However, it
is submitted that the Section Officer (Finance VII) returned the
applications along with the IPOs on 16.05.2016 to Section Officer
(Information), noting that IPOs were incorrectly addressed in favour
of “PIO, DU” instead of the “Registrar, University of Delhi,”.
iv. Subsequently, the RTI applications along with the IPOs were returned
to the respondent no. 1 vide letters bearing nos.
Info./ROA/228/2016/2471 and Info./ROA/229/2016/2472 both dated
16.05.2016, passed by the CPIO. The letter bearing no.
Info./ROA/228/2016/2471 is reproduced as under –
Sir,
The Information Section of the University has received your
application dated 11th May, 2016 under the Right to Information
Act, 2005 on 13th May, 2016. The instrument No. 32F 244788 for
Rs. 10/- sent by the applicant is not in favour of “Registrar,
University of Delhi” and therefore, the application is returned
herewith in original alongwith IPO.
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The relevant para regarding fees for admissibility of the
application under Right to Information Act, 2005, which is
available on the website of the University www.du.ac.in under the
Head ‘Useful Links’-‘RTI’ under Manual 17 under section 4 (1)(b)
(xvii) of the Act, reads as under:
The person seeking information may apply on a plain paper giving
particulars of information being sought and his/her correct address
for communication.
A request for obtaining information under sub-section (1) of
section 6 shall be accompanied by an application fee of rupees ten
by way of cash against proper receipt or by demand draft or
bankers cheque or Indian Postal Order payable to the Registrar,
University of Delhi. The IPO can also be in favour of Accounts
Officer, University of Delhi.
Therefore, the applicant may send a fresh instrument of Rs 10/-
accordingly payable at Delhi alongwith the application, so that the
application can be admitted under the Right to Information Act,
2005. Alternatively, the applicant may visit the Information
Section, 1st Floor, New Administrative Block, University of Delhi,
Delhi-110007 in person and deposit the fees with the University
Cashier as mentioned above against proper receipt. The applicant
should not send any currency note or blank instrument alongwith
the application as it is not permissible.
The date of receipt of the signed application alongwith fees as
mentioned above would be treated as the date of admission of the
application under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Yours faithfully,
(Meenakshi Sahay)
Central Public Information Officer”
v. Subsequently, the University received notices of hearing, both dated
20.07.2016, from the CIC on 02.08.2016 for complaints filed by the
respondent no. 1 (Complaint nos. CIC/SA/C/2016/000234 and
CIC/SA/C/2016/000235) and copies of the complaints were received
on 08.08.2016. The initial hearing was scheduled for 24.08.2016 but
was later rescheduled to 08.09.2016.
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vi. It is submitted that the hearings were duly attended by the CPIO. The
written submissions and additional written submissions were also
submitted as per the directions.
vii. Subsequently, the CPIO was issued two show-cause notices both
dated 11.11.2016, in Complaint nos. CIC/SA/C/2016/000234 and
CIC/SA/C/2016/000235, asking why a maximum penalty should not
be imposed for the alleged denial of information. The show-cause
notice issued in Complaint no. CIC/SA/C/2016/000234 is reproduced
as under –
“CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
(Room No.315, B-Wing, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi 110 066)
Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)
Central Information Commissioner
CIC/SA/C/2016/000234
Mohd. Irsad v. PIO, Delhi University
Important dates and time taken:
Date of hearing : 05.10.2016
Decided on : 11.11.2016
Result : Show cause and posted to 14.12.2016 at
1200 noon.
Parties Present:
1. Appellant: Present.
Public authority; Ms. Meenakshi Sahay, CPIO arid Mr. P.
Roy Chaudhuri, AdvocateFACTS:
2. Complainant had sought for inspection of documents of student
with enrolment number CC-2366/74. PIO replied on 16.05.2016
stating that the IPO was not correctly marked in favour of
Registrar, university of Delhi. Complainant approached the
Commission.
3. The Commission’s order dated 08.09.2016:
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3. Case is adjourned and posted to 5.10.2016 at 2:30 PM, as
agreed by both the parties for submission of their written
statements and further directions. Both the parties shall
exchange their submissions with each other, before filing the
same to the Commission.
Decision:
4. The Counsel for Delhi University submitted a detailed response.
Appellant’s counsel said that they had nothing to submit in addition
to the complaint. The Commission directs the CPIO of Delhi
University to show cause why maximum penalty should not be
imposed against him/her for alleged wrongful rejection of RTI
application and denial of information to the appellant, within 21
days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. The case is posted to 14.12.2016 at 1200 noon.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner”
The show-cause notice issued in Complaint no.
CIC/SA/C/2016/000235 is reproduced as under –
“CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
(Room No.315, B-Wing, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi 110 066)
Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)
Central Information Commissioner
CIC/SA/C/2016/000235
Mohd. Irsad v. PIO, Delhi University
Important dates and time taken:
Date of hearing : 05.10.2016
Decided on : 11.11.2016
Result : Show cause and posted to 14.12.2016 at
1200 noon.
Parties Present:
1. Appellant:.
Public authority: Ms. Meenakshi Sahay, CPIO and Mr. P.
Roy Chaudhuri, AdvocateFACTS:
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2. Complainant had sought for inspection of documents of student
with enrolment number CC-5594/74. PIO replied on 16.05.2016
stating that the IPO was not correctly marked in favour of
Registrar, university of Delhi. Complainant approached the
Commission.
3. The Commission’s order dated 08.09.2016:
3. Case is adjourned and posted to 5.10.2016 at 2:30 PM, as
agreed by both the parties for submission of their written
statements and further directions. Both the parties shall
exchange their submissions with each other, before filing the
same to the Commission.
Decision:
4. The Counsel for Delhi University submitted a detailed response.
Appellant’s counsel said that they had nothing to submit in addition
to the complaint. The Commission directs the CPIO of Delhi
University to show cause why maximum penalty should not be
imposed against him/her for alleged wrongful rejection of RTI
application and denial of information to the appellant, within 21
days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. The case is posted to 14.12.2016 at 1200 noon.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner”
viii. The CPIO responded to the show-cause notices on 14.12.2016.
ix. Subsequently, the CIC issued a combined impugned order dated
27.12.2016, directing recovery of ₹25,000 as penalty from the salary
of the CPIO. The relevant portion of the Order dated 27.12.2016 is
reproduced as under –
“Analysis and Decision
8. The Question before the Commission are: Whether rejection of
RTI application along with the IPO is illegal? Will it form ground
for complaint? Answer to both is ‘yes’.
9. The fact of returning of the RTI request is admitted by the CPIO.
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The CPIO also gave a list of seven cases during 2009 to 2013,
wherein the RTI application along with the IPO was returned on
the ground that IPO was left blank. Thus it is proved that several
RTI applications are being rejected on such grounds.
10. The CPIO justified her action stating that Delhi University has
a procedure for admissibility of RTI application (they called it
Institutional Procedure of Admission of RTI Applications). The
point 9 of this procedure as submitted by the CPIO authorizes the
CPIO to return the original RTI application. The text of the point 9
is as follows:
9. On receipt of the applications with the inadmissible financial
instruments from the Section Officer (Finance VII), a letter is
prepared by the Information Section addressed to the applicant
forwarding the application and financial instrument in original
for the purpose of rectification. This communication is sent by
the University through the Deputy Registrar (Information) &
CPIO to facilitate its return to the individual concerned through
a systematic procedure of returning such applications as a
routine in the University over the years.
11. The CPIO did not explain the basis of this ‘institutional
procedure for admissibility of RTI applications’, who authored it
who authorized it and when etc. The public authority has not
published this ‘procedure’ on its official website. They claimed it as
internal procedure. It is not shown to be a regulation passed by
appropriate body of the public authority. The rule 9 of that
procedure proves that there is merit in the contention of
complainant that Delhi University habitually rejects the RTI
application on illegal grounds. Pretending to be dedicated and
committed to earn Rs 10 to the public authority, the CPIO is
causing the drain of public funds in getting letters of rejection
posted with approximate cost of Rs 50 or more, makes the
authorities to appoint lawyers to argue this case at huge cost and
harass the RTI applicants without giving any information and
litigating on that to any extent. It appears that there is a set of
people in the University who bent upon denying information and
harass the seekers by misusing their discretionary authority both
under-their original office and under RTI Act. It is highly
deplorable.
12. The Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules,
2012 prescribed under Rule 6(b) that fee may be paid by….IPO
payable to Accounts Officer of the Public Authority.
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13. The ‘Office Memorandum’ of DoPT dated 5th December 2008
directed the public authorities not to reject the RTI applications if
IPO is addressed to accounts officer. The OM also cautioned that
such non-acceptance of IPOs may amount to refusal to accept the
application which may result into imposition of penalty by the CIC
on the concerned CPIO.
11. Returning/rejecting of application for RTI could be a ground
for complaint under Section 18(1), which says;
Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the
Central Information Commission or State Information
Commission, as the case may be, to receive and inquire into a
complaint from any person,–
a) …..
b) who has been refused access to any information requested
under this Act;
c) who has not been given a response to a request for
information or access to information within the time limit
specified under this Act;
d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or
she considers unreasonable;
e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete,
misleading or false information under this Act; and
f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or
obtaining access to records under this Act.
12. The CPIO stated that “since the application is not maintainable
as per the RTI Act, the question of any further deliberation on the
application does not arise at all under any circumstances”.
According to her neither application, nor complaint is
maintainable. Facts and submissions of the CPIO proved that the
University’s CPIOs are adamant in rejecting RTI applications and
violating RTI Act. The CPIO was also supported by the standing
counsel of the University to plead this point and justify the
rejection.
13. The public authority cannot impose exemptions and substitute
new or additional grounds other than those provided in the RTI
Act. The Act leaves no such liberty with the public authorities and
PIOs to read law beyond what it is stated explicitly. There is
absolutely no ambiguity in the Act and tinkering with it in the name
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of larger public interest is beyond the scope of the Public
information officers. In Kanchi Kohli v. M/o Environment & Forest
in Case No. CIC/SA/A/2016/000209, the Commission held that the
public authority cannot invent a new defence or exemption such as
‘the report is under submission’, ‘file is pending consideration’ and
‘unless approved it cannot be given’, etc, which are not available
under RTI Act, 2005, such an illegal refusal will amount to denial
of information which would invite penal proceedings under Section
20 of RTI Act, 2005. If public authority introduces a policy or
practice which prescribed additional grounds beyond RTI Act for
rejecting RTI application, public authority PIO as designated
independent officer it cannot be justified under RTI Act.
14. Explaining the disposal of request, the RTI Act, Section 7(1)
clearly said that the CPIO either provides the information on
payment of such fee as may be prescribed or reject the request for
any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9. The issue remained
is the point of payment of fee. Whether appellant/complainant paid
the fee of Rs. 10? Only point repeatedly argued and heavily
dependent upon by the CPIO was that IPO was not properly filled,
No other reason for rejection was mentioned by the CPIO in all of
her explanations. The IPO stands proof of his payment of fee.
Writing ‘PIO’ in IPO does not render the entire RTI application as
‘no application’ as alleged by the CPIO. The IPO in this case is not
invalid.
15. The CPIO has every authority to collect the fee prescribed. But
when IPO indicates that Rs 10 paid to Government of India, the
RTI application cannot be considered as ‘without payment’ and be
rejected. Even non-payment of fee was not prescribed as a ground
for rejection of RTI application. Only grounds for rejection are
specifically provided under section 8 and 9. Reading Section 6 and
7 together and understanding spirit of RTI Act as a whole should
make CPIO to act reasonably and provide information rather than
searching for excuses to reject. Expression “on payment of such
fee” means both fee of Rs 10 and further fee representing cost of
copying. For that the CPIO has to accept and study the RTI
Application, get ready to give the information sought, if not
exempted, and seek payment of cost of copying and on receipt of
additional fee, if needed, and then the information need to be
provided. What is the significance of fee of Rs. 10? Does it
represent the value of the information, cost of its searching, labour
charge for preparing the information or consideration for it? No. If
CPIO- has any issues with realization of that fee for his authority,
she has every chance of addressing those issues or communicating
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same with appellant. By returning application along with IPO she
has closed all those chances. One sms or email or phone call from
public authority would have helped appellant to resolve the issue
and facilitated public authority to consider RTI request. The CPIOs
action of rejection resulted in denial of RTI and harassment of
applicant. It appears RTI wing of public authority is bent upon
rejecting RTI requests on some or the other ground,
16. There is a point in the contention of the complainant that
according to the RTI Act, Rs. 10 is fee prescribed only at the
threshold level and nowhere a fee is prescribed at first and second
appellate stages. The Public authority should know that the fee
does not mean the cost for their services in giving information. The
information is not generated for RTI Act but it was developed
during its core activity. The public authority cannot spend
unreasonable amounts for gaining Rs.10 when it is already paid in
the account of Government of India. In this case one can easily say
that Delhi University has spent more than Rs. 10 in writing a
rejection letter and more than Rs. 1 lakh in defending the illegal
rejection upto second appeal. Once fee is paid to the Government
of India through IPO, it is the duty of the public authority to
examine whether information demanded could be disclosed or
exempted under Section 8 and 9 of RTI Act. By rejecting the
request the CPIO refused to perform this statutory function.
17. On the question whether four orders of CIC will bind this
Commission, we need to consider the contention of the complainant
that ‘the CIC is not an appellate body over the State Information
Commission, there is no hierarchy within the Commission to file
appeals over order of one commission before a two member bench,
etc, therefore a Bench of Commissioners, is not empowered to hear
appeals like LPAs over writ petitions in High Courts and no where
precedential character was prescribed to the decisions of CIC. The
order of one Information Commissioner is not binding on another
Information Commissioner except that it might have a strong
persuasive value. As there is no internal appellate authority in
Commission, the rule ‘per incuriam’ is not available. Therefore the
four orders of CIC cited by CPIO cannot stop this Commission
from independently examining the issue in this complaint and
decide according to the provisions of the law and facts of the case.
Decision
19. Guide on Right to Information Act, 2005, issued by DoPT with
caption, “Applications received without fee”, in which it is stated at
point 2 “Soon after receiving the application, the Public
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Information Officer should check whether the applicant has made
the payment of application fee or whether the applicant is a person
belonging to a Below Poverty Line (BPL) category. If application
is not accompanied by the prescribed fee or the BPL Certificate, it
cannot be treated as an application under the RTI Act. It may,
however, be noted that the Public Information Officer should
consider such an application sympathetically and try to supply
information sought by way of such an application”.
20. From these guidelines it is clear that ‘fee’ is not material factor
to throw out the RTI request. Non- payment of fee is not prescribed
ground for rejection of request. In fact, this is not at all a case of
RTI request without payment of fee. Applicant is also not claiming
BPL status. The very fact that he has paid fee through court fee
stamps proves his intention to pay. When guidelines goad the
public authority to be sympathetic to an applicant without paying
fee, it does not need special mention that it cannot take technical
excuse about form of payment to deny or delay the information.
21. Thus the Commission finds no justification to apprehend audit
objection to giving information disputing the mode of payment. In
fact, audit will surely object this way of unmindful spending of huge
amount for Rs. 10. There is a duty cast upon the public authority to
simplify the process of payment of fee of Rs 10. In Patna, public
authority accepts the RTI application on phone though it is not
accompanied with Rs. 10, which is added to telephone bill. Some
states accept court stamps for payment of fee. It is pathetic that
such a simple request for information has been dragged to the level
of second appeal building heaps of documents with multiple files
consuming reams of paper spending huge amount of money besides
consuming precious time of public servants including that of the
Commission.
22. After hearing story of spending for legal battles to deny
information up to amount of thousands for an IPO of Rs 10, the
proverb ‘penny wise pound foolish’ has to be rewritten as ‘rupee
wise and thousand foolish’. Thus it is apparent denial of
information and that too without any reasonable cause that attracts
Section 20 of RTI Act. The Commission is vexed with non-response
of CPIO to number of its penalty notices and thus finds it is a fit
case to impose penalty on CPIO.
23. The Commission finds that the rejections of RTI applications by
Delhi University reminds the saying ‘penny wise pound foolish’, the
rejection of RTI application of the complainant is against the Right
to Information Act, rules and OM of DoPT, their institutional rules
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of procedure, even if existed with any authority, is not valid to the
extent of its contradiction to RTI Act and Rules. The explanation of
the CPIO confirms the fact of rejection and totally fails to present
any merit or justification. Hence the Commission considers the
CPIO is liable. The Commission requires under Section 19(8)(a)
the Public Authority to facilitate sufficient training to the entire
staff including CPIO and First Appellate Authority in the matters of
RTI law so that they do not adamantly reject RTI application in
routine without application of mind and understanding the aims
and objectives of RTI Act. The Commission also suggest public
authority to arrange for sufficient training, for the RTI authorities,
dealing officers and staff, provide latest books on RTI Act, and
supply the classic text books on “Administrative Law” and “Right to
Know” by late Professor S P Sathe, besides the “Five point
someone: What not to do at IIT” a novel written by Shri Chetan
Bhagat, an alumnus of IIT Delhi and IIM Ahmadabad to develop a
positive mindset in disseminating information suo motu and on
request, without wasting university money for collecting Rs 10. The
training curriculum may also include the judgment of Mr. Justice
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in JP Agrawal v
Union of India, WP(c) 7232/2009 decided on 4th August 2011. (also
available on https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104466988/).
24. Hence, the Public Authority is directed to recover the amount
of Rs.25,000/- from the salary payable to Mrs. Meenakshy Sahay,
the CPIO by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of ‘PAO CAT’
New Delhi in 5 equal monthly instalments. The first instalment
should reach the Commission by 15.02.2017 and the last 51
instalment should reach by 15.06.2017. The Demand Draft should
be sent to Shri S. P. Beck, Joint Secretary & Addl. Registrar, Room
No. 302, Central Information Commission, B-Wing, 2nd Floor,
August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi 110 066.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner)”
x. Being aggrieved with the order dated 27.12.2016, the petitioner has
filed the present petition.
xi. In the said petition, the petitioner has also filed an additional affidavit
dated 25.04.2017, wherein it has been submitted that after receiving
communication from the University regarding the procedural defect inW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 43 of 175
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his initial RTI application, the respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Irsad filed two
fresh RTI applications on 24.05.2016. These were submitted with
valid and acceptable fee instruments and were duly registered by the
petitioner as OA No. 794 of 2016 and OA No. 795 of 2016. The
University accepted these applications without objection and
proceeded to process them under the provisions of the RTI Act. RTI
application bearing no. OA No. 794 of 2016 is reproduced as under –
“Sir,
A. I wish to Inspect the following documents of the student with
Enrol no-CC-5594/74 and the registers which contain this enrol
no.:
1. Admission form and enrolment form filled in student’s
handwriting along with all its annexure/enclosures.
2. Enrolment register which contains this enrol no.
3. ACC register which contains this enrol no.
4. All mark sheets of the student with this enrol no.
5. Did the student ever apply for duplicate copy of his mark sheet
or degree? If yes, I wish to inspect the application with all its
annexure.
6. Degree entry register of Exam IV branch which contains the
entry of the student with this enrol no.
7. Degree entry register of SOL, which contains entry of the student
with this enrol no.
8. Register which contains signature of receipt of degree of the
student with this enrol no.
9. Convocation list of 1979.
10. Signature of the student of receipt of degree at convocation.
11. Photograph of receipt of degree by this student at convocation.
12. Announcement list convocation of 1979.
B. After inspection, I should be provided copies of all the above
documents.
Note- Postal Order No. 288059 has been attached herewith this
application as requisite fee required under RTI Act 2005.”
RTI application bearing no. OA No. 795 of 2016 is reproduced as
under –
“Sir,
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A. I wish to Inspect the following documents of the student with
Enrol no -CC-2366/74 and the registers which contain this enrol
no.:
1. Admission form and enrolment form filled in student’s
handwriting along with all its annexure/enclosures.
2. Enrolment register which contains this enrol no.
3. ACC register which contains this enrol no.
4. All mark sheets of the student with this enrol no.
5. Did the student ever apply for duplicate copy of his mark sheet
or degree? If yes, I wish to inspect the application with all its
annexure.
6. Degree entry register of Exam IV branch which contains the
entry of the student with this enrol no.
7. Degree entry register of SOL, which contains entry of the student
with this enrol no.
8. Register which contains signature of receipt of degree of the
student with this enrol no.
9. Convocation list of 1979.
10. Signature of the student of receipt of degree at convocation.
11. Photograph of receipt of degree by this student at convocation.
12. Announcement list convocation of 1979.
B. After inspection, I should be provided copies of all the above
documents.
Note- Postal Order No. 288058 has been attached herewith this
application as requisite fee required under RTI Act 2005.”
xii. It is submitted that both RTI applications filed afresh by the
respondent no. 1/ Mohd. Irsad were decided on their merits by the
University. The University passed orders disposing of these
applications on 13.06.2016. OA No. 794 of 2016 was decided vide
Order No. Info/OA/794/2016/2884, and OA No. 795 of 2016 was
disposed of vide Order No. Info/OA/795/2016/2883.
xiii. Order bearing no. Info/OA/794/2016/2884 dated 13.06.2016 is
reproduced as under –
“To,
Mohd. Irsad
Advocate
Chamber No-230, Patiala House Court,
New DelhiW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 45 of 175
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Subject: Original Application (OA) No. 794 of 2016 under the
Right to Information Act, 2005.
Sir,
This has reference to the above original application, which has
been numbered 794 of 2016 as specified in the subject cited
above. The applicant is required to quote the original
application number in all future correspondence for proper
correlation of the documents.
The information sought by the applicant has already been
transferred to the School of Open Learning under intimation to
the applicant under section 6(3) of the Act. A copy of the
original application was endorsed to the Dean (Examinations),
OSD (Examinations), Joint Registrar (Degree), Joint Registrar
(Result), Deputy Registrar (Academic) and Assistant Registrar
(Results) SOL of the University, who are the deemed PIOs
under section 5(4) & 5(5) of the Act.
Relevant input received from the Joint Registrar (Exams.)/OSD
(Exams.)/Dean (Exams.) and Deputy Registrar (Academic) is
enclosed in this regard.
On perusal of the original application, it appears that the
applicant is seeking various admission and degree related
information of another student. The documents sought by the
applicant may also include data of other students of the
University.
In this connection, it is informed that the University as a.
matter of policy seeks, to maintain the privacy of every student
as it holds the data pertaining to a student in a fiduciary
relationship with the student concerned, which can be
disclosed only to the student concerned. The disclosure’ of
such information is exempt under-section 8(1)(e) of the Act.
Again, the information pertaining to the students of the
University is treated as personal information of the students
concerned, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any
public activity or interest. Disclosure of such information is
exempt under section 8(1)(j) of the Act.”
However, in this connection, it is informed that there is a
systematic procedure for verification of degree by the
University, the details of which are available on the website of
the University, www.du.ac.in under the head ‘Useful Links’ –
‘Forms’. Therefore, the applicant may visit the website for this
purpose.
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The applicant can prefer an appeal against the decision before
the Appellate Authority within 30 days. The name and
particulars of the Appellate Authority are as under:
Shri Jay Chanda
Joint Registrar
University of Delhi,
Delhi-110007
Telephone ; 011-27667623
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Meenakshi Sahay)
Central Public Information Officer”
xiv. Order bearing no. Info/OA/795/2016/2883 dated 13.06.2016 is
reproduced as under –
“To,
Mohd. Irsad
Advocate
Chamber No-230, Patiala House Court,
New DelhiSubject: Original Application (OA) No. 795 of 2016 under the
Right to Information Act, 2005.
Sir,
This has reference to the above original application, which has
been numbered 795 of 2016 as specified in the subject cited
above. The applicant is required to quote the original
application number in all future correspondence for proper
correlation of the documents.
The information sought by the applicant has already been
transferred to the School of Open Learning under intimation to
the applicant under section 6(3) of the Act. A copy of the
original application was endorsed to the Dean (Examinations),
OSD (Examinations), Joint Registrar (Degree), Joint Registrar
(Result), Deputy Registrar (Academic) and Assistant Registrar
(Results) SOL of the University, who are the deemed PIOs
under section 5(4) & 5(5) of the Act.
Relevant input received from the Joint Registrar (Exams.)/OSD
(Exams.)/Dean (Exams.) and Deputy Registrar (Academic) is
enclosed in this regard.
On perusal of the original application and on the basis of the
input received from the deemed PIO, it appears that theW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 47 of 175
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information requested by the applicant apparently concurs a
student of the University. The University, in general, treats the
data of the students as personal to the students concerned, the
disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity
or interest. For It does not appear that any larger public
interest would be served by disclosure of this information in
the public domain. Disclosure of such information is exempt
under section 8(1)(j) of the Act. Therefore, the request of
applicant attract Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.
However, in this connection, it is informed that there is a
systematic procedure for verification of degree by the
University, the details of which are available on the website of
the University, www.du.ac.in under the head ‘Useful Links’ –
‘Forms’. Therefore, the applicant may visit the website for this
purpose.
The applicant can prefer an appeal against the decision before
the Appellate Authority within 30 days. The name and
particulars of the Appellate Authority are as under:
Shri Jay Chanda
Joint Registrar
University of Delhi,
Delhi-110007
Telephone : 011-27667623
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Meenakshi Sahay)
Central Public Information Officer”
xv. It is emphasized that the University did not reject the information
sought arbitrarily or in bad faith, but merely acted upon a procedural
requirement concerning the admissibility of the application under the
RTI regime.
xvi. In light of the above, it is asserted that the allegations and objections
raised by the respondent against the petitioner in the CIC proceedings
either no longer survive or have become academic and infructuous. It
is submitted that the fact that the respondent was able to re-submit his
RTI applications in a valid form and obtain a decision on merits
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clearly nullifies the basis on which the impugned CIC order
proceeded.
D. Brief Facts in W.P.(C) 1091/2017
i. The petition arises out of an RTI application filed by respondent no.
1/ Mr. R.K. Jain, bearing reference no. RTI/P-822/7667/13 dated
23.12.2013. It is submitted that said application was addressed to a
non-existent CPIO of the Faculty of Management Studies (FMS),
University of Delhi. It is further submitted that the application was
accompanied by an Indian Postal Order (IPO) for₹10, with the “pay
to” column left blank, thereby rendering the fee instrument defective
and inadmissible under the RTI Act and the applicable rules framed
thereunder. The application dated 23.12.2013 is reproduced as under –
“Application under Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005
Ref No.RTI/P-822/7667/13
Dated : 23-12-2013
To
CPIO
Faculty of Management Studies
Delhi University
North Campus
Maurice Nagar
New Delhi – 110007
1. Name of the Applicant R. K. Jain
2. Address 1512-B, Bhishm Pitamah
Marg Wazir Nagar New
Delhi – 110003
(b) Phone Nos. 09810077977, 011-
24651101, 011-24690707
(c) Fax No. 011-24635243
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3. Whether a Citizen of India Yes
4. Particulars of Information
Details of information (A) Please provide details
required of the Thesis, Research
Paper, Project Report or
Study Report submitted by
Shri Pankaj Kumar
Pandey Shreyaskar,
during his MBA/Part-time
programme during
Academic year 2009-2012
under Delhi University
Roll No.13472 (copy of
Provisional Certificate
enclosed).
(B) Please provide the title
of the Thesis / Research
Papers / Project Reports
or Papers submitted by
Shri Pankaj Kumar
Pandey Shreyaskar with
copy of the Title Page.
(C) Please provide the
copy of the Thesis /
Project Report submitted
by Shri Pankaj Kumar
Pandey Shreyaskar and
date of submission of the
Thesis.
(D) Please provide Rules
and Regulations regarding
publication of the Thesis /
Research Paper submitted
by a student as a part of
the MBA Programme.
Note:- Please provide
pointwise information /
response for each of above
points.
5. I state that the information sought is covered under RTI Act
and does not fall within the exemptions contained in
sections 8 or 9 or any other provisions of the Right toW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 50 of 175
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Information Act, 2005 and to the best of my knowledge it
pertains to your office. Information is being shought in
larger public interest.
