Uttarakhand High Court
Unknown vs Medhani Prasad on 3 June, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
2025:UHC:4440-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. SUBHASH UPADHYAY
Special Appeal No. 258 of 2021
3rd June, 2025
State of Uttarakhand & others -------Appellants
Versus
Medhani Prasad ------Respondent
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Presence:-
Mr. Sushil Vashisth, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant
/State.
Mr. Niranjan Bhatt, learned counsel for the respondent.
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JUDGMENT:
(per Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
1. State has filed this intra-Court appeal, challenging
judgment and order dated 24.03.2021, passed by learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 393 of 2021
(Medhani Prasad Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Others). By
the said judgment, writ petition filed by Mr. Medhani
Prasad (respondent herein) was allowed and Competent
Authority was directed to consider his case for Sailesh
Matiyani State Teachers Award. Operative portion of the
impugned judgment is reproduced below:
“13. There is no dispute to the fact that on the date when
the petitioner applied for the award, he was eligible. The
Government Order dated 20.10.2009 also does not
categorically stipulate the date of eligibility, but it speaks of
the “preceding year”. The communication of the Director
Education dated 27.05.2019 and the Chief Education Officer,
Uttarkashi dated 28.05.2019 also state that applications of
ineligible candidates may not be forwarded. The
interpretation of these communications in the light of the
Government Order dated 20.10.2009 makes it abundantly1
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clear that the eligibility is to be determined on the date
when the applications are presented. Therefore, without
adverting to any other issue, this Court is of the view that
the candidature for the consideration of the award to the
petitioner may not be rejected on the ground that the day
when the Committee for selection, considered the matter,
the petitioner was not eligible. This Court also restrains to
direct the State Government to confer the award on the
petitioner, but in this petition what the Court considers, in
the interest of justice, is that while quashing the order dated
22.02.2021, respondent no. 1 should be directed to consider
the candidature of the petitioner on the date when he made
the application, not on the date when Selection Committee
considered it.
14. The impugned order dated 22.02.2021 is quashed. The
respondent no.1 is directed to consider the case of the
petitioner for the award, keeping in view his eligibility on the
date, when he submitted application for that purpose.”
2. It is not in dispute that the respondent, who was
serving as Assistant Lecturer in a Sanskrit
Mahavidhyalaya, applied for Sailesh Matiyani State
Teachers Award, which is given to teachers serving in
Government and Government aided Educational Institution
for excellence in service. Respondent however was not
given the award on the ground that he superannuated
from service on 30.09.2020. He made a representation
which was rejected by Secretary, School Education vide
order dated 22.02.2021. Respondent, thereafter, filed Writ
Petition (S/S) No. 393 of 2021, which has been allowed by
the impugned judgment.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that
eligibility and the criteria for selection for the Award is laid
down in a Government Order dated 20.10.2009 and in
para 3(4) of the Government Order, it is provided that
teachers, including Principal, will not be eligible for the
award, if they are re-employed upon superannuation, till
end of academic session.
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4. Learned counsel for the appellant/State further
submits that this vital aspect could not be considered by
learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition.
Clause 3(4) of Government Order dated 20.10.2009 relied
by State Counsel is reproduced below:-
“3(4)- lsokfuo`r@iqufuZ;qDr v/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z@iz/kkuk/;kid@izf”k{kd jkT;
iqjLdkj ds fy, ;ksX; ugha gksaxasA”
5. He thus submits that, as writ petitioner attained age
of superannuation in the month of September, 2020, he
therefore became ineligible for Sailesh Matiyani State
Teachers Award. He submits that in view of express
provision made in para 3(4) of aforesaid government
order, re-employment of a teacher post retirement, till end
of academic session will not improve his case for the
award and he will become ineligible for the award.
6. Learned State Counsel further submits that the
analogy drawn by learned Single Judge in para 12 of the
writ petition that eligibility for appointment has to be seen
with reference to the date on which a candidate submits
application in response to an advertisement is not correct
as the principle of service jurisprudence that eligibility
regarding age and academic qualification has to be seen
with reference to the last date of submission of application
will not apply to the present case where conditions of
eligibility are prescribed in the Government Order dated
20.10.2009.
7. He submits that present is not the case where writ
petitioner (respondent herein) had applied for appointment
to a public post but he had applied for conferment of an
award and conditions of eligibility for such award are
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prescribed in a Government Order, therefore, eligibility of
a teacher for such award is to be seen only with reference
to the condition mentioned in the Government Order.
8. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner (respondent
herein), per contra submits that writ petitioner had not
completed age of superannuation on the date he
submitted application for award, therefore his subsequent
superannuation would not render him ineligible as his
eligibility has to be seen on the date of making application
and not on the date when result of selection is declared.
