Uttarakhand High Court
Unknown vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 23 July, 2025
2025:UHC:6501-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
THE HON'BLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. G. NARENDAR
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MR. ALOK MAHRA
Writ Petition (M/B) No.569 of 2025
23rd July, 2025
M/s Tarun Tour and Travels --Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and others --Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Jitendra Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Mr. Yogesh Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel along with Mr. S.M.S.
Mehta, learned Brief Holder for the State.
Mr. N. S. Pundir and Ms. Sangeeta Patni Adhikari, learned counsel for
respondent nos.2, 3 & 4/Corporation.
JUDGMENT :
(per Mr. Alok Mahra, J.)
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned counsel for the respondents.
2. By means of this writ petition, petitioner seeks the
following reliefs:-
“(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari,
calling for original record and pleased to quash the impugned
office order no. 279/HQ/11-HB/Volvo/25 dated 17th May 2025
{Annexure No.1} issued by the respondent no. 4 i.e. the
Managing Director (Technical) of Uttarakhand Transport
Corporation (UTC).
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari,
calling for original record and pleased to quash the another
impugned board decision dated 07-05-2025 (Annexure No.2)
pertains to decision no.14 taken in the 37th board meeting by the
respondent no. 2.
(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus,
directing and commanding the respondents, permit the petitioner1
2025:UHC:6501-DBto run their 06 Volvo Buses bearing registration no. UK-07PA-
4391, UK-07PA-4392, UK-07PA-4393, UK-07PA-4394, UK-07PA-
4395 and UK-07PA-4405 respectively for extended period of 6
months + 6 months as per the earlier 31st and 33rd Board
Meetings dated 12-07-2022 and 01-03-2023 respectively and
also make payment of rent as fixed between the parties in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement dated
17th March 2020.”
3. Petitioner is a proprietorship firm involved in public
transport service registered with Uttarakhand Transport
Corporation. According to the petitioner, in the year 2020, he
was awarded a contract for operating 6 Volvo buses and
agreement was executed between the petitioner and the U.T.C.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
respondent U.T.C., vide its two Board Meetings i.e. 31st Meeting
and 33rd Meeting, took a decision that, for the purpose of
granting Covid-19 benefit to the contractors, who had provided
their buses on contract, after considering their representations,
the aforesaid agreement is being extended for next one year
and, hence, the contract of the petitioner which was going to
expire on 17.03.2026, was extended to 17.03.2027; that, on
17.05.2025, the respondent issued a letter abruptly deciding to
discontinue the petitioner’s Volvo buses citing the BS-4 ban in
Delhi NCR and, according to the petitioner, the Corporation
have no authority to review its own order.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-
Corporation submits that the contract was extended for 6
months in 2023 and it was done only for the person whose
contract was expiring in the month of March/April, 2023,
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inasmuch as, that was the peak time of Char Dham Yatra. He
further submits that petitioner did not make any objection at
that point of time, when contract was extended for a further
period of six months and that no further extension will be
granted to the petitioner to ply the buses. He further submits
that, as per the agreement executed between the petitioner
and the respondent-Corporation, petitioner has a remedy to
refer the matter for the Arbitration, as mentioned in Clause 45
of the aforesaid agreement.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Joshi
Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India,
reported in (2015) 7 SCC 728, has held in para 69 and 70 as
under:
“69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to
be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we
have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute
bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual
matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when
monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the
High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to
exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances,
“normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion:
69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has
some public law character attached to it.
69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is
provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its
discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the
party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of
disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.
69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are
of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.
69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual
obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional
circumstances.
70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various
judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects
relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with
private parties, can be summarised as under:
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70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely
in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness.
70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is
under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some
discriminations.
70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of
competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts
have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are
disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of
which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence,
involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case
could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can
direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit,
etc.70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation
voluntarily incurred.
70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual
obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or
hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract
can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of
contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot
ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it
profitable to do so : and he can challenge the conditions under which
he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient
to conduct his business.
70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the
party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance
of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed.
Otherwise, the party may sue for damages.
70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action
unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is
denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be
shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any
hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that
action could not have been taken without observing principles of
natural justice.
70.8. If the contract between private party and the
State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm
of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal
course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided
under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its
extraordinary jurisdiction.