6. A Postal Order No. 13F 874368 for Rs. 10 towards
payment of fee is enclosed herewith. You are requested to
filling the name in which the Postal Order is payable.
8. As per Section 7 of the RTI Act, 2005 information is to be
provided within 30 days of the Application.
Signature of Applicant
Telephone No. : 9810077977
011-24651101, 24690707
Fax No. 011-24635243
Place: New Delhi
Encl: as above.”
ii. It is submitted that subsequently, on 15.01.2014, the application was
forwarded by the Section Officer, Faculty of Management Studies, of
the petitioner, to the Deputy Registrar and CPIO of the University of
Delhi vide letter no. FMS/1870 dated 15.01.2014 which was received
by the Section Officer (Information Section). It is submitted that the
RTI application and IPO were thereafter placed before the Section
Officer (Finance – VII) for encashment and issuance of receipt.
However, it is submitted that the application and IPO was returned by
the Section Officer (Finance – VII) with the observation that IPO
should be drawn in favour of the “Registrar, University of Delhi”.
iii. Subsequently, it is submitted that the Section Officer (Information
Section) prepared a standard response/letter bearing reference no.
Info/ROA/32/2014, dated 15.01.2014 explaining the procedural
defects in the application and returned the IPO and application to the
applicant for rectification. It is submitted that the CPIO signed and
dispatched the letter bearing reference no. Info/ROA/32/2014, dated
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15.01.2014 prepared by the Section Officer (Information Section), on
16.01.2014, within 24 hours of receipt of the file. This letter informed
the applicant of two specific deficiencies: (i) the application was not
addressed to the proper authority, i.e., the CPIO, University of Delhi;
and (ii) the IPO was not made in favour of the “Registrar, University
of Delhi.” The letter dated 15.01.2014 is reproduced as under –
“Shri R.K. Jain
1512-B, Bhishm Pitamah Marg,
Wazir Nagar,
New Delhi-110003
Subject: Application under the Right to Information Act 2005
Sir,
The Information Section of the University has received an
application from the applicant dated 23rd December, 2013 under
the Right to Information Act, 2005 on 15th January, 2014.0n
perusal of the application, the following deficiencies have been
found in the application for admittance of the application in the
University of Delhi.
1. The Application is addressed to the CPIO, Faculty of
Management Studies, New Delhi, whereas the application is
required to the addressed to the ‘CPIO, University of Delhi’ for
filling an application for seeking information under the RTI Act,
2005. This has been elaborated on the website of the University,
www.du.ac.in under the head ‘RTI’.
2. The Instrument No. 13F 874368 for Rs. 10/- sent by the
applicant is not in favour of ‘Registrar, University of Delhi’.
Therefore, the application is returned herewith alongwith the IPO.
The relevant para, regarding fees for admissibility of the
application under Right to Information Act, 2005 which is
available on the website of the University www.du.ac.in under the
Head RTI under Manual 17 under Section 4 (1)(b) (xvii) of the Act
reads as under.
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The person seeking information may apply on a plain paper
giving particulars of information being sought and his/her correct
address for communication.
A request for obtaining information under sub-section (1) of
Section 6 shall be accompanied by an application fee of rupees ten
by way of cash against proper receipt or by demand draft or
bankers cheque or Indian Postal Order payable to the Registrar,
University of Delhi.
Therefore, you may send a fresh instrument of Rs 10/-
favouring ‘The Registrar, University of Delhi’ payable at Delhi
alongwith your application, so that your application can be
admitted under the Right to Information Act, 2005. Alternatively,
you may visit the Information Section, 1st Floor, New
Administrative Block, University of Delhi, Delhi-110007 in person
and deposit the fees with the University Cashier as mentioned
above against proper receipt. You should not send any currency
note or blank instrument alongwith your application as it is not
permissible.
The date of receipt of the application alongwith fees as
mentioned above would be treated as the date of admission of the
application under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Yours faithfully,
Sd.-
(Jay Chanda)
Deputy Registrar (Information) & CPIO.”
iv. It is submitted that instead of correcting the deficiency and
resubmitting the application, respondent no. 1 preferred a First Appeal
on 06.02.2014, which was registered as First Appeal No. 44/2014
before the First Appellate Authority (FAA) of the University.
v. Respondent No. 1 also filed a Complaint against CPIO, under Section
18 before the CIC on 10.02.2014, registered as
CIC/RM/C/2014/000138.
vi. It is the case of the petitioner that a complaint under Section 18 of the
RTI Act is not maintainable where there is no refusal to provide
information. In this case, it is submitted that the CPIO had clearly
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stated that the application would be considered admitted upon
rectification of the fee-related defect. Thus, there was no denial of
information.
vii. The First Appellate Authority (FAA) by an order dated 25.02.2014,
upheld the decision of the CPIO. The FAA noted that the petitioner
had acted in accordance with the rules detailed in the Information
Handbook prepared under Section 4 of the RTI Act, and also relied
upon prior decisions of the CIC in similar matters. Order dated
25.02.2014 is reproduced as under –
“Proceedings before the 1st Appellate Authority under the Right to
Information Act, 2005
Coram: Ms. Alka Sharma, Registrar & Appellate
Authority
Date: 25-02-2014
Appellant Shri R K Jain
Respondent Section Officer (Information)
Central Public Information Officer (CPIO), University of Delhi
ROA No. 32 of 2014 dated 15.01.2014
Appeal No. 44 of 2014 dated 14.02.2014
Facts:-
1. The Appellant, Shri R. K. Jain has filed an appeal dated
06.02.2014 before the Registrar & First Appellate Authority
received on 14.02.2014 against an application filed under RTI Act,
2005, which was returned to the Appellant by the CPIO on
15.01.2014 as the instrument sent by the applicant was not in
favour of “Registrar, University of Delhi”. The application was
numbered as ROA 32 of 2014.
2. The Appellant, Shri R. K. Jain stated that the CPIO of the
University has wrongfully returned the application and hence
violated Section 5(3) of the Act in the process.
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3. The Information Section had received the application dated
23.12.2013 on 15.01.2014 from the Faculty of Management
Studies. The application was returned to the Appellant Immediately
on 15.01.2014 itself alongwith a letter from the CPIO stating that
the IPO is not in favour of the Registrar, University of Delhi.
Further, the application was also not addressed to the CPIO,
University of Delhi. The CPIO in his letter to the Appellant has
categorically brought out the process of filing, a valid application
under the Act alongwith fees and also provided a copy of the
relevant rules of the University for this purpose to the Appellant for
compliance. Suitable guidance has been extended by the CPIO to
the Appellant for filing an application under the Act with the
University.
Decision:-
1. On considering the Appeal, it has observed that the CPIO
received a wrongly addressed application on 15.01.2014 with an
inadmissible blank IPO from the Faculty of Management Studies
and immediately sent a letter to the Appellant on 15.01.2014 itself
stating therein the procedure for filing an application with the
University under the Act and the rule framed thereunder. It was
stated in the letter that the IPO is not in favour of Registrar,
University of Delhi which is required as per Rules. Therefore,
application alongwith the inadmissible IPO was returned by the
CPIO to the Appellant with proper guidance. The CPIO has
mentioned about the website of the University and relevant link of
the Information Handbook under Section 4 of the Act. Therefore,
the contention of the Appellant that the CPIO has wrongfully
returned the application is untenable as the procedure followed in
this matter is, a standard, procedure in the University for such
incomplete Financial Instruments. Neither the CPIO nor any other
official of the University is authorized to work on behalf of the
Appellant in completing the formalities for filing an OA with the
University under the Act as the onus of such completion of
formality lies entirely with the Appellant who is seeking
information under the Act.
3. The CPIO has acted with highest bonafide and given an
elaborate systematic guidance to the Appellant to follow while
obtaining information from the University under the Act. Further,
there are a number of decisions of Hon’ble Central Information
Commission, numbered as CIC/SG/C/2009/00:1351/5070 dated 07-
10-2009 In the matter of Dr.Fazal Ul Haque vs. PIO & Deputy
Registrar, University of Delhi, CIC/DS/A/2011/004344/RM: dated
07.02.2013 In the matter of Deepak Prasad Vs. University of Delhi
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and CIC/RM/A/2012/000773 dated 21.06.2013 In the matter of Anil
Pathak vs. University of Delhi, which are relevant in this matter.
According to these decisions, the financial instrument is required to
be submitted as per Rules for seeking information from the
University under the Act.
4. Since the Appellant has not followed the standard procedure of
filing an application for seeking Information under the Act from the
University, nor complied with the guidance of the CPIO, the
application cannot be considered as an application for seeking
information under Act. The Appellant is required to comply with
the guidance of the CPIO dated 15.01.2014 which is self contained
and only procedure for admissibility of an application for seeking
information under the Act with the University.
5. The appeal is decided accordingly.
Sd/-
Registrar & Appellate/Authority”
viii. Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 filed a Second Appeal before the CIC
on 11.03.2014 bearing no. CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SA
ix. In Second Appeal bearing no. CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SA the
Commission issued an order cum show cause notice dated
09.11.2015, proposing maximum penalty against the CPIO,
compensation to the appellant, and initiation of disciplinary action. It
is submitted that while issuing order cum show cause notice dated
09.11.2015, the respondent no. 2 failed to record or address any of the
specific issues raised by the CPIO. Order cum show cause notice
dated 09.11.2015 is reproduced as under –
“CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
(Room No.315, B-Wing, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaj Cama Place, New Delhi 110 066)
Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)
Information Commissioner
CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SAW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 56 of 175
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R.K. Jain vs. Delhi University
Important Dates and time taken:
RTI/CPIO;23- FA/FAO:6-2/25-2- 2nd appeal :
12/15-1-14(23) 14(19) 11-3-2014
Show cause Hearing : 03-11-2015 Decision : 9-
Issued 11-2015
Parties present:
The appellant is present. The Public Authority represented by Mr.
Jay Chandra, JR&CPIO.
FACTS:
2. The appellant through his RTI application, was seeking
information regarding. (A) details of the thesis, research paper, etc.
submitted by Shri Pankaj Kumar Pandey Shreyaskar during the
MBA/Part time programme during 2009-2012 (B) copies of title
pages of the same, (C) copy of thesis/ project about the inquiry
report and (D) rules and regulations regarding publication of the
thesis, etc. Claiming that no Information was received from the
Public Authority, he approached the Commission in second appeal
after exhausting the first appeal.
DECISION:
3. Both the parties made their submissions. The appellant submitted
that he was denied information on the pretext of the IPO, in which
the name of the payee was left blank, to be filled by the CPIO, whom
he had authorized through his RTI application, as the appellant was
not sure about the proper title of the Payee. But Instead of helping
the appellant, the CPIO chose to routinely return back the RTI
application stating that the name of the Payee should be filled up
and the IPO should be sent afresh. The appellant alleged that this
tantamount to the negative mind-set of the CPIO, not to furnish
Information and deny the same on some technical grounds.
4. The respondent officer had submitted that there was no intention
to deny the information. It was routinely returned to the appellant
and not with mala fide intentions. This is as per the University
rules/DOPT Instructions with regard to the RTI Act.
5. The Commission having heard the submissions and perused the
record, considers that it is a case where the CPIO returned the
original RTI application along with the IPO, which means a total
and complete refusal to act under the provisions of RTI Act, whichW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 57 of 175
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appears to be a serious breach of RTI Act. The Commission directs
the CPIO to explain and show cause as to why maximum penalty
should not be imposed against him and why compensation should
not be granted to the appellant and disciplinary action should not be
recommended against him. His explanation should reach the
Commission within 21 days from the date of receipt of this order.
6. The Commission orders accordingly.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Information Commissioner”
x. Subsequently, a second order cum show cause notice dated
19.11.2015 was issued in the complaint proceedings again based on
the same facts and RTI application. Order cum show cause notice
dated 19.11.2015 is reproduced as under –
“CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
(Room No.315, B-Wing, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaj Cama Place, New Delhi 110 066)
Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)
Information Commissioner
CIC/RM/C/2014/00138
R.K. Jain vs. Delhi University
Important Dates and time taken:
RTI: FAA:06.02.2014
23.12.2013
SA: Hearing: 09.11.2015 Decision: 19-
10.02.2014 11-15
Result: Posted on 23.12.2015 at 2:30 PM.
Parties Present:
1. Complainant is present. Dr. K. Ratnabala, Dy. Dean (Legal) &
Mr. Jay Chanda, CPIO represent Public Authority.
FACTS:
2. Appellant through his RTI application sought information on the
following points :-
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i) Details of the Thesis/ Research Paper, Project Report or Study
Report submitted by Shri Pankaj Kumar Pandey Shreyaskar,
during his MBA/Part time programme during Academic Year 2009-
2012 under Delhi University Roll No. 13472.
ii) Titles of the Thesis/Research Papers/Project Reports or Papers
submitted by Shri Pankaj Kumar Pandey Shreyaskar with copy of
the Title Page.
iii) Copy of the Thesis/Project Report submitted by Shri Pankaj
Kumar Pandey Shreyaskar and date of the submission of the
Thesis.
iv) Rules and Regulations regarding publication of the
Thesis/Research Paper submitted by a student as a part of the MBA
Programme.
3. Claiming that RTI is returned on the pretext of blank IPO,
appellant filed first appeal. Claiming non-furnishing of
information, appellant approached the Commission.
Proceedings Before the Commission:
4. The University Registrar has sent a sealed cover which was
handed over to the Commission by Dy. Dean (Legal), in which the
Registrar requested the Commission to provide an opportunity of
hearing in the case No. CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SA which was
heard earlier and case No. CIC/RM/C/2014/000138-SA. The
Registrar in this sealed cover letter stated as follows:-
“It seems that there is a communication gap between what the law
mandates and what has been verbally communicated to the
University through its officers who attended the hearing on
03.11.2015.
Therefore, the University, as a Public Authority as per section 2 (h)
of the Act strongly puts forward before the Central Commission to
conduct a fresh hearing in this matter for it to be looked into in all
its functional, operational and legal ramifications.
The University also submits that the Complaint Proceedings
initiated by the CIC in the matter vide Notice No.
CIC/RM/C/2014/000138-SA dated 21.10.2015 should be deferred
till the time the Appeal proceedings are not concluded to meet the
ends of justice.
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The University may kindly be given suitable date and time to
present the matter under reference before the Hon’ble Central
Information Commission through a notice of hearing”.
5. The case has come up before the Commission today in the form
of complaint on the subject matter which came up as an appeal in
No. CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SA, filed by same appellant against
same authority on 03.09.2015 in the presence of both the parties.
The Commission in case No. 001389 has directed the CPIO to
explain and show cause as to why maximum penalty should not be
imposed against him and why compensation should not be granted
to the appellant and disciplinary action should not be
recommended against him.
6. Appellant Mr. R. K. Jain sought copy of letter sent in the sealed
cover saying that how he was kept in dark about this paper relating
to the Second Appeal/Complaint filed by him. The Commission
directed Dy. Dean to provide copy of letter to the appellant. The
appellant has pointed out that the language in the letter wrote by
the Registrar is not proper, as he contended that matter “should be
deferred”. He said that higher officer of the university should not
have used such language. He should have made request instead of
commanding.
7. The Commission after hearing both the parties in the presence of
CPIO of Delhi University directed Dy. Registrar of the Commission
to combine these cases together and posted on 23.12.2015 at 2.30
pm to give sufficient opportunity to the CPIO as requested by the
Registrar.
8. The appellant filed some additional documents consisting
various points including First Appellate Authority order, which
reflected the fact that original postal order for Rs. 10/- and original
RTI application with IPO was returned to the appellant. A copy of
the additional submission was handed over to the CPIO of Delhi
University. Appellant contended that returning the original
application & IPO amounts to refusal of the request for
Information.
9. The Commission, after hearing the submissions from both the
sides, on their agreement, directs the CPIO Mr. Jay Chanda of the
respondent authority to submit his explanation by 17th December,
2015 along with supplying a copy of the same to the appellant, to
which the appellant shall file his written submission, serving a copy
on the CPIO, before 23.12.2015. Accordingly, the appeal and
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complaint are posted for hearing on 23.12.2015 at 2.30 pm for
show cause notice, as chosen by both.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Information Commissioner”
xi. The appeal and complaint proceedings were subsequently clubbed for
hearing on 23.12.2015.
xii. It is submitted that the respondent no. 1 thereafter filed eight more
RTI applications with the University, all of which complied with the
procedural requirements previously indicated by the CPIO. These
were duly registered and replied to within the prescribed time limit.
xiii. It is submitted that the former CPIO and Registrar of the petitioner
made detailed written submissions to the CIC on 14.01.2016 and
supplementary submission on 26.07.2016, none of which were given
proper consideration in the final order dated 23.12.2016, which was
passed by the CIC. Relevant portion of the final order dated
23.12.2016 passed in CIC/RM/C/2014/000138-SA is reproduced as
under –
“Decision in Appeal and Complaint
17. Facts are simple. Appellant sought some information along
with IPO of Rs. 10/- leaving payeė address blank, requesting to fill
it with appropriate name. His RTI application was also returned
along with IPO. Mr. Jain complained that returning amounts to
rejection.
The Question: Whether the CPIO of public authority DU, can
return/reject the original RTI application alleging the IPO as
defective, wherein Rs 10 is already paid into account of
Government of India? Answer is ‘no’.
18. Following facts emerged out of submissions of CPIO:
a) The applicant should not leave the payee space blank, he
should have addressed in favour of Registrar, University ofW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 61 of 175
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Delhi, and hence it was returned on 15.1.2014. The original
RTI request dated 23.12.2013 was also returned.
b) The RTI wing of the University uses a standard drafted
letter to reject the application and the IPO in original.
c) Applicant should not have addressed CPIO, Faculty of
Management Studies, University of Delhi, but address CPIO,
University of Delhi.
d) The CPIO claimed returning was as per guidance, and for
smooth implementation of RTI Act.
e) First Appellate Authority upheld this action of CPIO. The
CPIO agreed that no relief was granted to the appellant, and
that appellant was told to comply with guidance available in
letter dated 15.1.2014, by which both IPO and original RTI
application was returned.
f) The University has a procedure for admissibility of RTI
application (they called it Institutional Procedure of Admission
of RTI Applications) which is reflected in this returning of
application. The CPIO claims it was institutional decision and
not his personal decision. Both the CPIO and Registrar
présented more than dozen points of ‘institutional procedure’
for admissibility of RTI applications.
19. Each of the above factual points appear to be an impediment in
the access to information as that happened in this case. Denial of
access was admitted but the CPIO tried to justify. Neither the CPIO
nor the Registrar could explain the basis of this ‘institutional
procedure for admissibility of RTI applications’, who authored it,
who authorized it and when etc. The public authority has not
published this ‘procedure’ on its official website. They claimed it as
internal procedure. It is not shown to be a regulation passed by
appropriate body of the public authority. The point 9 of this
procedure as submitted by the CPIO and reiterated by Registrar,
authorizes the CPIO to return the original RTI application. The
text of the point 9 is as follows:
On receipt of the applications with the inadmissible financial
Instruments from the Section Officer (Finance VII), a letter is
prepared by the Information Section addressed to the applicant
forwarding the application and financial Instrument in original for
the purpose of rectification. This communication is sent by the
University through the Deputy Registrar (Information) & CPIO toW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 62 of 175
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facilitate its return to the individual concerned through a
systematic procedure of returning such applications as a routine in
the University over the years.
20. The CPIO reiterated: “As already explained by the CPIO in his
submissions, the application was not an RTI application, at the first
instance as per the RTI Act and rules framed there under, and
therefore cannot be treated as an application filed by an
application as per section 6(1) of the RTI Act”. The CPIO is not
considering an applicant as RTI Applicant. All this reveal that RTI
applications were returned routinely allegedly as per this
unauthorized procedure. Even assuming that it was authorized
procedure, RTI Act overrides it as per the Section 22 of RTI Act. It
is not just denial of this RTI application, but a continuous practice
of denying applications in routine, which appears to be seriously
flawed.
21. The complainant explained that if his RTI request is being
stone-walled by a self proclaimed ‘institutional procedure’; a
student, who is at the mercy of the University authorities may not
venture to challenge them for fear of their stay in University, future
and career, those students are in fact suffering a lot with this
attitude of officers and hence he was seriously pursuing this issue.
He also said that the CPIO being a public servant, expected to act
in conformity of the law under which he was designated as an
authority.
22. Another contention of the CPIO was that the appellant filed
complaint, without waiting for the decision in first appeal. This
cannot come to his rescue as Section 18 enables a citizen to file a
complaint without filing first appeal.
23. The RTI Act specifically says that information request could be
rejected on the grounds of exemptions prescribed under Section 8
or 9 of RTI Act. Section 5(2) of RTI Act says every public authority
shall designate an officer to receive the applications for
information… Act did not authorize such returning of RTI
applications in routine, Section 5(2) also says that every CPIO
shall deal with requests from persons seeking information and
render reasonable assistance…. Section 5(4) says the CPIO may
seek assistance of any other officers for proper discharge of his
duties. Section 5(5) says any officer whose assistance is sought
shall render all assistance to the CPIO and for the purposes of any
contravention of provisions of this Act such officer shall be treated
as CPIO. All these provisions of RTI Act were ignored.
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24. The fact of returning the RTI: application of complainant is
admitted by the CPIO, First Appellate Authority, Deputy Dean
(Law), and the new CPIO, etc. As the application has been
returned, the complainant has left with no chance of getting any
information. Thus the effect of this return of application is rejection
and complete denial of information. The RTI Act has not provided
for this kind of rejection. Returning/rejecting of application for RTI
could be a ground for complaint under Section 18(1), which says;
Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the
Central Information Commission or State Information Commission,
as the case may be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from
any person,
a) …..
b) who has been refused access to any information requested under
this Act;
c) who has not been given a response to a request for information
or access to information within the time limit specified under this
Act;
d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or she
considers unreasonable;
e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete,
misleading or false information under this Act; and
f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining
access to records under this Act.
25. The ‘Office Memorandum’ of DOPT dated 5th December 2008
directed the public authorities not to reject the RTI applications if
IPO is addressed to accounts officer. The OM also cautioned that
such nón-acceptance of IPOs may amount to refusal to accept the
application which may result into imposition of penalty by the CIC
on the concerned CPIO. Returning of RTI application in this case
amounts to refusing to receive an application. There is no need to
invoke the provision of deemed refusal as information was not
furnished within one month, because it was rejected in fact. The
applicant lost chance of getting information because of returning.
Hence it is established that the complaint is maintainable under
Section 18.
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26. While explaining the disposal of request, the RTI Act, Section
7(1) clearly said that the CPIO…..either provides the information
on payment of such fee as may be prescribed or reject the request
for any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9. The issue
remained is the point of payment of fee. Whether
appellant/complainant paid the fee of Rs. 10? Önly point
repeatedly argued and heavily dependent upon by the CPIO was
that IPO was not completely filled. No other reason for rejection
was mentioned by the CPIO in all of his explanations. The IPO
stands proof of his payment of fee. Leaving space for addressee
blank in IPO does not render the entire RTI application as ‘no
application’ as alleged by the CPIO. The IPO in this case is not
invalid.
28. The CPIO has every authority to collect the fee prescribed. But
when IPO indicates that Rs 10 paid to Government of India, the
RTI application cannot be considered as without payment. Even
non-payment of fee cannot be a ground for rejection of RTI
application. Only grounds for rejection are specifically provided
under section 8 and 9. Reading Section 6 and 7 together and
understanding ‘spirit of RTI Act as a whole should make CPIO to
act reasonably and provide information rather than searching for
excuses to reject. Expression “on payment of such fee” means both
fee of Rs 10 and further fee representing cost of copying. For that
the CPIO has to accept and study the RTI Application, get ready to
give the information sought, if not exempted, and seek payment of
cost of copying and on receipt of additional fee, if needed, and then
the information need to be provided. What is the significance of fee
of ‘Rs. 10’? Does it represent the value of the information, cost of
its searching, labour charge for preparing the information or
consideration for it? No. The decision of CPIO to return the entire
application lock stock and barrel on the excuse that addressee
space was left blank is without any legal base and totally
unjustifiable. He refused application at threshold and was not
inclined to arrange information. The mandatory 30 day limit is
dismissed by this action. If CPIO has any issues with realization of
that fee for his authority, he has every chance of addressing those
issues. By returning application along with IPO he has closed all
those chances.
29. The public authority and the CPIO have built up a huge case,
dozens of lengthy letters, commissioning a council, spending huge
amount in attending several adjournments over a period of 18
months, just for Rs. 10 remind the English maxim: ‘penny wise and
pound foolish’.
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30. As demanded by the CPIO, Registrar, Deputy Dean (legal),
appeal was heard first and then complaint was taken up for
hearing, all their submissions were considered, the
FAA/Registrar’s request also was considered, their multiple and
repeated complaints against the Commission were also patiently
heard, the number of adjournments were meticulously granted as
asked, the demand for large time gap was conceded with due
respect and, all sympathy to the CPIO. Finally Mr. Jay Chanda
also expressed satisfaction after using all time given, in the
presence of all his colleagues, officers, and Commission reserved
order only after Mr. Jay Chanda and his council expressed
satisfaction.
33. The appeal is allowed because the information sought was not
given and all the ways to get such information were closed by
returning of RTI application. The CPIO is directed to provide the
information sought, free of cost to the appellant and file
compliance report to the Commission within 25 days from the date
of receipt of this order.
34. The Commission requires under section 19(8)(iv) of RTI Act,
the public authority to bring a change in the system not to reject or
return IPOS and RTI applications citing the ‘Institutional practice’
in contradiction with RTI Act. The Commission also suggests
public authority to arrange for sufficient training for the RTI
authorities, dealing officers and staff, provide latest books on RTI
Act, and supply the classic text books on “Administrative Law” and
“Right to Know” by late Professor S P Sathe. The training
curriculum may also include the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajiv
Sahai Endlaw of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in JP Agrawal v Union
of India, WP(c) 7232/2009 decided on 4th August 2011. (also
available on https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104466988/).
36. After hearing the submissions CPIO, perusing the records,
arguments by learned council, the submissions made by the
Registrar who was also First Appellate Authority under RTI Act,
the present CPIO, Deputy Dean of Law, and of the complainant,
the Commission could not find any reasonable cause for rejection
of RTI application. The allegations made by complainant case
against CPIO Mr. Jay Chanda were proved by submissions of
public authority as mentioned above.
37. Hence, the Public Authority is directed to recover the amount
of Rs.25,000/- from the salary payable to Mr. Jay Chanda, Former
CPIÖ by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of ‘PAO CAT’ New
Delhi in 5 equal monthly installments. The first installment should
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reach the Commission by 15.02.2017 and the last installment
should reach by 15.06.2017. The Demand Draft should be sent to
Shri S. P. Beck, Joint Secretary & Addl. Registrar, Room No. 302,
Central Information Commission, B-Wing, 2nd Floor, August
Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi 110 068.
Sd/-
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Information Commissioner”
xiv. Aggrieved by this impugned Order dated 23.12.2016 and the two
order cum show cause notices dated 09.11.2015 and 19.11.2015, the
petitioner has filed the present petition.
xv. It is noticed that the petitioner has filed an affidavit in compliance
with the directions issued by this Court vide order dated 27.02.2025,
whereby the petitioner was directed to file an affidavit clarifying the
status of respondent no. 1 in light of his demise during the pendency
of these proceedings.
xvi. In the said affidavit it is submitted that the demise of respondent no. 1
had already been recorded by this Court by way of its earlier order
dated 15.11.2022. On that date, the learned counsel appearing for
respondent no. 1 had submitted before the Court that the respondent
no. 1 in W.P.(C) 1091/2017 had passed away. In view of the same, the
said counsel had sought to be discharged from further representing the
deceased respondent in the matter. This Court allowed the said
request and discharged the counsel accordingly.
xvii. It is submitted that upon verification, it was confirmed that respondent
no. 1 had indeed expired. However, since there existed no formal or
jural relationship between the petitioner and the said respondent, the
petitioner was not in a position to independently obtain a copy of the
death certificate.