9. After hearing rival contentions for the parties, we are
of the considered opinion that principle of service law that
eligibility of a candidate has to be seen with reference to
the last date of submission of application and not on the
date when result of the selection is declared, can have no
application in the present case where selection is for
conferment of an award, especially when the conditions of
eligibility are provided in a Government Order. One of the
condition of the Government Order is that upon
superannuation, a Teacher/Principal/ Administrator/
Trainer, will not be eligible for the award.
10. Conferment of State Teachers Award is not regulated
by any statute and it is governed only by a self contained
Government Order dated 20.10.2009. In view of the
express bar contained in para 3(4) of the Government
Order, upon completing age of superannuation, a teacher
cannot be considered for conferment of State Teachers
Award.
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11. Perusal of impugned judgment reveals that attention
of learned Single Judge was drawn to para 3(4) of the
aforesaid Government Order, however, there is no
discussion as to how condition mentioned in para 3(4) of
the Government Order would not be attracted to the case
in hand.
12. In view of express provision made in para 3(4) of the
Government Order, the date of submitting application, the
academic year for which award is to be given or the date
when meeting of selection committee is held, becomes
irrelevant, and anyone who completes age of
superannuation, becomes ineligible for the award.
13. It is settled principle of interpretation that full
meaning should be given to every provision of a statute or
in other words, every word and phrase should be
considered and given its proper meaning, unless doing so
leads to an absurd or unreasonable result. The object is to
ascertain the intention of the legislature and apply the law
as it was intended.
14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nathi Devi Vs.
Radha Devi Gupta has held as under:
“13. The interpretative function of the court is to discover the true
legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the court must, if
the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only
one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the
consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and
ordinary sense. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits
of only one meaning, no question of construction of statute arises, for the
Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or
that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving
effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one
construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any
other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is
more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In
considering whether there is ambiguity, the court must look at the statute
as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular
context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which
may render the statute unconstitutional.
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14. It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be
made to give effect to each and every word used by the legislature. The
courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a
purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute
should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the
legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as
obvious drafting errors. (See State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj [AIR
1963 SC 946 : (1963) 1 SCR 1] , Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh [AIR
1954 SC 749 : (1955) 1 SCR 671] , Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907 : 1958 SCR 360] , Nyadar Singh v. Union of
India [(1988) 4 SCC 170 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 934 : (1988) 8 ATC 226 : AIR
1988 SC 1979] , J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1170] and Ghanshyamdas v. CST [AIR 1964 SC 766 :
(1964) 4 SCR 436] .)
15. It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute
if the same does not lead to an absurdity.
16. In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2 SCC 577] this Court
stated the law in the following terms: (SCC p. 589, para 37)
“37. The court’s jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the
same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron
out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot
enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a
statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or
recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a
presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is
well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from
the language used. It may be true that use of the expression ‘shall or may’
is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is
directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found
out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when
negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the
legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character.”
17. Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is
capable of two interpretations, it is trite that the interpretation which
serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a
case the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted.
(See Swedish Match AB v. Securities & Exchange Board of India [(2004) 11
SCC 641 : (2004) 7 Scale 158] .)
15. Although in the present case, we are not dealing with
a statutory provision, however, since the eligibility
conditions, criteria for selection, composition of selection
committee, etc. are governed by Government Order dated
20.10.2009, therefore the law declared by constitution
Bench in the aforesaid judgment become relevant while
interpreting the different clauses of aforesaid Government
Order.
16. Learned writ Court has although noted the argument
raised by State Counsel, based on para 3(4) of the
Government Order dated 20.10.2009, however the import
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of para 3(4) is not considered and discussed in the
impugned judgment and no reason is assigned for holding
that it would be inapplicable to the case in hand.
17. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner (respondent
herein) submitted that in similar circumstances, another
teacher was conferred Sailesh Matiyani State Teachers
Award after superannuation, therefore his client is also
entitled to similar benefit and denial of award to him only
on the ground that he has superannuated from service is
not proper. This submission however is denied by State
Counsel who submits that no one was given the award
post retirement.
18. The submission made by counsel for the respondent
is bereft of merit. Two wrongs do not make a right. Merely
because someone, who was not eligible for award as per
Government Order was conferred the same, will not entitle
the respondent to claim award on the ground of parity.
Courts are required to enforce law or Government Policy,
and an illegality cannot be permitted to be perpetuated
merely because of some decision taken earlier in
ignorance of law or Government Policy.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, Special Appeal is allowed
and the impugned judgment rendered by learned Single
Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 393 of 2021, is set aside.
(Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
(Subhash Upadhyay, J.)
Dated: 03.06.2025
Kaushal
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