70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in
the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not
been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private
field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ
petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and
private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix
of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and
private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each
case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual
relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once
on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity
or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be
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examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or
instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or
that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant
factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the
decision is not arbitrary.
70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in
such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but
failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision
arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a
legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-
arbitrariness.
70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling
within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited
and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of
their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely
contractual disputes.”
7. Similarly, in the case of Life Insurance
Corporation of India and others vs. Asha Goel (smt.) and
another, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 160, Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while dealing with the identical issue, proceeded to hold
in para 10 as under:
“10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers extraordinary jurisdiction
on the High Court to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of
the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It is wide and
expansive. The Constitution does not place any fetter on exercise of
the extraordinary jurisdiction. It is left to the discretion of the High
Court. Therefore, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of
law that in no case the High Court can entertain a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a life
insurance policy. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate
exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can or cannot
be enforced by filing a writ petition. The determination of the
question depends on consideration of several factors like, whether a
writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her contractual
rights or the case raises important questions of law and
constitutional issues, the nature of the dispute raised; the nature of
inquiry necessary for determination of the dispute etc. The matter is
to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. While
the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied altogether, courts
must bear in mind the self-imposed restriction consistently followed
by High Courts all these years after the constitutional power came
into existence in not entertaining writ petitions filed for enforcement
of purely contractual rights and obligations which involve disputed
questions of facts. The courts have consistently taken the view that
in a case where for determination of the dispute raised, it is
necessary to inquire into facts for determination of which it may
become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding under Article
226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate forum. The position is
also well settled that if the contract entered between the parties
provide an alternate forum for resolution of disputes arising from the
contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by
them and the High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them5
2025:UHC:6501-DBto bypass the agreed forum of dispute resolution. At the cost of
repetition it may be stated that in the above discussions we have
only indicated some of the circumstances in which the High Court
have declined to entertain petitions filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution for enforcement of contractual rights and obligation; the
discussions are not intended to be exhaustive. This Court from time
to time disapproved of a High Court entertaining a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of enforcement of
contractual rights and obligation particularly where the claim by one
party is contested by the other and adjudication of the dispute
requires inquiry into facts. We may notice a few such cases; Mohd.
Hanif v. State of Assam [(1969) 2 SCC 782] ; Banchhanidhi Rath v.
State of Orissa [(1972) 4 SCC 781] ; Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector,
Jabalpur [(1980) 4 SCC 556] ; Food Corpn. of India v. Jagannath
Dutta [1993 Supp (3) SCC 635] and State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra
Pal [(1999) 4 SCC 43].”
8. The general principle which may be concluded is
where the contract entered into between the State and the
person aggrieved is of a non-statutory character and the
relationship is governed purely in terms of a contract between
the parties, in such situations, the contractual obligations are
matters of private law and a writ would not lie to enforce a civil
liability arising purely out of a contract. The proper remedy in
such cases would be to file a civil suit for claiming damages,
injunctions or specific performance or such appropriate reliefs
in a Civil Court. Pure contractual obligation in the absence of
any statutory complexion would not be enforceable through a
writ.
9. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, being an extraordinary remedy, it is not intended to be
used for the purpose of declaring private rights of the parties.
In the case of enforcement of contractual rights and liabilities,
the normal remedy of filing a civil suit being available to the
aggrieved party, this Court may not exercise its prerogative writ
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jurisdiction to enforce such contractual obligations.
10. In the case in hand, the claim sought to be set up by
petitioner has been strongly disputed and the petitioner has
raised its claim pertaining to contractual and commercial
obligations, and the pleadings and the material which are on
record do not, in any manner, indicate that it is a public law
remedy, which the petitioner is seeking to invoke so as to
persuade this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.
11. In view of the foregoing discussions and keeping in
view the facts of the case at hand, we are not inclined to
exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
12. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.
(G. NARENDAR, C. J.)
(ALOK MAHRA, J.)
Dated: 23.07.2025
BS
BALWANT
Digitally signed by BALWANT SINGH
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH
COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
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f28cdf4ba7ce8640c5820, postalCode=263001,
SINGH
st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=04E141DF4614F9A4D5F48346EB553DE5185F
418755DC00A7A13C14A680C3FA90, cn=BALWANT SINGH
Date: 2025.07.31 17:14:10 +05’30’
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