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xviii. It is pointed that since the passing of the order dated 15.11.2022, no
counsel or legal representative has entered appearance or made any
submission on behalf of respondent no. 1.
xix. In view of the above circumstances, it is submitted that the present
writ petition may be treated as having abated on account of the demise
of the RTI applicant.
E. Brief Facts in W.P.(C) 1095/2017
i. The present case arises out of an RTI application dated 05.05.2016
filed by respondent no. 1/Sanjay Singh, which was received by the
petitioner on 09.05.2016. The application was accompanied by an
Indian Postal Order (IPO)₹10,
of submitted as the requisite
application fee. It is submitted that as per the institutional procedure
followed by the petitioner, all such applications, upon receipt, are
forwarded to the Cash Section for generation of a receipt of
application fees to ensure procedural compliance before registration
of the application under the RTI Act. The RTI application dated
05.05.2016 is reproduced as under –
“Sir,
The Times of India published photocopy of B.A. degree of Shri
Narendra Modi on 04.05.2016. Copy of paper cutting is attached.
Kindly provide following information –
1. Whether this degree is genuine or fake?
2. File-notings on movement of RTI petition.
Note – postal order no. 231813 has been attached herewith this
application as requisite fee required under RTI Act 2005″
ii. It is submitted that upon examination, the Cash Section returned the
application on 10.05.2016 with an observation that the IPO submitted
by respondent no. 1/Sanjay Singh was inadmissible. The IPO was
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incorrectly made in favour of the “PIO, DU” rather than in favour of
the “Registrar, University of Delhi” or “Accounts Officer”.
Accordingly, the Finance Branch determined that the IPO could not
be encashed and recommended returning the same to the applicant for
rectification.
iii. Subsequently, a letter bearing reference no.
Info./ROA/216/2016/2401 dated 10.05.2016, was issued by the CPIO
to the respondent no. 1/Sanjay Singh, enclosing the original
application. The letter outlined the deficiency and provided guidance
for rectification, including directions to refer to the University’s
website where the RTI procedures are made publicly available. The
letter clarified that IPOs drawn in favour of either the Registrar or
Accounts Officer would be considered valid. Letter dated 10.05.2016
is reproduced as under –
“To,
Shri Sanjay Singh S/o Shri Dinesh Kumar Singh
4A/10, First Floor, Tilak Nagar,
Delhi-110018
Subject: Application under the Right to Information Act 2005
Sir, The Information Section of the University has received your
application dated 05 May, 2016 under the Right to Information Act,
2005 on 09th May, 2016. The instrument No. 32F 231813 for Rs.
10/- sent by the applicant is not in favour of “Registrar, University
of Delhi” or Accounts Officer, as mention in the original
application. Therefore, the application is returned herewith in
original alongwith IPO.
The relevant para regarding fees for admissibility of the
application under Right to Information Act, 2005, which is
available on the website of the University www.du.ac.in under theW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 69 of 175
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Head ‘Useful Links’-‘RTI’ under Manual 17 under section 4 (1)(b)
(xvii) of the Act, reads as under:
The person seeking information may apply on a plain paper giving
particulars of information being sought and his/her correct address
for communication.
A request for obtaining information under sub-section (1) of
section 6 shall be accompanied by an application fee of rupees ten
by way of cash against proper receipt or by demand draft or
bankers cheque or Indian Postal Order payable to the Registrar,
University of Delhi. The IPO can also be in favour of Accounts
Officer, University of Delhi.
Therefore, the applicant may send a fresh instrument of Rs 10/-
accordingly payable at Delhi alongwith the application, so that the
application can be admitted under the Right to Information Act,
2005. Alternatively, the applicant may visit the Information
Section, 1st Floor, New Administrative Block, University of Delhi,
Delhi-110007 in person and deposit the fees with the University
Cashier as mentioned above against proper receipt. The applicant
should not send any currency note or blank instrument alongwith
the application as it is not permissible.
The date of receipt of the signed application alongwith fees as
mentioned above would be treated as the date of admission of the
application under the Right to Information Act, 2005.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Meenakshi Sahay)
Central Public Information Officer”
iv. Thereafter, the petitioner received a notice of hearing dated
20.07.2016 from the CIC in relation to a complaint bearing no.
CIC/SA/C/2016/000230 filed by respondent no. 1/ Sanjay Singh. This
complaint was listed for hearing on 24.08.2016. It is submitted that a
copy of the complaint itself was received on 09.08.2016, followed by
a second notice of hearing dated 16.08.2016, rescheduling the hearing
to 08.09.2016.
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v. It is submitted that the CPIO of the petitioner attended the hearing on
08.09.2016, where she was directed to file written submissions by
05.10.2016 and to share the same with the respondent. It is submitted
that these written submissions were filed in time. Additional Written
Submissions were also filed on 19.10.2016.
vi. Subsequently, on 11.11.2016, the CIC issued a show cause notice to
the CPIO asking why the maximum penalty should not be imposed
for allegedly rejecting the RTI application and failing to provide
information. The said notice is reproduced as under –
“CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
(Room No.315, B-Wing, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi
110 066)Prof M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)
Central Information Commissioner
CIC/SA/C/2016/000230
Sanjay Singh v. PIO, Delhi University
Important Dates and time taken:
Date of hearing : 05.10.2016
Decided on : 11.11.2016
Result : Show cause and posted to
14.12.2016 at 1200 noon.
Parties Present:
1. Appellant: Mr. Rishikesh Kr.
Public authority: Ms. Meenakshi Sahay, CPIO and Mr. P. Roy
Chaudhuri, Advocate.
FACTS:
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2. Complainant had sought for Information regarding copy of
BA degree of Shri. Narendra Modi as appeared on 04.05.2016
in Times of India. He wanted to know whether this degree is
genuine or fake, file notings on movement of RTI petition. PIO
replied on 10.05.2016 stating that the IPO was not in favour of
Registrar, Delhi University. Complainant approached the
Commission.
3. The Commission’s order dated 08.09.2016:
3. Case is adjourned and posted to 05.10.2016 at 2.30 PM, as
agreed by both the parties for submission of their written
statements and further directions. Both the parties shall
exchange their submissions with each other, before filing the
same to the Commission.
Decision:
4. The Counsel for Delhi University submitted a detailed
response. Appellant’s counsel said that they had nothing to
submit in addition to the complaint. The Commission directs the
CPIO of Delhi University to show cause why maximum penalty
should not be imposed against him/her for alleged wrongful
rejection of RTI application and denial of information to the
appellant within 21 days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. The case is posted to 14.12.2016 at 1200 noon.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner”
vii. On 14.12.2016, the CPIO submitted a reply to the Show Cause
Notice.
viii. Subsequently, CIC passed a final order dated 22.12.2016 imposing a
penalty of₹25,000 to be recovered from the salary of the CPIO.
Relevant portion of the order dated 22.12.2016 is reproduced as
under-
“Analysis and Decision
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8. The Question before the Commission are: Whether rejection of
RTI application along with the IPO is illegal? Will it form ground
for complaint? Answer to both is ‘yes’.
9. The fact of returning of the RTI request is admitted by the CPIO.
The CPIO also gave a list of seven cases during 2009 to 2013,
wherein the RTI application along with the IPO was returned on
the ground that IPO was left blank. Thus it is proved that several
RTI applications are being rejected on such grounds.
10. The CPIO justified her action stating that Delhi University has
a procedure for admissibility of RTI application (they called it
Institutional Procedure of Admission of RTI Applications). The
point 9 of this procedure as submitted by the CPIO authorizes the
CPIO to return the original RTI application. The text of the point
9-is as follows:
9. On receipt of the applications with the inadmissible
financial instruments from the Section Officer (Finance VII), a
letter is prepared by the Information Section addressed to the
applicant forwarding the application and financial instrument
in original for the purpose of rectification. This
communication is sent by the University through the Deputy
Registrar (Information) & CPIO to facilitate its return to the
individual concerned through a systematic procedure of
returning such applications as a routine in the University over
the years.
11. The CPIO did not explain the basis of this ‘institutional
procedure for admissibility of RTI applications’, who authored it
who authorized it and when etc. The public authority has not
published this ‘procedure’ on its official website. They claimed it as
internal procedure. It is not shown to be a regulation passed by
appropriate body of the public authority. The rule 9 of that
procedure proves that there is merit in the contention of
complainant that Delhi University habitually rejects the RTI
application on illegal grounds. Pretending to be dedicated and
committed to earn Rs 10 to the public authority, the CPIO is
causing the drain of public funds in getting letters of rejection
posted with approximate cost of Rs 50 or more, makes the
authorities to appoint lawyers to argue this case at huge cost and
harass the RTI applicants without giving any information and
litigating on that to any extent. It appears that there is a set of
people in the University who bent upon denying information and
harass the seekers by misusing their discretionary authority bothW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 73 of 175
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under their original office and under RTI Act. It is highly
deplorable.
12. The Right to Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules,
2012 prescribed under Rule 6(b) that fee may be paid by….IPO
payable to Accounts Officer of the Public Authority.
13. The ‘Office Memorandum’ of DoPT dated 5th December 2008
directed the public authorities not to reject the RTI applications if
IPO is addressed to accounts officer. The OM also cautioned that
such non-acceptance of IPOs may amount to refusal to accept the
application which may result into imposition of penalty by the CIC
on the concerned CPIO.
11. Returning/rejecting of application for RTI could be a ground
for complaint under Section 18(1), which says; Subject to the
provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the Central
Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the
case may be, to receive and inquire into a complaint from any
person, –
a) …
b) who has been refused access to any information requested under
this Act;
c) who has not been given a response to a request for information
or access to information within the time limit specified under this
Act;
d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or she
considers unreasonable;
e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete,
misleading or false information under this Act; and
f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining
access to records under this Act.
12. The CPIO stated that “since the application is not maintainable
as per the RTI Act, the question of any further deliberation on the
application does not arise at all under any circumstances”.
According to her neither application, nor complaint is
maintainable. Facts and submissions of the CPIO proved that the
University’s CPIOs are adamant in rejecting RTI applications and
violating RTI Act. The CPIO was also supported by the standing
counsel of the University to plead this point and justify the
rejection.
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13. The public authority cannot impose exemptions and substitute
new or additional grounds other than those provided in the RTI
Act. The Act leaves no such liberty with the public authorities and
PIOs to read law beyond what it is stated explicitly. There is
absolutely no ambiguity in the Act and tinkering with it in the name
of larger public interest is beyond the scope of the Public
information officers. In Kanchi Kohli v. M/o Environment & Forest
in Case NO. CIC/SA/A/2016/000209, the Commission held that the
public authority cannot invent a new defence or exemption such as
‘the report is under submission’, ‘file is pending consideration’ and
‘unless approved it cannot be given’, etc, which are not available
under RTI Act, 2005, such an illegal refusal will amount to denial
of information which would invite penal proceedings under Section
20 of RTI Act, 2005. If public authority introduces a policy or
practice which prescribed additional grounds beyond RTI Act for
rejecting RTI application, public authority PIO as designated
independent officer it cannot be justified under RTI Act.
14. Explaining the disposal of request, the RTI Act, Section 7(1)
clearly said that the CPIO either provides the information on
payment of such fee as may be prescribed or reject the request for
any of the reasons specified in sections 8 and 9. The issue remained
is the point of payment of fee. Whether appellant/complainant paid
the fee of Rs. 10? Only point repeatedly argued and heavily
dependent upon by the CPIO was that IPO was not properly filled.
No other reason for rejection was mentioned by the CPIO in all of
her explanations. The IPO stands proof of his payment of fee.
Writing ‘PIO’ in IPO does not render the entire RTI application as
‘no application’ as alleged by the CPIO. The IPO in this case is not
invalid.
15. The CPIO has every authority to collect the fee prescribed. But
when IPO indicates that Rs 10 paid to Government of India, the
RTI application cannot be considered as ‘without payment’ and be
rejected. Even non-payment of fee was not prescribed as a ground
for rejection of RTI application. Only grounds for rejection are
specifically provided under section 8 and 9. Reading Section 6 and
7 together and understanding spirit of RTI Act as a whole should
make CPIO to act reasonably and provide information rather than
searching for excuses to reject. Expression “on payment of such
fee” means both fee of Rs 10 and further fee representing cost of
copying. For that the CPIO has to accept and study the RTI
Application, get ready to give the information sought, if not
exempted, and seek payment of cost of copying and on receipt of
additional fee, if needed, and then the information need to be
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provided. What is the significance of fee of ‘Rs. 10’? Does it
represent the value of the information, cost of its searching, labour
charge ‘for preparing the information or consideration for it? No.
If CPIO has any issues with realization of that fee for his authority,
she has every chance of addressing those issues or communicating
same with appellant. By returning application along with IPO she
has closed all those chances. The simple form of communication
would have helped the appellant to resolve the issue and facilitated
public authority to consider RTI request. The CPIO’s action of
rejection resulted in denial of RTI and harassment of applicant. It
appears RTI wing of public authority is bent upon rejecting RTI
requests on some or the other ground.
16. There is a point in the contention of the complainant that
according to the RTI Act, Rs. 10 is fee prescribed only at the
threshold level and nowhere a fee is prescribed at first and second
appellate stages. The Public authority should know that the fee
does not mean the cost for their services in giving information. The
Information is not generated for RTI Act but it was developed
during its core activity. The public authority cannot spend
unreasonable amounts for gaining Rs. 10 when it is already paid in
the account of Government of India. In this case one can easily say
that Delhi University has spent more than Rs. 10 in writing a
rejection letter and more than Rs. 1 lakh in defending the Illegal
rejection upto second appeal. Once fee is paid to the Government
of India through IPO, it is the duty of the public authority to
examine whether information demanded could be disclosed or
exempted under Section 8 and 9 of RTI Act. By rejecting the
request the CPIO refused to perform this statutory function.
17. On the question whether four orders of CIC will bind this
Commission, we need to consider the contention of the complainant
that ‘the CIC is not an appellate body over the State Information
Commission, there is no hierarchy within the Commission to file
appeals over order of one commission before a two member bench,
etc, therefore a Bench of Commissioners is not empowered to hear
appeals like LPAs over writ petitions in High Courts and no where
precedential character was prescribed to the decisions of CIC’. The
order of one Information Commissioner is not binding on another
Information Commissioner except that it might have a strong
persuasive value. As there is no internal appellate authority in
Commission, the rule ‘per incuriam’ is not available. Therefore the
four orders of CIC cited by CPIO cannot stop this Commission
from independently examining the issue in this complaint and
decide according to the provisions of the law and facts of the case.
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Decision
19. Guide on. Right to Information Act, 2005, Issued by DoPT with
caption, “Applications received without fee”, in which it is stated at
point 2 “Soon after receiving the application, the Public
Information Officer should check whether the applicant has made
the payment of application fee or whether the applicant is a person
belonging to a Below Poverty Line (BPL) category. If application,
is not accompanied by the prescribed fee or the BPL Certificate, it
cannot be treated as an application under the RTI Act. It may,
however, be noted that the Public Information Officer should
consider such an application sympathetically and try to supply
information sought by way of such an application”.
20. From these guidelines it is clear that ‘fee’ is not material factor
to reject the RTI request. In fact, this is not at all a case of RTI
request without payment of fee. Applicant is also not claiming BPL
status. The very fact that he has paid fee through court fee stamps
proves his intention to pay. When guidelines goad, the public
authority to be sympathetic to an applicant without paying fee, it
does not need special mention that it cannot take technical excuse
about form of payment to deny or delay the information.
21. Thus the Commission finds no justification to apprehend audit
objection to giving information disputing the mode of payment. In
fact, audit will surely object this way of unmindful spending of huge
amount for Rs. 10. There is a duty cast upon the public authority to
simplify the process of payment of fee of Rs 10. In Patna, public
authority accepts the RTI application on phone though it is not
accompanied with Rs 10, which is added to telephone bill. Some
states accept court stamps for payment of fee. It is condemnable
that such a simple request for information has been dragged to the
level of second appeal, building heaps of documents with multiple
files, consuming reams of paper, spending huge amount of money
besides consuming precious time of public servants including that
of the Commission.
22. The Commission finds that the rejections of RTI applications by
Delhi University reminds the saying ‘penny wise pound foolish’, the
rejection of RTI application of the complainant is against the Right
to Information Act, rules and OM of DoPT, their institutional rules
of procedure, even if existed with any authority, is not valid to the
extent of its contradiction to RTI Act and Rules. The explanation of
the CPIO confirms the fact of rejection and totally fails to present
any merit or justification. Hence the Commission considers the
CPIO is liable. The Commission requires under Section 19(8)(a)
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the Public Authority to facilitate sufficient training to the entire
staff including CPIO and First Appellate Authority in the matters of
RTI law so that they do not adamantly reject RTI application in
routine without application of mind and understanding the aims
and objectives of RTI Act. The Commission also suggest public
authority to arrange for sufficient training for the RTI authorities,
dealing officers and staff, provide latest books on RTI Act, and
supply the classic text books of “Administrative Law” and “Right to
Know” by late Professor S P Sathe. The training curriculum may
also include the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in JP Agrawal v Union of India, WP(c)
7232/2009 decided on 4th August 2011. (also available on
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104466988/).
23. Hence, the Public Authority is directed to recover the amount
of Rs.25,000/- from the salary payable to Mrs. Meenakshy Sahay,
the CPIO by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of ‘PAO CAT’
New Delhi in 5 equal monthly instalments. The first instalment
should reach the Commission by 15.02.2017 and the last instalment
should reach by 15.06.2017. The Demand Draft should be sent to
Shri S. P. Beck, Joint Secretary & Addl. Registrar, Room No. 302,
Central Information Commission, B-Wing, 2nd Floor, August
Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi 110 066.
(M. Sridhar Acharyulu)
Central Information Commissioner”
ix. Being aggrieved of the same the petitioner has filed the present
petition.
F. Brief Facts in W.P.(C)13568/2023
i. The petitioner on 17.05.2016, filed an RTI application bearing no. OA
No. 795/2016 before the CPIO of the University of Delhi. The
application sought the following information –
“Subject: – Application under Section 2(j) of The RTI Act 2005
Sir,
A. I wish to Inspect the following documents of the student with
Enrol no-CC-5594/74 and the registers which contain this enrol
no.:
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1. Admission form and enrolment form filled in student’s
handwriting along with all its annexure/enclosures.
2. Enrolment register which contains this enrol no.
3. ACC register which contains this enrol no…
4. All mark sheets of the student with this enrol no.
5. Did the student ever apply for duplicate copy of his mark sheet
or degree? If yes, I wish to inspect the application with all its
annexure.
6. Degree entry register of Exam IV branch which contains the
entry of the student with this enrol no.
7. Degree entry register of SQL, which contains entry of the student
with this enrol no.
8. Register which contains signature of receipt of degree of the
student with this enrol no.
9. Convocation list of 1979.
10. Signature of the student of receipt of degree at convocation.
11. Photograph of receipt of degree by this student at convocation.
12. Announcement list at convocation of 1979.
B. After inspection, I should be provided copies of all the above
documents.
Note – Postal Order No.-288059 has been attached herewith this
application as requisite fee required under RTI Act 2005″
ii. Subsequently, CPIO, vide an order dated 13.06.2016, rejected the
application, citing Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. Order dated
13.06.2016 is reproduced as under –
“To,
Mohd. Irsad
Advocate
Chamber No-230, Patiala House Court,
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Subject: Original Application (OA) No. 795 of 2016 under the
Right to Information Act, 2005.
Sir,
This has reference to the above original application, which has
been numbered 795 of 2016 as specified in the subject cited
above. The applicant is required to quote the original
application number in all future correspondence for proper
correlation of the documents.
The information sought by the applicant has already been
transferred to the School of Open Learning under intimation to
the applicant under section 6(3) of the Act. A copy of the
original application was endorsed to the Dean (Examinations),
OSD (Examinations), Joint Registrar (Degree), Joint Registrar
(Result), Deputy Registrar (Academic) and Assistant Registrar
(Results) SOL of the University, who are the deemed PIOs
under section 5(4) & 5(5) of the Act.
Relevant input received from the Joint Registrar (Exams.)/OSD
(Exams.)/Dean (Exams.) and Deputy Registrar (Academic) is
enclosed in this regard.
On perusal of the original application and on the basis of the
input received from the deemed PIO, it appears that the
information requested by the applicant apparently concerns a
student of the University. The University, in general, treats the
data of the students as personal to the students concerned, the
disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity
or interest. Further, it does not appear that any larger public
interest would be served by disclosure of this information in
the public domain. Disclosure of such information is exempt
under section 8(1)(j) of the Act. Therefore, the requests of the
applicant attract section 8(1)(j) of the Act.
However, in this connection, it is informed that there is a
systematic procedure for verification of degree by the
University, the details of which are available on the website of
the University, www.du.ac.in under the head ‘Useful Links’ –
‘Forms’. Therefore, the applicant may visit the website for this
purpose.
The applicant can prefer an appeal against the decision before
the Appellate Authority within 30 days. The name and
particulars of the Appellate Authority are as under:
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Shri Jay Chanda
Joint Registrar
University of Delhi,
Delhi-110007
Telephone ; 011-27667623
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
(Meenakshi Sahay)
Central Public Information Officer”
iii. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred a First Appeal before
the First Appellate Authority (FAA). However, it is submitted that the
Executive Director, FAA, upheld the denial of information by order
dated 15.07.2016. Order dated 15.07.2016 is reproduced as under –
“Facts:
10. The appellant Mohd. Irsad has filed an appeal against the reply
of the Original Application no 81 of 2016 before the Executive
Director 1st Appellate Authority of the SOI, under Right to
Information Act 2005. The Appellant stated that he is not satisfied
with reply of the PIO. The brief of the RTI application is given
below.
11. The Appellant Mohd. Irsad has filed an RTI Application to the
CPIO, University of Delhi vide OA no.795/2016 dt. 25.5.2016.
12. The CPIO University of Delhi transferrred the RTI Application
of Mohd. Irsad U/S 6(3) to the PIO, SOI, Delhi University. The
PIO, SOI has assigned OA No.81 dated 31.05.16.
13. On perusal of the appeal, it appears that the applicant is
requesting for admission form and enclosures. In this connection,
this is to inform you that the SOI, DU as a matter of policy seeks to
maintain the privacy of every student as it holds the data pertaining
to a student in a fiduciary relationship with the student concerned,
which can be disclosed only to the student concerned. The
disclosure of such information is exempt u/s 8(1)(e) of the Act.
14. Again, the information pertaining to the student of the SOI, DU,
is treated as personal information of the students concerned, the
disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or
interest. Disclosure of such information is exempt u/s 8(1)(j) of the
RTI Act.
Decision
15. After considering the Appeal, it was noticed that the reply given
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by the PIO is correct.
16. The appeal is decided accordingly.
Sd/-
st
Executive Director, 1 Appellate Authority”
iv. It is submitted that subsequently, the Joint Registrar/FAA also vide
order dated 18.07.2016 upheld the denial of information in connection
with RTI application bearing OA No. 795/2016. Order dated
18.07.2016 is reproduced as under –
“Facts:-
1. The Appellant, Mohd. Irshad has filed an Appeal against the
reply of the Original Application (OA) No. 795 of 2016 before the
First Appellate Authority of the University under the Right to
Information Act, 2005 (hereafter the Act). The Appellant states that
he is not satisfied with the reply of the CPIO.
2. The Appellant, Mohd. Irshad had filed the original application
dated 17.05.2016, received by the CPIO, University of Delhi on
24.05.2016 seeking various information regarding student related
personal matters with respect to Enrollment no. CC-2366/74. The
CPIO replied to the OA on 13.06.2016.
3. On perusal of the reply of the CPIO, it appears that the CPIO
had endorsed the original Application to the Dean (Examinations),
O.S.D. (Examinations), Joint Registrar (Results), Joint Registrar
(Degree), Deputy Registrar (Academic), Assistant Registrar
(Results), SOL and Section Officer (Information), who are the
deemed PIOs under section 5(4) and 5(5) of the Act. The CPIO had
transferred a copy of the OA to the PIO/Executive Director, School
of Open Learning under section 6(3) of the Act.
Decision:-
1. The Original Application, the First Appeal and the reply of the
CPIO have been perused vis-à-vis the input provided by the
concerned deemed PIOs in this matter. On perusal of the
concerned file, it has been observed that the CPIO has decided the
matter based on the input of the concerned deemed PIOs. Further,
the CPIO has transferred the OA to the PIO, School of Open
Learning under Section 6(3) of the Act, being a separate Public
Authority as per Section 2 (h) of the Act.
2. On perusal of the OA, input provided by the deemed PIOs and
the decision of the CPIO, it has been observed that the CPIO has
decided the matter as per various relevant provisions of Section 8
(1) of the Act. Further, the CPIO has mentioned in her reply that a
systematic procedure of verification of degree is available in theW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 82 of 175
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University. Therefore, the decision of the CPIO is upheld in ‘this
matter. Further, a copy of the First Appeal is required to be sent to
the Executive Director, School of Open Learning for further
appropriate disposal at their end.
3. The appeal is decided accordingly.”
v. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Second Appeal before the Central
Information Commission on 20.07.2016. The CIC, disposed of the
Second Appeal vide order dated 08.09.2017, stating that since a
similar matter was sub judice before the High Court of Delhi in
W.P.(C) No. 600/2017, and a stay had been granted by the High Court
on 23.01.2017, no intervention by the Commission was called for.
Order dated 08.09.2017 is reproduced as under –
“1. Shri Mohd. Irshad, the appellant, had sought copy of admission
form and enrolment form along with enclosures, copy of enrolment
register and ACC register; all marks sheets or degree, copy of
degree entry register, copy of register which contains signature of
receipt of degree of the enrolment no. CC-5594/74 and convocation
list of the year 1979 etc.
2. The CPIO denied the information to the appellant u/s 8(1)(e) &
(j) of the RTI Act. Dissatisfied, the appellant approached the FAA.
The FAA upheld the CPIO’s reply. Aggrieved, the appellant came
in appeal before the Commission requesting the Commission to
direct the CPIO to provide detailed information to the appellant on
his RTI application.
3. The matter was heard by the Commission. The appellant was not
present during the hearing in spite of the notice of hearing having
been sent to him. However, the appellant approached the
Commission after the hearing and submitted his written arguments
wherein he mentioned that the information sought was relating to
the degree of Hon’ble Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi
ji. As Shri Narendra Modi was the serving Prime Minister of India
and the appellant being a citizen of India was entitled to know the
details of educational qualification of the serving Prime Minister
and hence the information sought could not be qualified as
personal information.
4. The respondent stated that the appellant sought information i.e.
copy of admission form and enrolment form along with enclosures,
copy of enrolment register and ACC register; all marks sheets or
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degree, copy of degree etc. of the enrolment no. CC-5594/74, which
was personal information of third party and the institute held this
information of third party in fiduciary capacity, hence could not
disclose the same to the appellant. The information sought was
denied to the appellant u/s 8(1)(e) & (j) of the RTI Act on
13.06.2016 and the reply was upheld by the FAA on 15.07.2016.
The CPIO added that the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi vide order
dated 23.01.2017 in WP(C) No. 600 of 2017 stayed the
Commission’s order dated 21.12.2016 directing to provide the
result of all students appeared in Bachelor of Arts, year 1978 with
roll no., name of the students with father name, marks and result
pass or failed. The Hon’ble High Court while granting the stay
placed reliance on the Apex court judgement CBSE and Anr.
Vs.Aditya Bandopadhyay & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 497. The CPIO
stated that in the instant matter the issue was the same as the
information sought was the part of information provisioning of
which had been stayed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi vide
order dated 23.01.2017.
5. The Commission observes that as per the respondent’s
submissions the same issue is pending for adjudication before the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in WP(C) No. 600 of 2017 and the
stay had been granted by the Hon’ble High Court on 23.01.2017,
hence no intervention is required on the part of the Commission.
The appeal is disposed of.”
vi. Being aggrieved of the same the petitioner has filed the present
petition challenging the order dated 08.09.2017 passed by the CIC,
order dated 15.07.2016 passed by the first appellate authority and
order dated 13.06.2016 passed by the CPIO.
vii. It is submitted that the CIC erred in law by dismissing the petitioner’s
appeal solely on the ground that a similar matter was pending before
the High Court. Reliance has been placed on the order dated
23.09.2010 passed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.K. Jain,
W.P.(C) No. 14120/2009, wherein the Court has observed as under –
“….The matter being sub judice before a court is not one of the
categories of information which is exempt from disclosure under any
of the clauses of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act”
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
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17. Learned Solicitor General has submitted as under –
i. The order dated 27.12.2016 passed by the CIC is legally flawed. The CIC
erroneously held that, since the University is a public body engaged in
public functions (i.e., conducting educational courses), it is obliged to
disclose degree-related information of individuals to third parties under
the RTI Act. The contention of the petitioner is that the information
sought by the RTI applicant/respondent no. 1 is exempted under section 8
(1)(e) and 8 (1)(j) of the RTI Act.
ii. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has, in several judgments
recognized that the marks, results, and degree-related records of a student
are generated pursuant to a fiduciary relationship between the examining
body and the candidate.
iii. Reliance has been placed on Kerala Public Service Commission v. State
Information Commission, (2016) 3 SCC 417, wherein the Court has
observed as under –
“8. In the present case, PSC has taken upon itself in appointing the
examiners to evaluate the answer papers and as such, PSC and
examiners stand in a principal-agent relationship. Here PSC in the
shoes of a principal has entrusted the task of evaluating the answer
papers to the examiners. Consequently, examiners in the position of
agents are bound to evaluate the answer papers as per the
instructions given by PSC. As a result, a fiduciary relationship is
established between PSC and the examiners. Therefore, any
information shared between them is not liable to be disclosed.
Furthermore, the information seeker has no role to play in this and
we do not see any logical reason as to how this will benefit him or
the public at large. We would like to point out that the disclosure of
the identity of examiners is in the least interest of the general
public and also any attempt to reveal the examiner’s identity will
give rise to dire consequences. Therefore, in our considered
opinion revealing examiner’s identity will only lead to confusionW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 85 of 175
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and public unrest. Hence, we are not inclined to agree with the
decision of the Kerala High Court with respect to the second
question.”
iv. It is submitted that the relationship between a student and the University
is of a fiduciary character, akin to the relationship between an examiner
and the Public Service Commission (PSC), as recognized by the Supreme
Court in Kerala Public Service Commission v. State Information
Commission(supra). This implies that degree and result information
collected by the University is held in confidence and must be protected
from disclosure to third parties.
v. Reliance has also been placed on Central Board of Secondary
Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497, thereby
emphasising upon the following portion of the judgment –
“44. We may next consider whether an examining body would be
entitled to claim exemption under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act,
even assuming that it is in a fiduciary relationship with the
examinee. That section provides that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Act, there shall be no obligation to give any
citizen information available to a person in his fiduciary
relationship. This would only mean that even if the relationship is
fiduciary, the exemption would operate in regard to giving access
to the information held in fiduciary relationship, to third parties.
There is no question of the fiduciary withholding information
relating to the beneficiary, from the beneficiary himself.
45. One of the duties of the fiduciary is to make thorough
disclosure of all the relevant facts of all transactions between them
to the beneficiary, in a fiduciary relationship. By that logic, the
examining body, if it is in a fiduciary relationship with an
examinee, will be liable to make a full disclosure of the evaluated
answer books to the examinee and at the same time, owe a duty to
the examinee not to disclose the answer books to anyone else.
If A entrusts a document or an article to B to be processed, on
completion of processing, B is not expected to give the document or
article to anyone else but is bound to give the same to A whoW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 86 of 175
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entrusted the document or article to B for processing. Therefore, if
a relationship of fiduciary and beneficiary is assumed between the
examining body and the examinee with reference to the answer
book, Section 8(1)(e) would operate as an exemption to prevent
access to any third party and will not operate as a bar for the very
person who wrote the answer book, seeking inspection or
disclosure of it.”
vi. Reliance has also been placed on Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India v. Shaunak H. Satya and Others, (2011) 8 SCC 781, wherein the
court has observed as under –
“22. It should be noted that Section 8(1)(e) uses the words
“information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship”.
Significantly Section 8(1)(e) does not use the words “information
available to a public authority in its fiduciary relationship”. The
use of the word “person” shows that the holder of the information
in a fiduciary relationship need not only be a “public authority” as
the word “person” is of much wider import than the words “public
authority”. Therefore the exemption under Section 8(1)(e) is
available not only in regard to information that is held by a public
authority (in this case the examining body) in a fiduciary capacity,
but also to any information that is given or made available by a
public authority to anyone else for being held in a fiduciary
relationship. In other words, anything given and taken in
confidence expecting confidentiality to be maintained will be
information available to a person in fiduciary relationship. As a
consequence, it has to be held that the instructions and solutions to
questions communicated by the examining body to the examiners,
Head Examiners and moderators, are information available to
such persons in their fiduciary relationship and therefore exempted
from disclosure under Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI Act.
23. The information to which the RTI Act applies falls into two
categories, namely, (i) information which promotes transparency
and accountability in the working of every public authority,
disclosure of which helps in containing or discouraging corruption,
enumerated in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 4(1) of the RTI Act;
and (ii) other information held by public authorities not falling
under Sections 4(1)(b) and (c) of the RTI Act. In regard to
information falling under the first category, the public authorities
owe a duty to disseminate the information widely suo motu to the
public so as to make it easily accessible to the public. In regard to
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information enumerated or required to be enumerated under
Sections 4(1)(b) and (c) of the RTI Act, necessarily and naturally,
the competent authorities under the RTI Act will have to act in a
proactive manner so as to ensure accountability and ensure that
the fight against corruption goes on relentlessly. But in regard to
other information which do not fall under Sections 4(1)(b) and (c)
of the Act, there is a need to proceed with circumspection as it is
necessary to find out whether they are exempted from disclosure.”
vii. While countering the assertion of the respondents that the degree
related information is “public” because it was generated during a public
function by a public authority, it is submitted that the test for disclosure
under the RTI Act is not whether the authority is public or whether the
function is public, but rather whether the information was obtained in
confidence or in a fiduciary relationship, and whether its disclosure is
warranted under Section 8(1)(e) or 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
viii. The petitioner submits that the reliance placed by the respondents on
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya,
(2011) 8 SCC 781 and Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497 is misplaced. It is submitted that the
respondents have cited these authorities to argue that no fiduciary
relationship exists between a student and an examining body. It is
submitted that this interpretation represents an incomplete reading of the
judgments in question.
ix. It is submitted that while it is true that the Supreme Court, in Central
Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay in the context
of students seeking their own answer scripts or marks, has held that no
fiduciary relationship exists between the student and the examining body,
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however, a distinct and critical distinction arises when such information
is sought by a third party.
x. The petitioner submits that it has never denied that a student is entitled to
access his or her own academic information under the RTI Act. However,
the issue in the present case pertains to the disclosure of such information
to third parties. In such instances, the relationship between the examining
body and the student assumes the character of a fiduciary relationship.
xi. In this regard, emphasis is placed on paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Central
Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (supra).
xii. Therefore, the petitioner submits that when degree-related or
academic information of a student is sought by an unrelated third party,
the fiduciary nature of the relationship comes into effect and acts as a
valid exemption under Section 8(1)(e).
xiii. It is further submitted that the Constitution bench of the Supreme
Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v.
Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481, has quoted with
approval the aforesaid judgments rendered in Central Board of
Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (supra) and Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya (supra), and has
held that the documents related to educational qualifications are held by
the institutions / examining bodies/boards/universities in fiduciary
capacity, and therefore, would be exempted\disclosure under Section
8(l)(e) of the RTI Act. The constitution bench has further held that
educational qualification related documents are nothing but personal
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information of the student and are thus exempted under section 8(1) (j) of
the RTI Act. Strenuous reliance has been placed on the following
paragraph of the judgment –
“70. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion,
would indicate that personal records, including name, address,
physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades
and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information.
Similarly, professional records, including qualification,
performance, evaluation reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings,
etc. are all personal information. Medical records, treatment,
choice of medicine, list of hospitals and doctors visited, findings
recorded, including that of the family members, information
relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of
investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information.
Such personal information is entitled to protection from
unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional access is
available when stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This
list is indicative and not exhaustive.”
xiv. It is submitted that therefore, disclosure of such information, when it
does not serve any larger public interest, would amount to an
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual and is thus barred
under the statute.
xv.In light of the binding nature of the aforesaid judgment it is submitted
that the petitioner is fully justified in refusing disclosure of degree-
related information of its students when such information is sought by
unrelated third parties. Both the fiduciary relationship and the personal
privacy protections, as enshrined in Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j), stand
squarely attracted in the present case.
xvi. It is further submitted that in the Central Public Information Officer,
Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) Sanjiv
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Khanna, J. has interpreted the word “public interest” in the context of
RTI Act in the following terms –
“88. The RTI Act is no exception. Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act
prescribes the requirement of satisfaction of “larger public
interest” for access to information when the information relates to
personal information having no relationship with any public
activity or interest, or would cause unwarranted invasion of
privacy of the individual. Proviso to Section 11(1) states that
except in case of trade or commercial secrets protected by law,
disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure
outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interest
of the third party. The words “possible harm or injury” to the
interest of the third party are preceded by the word “importance”
for the purpose of comparison. “Possible” in the context of the
proviso does not mean something remote, far-fetched or
hypothetical, but a calculable, foreseeable and substantial
possibility of harm and injury to the third party.
xxx xxx xxx
91. Public interest in access to information refers to something that
is in the interest of the public welfare to know. Public welfare is
widely different from what is of interest to the public. “Something
which is of interest to the public” and “something which is in the
public interest” are two separate and different parameters. For
example, the public may be interested in private matters with which
the public may have no concern and pressing need to know.
However, such interest of the public in private matters would
repudiate and directly traverse the protection of privacy. The
object and purpose behind the specific exemption vide clause (j) to
Section 8(1) is to protect and shield oneself from unwarranted
access to personal information and to protect facets like reputation,
honour, etc. associated with the right to privacy. Similarly, there is
a public interest in the maintenance of confidentiality in the case of
private individuals and even Government, an aspect we have
already discussed.
xxx xxx xxx
95. The last aspect in the context of public interest test would be in
the form of clarification as to the effect of sub-section (2) to Section
6 of the RTI Act which does not require the information seeker to
give any reason for making a request for the information. Clearly,
“motive” and “purpose” for making the request for information is
irrelevant, and being extraneous cannot be a ground for refusing
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the information. However, this is not to state that “motive” and
“purpose” may not be relevant factor while applying the public
interest test in case of qualified exemptions governed by the public
interest test. It is in this context that this Court in Aditya
Bandopadhyay has held that beneficiary cannot be denied personal
information relating to him. Similarly, in other cases, public
interest may weigh in favour of the disclosure when the information
sought may be of special interest or special significance to the
applicant. It could equally be a negative factor when the “motive”
and “purpose” is vexatious or it is a case of clear abuse of law.”
xvii. It is submitted that in the present case, the information sought pertains
to specific individuals, and the applicants seeking such data have no
legitimate interest in it, nor is there any demonstrable public interest in
its disclosure.
xviii. Reliance has also been placed on Subhash Chandra Agarwal v.
Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Others, (2018) 11 SCC 634.
xix. It is also the case of the petitioner that the Delhi University is
obligated to respect the privacy rights of students under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. Disclosing such information to unrelated third
parties would violate these privacy rights, especially in the absence of the
student’s consent.
xx.Reliance has also been placed on the following paragraph of K.S.
Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 –
“479. Both the learned Attorney General and Shri Sundaram next
argued that the right to privacy is so vague and amorphous a
concept that it cannot be held to be a fundamental right. This again
need not detain us. Mere absence of a definition which would
encompass the many contours of the right to privacy need not deter
us from recognising privacy interests when we see them. As this
judgment will presently show, these interests are broadly classified
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pertaining to the mind. As case law, both in the US and India show,
this concept has travelled far from the mere right to be let alone to
recognition of a large number of privacy interests, which apart
from privacy of one’s home and protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures have been extended to protecting an
individual’s interests in making vital personal choices such as the
right to abort a foetus; rights of same sex couples–including the
right to marry; rights as to procreation, contraception, general
family relationships, child-bearing, education, data protection, etc.
This argument again need not detain us any further and is
rejected.”
xxi. It is submitted that Section 8 of the RTI Act must be interpreted
harmoniously and purposively. It is submitted that the exceptions
mentioned under Section 8 are merely illustrative and cannot be read in
isolation and have to be read in consonance of the other objectives of the
RTI Act. The public authorities, in order to protect the fundamental
rights of the citizens, cannot divulge information collected in fiduciary
capacity. Specific reliance has been placed in paragraph 62 and 67 of
Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others (Supra) –
“62. When trying to ensure that the right to information does not conflict
with several other public interests (which includes efficient operations of
the Governments, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information,
optimum use of limited fiscal resources, etc.), it is difficult to visualise
and enumerate all types of information which require to be exempted
from disclosure in public interest. The legislature has however made an
attempt to do so. The enumeration of exemptions is more exhaustive than
the enumeration of exemptions attempted in the earlier Act, that is,
Section 8 of the Freedom to Information Act, 2002. The courts and
Information Commissions enforcing the provisions of the RTI Act have to
adopt a purposive construction, involving a reasonable and balanced
approach which harmonises the two objects of the Act, while interpreting
Section 8 and the other provisions of the Act.
xxx xxx xxx
67. Indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under the RTI
Act for disclosure of all and sundry information (unrelated toW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 93 of 175
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transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities
and eradication of corruption) would be counterproductive as it will
adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the
executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of
collecting and furnishing information. The Act should not be allowed to
be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national
development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquillity and
harmony among its citizens. Nor should it be converted into a tool of
oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty.
The nation does not want a scenario where 75% of the staff of public
authorities spends 75% of their time in collecting and furnishing
information to applicants instead of discharging their regular duties. The
threat of penalties under the RTI Act and the pressure of the authorities
under the RTI Act should not lead to employees of a public authorities
prioritising “information furnishing”, at the cost of their normal and
regular duties.”
xxii. Reliance has also been placed on Union Public Service Commission
And Others v. Angesh Kumar And Others, (2018) 4 SCC 530 and
Central Board of Secondary Education v. Anil Kumar Kathpal, 2012
SCC OnLine Del 3043.
xxiii. It is submitted that the respondents have argued that the RTI Act is
solely a legislative manifestation of the fundamental right under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution, the right to freedom of speech and
expression. On that basis, it has been contended that the exemptions
enumerated under Section 8 of the RTI Act must be interpreted
restrictively and in the light of Article 19(2) which outlines the
permissible grounds for imposing reasonable restrictions. In support of
this contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1,
wherein the Court interpreted the scope of Article 19(2) and observed
that no restriction beyond the grounds mentioned therein can be imposed
on Article 19(1)(a).
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xxiv. It is submitted that the RTI Act, while embodying aspects of the right
to know under Article 19(1)(a), is not solely confined to that right. The
statute also operationalizes broader constitutional objectives including
transparency, good governance, and privacy, and must be harmoniously
construed in relation to Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21.
xxv. It is submitted that the exemptions contemplated under Section 8 of
the RTI Act, as such, not only deal with Article 19(2) restrictions but also
deals with other vast varieties of restrictions such as Article 19(6) and
Article 21 restrictions and other restrictions which may be imposed by
the parliament in exercise of its sovereign powers.
xxvi. It is also submitted that the Data Protection Act, 2023, which
amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act (though not yet notified),
reinforces the legislative intent to recognize and preserve personal
information as sacrosanct. The amended provision now simply states that
“information which relates to personal information” shall be exempt
from disclosure.
xxvii. While countering the objection of the respondent that by virtue of
Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, exemptions under clauses (b), (d) to (h) and
(j) of Section 8(1) cease to apply after 20 years. it is submitted that the
said contention has been rendered untenable post K.S. Puttaswamy v.
Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
xxviii. Reliance has also been placed on the Full Bench of the Central
Information Commission (CIC) in Ehtesham Qutubuddin Siddiqui v.
CPIO, 2019 SCC OnLine CIC 12683, in order to substantiate the
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argument that constitutional rights under Article 21, including privacy,
are continuing rights and do not lapse with the passage of time. Hence,
personal information remains exempt even after 20 years.
xxix. It is submitted that this view was subsequently affirmed by the Delhi
High Court in Ehtesham Qutubuddin Siddiqui v. CPIO, 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 1559. Therefore, Section 8(3) cannot override the
constitutional guarantee of privacy under Article 21, and sensitive
personal data continues to remain protected even beyond the 20-year
limit.
xxx. It is further submitted that the respondents have relied on Section 6(2)
of the RTI Act to argue that the purpose or motive behind an RTI
application is irrelevant. However, it is submitted that, this interpretation
does not reflect the complete jurisprudential framework laid down by the
Supreme Court.
xxxi. It is submitted that in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal (supra), the Constitution
Bench clarified that while Section 6(2) does not require disclosure of
motive at the stage of making a request, motive and purpose become
relevant while applying the “public interest test” in the context of
qualified exemptions under Section 8. Specific reliance has been placed
on paragraph 95 of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court
v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal (supra).
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xxxii. Reliance has also been placed on Gujarat University v. M. Sridhar
Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar) and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine Guj
4902.
Specific submissions of the petitioner as regards W.P.(C) 1051/2017
xxxiii. It is submitted that the impugned CIC order was passed ex-
parte, without the presence or participation of the RTI applicant. Despite
the issuance of multiple notices, the applicant did not appear before the
Commission. The applicant had, in effect, abandoned the RTI
proceedings.
xxxiv. Despite the applicant’s non-appearance, the CIC proceeded to
adjudicate the matter ex-parte and passed an order that ventured into
politically sensitive territory.
xxxv. It is submitted that to date, there has been no representation or
appearance on behalf of the RTI applicant before this Court.
Specific submissions of the petitioner as regards W.P.(C) 1077/2017,
W.P.(C) 1095/2017, W.P.(C) 1091/2017.
xxxvi. The RTI applications in these cases were found to be defective, either
due to non-payment of the prescribed fee or because the Indian Postal
Order (IPO) was made payable to the wrong authority.
xxxvii. It is submitted that in accordance with settled practice and
previous CIC decisions, the defective RTI applications were returned
with directions to re-file after correcting the deficiency. However, in
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these matters, the CIC imposed penalties on the CPIOs despite
procedural compliance on the part of the petitioner.
xxxviii. It is submitted that the University of Delhi processes thousands
of RTI applications every year, if the interpretation adopted by the CIC is
upheld, it would lead to a disproportionate burden on the administrative
functioning of the University. The University submits that accepting the
CIC’s approach would render the RTI Act practically unworkable,
especially for academic institutions handling large volumes of
applications. Reliance has been placed on paragraph 62 and 67 of the
Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay,
(supra).
Specific submissions of the petitioner as regards W.P.(C) 1091/2017
xxxix. It is submitted that respondent no.1/ R.K. Jain has passed away. No
legal representatives have come on record. Accordingly, it is prayed that
the writ petition be declared as abated.
Submissions on behalf of respondent no. 1 in W.P.(C)600/2017
18. It is submitted that marks obtained by students in examinations
conducted by a public authority do not constitute personal information under
Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. These records are not provided voluntarily or
in confidence, but are generated and maintained by the Delhi University as
part of its public function.
19. Reliance has been placed on Central Board of Secondary Education
v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (supra), Kush Kalra v. University of Delhi, 2021
SCC OnLine Del 3757, Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar v. PIO, 2024 SCC
OnLine Bom 3513 and Public Information Officer and Registrar v. Onkar
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Dattatray Kalmankar SLP(C) No. 2783/2025.
20. It is also averred that the proviso to Section 8(1)(j) clearly provides
that information which cannot be denied to Parliament or a State Legislature
shall not be denied to any citizen, making it evident that such academic
records are subject to disclosure.
21. It is submitted that the respondent did not seek sensitive personal
records, such as address, identification documents, or academic credentials
in copy form. The scope of the request was limited to record of examination
outcomes, a form of information that is inherently of public nature.
22. It is the case of the respondent that the University of Delhi itself has
followed the practice of publishing examination results, including names,
roll numbers, marks, and other relevant information on its website.
23. It is further submitted that the University has wrongly invoked
Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act, which protects information held in a
fiduciary capacity. It is submitted that there exists no fiduciary relationship
between students and a public university with respect to examination results.
The University is under a statutory obligation to conduct examinations,
evaluate answer scripts, and declare results.
24. It is submitted that the records in question pertain to the year 1978,
i.e., more than 40 years old. As per Section 8(3) of the RTI Act, the
exemptions provided under Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) cease to apply once
the information is older than 20 years, unless it pertains to national security
or other exceptions specified in Section 8(1)(a), (c), or (i).
Submissions on behalf of respondent no. 1 in W.P.(C) 1077/2017
25. It is submitted that the CIC’s order is legally valid. The CPIO’s
rejection of the RTI application solely on the alleged technical defect in the
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IPO was in clear violation of the RTI Act. it is submitted that Right to
Information (Regulation of Fee and Cost) Rules, 2005 clearly recognizes an
IPO as a valid mode of fee payment. In exercising powers under Section 20
of the RTI Act, the CIC is empowered to impose a penalty for wrongful
denial of information.
26. It is submitted that the RTI Act only permits denial of information on
specific substantive grounds enumerated under Sections 8 and 9 of the RTI
Act. In the present case, the petitioner did not invoke any such exemption to
justify the denial. Procedural technicalities cannot override a citizen’s
fundamental right to access information. Reliance has been placed on PIO,
Prem Lata v. CIC & Ors., W.P. (C) 2458/2012.
27. It is submitted that respondent no.1 had furnished a valid IPO, and it
was the duty of the CPIO either to accept the application or to provide
appropriate guidance for rectifying any minor defects, rather than rejecting it
outright.
28. The respondent further submits that the petitioner’s institutional
policies and practices cannot be used to override the statutory scheme of the
RTI Act. Reliance has also been placed on Union of India v. Namit
Sharma, W.P. (C) No. 210/2012, while emphasising upon the constitutional
dimensions of the right to information.
29. It is further submitted that the CIC is the apex adjudicating authority
under the RTI Act and is statutorily empowered to impose a penalty for
wrongful denial of information.
Submissions on behalf of respondent no. 1 in W.P.(C) 1095/2017
30. It is submitted that the writ petition is premised on technicalities that
defeat the very purpose and legislative intent of the RTI Act. The objective
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of the RTI Act is to ensure transparency, accountability, and participatory
governance, not to enable the denial of fundamental rights through
procedural pretexts.
31. It is submitted that Section 3 of the RTI Act grants every Indian
citizen the right to information. It is well settled that the right to information
is a facet of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution of India.
32. It is further submitted that the Act mandates a response to RTI
applications within 30 days (or 48 hours in matters concerning life and
liberty). Failure to respond within this timeframe is deemed a refusal. It is
also submitted that no fee shall be charged from applicants below the
poverty line.
33. It is submitted that rejection of information is only permissible on the
limited grounds enumerated under Sections 8 and 9 of the RTI Act.
34. It is submitted that the RTI application was returned without due
consideration merely because the IPO was incorrectly addressed. However,
the amount had already been paid to the Government of India. This technical
rejection is inconsistent with the object and spirit of the Act.
35. It is submitted that as per the Right to Information (Regulation of Fee
and Cost) Rules, 2005, application fees may be paid via cash, demand draft,
bankers’ cheque, or IPO payable to the Accounts Officer. If further fees are
required, the PIO must provide detailed calculations. The law does not
permit outright rejection for addressing errors in the IPO.
36. It is submitted that the rejection of the RTI application in this
instance, despite payment through a valid IPO, constitutes a wilful rejection
attracting penal consequences under Section 20 of the RTI Act.
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37. It is submitted that the rejection of the RTI application was not based
on any valid exemption under Section 8 or 9, revealing malafide intent to
obstruct access to information. Thus, imposition of penalty under Section 20
becomes mandatory.
38. It is further submitted that the DoPT Office Memorandum dated
05.12.2008 explicitly directs public authorities not to reject applications
merely because IPOs are addressed to the Accounts Officer. Non-
compliance with this OM can result in penalty imposition.
39. Reliance has been placed on Dr. P.K. Pippal v. The State Of Madhya
Pradesh, submitting that the Court took a decision in the matter of
imposition of penalty on the Public Information Officer for deliberately not
providing the information as was directed by the State Information
Commission in terms of the provisions as contained under Section 20 of the
Right to Information Act, 2005.
40. Reliance has also been placed on Manohar Manikrao Anchule v. State
of Maharashtra & Anr. and Union of India v. Vansh Sharad Gupta, WP(C)
4761/2016 and PIO, Prem Lata v. CIC & Ors., W.P(C) 2458/2012.
Submissions on behalf of intervener in W.P.(C) 600/2017
41. It is submitted that the CIC vide order dated 21.12.2016 directed
Delhi University to permit the RTI applicant to inspect relevant records and
obtain certified copies of the requested information. It is submitted that this
directive is consistent with the statutory scheme of the RTI Act.
42. It is submitted that the CIC correctly applied the provisions of Section
6(1) of the RTI Act, which entitles any citizen to seek information held by or
under the control of a public authority. It submitted that it is rightly held by
the CIC that the information sought does not fall within the scope of the
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exemptions enumerated in Section 8(1) (e) and/or section 8(1) (j).
43. It is submitted that Delhi University itself routinely publishes results
of various examinations, including details such as the names of students,
their roll numbers, marks obtained, and father’s names. This practice of
proactive disclosure has been followed consistently for years and continues
even now.
44. It is submitted that the CIC, in paragraphs 29 and 32 of its order,
recorded that it had verified Delhi University’s website and confirmed that
results of B.A. (Hons.) Humanities and Social Sciences (Part II, Semester
IV) were available online and contained precisely the kind of information
sought under the present RTI request. The Commission therefore rightly
held that the denial of information by the CPIO was inconsistent with the
University’s own longstanding practice.
45. Annexures R-1 to R-6 filed by the Interveners include screenshots and
downloads from the University’s official website showing exam results of
LLM, MA, and Ph.D. programs.
46. It is submitted that the University also broadcasts its annual
convocation ceremonies live on YouTube, publicly identifying degree
recipients, which further establishes that the University treats such
information as public, not private or confidential.
47. It is further submitted that Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act exempts
“personal information” from disclosure only if the information is unrelated
to any public interest and would result in an “unwarranted invasion of
privacy.”
48. It is submitted that in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal, (2020) 5 SCC 481, the Supreme Court
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held that in order to deny the information under the RTI Act, the public
authority cannot simply state that this is personal information but would
have to establish that disclosing it would cause unwarranted invasion of
privacy. Reliance has been placed on the following paragraph of Central
Public Information Officer, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal
(supra) –
“59. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion,
would indicate that personal records, including name, address,
physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades
and answer sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly,
professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation
reports, ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal
information. Medical records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of
hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the
family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax
returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are
personal information. Such personal information is entitled to
protection from unwarranted invasion of privacy and conditional
access is available when stipulation of larger public interest is
satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive.”
49. In the present case, it is submitted that the disclosure of the
examination results of 1978 does not cause any unwarranted invasion of
privacy, especially as such information is regularly made public by the
University itself. Therefore, the exemption under Section 8(1)(j) is
inapplicable.
50. It is further submitted that the information regarding results of
students is not held in fiduciary capacity by the Delhi University and cannot
be exempted under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act. In order to substantiate
the said argument reliance has been placed on Central Board of Secondary
Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497. Specific emphasis
has been placed on the following paragraphs –
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“39. The term “fiduciary ” refers to a person having a duty to act for the
benefit of another, showing good faith and candour, where such other
person reposes trust and special confidence in the person owing or
discharging the duty. The term “fiduciary relationship ” is used to
describe a situation or transaction where one person (beneficiary) places
complete confidence in another person (fiduciary) in regard to his
affairs, business or transaction(s). The term also refers to a person who
holds a thing in trust for another (beneficiary). The fiduciary is expected
to act in confidence and for the benefit and advantage of the beneficiary,
and use good faith and fairness in dealing with the beneficiary or the
things belonging to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary has entrusted
anything to the fiduciary, to hold the thing in trust or to execute certain
acts in regard to or with reference to the entrusted thing, the fiduciary
has to act in confidence and is expected not to disclose the thing or
information to any third party.
40. There are also certain relationships where both the parties have to
act in a fiduciary capacity treating the other as the beneficiary. Examples
of these are: a partner vis-a-vis another partner and an employer vis-d-
vis employee. An employee who comes into possession of business or
trade secrets or confidential information relating to the employer in the
course of his employment, is expected to act as a fiduciary and cannot
disclose it to others. Similarly, if on the request of the employer or
official superior or the head of a department, an employee furnishes his
personal details and information, to be retained in confidence, the
employer, the official superior or departmental head is expected to hold
such personal information in confidence as a fiduciary, to be made use of
or disclosed only if the employee’s conduct or acts are found to be
prejudicial to the employer.
41 But the words “information available to a person in his fiduciary
relationship” are used in Section 8(1 )(e) of the RTI Act in its normal and
well-recognised sense, that is, to refer to persons who act in a fiduciary
capacity, with reference to a specific beneficiary or beneficiaries who are
to be expected to be protected or benefited by the actions of the fiduciary-
a trustee with reference to the beneficiary of the trust, a guardian with
reference to a minor/physically infirm/mentally challenged, a parent with
reference to a child, a lawyer or a chartered accountant with reference to
a client, a doctor or nurse with reference to a patient, an agent with
reference to a principal, a partner with reference to another partner, a
Director of a company with reference to a shareholder, an executor with
reference to a legatee, a Receiver with reference to the parties to a Us,
an employer with reference to the confidential information relating to the
employee, and an employee with reference to business
dealings/transaction of the employer. We do not find that kind ofW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 105 of 175
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fiduciary relationship between the examining body and the examinee,
with reference to the evaluated answer hooks, that come into the custody
of the examining body.”
51. Reliance has also been placed on paragraph 43 of Central Public
Officer, Supreme Court of India vs Subash Chandra Aggarwal (2020)5
SCC 481. The same is reproduced as under –
“43… This Court held that the exemption under section 8(1)(e) of the RTI
Act does not apply to beneficiaries regarding whom the fiduciary holds
information. In other words, information available with the public
authority relating to beneficiaries cannot be withheld from or denied to
the beneficiaries themselves. A fiduciary would, ergo, be duty-bound to
make thorough disclosure of all relevant facts of all transactions between
them in a fiduciary relationship to the beneficiary. In the facts of the said
ca.se, this Court had to consider whether an examining body, the Central
Board of Secondary Education, held information in the form of evaluated
answer-books of the examinees in fiduciary capacity. Answering in the
negative, it was nevertheless observed that even if the examining body is
in a fiduciary relationship with an examinee, it will be dutybound to
disclose the evaluated answer books to the examinee and at the same
time, they owe a duty to the examinee not to disclose the answer-books to
anyone else, that is, any third party… ”
52. Reliance has also been placed on Reserve Bank of India vs Jayantilal
N. Mistry (2016) 3 SCC 525.
53. It is further submitted that Section 8(3) of the RTI Act provides that
exemptions under Section 8(1)(b), (d) to (h) and (j) shall cease to apply once
the information pertains to an event that occurred over 20 years before the
date of the RTI request. The only continuing exemptions are those under
clauses (a), (c), and (i).
54. In the present case, the RTI request seeks information from 1978,
nearly five decades ago. Consequently, by operation of Section 8(3), the
exemptions under Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) are inapplicable.
55. It is submitted that this legal position has been clearly articulated in
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Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others (supra), wherein the Court held that,
notwithstanding the general exemptions under Section 8(1), information
more than twenty years old must be disclosed unless it falls under a
continuing exemption (clauses (a), (c), or (i)). Reliance has been placed on
paragraphs 57 and 58 of the said judgment.
56. It is further submitted that Gujarat University v. M. Sridhar
Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar) and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine Guj 4902
is factually and legally distinguishable and has no bearing on the present
matter.
57. It is submitted that the Gujarat High Court specifically took notice of
the procedural irregularity in that case and found that the CIC had exceeded
its jurisdiction by treating an oral response as a formal RTI application and
acting suo motu at the second appellate stage.
58. In contrast, it is submitted that the present matter (W.P.(C) 600/2017)
arises from a separate CIC order dated 21.12.2016 in
CIC/SA/C/2016/900122, which involved a regular RTI application
submitted to Delhi University, proper invocation of appellate remedies
under the RTI Act, and compliance with the statutory process.
59. It is further submitted that unlike the Gujarat case, the respondent did
not seek a copy of any degree. Instead, the information sought relates to
declaration of results of the B.A. examination held in 1978, including
names, roll numbers, father’s names, marks obtained, and result status
(pass/fail).
60. It is further submitted that internationally, academic institutions
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routinely disclose examination and degree results. For example, the London
School of Economics and Political Science provided complete digests of
students awarded degrees, including their classifications (distinction, merit,
pass) under the UK Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, Oxford
University disclosed names of persons who graduated from Oriel College in
1999 in response to a similar information request.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
61. In the aforesaid conspectus, the following legal issues arise for
consideration in these proceedings:
(i) Whether a Board/University (in particular, the Delhi University) is
exempt from disclosing information pertaining to the educational
qualifications/ results / mark sheets / degrees of an individual by
virtue of Section 8(1)(e) and/or Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act?
(ii) Whether ‘larger public interest’ justifies disclosure of the
information sought even if the same falls within the purview of
Section 8(1)(e) and/or Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act?
(iii) Even assuming that the supply of information is precluded under
Section 8(1)(e) and/or Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, whether
disclosure of information is mandated under Section 8(3) of the
RTI Act?
Framework of the RTI Act
62. Section 3 of the RTI Act confers the right to information upon all
citizens, subject to the provisions of the Act. It reads as under:
“3. Subject to the provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have the
right to information.”
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63. The terms “information” and “right to information” are defined
under Sections 2(f) and 2(j) of the RTI Act, respectively. These are
reproduced as under:
(f) “information” means any material in any form, including records,
documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases,
circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples,
models, data material held in any electronic form and information
relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public
authority under any other law for the time being in force;
xxx
(j) “right to information” means the right to information accessible
under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public
authority and includes the right to–
(i) inspection of work, documents, records;
(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of documents or records;
(iii) taking certified samples of material;
(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes,
video cassettes or in any other electronic mode or through printouts
where such information is stored in a computer or in any other
device;
64. The Supreme Court, in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) while examining the
scope of the term, “right to information,” held as under:
“28. The expressions “held by or under the control of any public
authority” and “information accessible under this Act” are
restrictive and reflect the limits to the “right to information”
conferred vide Section 3 of the RTI Act, which states that subject to
the provisions of the RTI Act, all citizens shall have the right to
information. The right to information is not absolute and is subject to
the conditions and exemptions under the RTI Act.”
65. The use of the expression “Subject to the provisions of this Act” in
Section 3 makes it abundantly clear that the right to information under the
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RTI Act is not unfettered and is subject to the exemptions and conditions
prescribed therein, including those under Section 8 of the RTI Act.
66. Section 8 is reproduced as under –
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be
no obligation to give any citizen,–
(a) information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or
economic interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to
incitement of an offence;
(b) information which has been expressly forbidden to be published
by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may
constitute contempt of court;
(c) information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of
privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature;
(d) information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or
intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the
competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority
is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such
information;
(e) information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship,
unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public
interest warrants the disclosure of such information;
(f) information received in confidence from foreign Government;
(g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or
physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or
assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security
purposes;
(h) information which would impede the process of investigation or
apprehension or prosecution of offenders;
(i) cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council
of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers:
Provided that the decisions of Council of Ministers, the reasons
thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were
taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the
matter is complete, or over:
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Provided further that those matters which come under the
exemptions specified in this section shall not be disclosed;
(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure
of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or
which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the
individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the State
Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case
may be, is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the
disclosure of such information:
Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the
Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Official Secrets Act, 1923 nor
any of the exemptions permissible in accordance with sub-section
(1), a public authority may allow access to information, if public
interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests.
(3) Subject to the provisions of clauses (a), (c) and (i) of sub-section
(1), any information relating to any occurrence, event or matter
which has taken place, occurred or happened twenty years before the
date on which any request is made under section 6 shall be provided
to any person making a request under that section:
Provided that where any question arises as to the date from which
the said period of twenty years has to be computed, the decision of
the Central Government shall be final, subject to the usual appeals
provided for in this Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
67. Section 8(1) of the RTI Act opens with a non obstante clause,
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act”, thereby granting it
overriding effect over all other provisions of the Act. This makes it clear that
the right conferred under Section 3 is not absolute, but is subject to the
exemptions enumerated under Section 8(1).
68. The exemptions under Section 8(1) may be broadly classified into two
categories-
a. Clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (h), and (i), wherein disclosure is
impermissible regardless of any plea of public interest.
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b. Clauses (d), (e), and (j), which incorporate a public interest override.
Under these clauses, information may be disclosed if the competent
authority [in the case of clauses (d) and (e)] or the Central Public
Information Officer (CPIO), the State Public Information Officer
(SPIO), or the appellate authority (in the case of clause (j)) is satisfied
that the larger public interest justifies such disclosure.
69. While considering the interplay between the right to information and
the exemptions / exclusions under Sections 8 to 11 of the RTI Act, the Court
in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash
Chandra Agarwal (supra) has observed as under –
“40. At the present stage, we would like to quote from Aditya
Bandopadhyay [CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497 :
6 SCEC 25] wherein this Court, on the aspect of general principles
of interpretation while deciding the conflict between the right to
information and exclusions under Sections 8 to 11 of the RTI Act,
had observed : (SCC pp. 532-33, paras 61-63)
“61. Some High Courts have held that Section 8 of the RTI
Act is in the nature of an exception to Section 3 which
empowers the citizens with the right to information, which
is a derivative from the freedom of speech; and that,
therefore, Section 8 should be construed strictly, literally
and narrowly. This may not be the correct approach. The
Act seeks to bring about a balance between two conflicting
interests, as harmony between them is essential for
preserving democracy. One is to bring about transparency
and accountability by providing access to information
under the control of public authorities. The other is to
ensure that the revelation of information, in actual
practice, does not conflict with other public interests
which include efficient operation of the Governments,
optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation
of confidentiality of sensitive information. The Preamble
to the Act specifically states that the object of the Act is to
harmonise these two conflicting interests. While Sections 3
and 4 seek to achieve the first objective, Sections 8, 9, 10
and 11 seek to achieve the second objective. Therefore,
when Section 8 exempts certain information from beingW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 112 of 175
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disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the
right to information, but as an equally important provision
protecting other public interests essential for the fulfilment
and preservation of democratic ideals.
62. When trying to ensure that the right to information
does not conflict with several other public interests (which
includes efficient operations of the Governments,
preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information,
optimum use of limited fiscal resources, etc.), it is difficult
to visualise and enumerate all types of information which
require to be exempted from disclosure in public interest.
The legislature has however made an attempt to do so.
The enumeration of exemptions is more exhaustive than
the enumeration of exemptions attempted in the earlier
Act, that is, Section 8 of the Freedom to Information Act,
2002. The courts and Information Commissions enforcing
the provisions of the RTI Act have to adopt a purposive
construction, involving a reasonable and balanced
approach which harmonises the two objects of the Act,
while interpreting Section 8 and the other provisions of
the Act.
63. At this juncture, it is necessary to clear some
misconceptions about the RTI Act. The RTI Act provides
access to all information that is available and existing.
This is clear from a combined reading of Section 3 and the
definitions of “information” and “right to information”
under clauses (f) and (j) of Section 2 of the Act. If a public
authority has any information in the form of data or
analysed data, or abstracts, or statistics, an applicant may
access such information, subject to the exemptions in
Section 8 of the Act. But where the information sought is
not a part of the record of a public authority, and where
such information is not required to be maintained under
any law or the rules or regulations of the public authority,
the Act does not cast an obligation upon the public
authority, to collect or collate such non-available
information and then furnish it to an applicant. A public
authority is also not required to furnish information which
requires drawing of inferences and/or making of
assumptions. It is also not required to provide “advice” or
“opinion” to an applicant, nor required to obtain and
furnish any “opinion” or “advice” to an applicant. The
reference to “opinion” or “advice” in the definition of
“information” in Section 2(f) of the Act, only refers to
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authority. Many public authorities, as a public relation
exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to the
citizens. But that is purely voluntary and should not be
confused with any obligation under the RTI Act.”
70. Thus, Section 8 cannot simply be viewed as an exception to Section 3
of the RTI Act. It is in the nature of a “balancing provision” which seeks to
harmonize / balance two conflicting interests, viz.: (i) the need to bring
about transparency and accountability by providing access to information
under Control of public authorities; and (ii) to ensure that revelation of
information, in actual practice, does not conflict with other public interests
which include preservation of confidentiality of personal information.
(i) Whether a Board/University (in particular the Delhi
University) is exempt from disclosing information pertaining to
the educational qualifications/ results / mark sheets / degrees of
an individual by virtue of Section 8(1)(e) and/or Section 8(1)(j)
of the RTI Act?
71. The petitioner’s two principal contentions are, first, that a fiduciary
relationship exists between a university and its students, thereby exempting
the university from disclosing information regarding the educational
qualifications / results / mark sheets / degrees of its students under Section
8(1)(e) of the RTI Act; and second, that such information is in the nature of
“personal information” and therefore falls within the ambit of the exemption
under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
72. The contours/characteristics of a “fiduciary relationship” have been
noted by the Supreme Court in numerous judgments, inter alia, Central
Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
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Agarwal (supra), Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v.
Aditya Bandopadhyay and Others (supra), Kerala Public Service
Commission and Others v. State Information Commission and Another
(supra), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya
and Others (supra).
73. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v.
Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), the Supreme Court, taking note of the
judgment in RBI v. Jayantilal N. Mistry, (2016) 3 SCC 525, noted that a
fiduciary relationship is one in which a person is under a duty to act for the
benefit of another on matters within the scope of the fiduciary relationship.
It was further noted that such a relationship usually arises in one of the
following four situations; (1) when one person places trust in the faithful
integrity of another, who, as a result, gains superiority or influence over the
first; (2) when one person assumes control and responsibility over another;
(3) when one person has a duty to act for, or give advice to, another on
matters falling within the scope of the relationship; or (4) when there is a
specific relationship traditionally recognised as involving fiduciary duties,
such as between a lawyer and a client.
74. In RBI v. Jayantilal N. Mistry (supra), the Court further outlined the
contours of a fiduciary relationship by listing out the governing principles as
under:
“58. […] (i) No conflict rule-A fiduciary must not place himself in a position
where his own interest conflicts with that of his customer or the beneficiary.
There must be “real sensible possibility of conflict”.
(ii) No profit rule-A fiduciary must not profit from his position at the expense
of his customer, the beneficiary.
(iii) Undivided loyalty rule-A fiduciary owes undivided loyalty to the
beneficiary, not to place himself in a position where his duty towards one
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person conflicts with a duty that he owes to another customer. A consequence
of this duty is that a fiduciary must make available to a customer all the
information that is relevant to the customer’s affairs.
(iv) Duty of confidentiality-A fiduciary must only use information obtained in
confidence and must not use it for his own advantage, or for the benefit of
another person.”
75. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v.
Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), it was observed as under:
“45. Fiduciary relationships, regardless of whether they are formal.
informal, voluntary or involuntary, must satisfy the four conditions for a
relationship to classify as a fiduciary relationship. In each of the four
principles. the emphasis is on trust, reliance, the fiduciary’s superior
power or dominant -position and corresponding dependence of the
beneficiary on the fiduciary which imposes responsibility on the
fiduciary to act in good faith and for the benefit of and to protect the
beneficiary and not oneself. Section 8(1)(e) is a legal acceptance that
there are ethical or moral relationships or duties in relationships that
create rights and obligations, beyond contractual, routine or even
special relationships with standard and typical rights and obligations.
Contractual or non-fiduciary relationships could require that the party
should protect and promote the interest of the other and not cause harm
or damage, but the fiduciary relationship casts a positive obligation and
demands that the fiduciary should protect the beneficiary and not
promote personal self-interest. A fiduciary’s loyalty, duties and
obligations are stricter than the morals of the marketplace and it is not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honour which is the most sensitive
standard of behaviour which is applied (see Opinion of Cardozo, J. in
Meinhard v. Salmon). Thus, the level of judicial scrutiny in cases of
fiduciary relationship is intense as the level of commitment and loyalty
expected is higher than non-fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary
relationship may arise because of the statute which requires a fiduciary
to act selflessly with integrity and fidelity and the other party, that is, the
beneficiary, depends upon the wisdom and confidence reposed in the
fiduciary. A contractual, statutory and possibly all relationships cover a
broad field, but a fiduciary relationship could exist, confined to a
limited area or an act, as relationships can have several facets. Thus,
relationships can be partly fiduciary and partly non-fiduciary with the
former being confined to a particular act or action which need not
manifest itself in entirety in the interaction and relationship between two
parties. What would distinguish non-fiduciary relationship from
fiduciary relationship or an act is the requirement of trust reposed,
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fiduciary with reference to a particular transaction(s) due to moral,
personal or statutory responsibility of the fiduciary as compared to the
beneficiary, resulting in dependence of the beneficiary. This may arise
due to superior knowledge and training of the fiduciary or the position
he occupies.”
76. In the concurring opinion rendered by D.Y. Chandrachud, J., in
Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash
Chandra Agarwal (supra), the Court took note of the connotation of the
expressions, “fiduciary” and “fiduciary relationship”, drawing upon
expositions in classical legal literature. The relevant observations are
reproduced as under –
“237. Black’s Law Dictionary, defines “fiduciary relationship” thus:
“A relationship in which one person is under a duty to act for the benefit
of the other on matters within the scope of the relationship. Fiduciary
relationships such as trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, principal-
agent, and attorney-client require an unusually high degree of care.
Fiduciary relationships usually arise in one of four situations: (1) when
one person places trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a
result gains superiority or influence over the first, (2) when one person
assumes control and responsibility over another, (3) when one person
has a duty to act for or give advice to another on matters falling within
the scope of the relationship, or (4) when there is a specific relationship
that has traditionally been recognised as involving fiduciary duties, as
with a lawyer and a client or a stockbroker and a customer.”
(emphasis supplied)
238. In Words and Phrases the term “fiduciary” is defined:
“Generally, the term ‘fiduciary’ applies to any person who occupies a
position of peculiar confidence towards another… It refers to integrity
and fidelity… It contemplates fair dealing and good faith, rather than
legal obligation, as the basis of the transaction… The term includes
those informal relations which exist whenever one party trusts and relies
upon another, as well as technical fiduciary relations.”
(emphasis supplied)
239. In Corpus Juris Secundum “fiduciary” is defined thus:
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“A general definition of the word which is sufficiently comprehensive to
embrace all cases cannot well be given. The term is derived from the
civil, or Roman law. It connotes the idea of trust or confidence,
contemplates good faith, rather than legal obligation, as the basis of the
transaction, refers to the integrity, the fidelity, of the party trusted,
rather than his credit or ability, and has been held to apply to all
persons who occupy a position of peculiar confidence toward others,
and to include those informal relations which exist whenever one party
trusts and relies on another, as well as technical fiduciary relations.
The word ‘fiduciary’, as a noun, means one who holds a thing in trust for
another, a trustee, a person holding the character of a trustee, or a
character analogous to that of a trustee, with respect to the trust and
confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor
which it requires; a person having the duty, created by his undertaking,
Lie-act primarily for another’s benefit in matters connected with such
undertaking. Also more specifically, in a statute, a guardian, trustee
executor, administrator, receiver, conservator or any person acting in
any fiduciary capacity for any person, trust or estate. Some examples of
what, in particular connections, the term has been held to include and
not to include are set out in the note.”
77. The same judgment also observed as under:
“244. A fiduciary must be entrusted with a degree of discretion (power)
and must have freedom to act without resorting to prior approval of the
beneficiary, The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the
fiduciary, the greater the scope of fiduciary duty. The person so
entrusted with power is required to determine how to exercise that
power. Fiduciaries are identified by ascendancy, power and control on
the part of the stronger party and therefore, a fiduciary relationship
implies a condition of superiority of one of the parties over the other. It
is not necessary that the relationship has to be defined as per law, it
may exist under various circumstances, and exists in cases where there
has been a special confidence placed in someone who is bound to act in
good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the
confidence. Such is normally the case with, inter alia, attorney-client,
agent-principal, doctor-patient, parent-child, trustees-beneficiaries,
legal guardian-ward, personal representatives, court appointed
receivers and between the Directors of company and its shareholders. In
Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India)
Holding Ltd. and Dale & Carrington Invt. (P) Ltd. v. P.K. Prathapan,
this Court held that the Directors of the company owe a fiduciary duty
to its shareholders. In P.V. Sankara Kurup v. Leelavathy Nambiar, this
Court held that an agent and power of attorney can be said to owe aW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 118 of 175
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fiduciary relationship to the principal.”
78. Importantly, in paragraph 45 of Central Public Information Officer,
Supreme Court of India Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Agarwal (supra), it was recognized that “relationships can be partly
fiduciary and partly non-fiduciary,” with the former being confined to a
particular act or action, which need not manifest itself in the entirety of the
interaction or relationship between the two parties. What would distinguish
the non-fiduciary aspect of any relationship vis-a-vis the fiduciary aspect of
a relationship is the element of trust reposed, coupled with a higher standard
of good faith and honesty required on the part of the fiduciary due to moral,
personal, and statutory responsibility, thereby creating a dependence on the
part of the beneficiary.
79. Thus, a fiduciary relationship exists where, (i) one party is in a
position of trust and confidence; (ii) the other party undertakes, or is obliged
(due to moral, personal, and statutory responsibility), to act in the first
party’s interest, often with discretionary power over matters effecting them;
(iii) there is an aspect of control and responsibility assumed by the fiduciary;
and / or (iv) the fiduciary owes a duty of good faith and avoidance of
conflict of interest.
80. In the context of the relationship between a student and a university,
there can be no cavil with the proposition that there exists a special
relationship of trust and confidence. A student entrusts the university with
personal information (academic records, personal data etc.) with a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality and fair use. This parallels
relationships traditionally recognized as fiduciary, such as a doctor-patient,
lawyer-client, trust-beneficiary, etc. Moreover, the university exercises
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various discretionary powers in the academic sphere and is required to make
decisions that directly impact the future and career prospects of the student.
The degree of control and unilateral decision-making power can be said to
be akin to a trustee in respect of a trust. It can also hardly be disputed that a
university owes a duty of care towards its students.
81. As such, there are various aspects of relationship between the
university and a student which are fiduciary in nature. In the case of Delhi
University, this is also borne out from the relevant provisions of the Delhi
University Act, 1922, Statutes of the University and its Ordinances.
82. Section 4 of the Delhi University Act, 1922 enumerates the powers of
the University, including –
“4. The University shall have the following powers, namely:
(1) to provide for instruction in such branches of learning as the
University may think fit, and to make provision for research and for the
advancement and dissemination of knowledge,
(2) to hold examinations and to grant to, and confer degrees and other
academic distinctions on, persons who-
(a) have pursued a course of study in the University or in any College, or
(b) are Non-collegiate Women students residing within the territorial
jurisdiction of the University or
(c) are teachers in educational institutions, under conditions laid down in
the Statutes and Ordinances and have passed the examinations of the
University under like conditions, or
(d) have pursued a course of study by correspondence, whether residing
within the territorial jurisdiction of the University or not, or
(e) have been registered by the University, subject to such conditions as
may be laid down in the Statutes and Ordinances as external candidates,
being persons residing within the territorial limits to which the powers of
the University extend.
(3) to confer honorary degrees or other distinctions, on approved
persons in the manner laid down in the Statutes,
(4) to grant such diplomas to, and to provide such lectures and
instruction for, persons not being members of the University, as the
University may determine,
(5) to co-operate with other Universities and Authorities in such manner
and for such purposes as the University may determine,
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teaching posts required by the University,
(7) to appoint or recognise persons as Professors, Readers, or Lecturers,
or otherwise as teachers of the University,
(8) to institute an award Fellowships, Scholarships, Exhibitions and
Prizes,
(9) to maintain Colleges and Halls, to admit to its privileges Colleges not
maintained by the University and to withdraw all or any of those
privileges, and to recognise Halls, not maintained by the University and
to withdraw any such recognition,
(9-A) to declare. with the consent of the colleges concerned, in the
manner specified by the Academic Council, Colleges conducting courses
of study in the Faculties of Medicine, Technology, Music or Fine Arts, as
autonomous Colleges. Provided that the extent of the autonomy which
each such College may have, and matters in relation to which it may
exercise such autonomy, shall be such as may be prescribed by the
‘Statutes.
(9-B) to set up one or more College Administrative Councils for two or
more Colleges with such composition, powers and functions as may be
laid down in the Statutes,
(10) to demand and receive payment of such fees and other charges as
may be authorised by the Ordinances,
(11) to supervise and control the residence and discipline of students of
the University, and to make arrangements for promoting their health
and general welfare,
(11-A) to make grants from the funds of the University for assistance to
forms of extra-mural teaching,
(12) to make special arrangements in respect of the residence, discipline
and teaching of women students,
(12-A) to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of property, movable or
immovable, including trust or endowed property, for the purposes of the
University,
(12-B) with the approval of the Central Government, to borrow, on the
security of University property, money for the purposes of the University,
(12-C) to create administrative and ministerial and other necessary posts
and to make appointments thereto, and
(13) to do all such other acts and things, whether incidental to the
powers aforesaid or not, as may be requisite in order to further the
objects of the University as a teaching and examining body, and to
cultivate and promote Arts, Science and other branches of learning.”
83. Powers that have been conferred upon the University reflect a sense
of control and responsibility towards its students. Section 4(11) of the Delhi
University Act, 1922 specifically contemplates that the University would
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promote the health and general welfare of students.
84. The Academic Council of the Delhi University bears the
responsibility for ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and fairness of the
examination process, as part of its broader mandate to maintain the quality
of education and assessment.
85. Section 11-K(3)(a) of the Statutes of the University provides as
under-
“(3) It shall be the duty of the Registrar –
a) to be custodian of the records, Common Seal and such other
property of the University as the Executive Council shall commit to
his charge;….”
86. This expressly denotes custodianship, which by its nature implies
fiduciary obligations.
87. Ordinance IX of the University provides as under –
“(3) Eligibility for award of Degree and Division Criteria:
(a) A student who passes all the papers (minimum ‘Numerical Grade 4’)
prescribed for Semester I to Semester IV examinations would be eligible for
the award of degree. Such a student shall be categorized on the basis of the
combined result of Semester I to semester IV examinations as follows:
(Based on the Conversion Formula from CGPA to final Percentage)
60% or more First Division
50% or more but less than 60% Second Division
Less than 50% & declared passed Third Division
(b) The formula for calculating the final percentage of marks from
Cumulative Grade Point Average (CGPA) for final year students under
CBCS will be as follows:
Final Percentage of marks = CGPA based on overall four semesters x 9.5
Provided that the programmes regulated by different regulatory bodies like
Medical Council of India, AICTE etc. will be governed by the regulations
prescribed by their respective regulatory bodies from time to time.
(4) Issue of Transcripts:
Based on the grades earned, a Grade Certificate shall be issued to all the
registered students by the University after every semester and a
consolidated transcript indicating the performance in all semesters. The
Grade Certificate will display the course details (code, title of the paper,W.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 122 of 175
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number of credits, grade secured) along with SGPA of each semester and
CGPA earned based on overall six semesters.
The percentage shall not be displayed on the Grade Certificate/Transcript.
Only the formula approved for the conversion of CGPA into percentage will
be displayed on the Grade Certificate/Transcript.”
88. These provisions make it evident that the University is obligated to
issue results exclusively through official mark sheets and transcripts to the
concerned student. The provisions indicate issuing of results to the student/s,
not to the public. The framework does not permit the disclosure of marks /
grades to any third party. There is an implicit duty of trust and
confidentiality in handling students’ academic records.
89. Thus, the relationship between the Delhi University and its students is
characterized by trust reposed, a high standard of good faith, and a duty to
act in the students’ best interest.
90. In Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others (supra), the Supreme Court had occasion to
examine a particular facet of the relationship between the concerned
examining body (CBSE) and the examinee. The Court again referred to the
definition of a fiduciary relationship in Black’s Law Dictionary [as also
noticed in paragraph 237 of the Central Public Information Officer,
Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra)] and took
note the exposition thereof in certain foreign judgments. It was thereafter
observed as under:
“39. The term “fiduciary” refers to a person having a duty to act for
the benefit of another, showing good faith and candour, where such
other person reposes trust and special confidence in the person owing
or discharging the duty. The term “fiduciary relationship” is used to
describe a situation or transaction where one person (beneficiary)
places complete confidence in another person (fiduciary) in regard to
his affairs, business or transaction(s). The term also refers to a personW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 123 of 175
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who holds a thing in trust for another (beneficiary). The fiduciary is
expected to act in confidence and for the benefit and advantage of the
beneficiary, and use good faith and fairness in dealing with the
beneficiary or the things belonging to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary
has entrusted anything to the fiduciary, to hold the thing in trust or to
execute certain acts in regard to or with reference to the entrusted thing.
the fiduciary has to act in confidence and is expected not to disclose the
thing or information to any third party.
40. There are also certain relationships where both the parties have
to act in a fiduciary capacity treating the other as the beneficiary.
Examples of these are: a partner vis-à-vis another partner and an
employer vis-à-vis employee. An employee who comes into possession of
business or trade secrets or confidential information relating to the
employer in the course of his employment, is expected to act as a
fiduciary and cannot disclose it to others. Similarly, if on the request of
the employer or official superior or the head of a department, an
employee furnishes his personal details and information, to be retained
in confidence, the employer, the official superior or departmental head
is expected to hold such personal information in confidence as a
fiduciary, to be made use of or disclosed only if the employee’s conduct
or acts are found to be prejudicial to the employer.”
91. The Supreme Court held that the duty of the examining body (in that
case) was to subject the candidates to a process of
verification/examination/testing of their knowledge or skill. However, the
same does not detract from the proposition (reiterated in that case) that any
relationship in which a person (the fiduciary) has a duty to act for the benefit
of other in good faith and with candour, and where such other person
reposes trust and special confidence in the person owing or discharging the
duty, gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. In Central Board of Secondary
Education and Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Others (supra), the
Supreme Court was concerned with a particular facet of relationship
between the examining body (CBSE) and the examinee/s. Specifically, the
Court was concerned with the issue whether the concerned examinee would
be precluded from seeking information as regards his/her own answer books,
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even assuming that there exists a fiduciary relationship between the Board
and the examinee.
92. Unlike CBSE, Delhi University, is an over-arching academic
institution characterised by exercise of control over students in respect of a
wide gamut of activities. The relationship between the University and the
students is characterized by trust and confidence with a power imbalance (in
favour of the University) in respect of academic and disciplinary matters.
The University is also the custodian of all relevant records / data of the
students, including record / data that is created during the course of
academic pursuit/s, as also in the course of internal complaints and
disciplinary mechanisms. The relationship between the Delhi University and
its students involves asymmetrical trust, and consequential thereto, sensitive
and confidential student information/data is entrusted to the University.
93. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya
and Others (supra), the Supreme Court, relying upon the observations in
Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others (supra), held that the “instructions and solutions
to questions” issued to the examiners and moderators in connection with
evaluation of answer scripts by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India (ICAI), were held by the said examiners and moderators in confidence.
It was observed as under:
“21……The examiners and moderators are in the position of agents and
ICAI is in the position of principal in regard to such information which
ICAI gives to the examiners and moderators to achieve uniformity,
consistency and exactness of evaluation of the answer scripts. When
anything is given and taken in trust or in confidence, requiring or
expecting secrecy and confidentiality to be maintained in that behalf, it
is held by the recipient in a fiduciary relationship.”
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94. It was further observed as under:
“22……..In other words, anything given and taken in confidence
expecting confidentiality to be maintained will be information available
to a person in fiduciary relationship. As a consequence, it has to be held
that the instructions and solutions to questions communicated by the
examining body to the examiners, Head Examiners and moderators, are
information available to such persons in their fiduciary relationship and
therefore exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(d) of the RTI
Act.”
95. The above observations are applicable in the context of data
pertaining to students held by a university (Delhi University in particular).
Such data, which pertains to various facets of a student’s academic life, is
held by the university in trust and confidence, and there is a legitimate
expectation on the part of the students that confidentiality shall be
maintained with regard thereto. The same is consistent with the framework
of the Statutes and Ordinances of the Delhi University. There is merit in the
contention that the Delhi University has become the “custodian” of this data
by virtue of / pursuant to a fiduciary relationship.
96. In Kerala Public Service Commission and Others v. State
Information Commission and Another (supra), the Supreme Court held that
the information supplied by an examining body (Kerala Public Service
Commission) to examiners created a fiduciary relationship, inasmuch as it
involved reposing trust in the examiners to “check the exam papers with
utmost care, honesty and impartially”.
97. In Gujarat University v. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi
Sridhar) and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine Guj 4902, the Gujarat High Court,
in an identical conspectus and relying upon the judgments in Central Public
Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Agarwal (supra), Kerala Public Service Commission and Others v. State
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Information Commission and Another (supra), Central Board of
Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Others
(supra) and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H.
Satya and Others (supra), held that Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act was
attracted in view of the fiduciary relationship between the university and the
student. It was further held that the degrees of students are kept by the
university in confidence and in a fiduciary capacity.
98. Insofar as data/information as regards details/particulars of degrees,
results, mark sheets etc. of students (which is the subject matter of the
impugned RTI applications) is concerned, the matter is put beyond the pale
of doubt by virtue of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. In terms thereof, such
data/information, indubitably constitutes “personal information” which is
specifically exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
99. The petitioner has rightly placed reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of
India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) wherein the scope and
applicability of Section 8(1)(j) was comprehensively discussed.
100. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v.
Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), the Supreme Court clarified that
Section 8(1)(j) exempts the disclosure of two categories of information: (i)
“personal information” with no relation to any public activity or interest, and
(ii) “information” that is exempt from disclosure to prevent unwarranted
invasion of privacy. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as
under –
“58. Clause (j) to sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the RTI Act
specifically refers to invasion of the right to privacy of an individual
and excludes from disclosure information that would causeW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 127 of 175
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unwarranted invasion of privacy of such individual, unless the
disclosure would satisfy the larger public interest test. This clause
also draws a distinction in its treatment of personal information,
whereby disclosure of such information is exempted if such
information has no relation to public activity or interest. We would
like to, however, clarify that in their treatment of this exemption, this
Court has treated the word “information” which if disclosed would
lead to invasion of privacy to mean personal information, as distinct
from public information. This aspect has been dealt with in the
succeeding paragraphs.
xxx xxx xxx
64. While clause (j) exempts disclosure of two kinds of information,
as noted in para 58 above, that is, “personal information” with no
relation to public activity or interest and “information” that is
exempt from disclosure to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy,
this Court has not underscored, as will be seen below, such
distinctiveness and treated personal information to be exempt from
disclosure if such disclosure invades on balance the privacy rights,
thereby linking the former kind of information with the latter kind.
This means that information, which if disclosed could lead to an
unwarranted invasion of privacy rights, would mean personal
information, that is, which is not having co-relation with public
information.”
101. The Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) took note of the
progression of the ‘Right to Privacy’, consequent to which the underlying
provision protecting personal information, came to be viewed differently.
The Court expounded at length upon the interplay between the ‘Right to
Information’ and the ‘Right to Privacy’ under the RTI Act. The following
observations were made by the Court:
“47. If one’s right to know is absolute, then the same may invade
another’s right to privacy and breach confidentiality, and, therefore,
the former right has to be harmonised with the need for personal
privacy, confidentiality of information and effective governance. The
RTI Act captures this interplay of the competing rights under clause
(j) to Section 8(1) and Section 11. While clause (j) to Section 8(1)
refers to personal information as distinct from information relating
to public activity or interest and seeks to exempt disclosure of suchW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 128 of 175
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information, as well as such information which, if disclosed, would
cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of an individual, unless
public interest warrants its disclosure, Section 11 exempts the
disclosure of “information or record … which relates to or has been
supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that
third party”. By differently wording and inditing the challenge that
privacy and confidentiality throw to information rights, the RTI Act
also recognises the interconnectedness, yet distinctiveness between
the breach of confidentiality and invasion of privacy, as the former is
broader than the latter, as will be noticed below.
48. Breach of confidentiality has an older conception and was
primarily an equitable remedy based on the principle that one party
is entitled to enforce equitable duty on the persons bound by an
obligation of confidentiality on account of the relationship they
share, with actual or constructive knowledge of the confidential
relationship. Conventionally a conception of equity, confidentiality
also arises in a contract, or by a statute. Contractually, an obligation
to keep certain information confidential can be effectuated expressly
or implicitly by an oral or written agreement, whereas in statutes
certain extant and defined relationships are imposed with the duty to
maintain details, communication exchanged and records
confidential. Confidentiality referred to in the phrase “breach of
confidentiality” was initially popularly perceived and interpreted as
confidentiality arising out of a pre-existing confidential relationship,
as the obligation to keep certain information confidential was on
account of the nature of the relationship. The insistence of a pre-
existing confidential relationship did not conceive a possibility that a
duty to keep information confidential could arise even if a
relationship, in which such information is exchanged and held, is not
pre-existing. This created a distinction between confidential
information obtained through the violation of a confidential
relationship and similar confidential information obtained in some
other way. With time, courts and jurists, who recognised this
anomaly, have diluted the requirement of the existence of a
confidential relationship and held that three elements were essential
for a case of breach of confidentiality to succeed, namely — (a)
information should be of confidential nature; (b) information must be
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidentiality;
and (c) that there must be unauthorised use of information
[See Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd.]. The
“artificial” distinction was emphatically abrogated by the test
adopted by Lord Goff of Chieveley in Attorney General v. Guardian
Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), who had observed : (AC p. 281)
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“… a duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes
to the knowledge of a person … in circumstances where he has
notice, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential,
with the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he
should be precluded from disclosing the information to others.”
Lord Goff, thus, lifted the limiting constraint of a need for initial
confidential relationship stating that a “duty of confidence” would
apply whenever a person receives information he knows or ought to
know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential.
Therefore, confidential information must not be something which is a
public property and in public knowledge/public domain as
confidentiality necessarily attributes inaccessibility, that is, the
information must not be generally accessible, otherwise it cannot be
regarded as confidential. However, self-clarification or certification
will not be relevant because whether or not the information is
confidential has to be determined as a matter of fact. The test to be
applied is that of a reasonable person, that is, information must be
such that a reasonable person would regard it as confidential.
Confidentiality of information also has reference to the quality of
information though it may apply even if the information is false or
partly incorrect. However, the information must not be trivial or
useless.
49. While previously information that could be considered personal
would have been protected only if it were exchanged in a confidential
relationship or considered confidential by nature, significant
developments in jurisprudence since the 1990’s have posited the
acceptance of privacy as a separate right and something worthy of
protection on its own as opposed to being protected under an
actionable claim for breach of confidentiality. A claim to protect
privacy is, in a sense, a claim for the preservation of confidentiality
of personal information. With progression of the right to privacy, the
underlying values of the law that protects personal information came
to be seen differently as the courts recognised that unlike law of
confidentiality that is based upon duty of good faith, right to privacy
focuses on the protection of human autonomy and dignity by
granting the right to control the dissemination of information about
one’s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other
people (see Sedley, L.J. in Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [Douglas v. Hello!
Ltd., 2001 QB 967 : (2001) 2 WLR 992 (CA)] ). In PJS v. News
Group Newspapers Ltd. [PJS v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.,
(2016) 2 WLR 1253 : 2016 UKSC 26] , the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom had drawn a distinction between the right to respect
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private and family life or privacy and claims based upon
confidentiality by observing that the law extends greater protection
to privacy rights than rights in relation to confidential matters. In the
former case, the claim for misuse of private information can survive
even when information is in the public domain as its repetitive use
itself leads to violation of the said right. The right to privacy gets the
benefit of both the quantitative and the qualitative protection. The
former refers to the disclosure already made and what is yet
undisclosed, whereas the latter refers to the privateness of the
material, invasion of which is an illegal intrusion into the right to
privacy. Claim for confidentiality would generally fail when the
information is in public domain. The law of privacy is, therefore, not
solely concerned with the information, but more concerned with the
intrusion and violation of private rights. Citing an instance of how
publishing of defamatory material can be remedied by a trial
establishing the falsity of such material and award of damages,
whereas invasion of privacy cannot be similarly redressed, the Court
had highlighted the reason why truth or falsity of an allegation or
information may be irrelevant when it comes to invasion of privacy.
Therefore, claims for protection against invasion of private and
family life do not depend upon confidentiality alone. This distinction
is important to understand the protection given to two different rights
vide Sections 8(1)(j) and 11 of the RTI Act.
xxx xxx xxx
51. The right to privacy though not expressly guaranteed in the
Constitution of India is now recognised as a basic fundamental right
vide decision of the Constitutional Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy
(Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India holding that it is an intrinsic part of
the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution and recognised under several international treaties,
chief among them being Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1948 which states that no one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. The
judgment recognises that everyone has a right to the protection of
laws against such interference or attack.
52. In K.S. Puttaswamy the main judgment (authored by D.Y.
Chandrachud, J.) has referred to the provisions of Section 8(1)(j) of
the RTI Act to highlight that the right to privacy is entrenched with
constitutional status in Part III of the Constitution, thus providing a
touchstone on which validity of executive decisions can be assessed
and validity of laws can be determined vide judicial review exercised
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by the courts. This observation highlights the status and importance
of the right to privacy as a constitutional right. The ratio as recorded
in the two concurring judgments of the learned Judges (R.F.
Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.) is similar. It is observed that
privacy involves a person’s right to his physical body; right to
informational privacy which deals with a person’s mind; and the
right to privacy of choice which protects an individual’s autonomy
over personal choices. While physical privacy enjoys constitutional
recognition in Articles 19(1)(d) and (e) read with Article 21,
personal informational privacy is relatable to Article 21 and right to
privacy of choice is enshrined in Articles 19(1)(a) to (c), 20(3), 21
and 25 of the Constitution. In the concurring opinion, there is a
reference to “The Right to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis on an individual’s right to control the dissemination of
personal information and that an individual has a right to limit
access to such information/shield such information from
unwarranted access. Knowledge about a person gives another power
over that person, as personal data collected is capable of effecting
representations in his decision-making process and shaping
behaviour which can have a stultifying effect on the expression of
dissent which is the cornerstone of democracy. In the said
concurring judgment, it has been further held that the right to
protection of reputation from being unfairly harmed needs to be
zealously guarded not only against falsehood but also against certain
truths by observing : (SCC p. 628, para 623)
“623. An individual has a right to protect his reputation from being
unfairly harmed and such protection of reputation needs to exist not
only against falsehood but also certain truths. It cannot be said that
a more accurate judgment about people can be facilitated by
knowing private details about their lives — people judge us badly,
they judge us in haste, they judge out of context, they judge without
hearing the whole story and they judge with hypocrisy. Privacy lets
people protect themselves from these troublesome judgments.”
53. Privacy, it is uniformly observed in K.S. Puttaswamy, is essential
for liberty and dignity. Therefore, individuals have the need to
preserve an intrusion-free zone for their personality and family. This
facilitates individual freedom. On the question of invasion of
personal liberty, the main judgment has referred to a threefold
requirement in the form of — (i) legality, which postulates the
existence of law (the RTI Act in the present case); (ii) need, defined
in terms of a legitimate State aim; and (iii) proportionality, which
ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means to be
adopted to achieve them. The third requirement, we would observe,
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is achieved in the present case by Sections 8(1)(j) and 11 of the RTI
Act and the RTI Act cannot be faulted on this ground. The RTI Act
also defines the legitimate aim, that is, a public interest in the
dissemination of information which can be confidential or private (or
held in a fiduciary relationship) when larger public interest or public
interest in disclosure outweighs the protection or any possible harm
or injury to the interest of the third party.”
102. The Supreme Court took note of the fact that the Right to Privacy has
been elevated to the status of a Fundamental Right, in terms of the dicta laid
down by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy
v. Union of India (supra) (9-Judge Bench). The Court also referred to
Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others (supra) and observed as under:
“69. Reference can also be made to Aditya Bandopadhyay, as discussed
earlier in paras 42 and 43, where this Court has held that while a
fiduciary could not withhold information from the beneficiary in whose
benefit he holds such information, he/she owed a duty to the beneficiary
to not disclose the same to anyone else. This exposition of the Court
equally reconciles the right to know with the rights to privacy under
clause (j) to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.”
103. After taking into account the aforesaid and other relevant precedents,
[including Subhash Chandra Agarwal v. Supreme Court of India, (2018)
11 SCC 634 and R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (2013) 14 SCC 794], it was
categorically concluded as under:
“70. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion.
would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical,
mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer
sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional
records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports,
ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information.
Medical records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of hospitals and
doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members,
information relating to assets, liabilities, Income tax returns, details of
investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such
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invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation
of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not
exhaustive.”
104. Thus, it is unambiguously clear that the ‘marks obtained’, grades, and
answer sheets etc. are in the nature of personal information and are protected
under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, subject to an assessment of overriding
public interest.
105. One of the arguments raised by the respondent/intervenor is that,
since the university routinely publishes such information through its official
website and during convocations ceremonies, it cannot now claim that such
disclosure constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy and /or is in the
nature of ‘personal information’. According to the respondent/intervenor,
the university’s own consistent practice undermines its reliance on Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. This contention cannot be accepted.
106. As noticed by the Supreme Court in Central Public Information
Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) the
right to privacy gets the benefit of both the quantitative and qualitative
protection. The former refers to the disclosure already made and what is yet
undisclosed, whereas the latter refers to the privateness of the material,
invasion of which is an illegal intrusion into the right to privacy.
107. The mere act of publishing certain information on some occasions
does not dilute the legal protection accorded to personal information under
Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. Whether or not Section 8(1)(j) applies in the
context of any RTI application has to be assessed on the basis of the
statutory provisions, and not on the basis of any anecdotal evidence or ad-
hoc examples of how a university has dealt with similar information on
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certain occasion/s.
108. As noticed, the Supreme Court has categorically held in Central
Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Agarwal (supra) that marks, grades, answer-sheets etc. are inherently
personal information and are entitled to protection on the touchstone of
privacy and personal information, save and except in situations where there
is a demonstrable larger public interest justifying disclosure.
109. Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act exempts from disclosure any personal
information that is not related to any public activity or interest, or the
disclosure of which would result in an unwarranted invasion of an
individual’s privacy. Section 11 of the Act complements this by
safeguarding information that has been treated as confidential by a third
party. The RTI Act, therefore, draws a clear distinction between the
concepts of privacy and confidentiality.
110. The Supreme Court has observed that while confidentiality arises
from duties in specific relationships, privacy has emerged as an independent
right grounded in human autonomy and dignity. Confidential information
typically arises within the confines of professional or trust-based
relationships and must not be information already in the public domain.
Unlike confidentiality, privacy may be violated even if the information is
already public.
111. Further the judgment also observed that the K.S. Puttaswamy (supra)
decision established privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the
Constitution. Privacy protects against arbitrary interference in personal,
family, and reputational domains. In K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), the Court
specifically recognised the notion of informational privacy and emphasised
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that the right to control the dissemination of one’s personal data is integral to
the protection of individual dignity and autonomy. It was also clearly
observed that any invasion of privacy must satisfy a threefold test: “(i)
legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of
a legitimate State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational
nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them”.
112. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v.
Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), the Supreme Court while relying upon
K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) observed as under –
“Privacy, it is uniformly observed in K.S. Puttaswamy, is essential for
liberty and dignity. Therefore, individuals have the need to preserve an
intrusion-free zone for their personality and family. This facilitates
individual freedom. On the question of invasion of personal liberty, the
main judgment has referred to a threefold requirement in the form of —
(i) legality, which postulates the existence of law (the RTI Act in the
present case); (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and
(iii) proportionality, which ensures a rational nexus between the objects
and the means to be adopted to achieve them. The third requirement, we
would observe, is achieved in the present case by Sections 8(1)(j) and 11
of the RTI Act and the RTI Act cannot be faulted on this ground.”
113. Thus, the RTI Act meets the threefold test through Sections 8(1)(j)
and 11 by providing exemptions and balancing competing rights.
114. In light of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that
information pertaining to an individual’s educational qualifications,
including degrees and marks, falls within the ambit of “personal
information” under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
(ii) Whether ‘larger public interest’ justifies disclosure of the
information sought even if the same falls within the purview of
Section 8(1)(e) and/or Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act?
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115. The next question that arises for consideration is whether “larger
public interest” can justify disclosure despite the information sought being
in the nature of “personal information”. This question has also been
comprehensively answered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment
of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash
Chandra Agarwal (supra), wherein it was held as under –
88. The RTI Act is no exception. Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act
prescribes the requirement of satisfaction of “larger public
interest” for access to information when the information
relates to personal information having no relationship with any
public activity or interest, or would cause unwarranted
invasion of privacy of the individual. Proviso to Section 11(1)
states that except in case of trade or commercial secrets
protected by law, disclosure may be allowed if the public
interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible
harm or injury to the interest of the third party. The words
“possible harm or injury” to the interest of the third party are
preceded by the word “importance” for the purpose of
comparison. “Possible” in the context of the proviso does not
mean something remote, far-fetched or hypothetical, but a
calculable, foreseeable and substantial possibility of harm and
injury to the third party.
89. Comparison or balancing exercise of competing public
interests has to be undertaken in both sections, albeit under
Section 8(1)(j) the comparison is between public interest
behind the exemption, that is, personal information or invasion
of privacy of the individual and public interest behind access to
information, whereas the test prescribed by the proviso to
Section 11(1) is somewhat broader and wider as it requires
comparison between disclosure of information relating to a
third person or information supplied and treated as
confidential by the third party and possible harm or injury to
the third party on disclosure, which would include all kinds of
“possible” harm and injury to the third party on disclosure.
90. This Court in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed
Hussain Abbas Rizwi [Bihar Public Service
Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, (2012) 13 SCC 61
: (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 131] has held that the phrase “public
interest” in Section 8(1)(j) has to be understood in its true
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connotation to give complete meaning to the relevant
provisions of the RTI Act. However, the RTI Act does not
specifically identify factors to be taken into account in
determining where the public interest lies. Therefore, it is
important to understand the meaning of the expression “public
interest” in the context of the RTI Act. This Court held “public
interest” to mean the general welfare of the public warranting
the disclosure and the protection applicable, in which the
public as a whole has a stake, and observed : (SCC p. 74, para
23)
“23. The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities
objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be
weighed with regard to the circumstances of a given case. The
decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for
ensuring that larger public interest outweighs unwarranted
invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision.
Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are
required to be dealt with great confidentiality. The information
may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of
disclosure by others who give that information in confidence
and with complete faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such
information shall be maintained, thus, bringing it within the
ambit of fiduciary capacity. Similarly, there may be cases
where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity
or interest or it may even cause unwarranted invasion of
privacy of the individual. All these protections have to be given
their due implementation as they spring from statutory
exemptions. It is not a decision simpliciter between private
interest and public interest. It is a matter where a
constitutional protection is available to a person with regard to
the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has to be
construed while keeping in mind the balance factor between
right to privacy and right to information with the purpose
sought to be achieved and the purpose that would be served in
the larger public interest, particularly when both these rights
emerge from the constitutional values under the Constitution of
India.”
91. Public interest in access to information refers to something
that is in the interest of the public welfare to know. Public
welfare is widely different from what is of interest to the public.
“Something which is of interest to the public” and “something
which is in the public interest” are two separate and different
parameters. For example, the public may be interested in
private matters with which the public may have no concern andW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 138 of 175
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pressing need to know. However, such interest of the public in
private matters would repudiate and directly traverse the
protection of privacy. The object and purpose behind the
specific exemption vide clause (j) to Section 8(1) is to protect
and shield oneself from unwarranted access to personal
information and to protect facets like reputation, honour, etc.
associated with the right to privacy. Similarly, there is a public
interest in the maintenance of confidentiality in the case of
private individuals and even Government, an aspect we have
already discussed.
92. The public interest test in the context of the RTI Act would
mean reflecting upon the object and purpose behind the right
to information, the right to privacy and consequences of
invasion, and breach of confidentiality and possible harm and
injury that would be caused to the third party, with reference to
a particular information and the person. In an
article “Freedom of Information and the Public Interest : the
Commonwealth experience” published in the Oxford
University Commonwealth Law Journal, [ Published online on
28-8-2017.] the factors identified as favouring disclosure,
those against disclosure and lastly those irrelevant for
consideration of public interest have been elucidated as under:
“it is generally accepted that the public interest is not
synonymous with what is of interest to the public, in the sense
of satisfying public curiosity about some matter. For example,
the UK Information Tribunal has drawn a distinction between
‘matters which were in the interests of the public to know and
matters which were merely interesting to the public (i.e. which
the public would like to know about, and which sell
newspapers, but … are not relevant)’.
Factors identified as favouring disclosure include the public
interest in : contributing to a debate on a matter of public
importance; accountability of officials; openness in the
expenditure of public funds, the performance by a public
authority of its regulatory functions, the handling of complaints
by public authorities; exposure of wrongdoing, inefficiency or
unfairness; individuals being able to refute allegations made
against them; enhancement of scrutiny of decision-making; and
protecting against danger to public health or safety.
Factors that have been found to weigh against disclosure
include : the likelihood of damage to security or international
relations; the likelihood of damage to the integrity or viability
of decision-making processes : the public interest in public
bodies being able to perform their functions effectively; theW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 139 of 175
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public interest in preserving the privacy of individuals and the
public interest in the preservation of confidences.
Factors irrelevant to the consideration of the public interest
have also been identified. These include : that the information
might be misunderstood; that the requested information in
overly technical in nature; and that disclosure would result in
embarrassment to the Government or to officials.”
116. Thus, “something which is of interest to the public” is quite different
from “something which is in the public interest”. As noted by the Supreme
Court, the public may be interested in private matters which may have no
bearing on the public interest. Such matters cannot impinge upon the
exemption provided under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
117. In the concurring judgment of Ramana, J. in Central Public
Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra
Agarwal (supra), it has been observed that the purport of Section 8(1)(j) of
the RTI Act is to balance privacy with public interest. It has been observed
that the Right to Information and Right to Privacy stand on an equal footing
and there is no ‘a priori’ requirement to take the view that one right trumps
the other. The relevant observations are as under:
“145. The purport of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act is to balance privacy
with public interest. Under the provision a two steps test could be
identified wherein the first step was: (i) whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and (ii) whether on an ultimate balancing
analysis, does privacy give way to freedom of expression? We should
acknowledge that these two tests are very difficult to be kept separate
analytically.
xxx xxx xxx
150. That the right to information and right to privacy are at an equal
footing. There is no requirement to take an a priori view that one right
trumps other. Although there are American cases, which have taken the
view that the freedom of speech and expression trumps all other rights
in every case. However, in India we cannot accord any such priority to
the rights.”
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118. The said judgment goes on to clarify that it is important to distinguish
between the separate concept of “interest of the public” and “something in
public interest”. The Court has emphasized that public interest needs to be
distinguished from matters which are for “public entertainment, curiosity or
amusement”. The relevant observations of the Court are as under:
“151. The contextual balancing involves “proportionality test”. [See
K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9 J.) v. Union of India] The test is to see
whether the release of information would be necessary, depends on the
information seeker showing the “pressing social need” or “compelling
requirement for upholding the democratic values”. We can easily
conclude that the exemption of public interest as occurring under
Section 8(1)(j) requires a balancing test to be adopted. We need to
distinguish two separate concepts i.e. “interest of the public” and
“something in the public interest”. Therefore, the material distinction
between the aforesaid concepts concern those matters which affect
political, moral and material welfare of the public need to be
distinguished from those for public entertainment, curiosity or
amusement. Under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act requires us to hold that
only the former is an exception to the exemption. Although we must note
that the majority opinion in K.S. Puttaswamy has held that the data
privacy is part of the right to privacy, however, we need to note that the
concept of data protection is still developing [refer Google Spain SL v.
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Bavarian Lager Co.
Ltd. v. Commission European Communities]. As we are not concerned
with the aforesaid aspects, we need not indulge any more than to state
that there is an urgent requirement for integrating the principles of data
protection into the right to information jurisprudence.”
119. The CPIO, when considering whether or not “public interest” in a
particular context would override the exemption afforded by Section 8(1)(j),
cannot be expected to assess the matter based on purely subjective
predilections. There has to be an objective test that is to be applied. Such an
objective test is mandated in terms of the judgment of Bihar Public Service
Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi 2012 (13) SCC 61, relied
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upon in paragraph 90 1 of Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra). It is evident
therefrom that disclosure is not mandated in a situation where the
information sought has no relation to any public activity. The public interest
override would not be attracted where the information sought has no bearing
on the discharge of responsibilities by the concerned public
official/functionary (whose personal information is sought).
120. On the other hand, public interest considerations would prevail where
if the information sought has a bearing on the performance of official
responsibilities/functions entrusted to a public functionary, or where the
information sought concerns exposure of wrongdoing in the discharge of
official functions, financial impropriety, inefficiency and/or has a bearing on
the very eligibility (as prescribed under law) for holding a particular office.
121. Thus, it is incumbent on a CPIO to identify the purpose for which
disclosure of exempted information is sought, and then verify whether it
relates to public accountability in discharge of official duties, detection of
financial impropriety, protection of fundamental rights etc. There should be
a clear, rational and direct nexus between the information sought and such
“public purpose”.
122. It is incumbent on the CPIO to exclude / exempt from disclosure any
information which is “curiosity driven” [as stated in the concurring
1
90. This Court in Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi [Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas
Rizwi, (2012) 13 SCC 61 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 131] has held that the phrase “public interest” in Section 8(1)(j) has to be understood in its true
connotation to give complete meaning to the relevant provisions of the RTI Act. However, the RTI Act does not specifically identify factors to be taken
into account in determining where the public interest lies. Therefore, it is important to understand the meaning of the expression “public interest” in the
context of the RTI Act. This Court held “public interest” to mean the general welfare of the public warranting the disclosure and the protection
applicable, in which the public as a whole has a stake, and observed : (SCC p. 74, para 23)
“23. The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to be weighed with regard to the
circumstances of a given case. The decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded for ensuring that larger public interest outweighs
unwarranted invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision. Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are required to be dealt
with great confidentiality….
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judgment of Ramana, J. in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra)] or matters which are
“of interest to the public” in contradistinction to being “in the public
interest” [this distinction has been cogently drawn in the majority judgment
of Sanjiv Khanna, J., in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme
Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra).]
123. Applying the aforesaid test in the present case, it is apparent that the
mark sheets/results/degree certificate/academic records of any individual,
even if that individual is a holder of public office, are in the nature of
personal information. The fact that a person holds a public office does not,
per se, render all personal information subject to public disclosure.
124. As mentioned, it would be a different matter where a particular
educational qualification is a criteria or prerequisite for holding a public
office or any post. However, in the present case, no public interest is implicit
in the disclosure of the information as sought vide RTI application, which is
the subject matter of W.P.(C) 600/2017.
125. Likewise, there is no implicit public interest in respect of the
information sought vide RTI Application, which is the subject matter of
W.P.(C) 1051/2017. Again, the concerned educational qualifications are not
in the nature of any statutory requirement for holding any public office or
discharging official responsibilities.
126. Public interest under Section 8(1)(j) requires an element of overriding
necessity for disclosure to protect or promote a significant public cause. It
needs to be emphasized that disclosure of academic details sans any
overriding public interest, would amount to an intrusion into the personal
sphere which is constitutionally protected post K.S. Puttaswamy (supra).
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The fact that the information sought pertains to a public figure does not
extinguish privacy/confidentiality rights over personal data, unconnected
with public duties.
127. This Court cannot be oblivious to the reality that what may
superficially appear to be an innocuous or isolated disclosure could open the
floodgates of indiscriminate demands, motivated by idle curiosity or
sensationalism, rather than any objective “public interest” consideration.
Disregarding the mandate of Section 8(1)(j) in such context would
inexorably lead to demands for personal information concerning officials /
functionaries spanning the entire gamut of public services, without any real
“public interest” being involved. The RTI Act was enacted to promote
transparency in government functioning and not to provide fodder for
sensationalism.
128. The judgment of the Bombay High Court in Onkar Dattatray
Kalmankar v. Public Information Officer and Registrar and Others, 2024
SCC OnLine Bom 3513, affords an example of a situation where the marks
obtained by candidates participating in a recruitment process are liable to be
disclosed, even though the same may constitute a personal information as
contemplated in Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. In that case, the petitioner
had applied for the post of junior clerk in the District Court at Pune pursuant
to an advertisement issued in this regard. The petitioner therein filed an RTI
application seeking the following details:
“(i) The marks secured by the petitioner in the screening test, Marathi
typing test, English typing test and interviews.
(ii) The marks secured by the candidates at Serial Nos. 1 to 363 in the
screening test, Marathi typing test, English typing test and interviews.
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(iii) The criteria or the basis for selecting the selected candidates and
other information in this regard with full details.”
129. It was held by the Court in that case as under:
“28. The legislature has not exempted all personal information under
Section 8(1)(j) but only such personal information, the disclosure of
which has no relationship to any public activity or interest. Since the
selection process for Junior Clerks at the District Court in Pune was
essentially a public activity which commenced with public advertisement
inviting applications from eligible candidates, we do not think that the
disclosure of marks obtained by the candidates participating in such a
process would amount to personal information, the disclosure of which
has no relationship to any public activity or interest. Given that such
selection processes must be transparent and above board, it would be in
the public interest to disclose such information rather than withhold it
and allow any doubts about the process (however unjustified such
doubts may be) to linger.
29. Similarly, in the context of a public examination for selection to a
public post, we are doubtful whether the disclosure of marks obtained by
the candidates would amount to any unwarranted invasion of the
privacy of such candidates. The legislature has advisedly used the
expression “unwarranted”. Therefore, not any and every invasion of an
individual’s privacy is exempted from disclosure. Only what is exempted
from disclosure is “unwarranted invasion”. Even here, the disclosure
can be ordered where the PIO or the appellate authorities are satisfied
that the “larger public Interest justifies the disclosure of such
information”. The proviso is also significant since it provides that the
information which cannot be denied to Parliament or the State
Legislature will not be denied to any person.”
130. Thus, in Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar (supra), the Court found that
the disclosure of marks obtained by candidates participating in a recruitment
process was justified, inasmuch as public interest warranted that the
selection process be transparent and above board, and that this public
interest would be served by disclosing the requisite information.
131. This judgment serves to underscore the point that where a particular
educational qualification is necessary as a pre-requisite for holding a public
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post, access to such information can be afforded based on public interest
considerations. The Bombay High Court also took note of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court
of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) and observed as under:
“34. The observations in para 70, which were relied upon by Mr
Datar, refer primarily to personal records, including name, address,
physical, mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades, and
answer sheets, all treated as personal information. Similarly,
professional records, including qualification, performance, evaluation
reports, ACRS, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal
information. Medical records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of
hospitals and doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the
family members, information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax
returns, details of investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal
information. Such personal information is protected from unwarranted
invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when the
stipulation of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is illustrative
and not exhaustive. The observations in this para must be considered in
tandem with the other observations in the same decision, bearing in
mind the context in which they were made. Besides, the larger public
interest aspect cannot bel ignored.
35. The court has explained that public interest in access to
Information refers to something that is in the interest of public welfare
to know. Public welfare is widely different from what is of interest to the
public. “Something which is of interest to the public” and “something
which is in the public interest” are two separate and different
parameters. For example, the public may be interested in private
matters with which the public may have no concern and pressing need to
know. However, such public interest in private matters would repudiate
and directly traverse the protection of privacy.
xxx xxx xxx
37. Thus, if the decision in Subhash Chandra Agarwal case is read in
its entirety and not by just picking some stray sentences dehors the
entire context, we are satisfied that the objection based on the
expression under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act ought not to prevail. The
confidence in the selection process would be boosted by disclosing the
marks obtained by all the candidates in the written test and interviews.
Transparency and accountability in a public recruitment process wouldW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 146 of 175
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be promoted. The disclosure of marks in a public recruitment process
cannot be said to be purely personal information, the disclosure of
which has no relationship to any public activity or interest or which
would cause an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual. In
any event, the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
information. Such disclosure would promote transparency and
accountability and dispel the lingering doubts about wrongdoings in the
public recruitment process. Such disclosures would strengthen the
recruitment process by boosting public confidence in it.
38. Recently, in Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan, the
Supreme Court stressed transparency in the public recruitment process.
In ICAI v. Shaunak H. Satya, the Supreme Court highlighted the RTI’s
objective of ensuring transparency and accountability and urged
examining bodies to adapt to the new disclosure regime. Thus, the trend
under the new RTI regime is to disclose information that would maintain
trust in the recruitment process without unduly compromising the
privacy of any candidate. A distinction must be made between sensitive
personal information like medical details, etc. and information
intrinsically linked to the marks obtained, qualifications, experience of
the candidates, etc.xxx xxx xxx
51. Since, we have found that the disclosure of the marks obtained by
the candidates in the written test, typing test and interviewers did not
constitute any exempted information or did not affect the confidentiality
of the exam so conducted, we must say that the approach of the District
Authorities in Wardha contributed to the promotion of transparency
which should typically be promoted in matters of public recruitment.
Withholding such information unnecessarily allows doubts, however
unreasonable, to linger, which is not very healthy in promoting
transparency and accountability in the working of public authorities and
public recruitment processes. Regarding RTI, it is repeatedly asserted
that sunlight is the best disinfectant.”
132. A Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 2783/2025 against the aforesaid
judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court with the observation that,
though the RTI application concerned disclosure of marks, which fall within
the domain of personal information, “disclosure of this personal information
is presently necessary in public interest”. It was held as under:
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“We see absolutely no reason to interfere with the impugned order
passed by the High Court of Bombay, which has correctly interpreted
the provisions of Section 8(1) (j) of the Right to Information Act 2005,
(for short ‘the RTI Act, 2005‘). The issue relates to disclosure of marks
of other candidate in an examination. We are also of the view that the
disclosure of the marks though may fall in the category of personal
information, yet the disclosure of this personal information is presently
necessary in public interest, and therefore, it is not an information
which cannot be given by the Information Officer under the RTI Act,
2005. To the contrary, such an information must be disclosed in order to
maintain transparency in the process.”
133. The underlying rationale which impelled the Court in Onkar
Dattatray Kalmankar (supra) to invoke overriding public interest in respect
of “personal information” was that the information was necessary to ensure
transparency and accountability in the public employment selection process.
No such considerations are involved in the present case. The situation might
have been different, had educational qualification/s been a pre-requisite for
eligibility to a specific public office.
134. One of the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents is that
since the RTI Act has been enacted to effectuate the Right to Information
recognised under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, a narrow and
restrictive interpretation must be accorded to Section 8 of the said Act,
which limits the said right. The said contention is misconceived.
135. The purport of Section 8 of the RTI Act has been elaborately dealt
with in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Board of Secondary
Education & Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Others (supra). As
noticed hereinabove, it has been held therein that Section 8 of the RTI Act
seeks to balance conflicting interests, on the one hand, to bring about
transparency and accountability by providing access to information under
the control of public authorities; on the other hand, to ensure that efficient
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operation of the Act, optimum use of limited fiscal resources, and the
preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information is not jeopardized.
The Court held as under:
“61. Some High Courts have held that Section 8 of the RTI Act is in the
nature of an exception to Section 3 which empowers the citizens with the
right to information, which is a derivative from the freedom of speech;
and that, therefore, Section 8 should be construed strictly, literally and
narrowly. This may not be the correct approach. The Act seeks to bring
about a balance between two conflicting interests, as harmony between
them is essential for preserving democracy. One is to bring about
transparency and accountability by providing access to information
under the control of public authorities The other is to ensure that the
revelation of information, in actual practice, does not conflict with other
public interests which include efficient operation of the Governments,
optimum use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of
confidentiality of sensitive information. The Preamble to the Act
specifically states that the object of the Act is to harmonise these two
conflicting interests. While Sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first
objective, Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve the second objective.
Therefore, when Section 8 exempts certain information from being
disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to
information, but as an equally important provision protecting other
public interests essential for the fulfilment and preservation of
democratic ideals.”
136. In Central Board of Secondary Education & Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay & Others (supra), it has also been noticed that the scheme of
the RTI Act classifies information into the following three categories: (i)
Information which promotes transparency and accountability in the working
of every public authority, disclosure of which may also help in containing or
discouraging corruption [enumerated in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 4(1) of
the RTI Act] (ii) Other information held by a public authority [that is, all
information other than those falling under clauses (b) and (c) of Section 4(1)
of the RTI Act]; (iii) Information which is not held by or under the control
of any public authority and which cannot be accessed by a public authority
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under any law for the time being in force. It has been held in Central Board
of Secondary Education & Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Others
(supra) as under:
“Information under the third category does not fall within the scope of
the RTI Act. Section 3 of the RTI Act gives every citizen, the right to
“information” held by or under the control of a public authority, which
falls either under the first or second category. In regard to the
information falling under the first category, there is also a special
responsibility upon the public authorities to suo motu publish and
disseminate such information so that they will be easily and readily
accessible to the public without any need to access them by having
recourse to Section 6 of the RTI Act. There is no such obligation to
publish and disseminate the other information which falls under the
second Category.”
137. It was further held that the provisions of the RTI Act should be
strictly enforced to ensure that the necessary information under Clause (b) of
Section 4(1) of the RTI Act is adequately disseminated. The same relates to
securing transparency and accountability in working of public authorities
and discouraging corruption. However, regarding other information, i.e.,
information other than those enumerated in Section 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(c) of
the Act, equal importance and emphasis be given to other relevant
considerations such as the confidentiality of sensitive information, fidelity,
fiduciary relation, etc.
138. Further, it was observed that indiscriminate and impractical demands
or directions under the RTI Act for the disclosure of ‘all and sundry
information’ (unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning
of public authorities and eradication of corruption) would be
counterproductive, as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the
administration. The relevant observations are as under:
“66. The right to information is a cherished right. Information and right
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to information are intended to be formidable tools in the hands of
responsible citizens to fight corruption and to bring in transparency and
accountability. The provisions of the RTI Act should be enforced strictly
and all efforts should be made to bring to light the necessary
information under clause (b) of Section 4(1) of the Act which relates to
securing transparency and accountability in the working of public
authorities and in discouraging corruption. But in regard to other
information [that is, information other than those enumerated in
Sections 4(1)(b) and (c) of the Act), equal importance and emphasis are
given to other public interests (like confidentiality of sensitive
information, fidelity and fiduciary relationships, efficient operation of
Governments, etc.).
67. Indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under the RTI
Act for disclosure of all and sundry information (unrelated to
transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities
and eradication of corruption) would be counterproductive as it will
adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the
executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of
collecting and furnishing information. The Act should not be allowed to
be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national
development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquillity and
harmony among its citizens. Nor should it be converted into a tool of
oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty.
The nation does not want a scenario where 75% of the staff of public
authorities spends 75% of their time in collecting and furnishing
information to applicants instead of discharging their regular duties.
The threat of penalties under the RTI Act and the pressure of the
authorities under the RTI Act should not lead to employees of a public
authorities prioritising “information furnishing”, at the cost of their
normal and regular duties.”
139. The Delhi High Court, in Central Board of Secondary Education v.
Anil Kumar Kathpal (supra), relying upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Shaunak H.
Satya (supra), held as under:
“16. The Supreme Court recently in The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India v. Shaunak H. Satya (2011) 8 SCC 781, in the
context of the RTI Act itself held that in achieving the objective of
transparency and accountability of the RTI Act other equally important
public interests including preservation of confidentiality of sensitive
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ensured that the revelation of information in actual practice, does not
harm or adversely affect other public interests including of preservation
of confidentiality of sensitive information. We have already held above
that disclosure of marks, which though exists with the appellant would
amount to allowing play to the policy earlier prevalent of marking the
examinees. Merely because the appellant/its examiners for the purpose
of grading, first mark the students would not compel this court to put at
naught or to allow full play to the new policy of grades.”
140. As regards absence of any “public interest” warranting disclosure of
personal information in the context of an RTI application seeking
details/copies of a degree/mark sheet, it has been observed by the Gujarat
High Court in the case of Gujarat University v. M. Sridhar Acharyulu
(Madabhushi Sridhar) and Others (supra) as under:
“30. Having held so, this court is of the opinion that information i.e.
educational degree of any individual can be sought using RTI Act only
when there is a pleading, which is proved by the Applicant and
thereafter satisfaction is reached by the authority under the Act that
“public interest” requires disclosure of such information. Such “public
interest” as used in Section 8(1)(e) and (j) would mean manifest public
interest and not just curiosity of the RTI Applicant. As explained in the
judgment of the Supreme Court, the term “public interest” would not
mean matters where “public is interested”. There can be certain matter
where public may develop interest out of curiosity. Such interest has
nothing to do with “public interest” which is the test required to be
applied under Section 8(1)(e) and (j)………”
141. This Court also finds merit in the submission of the petitioner (in
W.P. (C) No. 600/2017) that the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023,
which amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act (though not yet notified), is a
significant expression of legislative intent. The amended provision simply
states that “information which relates to personal information” shall be
exempt from disclosure, thereby eliminating the earlier qualification of
“unwarranted invasion of privacy” and removing the discretion of the Public
Information Officer to disclose such information on the basis of perceived
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“larger public interest.” This legislative development underscores the
evolving jurisprudence that places heightened value on informational
privacy and affirms the sacrosanct nature of personal data.
142. A Division Bench of this Court in Central Board of Secondary
Education v. Anil Kumar Kathpal (supra) has observed as under:
“15. The Supreme Court in Kailash Chand v. Dharam Das (2005) 5
SCC 375 reiterated that a statute can never be exhaustive and
legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible situations which
may arise in future litigation and in myriad circumstances and it is for
the Court to interpret the law with pragmatism and consistently with
demands of varying situations. The legislative intent has to be found out
and effectuated. Earlier also in Smt. Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (1990)
2 SCC 134 the same sentiment was expressed by holding that law as
creative response should be so interpreted to meet the different fact
situations coming before the court, for Acts of Parliament were not
drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity and when conflicting
interests arise, the court by consideration of legislative intent must
supplement the written word with force and life. Lord Denning (in
Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 KB 481) observing that the judge
must consciously seek to mould the law so as to serve the needs of time
and must not be a mere mechanic, was quoted with approval.”
143. Thus, the amendment brought about in Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act
by virtue of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 affords an insight
as to the legislative intent and the manner in which Section 8(1)(j) should be
interpreted/applied.
(iii) Even assuming that the supply of information is precluded
under Section 8(1)(e) and/or Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act,
whether disclosure of information is mandated under Section
8(3) of the RTI Act?
144. The next question that arises for consideration is whether Section 8(3)
of the RTI Act is applicable in the present case, given that the information
sought pertains to the year 1978, i.e., more than twenty years prior to the
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date of the RTI application, and therefore, whether the exemptions under
Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) can still be invoked.
145. The respondent contends that since the information pertains to a
period beyond 20 years, Section 8(3) mandates disclosure, rendering the
exemptions under Section 8(1)(e) and Section 8(1)(j), inapplicable.
146. This Court is not inclined to accept the said contention. In the post
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (supra) era, the Right to Privacy has
been unequivocally recognized as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. It is no longer tenable to assert that personal
information loses its protected status solely on account of the passage of
time. Privacy / confidentiality of personal information, is not time bound,
and mere passage of twenty years does not obliterate constitutional
protection.
147. In K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), a 9-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court,
while holding that the Right to Privacy is subsumed within Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and is intrinsic to life and personal liberty, also held
that privacy includes informational privacy.
148. The Right to Privacy, as recognized in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), does
not diminish with the passage of time. Section 8(3) of the Act cannot be
construed in a manner so as to reach the conclusion that mere a flux of 20
years would convert inherently personal information into public property.
149. The constitutional Right to Privacy, as recognized in K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), continues to operate as a shield for confidential and
personal information, even beyond the period referred to in Section 8(3) of
the RTI Act. Section 8(3) must be interpreted harmoniously with Article 21
so that the lapse of time does not infringe upon privacy rights.
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150. The mere efflux of time does not justify overriding privacy in the
absence of compelling necessity linked to a legitimate aim.
151. It is relevant to note that this Court, in Ehtesham Qutubuddin
Siddique vs. CPIO, Department of Personnel and Training, 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 1559, has recognized that the Right to Privacy endures even
after the expiry of 20 years. The relevant observations in the said judgment
are as under:
“6. The short question that arises for consideration before this Court
is that since the information has been sought after 20 years from the
date of appointment of the officers, would the bar under Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005 be still available to the officers
concerned or not.
7. Admittedly, the information as sought by the Petitioner is personal
in nature [Refer : Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central
Information Commr., (2013) 1 SCC 212, R.K. Jain v. Union of India,
(2013) 14 SCC 794 and Canara Bank v. C.S. Shyam, (2018) 11 SCC
426].
8. The Petitioner has been convicted and sentenced to death in the
Mumbai Twin Blast known as the 7/11 bomb blast case which took
place in the year 2006. The Petitioner was Accused No. 4. The
Petitioner was sentenced to the punishment of death for an offence
under Section 302 of the IPC, under Section 3(b) of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908, and Section 3(1)(i) of the Maharashtra
Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 and apart from this, the
Petitioner had also been sentenced for various offences under the
provision of IPC.
9. The information as sought by the Petitioner is against the officers
who were involved in the investigation and who were also involved in
granting sanction to the prosecution relating to the arrest and
conviction of the Petitioner. The information is of such a nature, if
given to the Petitioner, may expose these officers to grave danger.
The incident for which the Petitioner has been sentenced to the death
penalty has occurred in the year 2006. Admittedly, 20 years have not
passed after the date of the incident, and therefore, in any event, the
benefit of Section 8(3) of the RTI Act is not available to the Petitioner
in the facts of the present case. Even if it is assumed that 20 years
have passed, in such cases the right of privacy for these officers, who
can be exposed to grave risk, cannot be diverged to an accused and
that too when the accused has been convicted and sentenced to death
penalty.
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10. The Petitioner has not brought out any case as to what public
interest would be served by giving such information as sought for by
the Petitioner which would outweigh the protected interest under
Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. Rather in the facts of this case, the
protected interest is in the nature of danger to the life and property
of the officers who were involved in the investigation relating to the
Petitioner and that disclosing their information to the Petitioner
would certainly outweigh the public interest that has been claimed.
11. The Petitioner claims that the personal information can be
granted to him because the information has been sought after 20
years from the date of appointment of the officers concerned.
12. As rightly pointed out by the Ld. CIC, in the present case, the
public interest would lie in not disclosing the names and details of
the officers concerned to protect their life and property and there is
no public interest in disclosing the details of the officers concerned
regarding their appointment, which is sought for by the Petitioner.
13. In view of the above, this Court is not inclined to interfere with
the Impugned Order passed by the Ld. CIC. Resultantly, the writ
petitions are dismissed, along with pending application(s), if any.”
152. Thus Section 8(3) does not automatically override the exemption
under Section 8(1)(j) when the information sought is inherently personal and
protected under the right to privacy. The statutory provision must be
interpreted in harmony with constitutional guarantees, and no disclosure can
be directed unless a demonstrable and compelling public interest clearly
outweighs the privacy right in question.
Impugned order in W.P.(C) 600/2017 and W.P.(C) 1051/2017
153. In the impugned order passed in W.P.(C) 600/2017, it has been held
that: (i) acquiring an educational qualification is akin to acquiring property
through an authorized registration process; (ii) degree related information
about a student cannot be considered to be a third party information; (iii)
reference was made to the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in
Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem Sharat Chandra Singh, (2017) 2 SCC
487 which dealt with the consequences of making a false declaration under
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the Representation of the People’s Act, 1951 and the Rules framed
thereunder; (iv) since an education qualification is conferred in a
convocation, the disclosure of such qualification cannot be construed as
affecting the privacy of an individual; (v) the activity of awarding a degree
is a public activity, and therefore, all degree related information is accessible
public document; (vi) the Commission perused the official website of the
Delhi University and found that certain results of certain courses had been
displayed on the website of the university. Inference was drawn therefrom
that the same was done because information was not in the nature of
personal information.
154. It is evident that the entire approach of the CIC in the impugned order
was thoroughly misconceived. The conclusion that information relating to
degree / marks / results of any particular individual is in the nature of ‘public
information’, is in direct and utter contravention of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of
India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra).
155. It has been categorically held therein, in unmistakable terms, that
“marks obtained, grades and answer-sheets” are to be treated as personal
information. The relevant paragraph is again reproduced as under:
“70. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion.
would indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical,
mental and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer
sheets, are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional
records, including qualification, performance, evaluation reports,
ACRs, disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information.
Medical records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of hospitals and
doctors visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members,
information relating to assets, liabilities, Income tax returns, details of
investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such
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invasion of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation
of larger public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not
exhaustive.”
156. The other subjective observations in the impugned order viz. equating
acquisition of a degree to the acquisition of immovable property, or drawing
subjective inference from the fact that degrees are conferred in a
convocation, etc. are all de-hors the statutory provisions. Moreover, the CIC
misdirected itself in relying upon anecdotal material and subjective
assessments and drawing conclusions therefrom. Whether or not the Delhi
University has followed the practice of publishing certain results on its
website is not determinative of, and cannot have any bearing on, the
interpretation and scope of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.
157. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that it is based on a
subjective critique rather than on the interpretation and application of the
statutory provisions as they exist. Such an approach cannot be countenanced
in law, and this Court is constrained to express its dismay as regards thereto.
158. Likewise, in the context of the impugned order which is the subject
matter of W.P.(C) 1051/2017, the following observations have been made:
“It is not correct to say that once a student passes an examination and
qualifies to secure a certificate or degree, information about result will
be his personal information. Disclosure of the details of a particular
candidate contained in the degree or certificate register cannot cause
any unwarranted invasion of privacy of the certificate holder.”
159. Again, the aforesaid observations are in stark and utter contravention
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Public Information
Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra),
particularly paragraph 70 thereto, which has been reproduced above.
160. The impugned order/s refer to Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem
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Sharat Chandra Singh (supra) and to the consequences and repercussions
of the provisions of and the Rules framed under the Representation of
People’s Act 1951.
161. The Representation of People’s Act 1951 operates independently of
the RTI Act, and the consequences thereunder would flow independently of
the provisions of the RTI Act. Whether or not any information is in the
nature of “personal information” has to be assessed based on the statutory
provisions of the RTI Act. The impugned order in W.P.(C) 1051/2017, goes
to the extent of issuing directions to the concerned private school to trace the
roll number of the concerned public functionary (whose personal
information was sought) and provide the same to the CBSE.
162. Again, the said direction is completely de-hors the provisions of the
RTI Act. As observed in Central Board of Secondary Education &
Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay & Others (supra) and reiterated in
Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash
Chandra Agarwal (supra), the RTI Act cannot be construed so as to impose
an obligation on any public authority to collect or collate any non-available
information. The relevant observations are as under:
“63. At this juncture, it is necessary to clear some misconceptions
about the RTI Act. The RTI Act provides access to all information that is
available and existing. This is clear from a combined reading of Section
3 and the definitions of “information” and “right to information” under
clauses (f) and (j) of Section 2 of the Act. If a public authority has any
information in the form of data or analysed data, or abstracts, or
statistics. an applicant may access such information, subject to the
exemptions in Section 8 of the Act. But where the information sought is
not a part of the record of a public authority, and where such
information is not required to be maintained under any law or the rules
or regulations of the public authority, the Act does not cast an
obligation upon the public authority, to collect or collate such non-
available information and then furnish it to an applicant. A publicW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 159 of 175
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authority is also not required to furnish information which requires
drawing of inferences and/or making of assumptions. It is also not
required to provide “advice” or “opinion” to an applicant, nor required
to obtain and furnish any “opinion” or “advice” to an applicant. The
reference to “opinion” or “advice” in the definition of “information” in
Section 2(f) of the Act, only refers to such material available in the
records of the public authority. Many public authorities, as a public
relation exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to the citizens.
But that is purely voluntary and should not be confused with any
obligation under the RTI Act.”
163. In the circumstances, the impugned orders which are the subject
matter of W.P.(C) 600/2017 and W.P.(C) 1051/2017, being inconsistent
with and de-hors the provisions of RTI Act, cannot be sustained and are
accordingly set aside.
164. Consequently, the aforesaid writ petitions stand allowed.
Impugned order in W.P.(C) 1077/2017, W.P.(C) 1091/2017 and W.P.(C)
1095/2017
165. These cases pertain to the imposition of a monetary penalty on the
CPIO of the Delhi University for the alleged wrongful rejection of RTI
applications. The two RTI applications in W.P.(C) 1077/2017 were filed
seeking inspection of the documents of students of the Delhi University with
enrolment number CC-2366/74 and CC-5594/74, respectively. The RTI
application in W.P.(C) 1091/2017 pertains to information sought regarding
the thesis, research paper, project report or study report submitted by a
person, bearing Roll Number 13472, during his MBA/Part-time program in
the years 2009-2012, etc. The RTI application in W.P.(C) 1095/2017 was
filed seeking information about a degree awarded by the Delhi University.
166. The applications could not be processed for the reason that there was
a defect in the Indian Postal Order (IPO) accompanying the applications. In
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this regard, it is notable that Rule 3 of the Right to Information Rules, 2012,
provides as under:
“3. Application Fee.–An application under sub-section (1) of Section 6
of the Act shall be accompanied by a fee of Rupees Ten and shall
ordinarily not contain more than five hundred words, excluding
Annexures, containing address of the Central Public Information Officer
and that of the applicant:
Provided that no application shall be rejected only on the ground that it
contains more than five hundred words.”
167. The CIC while passing the impugned order dated 27.12.2016 in
W.P.(C) 1077/2017, observed that non-payment or improper filling of fee
instruments is not a valid statutory ground for rejecting an RTI application.
It was held that returning/rejecting the RTI application was a ground for
invoking Section 18(1)2 of the RTI Act.
168. It was observed that the rejection reflected an unreasonable denial of
information
169. The Commission also observed that the University had incurred
disproportionately high expenses, including legal costs, merely to reject an
application over a ₹10 fee, describing this as “penny wise, pound foolish.”
2
18. Powers and functions of Information Commissions.–(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall
be the duty of the Central Information Commission or State Information Commission, as the case may be,
to receive and inquire into a complaint from any person,–
(a) who has been unable to submit a request to a Central Public Information Officer or State Public
Information Officer, as the case may be, either by reason that no such officer has been appointed under this
Act, or because the Central Assistant Public Information Officer or State Assistant Public Information
Officer, as the case may be, has refused to accept his or her application for information or appeal under this
Act for forwarding the same to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer
or senior officer specified in sub-section (1) of Section 19 or the Central Information Commission or the
State Information Commission, as the case may be;
(b) who has been refused access to any information requested under this Act;
(c) who has not been given a response to a request for information or access to information within the time-
limit specified under this Act;
(d) who has been required to pay an amount of fee which he or she considers unreasonable;
(e) who believes that he or she has been given incomplete, misleading or false information under this Act;
and
(f) in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under this Act.
W.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 161 of 175
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The relevant observations in the said order are reproduced hereunder:
“19. Guide on Right to Information Act, 2005, issued by DoPT with
caption, “Applications received without fee”, in which it is stated at point
2 “Soon after receiving the application, the Public Information Officer
should check whether the applicant has made the payment of application
fee or whether the applicant is a person belonging to a Below Poverty
Line (BPL) category. If application is not accompanied by the prescribed
fee or the BPL Certificate, it cannot be treated as an application under
the RTI Act. It may, however, be noted that the Public Information
Officer should consider such an application sympathetically and try to
supply information sought by way of such an application”.
20. From these guidelines it is clear that ‘fee’ is not material factor to
throw out the RTI request. Non- payment of fee is not prescribed ground
for rejection of request. In fact, this is not at all a case of RTI request
without payment of fee. Applicant is also not claiming BPL status. The
very fact that he has paid fee through court fee stamps proves his
intention to pay. When guidelines goad the public authority to be
sympathetic to an applicant without paying fee, it does not need special
mention that it cannot take technical excuse about form of payment to
deny or delay the information.
21. Thus the Commission finds no justification to apprehend audit
objection to, giving information disputing the mode of payment. In fact,
audit will surely object this way of unmindful spending of huge amount
for Rs. 10. There is a duty cast upon the public authority to simplify the
process of payment of fee of Rs 10. In Patna, public authority accepts the
RTI application on phone though it is not accompanied with Rs 10, which
is added to telephone bill. Some states accept court stamps for payment
of fee. It is pathetic that such a simple request for information has been
dragged to the level of second appeal building heaps of documents with
multiple files consuming reams of paper spending huge amount of money
besides consuming precious time of public servants including that of the
Commission.
22. After hearing story of spending for legal battles to deny information
up to amount of thousands for an IPO of Rs 10, the proverb ‘penny wise
pound foolish’ has to be rewritten as ‘rupee wise and thousand foolish’.
Thus it is apparent denial of information and that too without any
reasonable cause that attracts Section 20 of RTI Act. The Commission is
vexed with non-response of CPIO to number of its penalty notices and
thus finds it is a fit case to impose penalty on CPIO.
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23. The Commission finds that the rejections of RTI applications by Delhi
University reminds the saying ‘penny wise pound foolish’, the rejection of
RTI application of the complainant is against the Right to Information
Act, rules and OM of DoPT, their institutional rules of procedure, even if
existed with any authority, is not valid to the extent of its contradiction to
RTI Act and Rules. The explanation of the CPIO confirms the fact of
rejection and totally fails to present any merit or justification. Hence the
Commission considers the CPIO is liable. The Commission requires
under Section 19(8)(a) the Public Authority to facilitate sufficient
training to the entire staff including CPIO and First Appellate Authority
in the matters of RTI law so that they do not adamantly reject RTI
application in routine without application of mind and understanding the
aims and objectives of RTI Act. The Commission also suggest public
authority to arrange for sufficient training, for the RTI authorities,
dealing officers and staff, provide latest books on RTI Act, and supply the
classic text books on “Administrative Law” and “Right to Know” by late
Professor S P Sathe, besides the “Five point someone: What not to do at
IIT” a novel written by Shri Chetan Bhagat, an alumnus of IIT Delhi and
IIM Ahmadabad to develop a positive mindset in disseminating
information suo motu and on request, without wasting university money
for collecting Rs 10. The training curriculum may also include the
judgment of Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw of Hon’ble Delhi High Court
in JP Agrawal v Union of India, WP(c) 7232/2009 decided on 4th August
2011. (also available on https://indiankanoon.orq/doc/104466988/).
24. Hence, the Public Authority is directed to recover the amount of
Rs.25,000/- from the salary payable to Mrs. Meenakshy Sahay, the CPIO
by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of ‘PAO CAT’ New Delhi in 5
equal monthly instalments. The first instalment should reach the
Commission by 15.02.2017 and the last instalment should reach by
15.06.2017. The Demand Draft should be sent to Shri. S. P. Beck, Joint
Secretary & Addl. Registrar, Room No.302, Central Information
Commission, B-wing, 2nd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi 110066.”
170. In the impugned order dated 23.12.2016, in W.P.(C) 1091/2017 the
CIC has rendered a finding that the CPIO sought to impose an impediment
to access the information sought. It was observed that the decision of the
CPIO to return the RTI application was without any legal basis and was
unjustifiable. The impugned order, after taking note of the protracted legal
proceedings that have taken place in the aftermath of RTI application being
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returned for want of a proper IPO, again observed that the conduct of the
CPIO could be characterized as “penny wise and pound foolish”. The
impugned order then proceeds to direct as under:
“33. The appeal is allowed because the Information sought was not
given and all the ways to get such Information were closed by returning
of RTI application. The CPIO is directed to provide the information
sought, free of cost to the appellant and file compliance report to the
Commission within 25 days from the date of receipt of this order.”
171. Further, it was observed as under:
“36. After hearing the submissions CPIO, perusing the records,
arguments by learned council, the submissions made by the Registrar
who was also First Appellate Authority under RTI Act, the present
CPIO, Deputy Dean of Law, and of the complainant, the Commission,
could not find any reasonable cause for rejection of RTI application.
The allegations made by complainant case against CPIO Mr. Jay
Chanda were proved by submissions of public authority as mentioned
above.
37. Hence, the Public Authority is directed to recover the amount of
Rs.25,000/- from the salary payable to Mr. Jay Chanda, Former CPIO
by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of ‘PAO CAT’ New Delhi in 5
equal monthly Installments. The first Installment should reach the
Commission by 15.02.2017 and the last Installment should reach by
15.06.2017. The Demand Draft should be sent to Shri S. P. Beck, Joint
Secretary & Addl. Registrar, Room No. 302, Central Information
Commission, B-Wing, 2nd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi 110066.
172. In the impugned order dated 22.12.2016 in W.P.(C) 1095/2017, it was
observed that the “fee is not a material factor to reject the application”. The
said order again characterized the conduct of the CPIO/Delhi University as
“penny wise and pound foolish”. In the said case as well, a direction has
been issued to recover an amount of Rs.25,000/- from the salary payable to
the CPIO. The relevant observations in the said order are reproduced
hereunder:
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“20. From these guidelines it is clear that ‘fee’ is not material factor to
reject the RTI request. In fact, this is not at all a case of RTI request
without payment of fee. Applicant is also not claiming BPL status. The
very fact that he has paid fee through court fee stamps proves his
intention to pay. When guidelines goad the public authority to be
sympathetic to an applicant without paying fee, it does not need special
mention that it cannot take technical excuse about form of payment to
deny or delay the Information.
21. Thus the Commission finds no justification to apprehend audit
objection to giving Information disputing the mode of payment. In fact,
audit will surely object this way of unmindful spending of huge amount
for Rs. 10. There is a duty cast upon the public authority to simplify the
process of payment of fee of Rs 10. In Patna, public authority accepts
the RTI application on phone though it is not accompanied with Rs 10,
which is added to telephone bill. Some states accept court stamps for
payment of fee. It is condemnable that such a simple request for
information has been dragged to the level of second appeal, building
heaps of documents with multiple files, consuming reams of paper,
spending huge amount of money besides consuming precious time of
public servants including that of the Commission.
22. The Commission finds that the rejections of RTI applications by
Delhi University reminds the saying ‘penny wise pound foolish’, the
rejection of RTI application of the complainant is against the Right to
Information Act, rules and OM of DoPT, their institutional rules of
procedure, even if existed with any authority, is not valid to the extent of
its contradiction to RTI Act and Rules. The explanation of the CPIO
confirms the fact of rejection and totally fails to present any merit or
justification. Hence the Commission considers the CPIO is liable. The
Commission requires under Section 19(8)(a) the Public Authority to
facilitate sufficient training to the entire staff including CPIO and First
Appellate Authority In the matters of RTI law so that they do not
adamantly reject RTI application in routine without application of mind
and understanding the aims and objectives of RTI Act. The Commission
also suggest public authority to arrange for sufficient training for the
RTI authorities, dealing officers and staff, provide latest books on RTI
Act, and supply the classic text books on “Administrative Law” and
“Right to Know” by late Professor SP Sathe. The training curriculum
may also include the judgment of Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in JP Agrawal v Union of India, WP(c)
7232/2009 decided on 4th August 2011. (also available on
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/104466988/).
23. Hence, the Public Authority is directed to recover the amount of
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Rs.25,000/-from the salary payable to Mrs. Meenakshy Sahay, the CPIO
by way of Demand Draft drawn in favour of ‘PAO CAT’ New Delhi in 5
equal monthly instalments. The first instalment should reach the
Commission by 15.02.2017 and the last instalment should reach by
15.06.2017. The Demand Draft should be sent to Shri S. P. Beck, Joint
Secretary & Addl. Registrar, Room No. 302, Central Information
Commission, B-Wing, 2nd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi 110066.”
173. The above impugned orders have recorded findings as regards
imposition of penalty upon the CPIO. They do not, however, render any
determination on the applicability of Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) of the RTI
Act in the context of their respective petitions.
174. This Court is of the opinion that the above impugned orders are
fraught with various legal infirmities. Firstly, while seeking to impose
penalty, the authority has failed to take note of the scope and import of
Section 20 of the RTI Act. The same contemplates that a penalty can be
imposed only if CPIO has: (i) without reasonable cause, refused to receive
an application; (ii) not furnished the information within the time specified;
(iii) malafidely denied the request for information; and/or (iv) knowingly
given incorrect or misleading information, or destroyed information which
was subject of the RTI Application.
175. The imposition of a penalty and its recovery from the personal salary
of the CPIO requires clear, cogent and specific finding of deliberate wrong
doing or misconduct. The impugned order fails to take into account that
there is a stark difference between a procedural infirmity/error and the
deliberate obstruction of an RTI application.
176. In the present case, it has been copiously brought out on behalf of the
Delhi University that as per the established procedure, any deficiency in the
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pay order is expeditiously communicated to the RTI applicant along with
proper guidance to the applicant for rectification of the defect.
177. It has been brought out by the Delhi University that there is a
standard, institutionalized procedure followed by the University in respect of
all RTI applications received by it. It was emphasized that the procedure was
evolved in view of the extremely large number of RTI applications that are
received by the Delhi University. The procedure, which has been taken note
of in the impugned order/s, is as under:
“1. The University receives the applications under the RTI Act by post
as well as over the Counter.
2. For applications received over the counter In the Information
Section at New Administrative Block, North Campus, the: Finance VII
Section receives cash directly submitted by the applicants along with
their application and provides a receipt to them immediately as an
acknowledgement of fee receipt as per rules framed by the University
under the RTI Act.
3. For applications received by Post, they are received by the Diary
and Dispatch Section of the University as it is the Central receipt and
dispatch facility of the University situated in the New Administrative
Building, North Campus.
4. The section, on receipt of the application, forwards it to the
Section Officer (Information Section).
5. Section Officer (Information Section) forwards the application to
the Section Officer (Finance VII) which is the cash section of the
University for Encashment of the IPOs, Banker’s Cheque etc. as
received along with the RTI applications.
6. When the applications are received from the Information Section,
on a daily basis, it is checked by the Finance VII section that whether
the fee submitted by the applicants along with their applications are as
per the rules framed by the University, for admissibility of financial
instrument, i.e., IPOs, DDs/Banker’s Cheques.
7. Those financial Instruments which are inadmissible because of
various deficiencies such as wrongly addressed, blank in the pay toW.P.(C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters Page 167 of 175
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column, mutilated, overwritten, beyond expiry date etc., are returned to
the Information Section for onward transmission to the applicants for
rectification. In addition, Cheque, Court fee stamp etc. provided as fee
is not accepted, as these are not permissible instruments for deposition
of fee as per rules framed by the University in consonance with the
relevant guidelines issued by the DoPT in this regard from time to time.
8. The Finance VII section receives hundreds of applications with
inadmissible fee instruments every year. In this connection, it is
emphasized that the procedure followed is uniform right from the
Inception of Implementation of the RTI Act, In the University, without
any exception whatsoever for any individual.
9. On receipt of the applications with the inadmissible financial
instruments from the Section Officer (Finance VII), a letter is prepared
by the Information, Section addressed to the applicant forwarding the
application and financial instrument in original for the purpose of
rectification, This communication is sent by the University through the.
Deputy Registrar (Information) & CPIO to facilitate its return to the
Individual concerned through a systematic procedure of returning such
applications as a routine in the University over the years.
10. There is no scope of application of any personal discretion by the
CPIO as he is neither physically accepting the applications along with
the financial instruments directly from the applicant nor deliberating
upon the fee encashment process. A careful perusal the RTI (Fee and
Cost) Rules, 2012 clearly brings out that such responsibility has been
categorically vested on the CAPIO of the Public Authority and the
University is yet to designate, a CAPIO under the RTI Act. In the
absence of the CAPIO, the Finance Office of the University de facto
discharges the duties of the CAPIO in terms of fee encashment. Mere
communication of the inadmissible applications for various reasons
including reason of inadmissible fee instrument is done by the
Information Section to facilitate such rectification of such deficiency by
the Information seekers.
11. This is clearly brought out in the decision of the Registrar & First
Appellate Authority of the University where she has categorically stated
that the procedure adopted by the University is the only procedure for
admissibility of an application for seeking Information under the Act
with the University.
12. This procedure is without prejudice to the applications received
by the University under Section 6(3) of the RTI Act from various other
Public Authorities from time to time.
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13. The University never returns any applications solely on the
ground that it is not addressed to the appropriate authority. However, in
case there is some other deficiency such as inadmissible fee, no
signature/authentication, etc. in the application, such applications are
returned where it is explicitly mentioned that the application is
addressed to an inappropriate authority to facilitate the applicant to
send the rectified application to the correct authority. In the instant case
too, the application would have been entertained if the financial
instrument accompanying the RTI application had been found
admissible by the concerned Finance Section of the University as per
rules.”
178. The impugned order/s contains adverse comments about the aforesaid
procedure. While there may be a requirement to improve the procedure and
ensure that the processing of RTI applications is further streamlined and
made smoother, without causing unnecessary inconvenience to the RTI
applicant/s, any perceived shortcomings in the procedure cannot be
construed as “obstructionist” or “malafide”.
179. Importantly, in W.P.(C) 1077/2017 the petitioner has filed an
additional affidavit dated 25.04.2017, wherein it has been submitted that
after being informed of a procedural defect in his initial RTI application,
respondent no. 1 submitted two fresh RTI applications on 24.05.2016 with
valid fee instruments. These were duly registered as OA No. 794 of 2016
and OA No. 795 of 2016, accepted without objection, and processed under
the RTI Act.
180. Both fresh applications were decided on their merits, with orders
issued on 13.06.2016 viz., Order No. Info/OA/794/2016/2884 in OA No.
794 of 2016 and Order No. Info/OA/795/2016/2883 in OA No. 795 of 2016.
The latter order, as well as the order of the first appellate authority dated
15.07.2016 and also the subsequent CIC order dated 08.09.2017, both in the
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context of the latter order, has been challenged in W.P. (C) 13568 (which
has been dealt with separately). This demonstrates that the University’s
actions were not arbitrary but were based solely on prescribed procedural
requirements for RTI applications, under the framework of the RTI Act.
181. Also, in the context of the RTI applicant in W.P.(C) 1091/2017, it was
emphasized by the Delhi University that the RTI applicant had filed
numerous applications under the RTI Act without any errors/discrepancies
in the accompanying financial instrument (IPO).
182. It was also brought out that in previous cases, in a similar context, the
CIC had refrained from imposing any penalty under Section 20 of the RTI
Act. The relevant submissions on behalf of the Delhi University, as recorded
in the impugned order in W.P.(C) 1091/2017, are as under:
“11. The University put forward that there 04 decisions of the Hon’ble
Central Information Commission claiming that such procedure was
upheld in similar matters:
i) CIC/SG/C/2009/001351/5070 dated 07.10.2009 [Dr. Fazal Ul Haque
vs. University of Delhi]
In this matter, the payee column of the IPO mentioned University of
Delhi but no specific authority was indicated. Even then, the Hon’ble
Commission did not given any relief to the Complainant, rather upheld
the procedure of the University.
ii) CIC/DS/A/2011/004344/RM dated 07.02.2013 [Shri Deepak Mishra
Vs. University of Delhi]
iii) CIC/RM/A/2012/000773 dated 21.06.2013 [Shri Anil Pathak vs
University of Delhi]In both these matters, the IPO was blank in the payee column, identical
to the present case and the said procedure of the University was upheld
by the Hon’ble Commission.
iv) CIC/RM/C/2013/000397 dated 11.03.2014 [Shri. Sudhesh Kumar
Goyal Vs. University of Delhi] In this matter, the IPO was addressed to
the PIO, wherein again no reply was given to the appellant.
These decisions of the Hon’ble Commission spanning over a
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period from 2009 to 2014 clearly indicates that the Hon’ble
Commission has time and again endorsed the University
procedure followed for the purpose of admissibility of
applications filed under the RTI Act and it also clearly bring out
that the University procedure in returning the application for
rectification on account of inadmissible fee instruments dates
back to the Inception of Implementation of the RTI Act in the
University and not a new dispensation of any particular officer.
Such repeated endorsement by the Hon’ble Commission left no doubt in
the understanding of the University, as a public authority implementing
the RTI Act, that there was any technical glitch in the Institutional
mechanism adopted by the University. :
If the University, as a public authority, does not have any
suspicion about the validity of the procedure adopted, how can
the Hon’ble Commission imagine that its CPIO would have a
separate personal wisdom beyond the collective wisdom of the
University to act in a different manner than what has been
followed over the years. Therefore, the question of any personal
malafide of the CPIO, as alleged by the appellant and
complainant, is unimaginable and incomprehensible.”
183. In the above context, the impugned orders appear to have clearly erred
in rejecting “the reasonable cause shown by the CPIO” in terms of Section
20 of the RTI Act.
184. The CIC ought not to have lost sight of that the CPIO could not be
faulted for seeking to adhere to the requirements under Rule 3 of the RTI
Rules, 2012. At the very highest, the conduct of the CPIO could be
characterized as a procedural irregularity rather than a malafide or
obstructionist denial of information. As mentioned, it has been brought out
that the procedure followed by the Delhi University is uniform; and the
same has fallen for scrutiny in other cases before the CIC, in which CIC
thought it fit not to impose any penalty.
185. It has been brought out by the Delhi University that it receives
thousands of RTI applications, and for the purpose of smooth processing, it
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is necessary for the Delhi University to evolve procedural guidelines, which
are strictly adhered to by the concerned CPIO.
186. The petitioner in its rejoinder written submissions, has set out a chart
depicting the valid RTI applications received by the Delhi University during
the years 2014-2017, as well as the “returned application”. The same is
reproduced hereunder:
Year Valid Applications Returned Applications
2014 2450 650
2015 2172 697
2016 2162 590
2017 2437 426
187. The staggering number of RTI applications is demonstrative of the
burden imposed on the CPIO. To attribute malafides to the CPIO for
following the established, institutionalized procedure does not appear to be
justified in the present case. Moreover, the recovery of the maximum
amount of penalty contemplated under Section 20 of the RTI Act from the
personal salary of CPIO is clearly disproportionate.
188. While this Court is usually loath to interfere with the exercise of
discretion by the CIC in assessing / considering a complaint under Section
18 and/or imposing a penalty under Section 20, in the facts of this case it is
evident that such discretion had not been properly exercised. The same
suffers on account of non-consideration of the “reasonable cause shown by
the CPIO”, particularly the fact that the procedure followed was in sync with
the established internal protocol/s, which had evolved and been put in place
in view of the sheer volume of RTI applications received every year by the
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Delhi University.
189. Moreover, on previous occasions, CIC found that the alleged
infraction did not constitute a valid ground for imposition of penalty. While
a body such as CIC is not strictly bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, it is
expected to take a uniform, consistent view. Such a stark deviation (in the
present cases), without any attempt to distinguish past precedents (attention
to which was specifically drawn by the Delhi University) or to explain the
rationale of the departure, renders the entire adjudicatory exercise vulnerable
to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness.
190. It also transpires that the information sought in the concerned RTI
applications in these petitions, is precluded in terms of Section 8(1)(j), as
discussed hereinabove.
191. In the circumstances, the impugned orders are unsustainable, the same
are accordingly set aside.
192. In W.P. (C) 1091/2017, the petitioner is also challenging order cum
show cause notices dated 09.11.2015 and 19.11.2015, passed in
CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SA [arising from the second appeal initiated by
respondent no. 1/ R.K Jain (deceased as per the affidavit dated 27.03.2025
filed by the petitioner)] and CIC/RM/C/2014/000138-SA (in complaint
proceedings initiated by respondent no. 1/ R.K Jain under Section 18 of the
RTI Act), respectively.
193. Vide order cum show cause notice dated 09.11.2015 the CPIO was
called upon to show cause why the maximum penalty should not be imposed
upon him, why compensation should not be awarded to the RTI applicant,
and why disciplinary action should not be recommended against the CPIO.
Relevant portion of the order is reproduced as under –
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“5. The Commission having heard the submissions and perused the
record, considers that it is a case where the CPIO returned the original
RTI application along with the IPO, which means a total and complete
refusal to ‘act under the provisions of RTI Act, which appears to be a
serious breach of RTI Act. The Commission directs the CPIO to explain
and show cause as to why maximum penalty should not be imposed
against him and why compensation should not be granted to the
appellant and disciplinary action should not be recommended against
him. His explanation should reach the Commission within 21 days from
the date of receipt of this order.”
194. Further, order cum show cause notice dated 19.11.2015 recorded as
under –
“5. The case has come up before the Commission today in the form of
complaint on the subject matter which came up as an appeal in No.
CIC/RM/A/2014/001389-SA, filed by same appellant against same
authority on 03.09.2015 in the presence of both the parties. The
Commission in case No. 001389 has directed the CPIO to explain and
show cause as to why maximum penalty should not be imposed against
him and why compensation should not be granted to the appellant and
disciplinary action should not be recommended against him.”
195. These show cause notices, being founded on the very same
circumstances already examined and adjudicated upon in the preceding
paragraphs of this judgment, are equally unsustainable and are, accordingly,
set aside. Also, as noted above, respondent no. 1/the RTI applicant/ Shri
R.K. Jain, has since passed away. Consequently, the grievance/s of the
information applicant has been rendered moot.
196. In the circumstances, the aforesaid writ petitions stand allowed.
Impugned order in W.P.(C) 13568/2023
197. The present writ petition has been filed to challenge the order dated
13.06.2016 passed by respondent no. 1, whereby the petitioner’s RTI
application seeking inspection of documents pertaining to a student of the
Delhi University, bearing enrolment number CC-5594/74, was rejected on
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the ground that the information sought was exempted under Section 8(1)(j)
of the RTI Act.
198. The petitioner has also impugned the order dated 15.07.2016 passed
by the First Appellate Authority, which upheld the decision of the CPIO
rendered on 13.06.2016. Further, the petitioner assails the order dated
08.09.2017 passed by the CIC, whereby the CIC disposed of the second
appeal of the petitioner on the reasoning that the subject matter was already
pending adjudication before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 600 of 2017. It was
noted that this Court had granted a stay on 23.01.2017, and hence, no further
intervention was considered necessary by the Commission. It is in the above
background that the present petition has been filed by the RTI applicant.
199. For the reasons elaborately discussed in the preceding paragraphs of
this judgment, it is manifest that the information sought by petitioner’s RTI
application falls squarely within the exemption contemplated under Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, for the reasons enumerated hereinabove.
200. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No. 13568/2023 also stands disposed of.
SACHIN DATTA, J
AUGUST 25, 2025/at/sv
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