Delhi District Court
Upl Ltd vs Dayal Beej Co on 28 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. VANSHIKA MEHTA
JMFC (NI ACT)- 04/ PHC/ NEW DELHI
CC No. 18977/2019
Unique Case ID No. DLND02-030023-2019
In the matter of: -
UPL Ltd.
through its AR,
Having its corporate office at:-
UPL House, 610 B/2,
Bandra Village,
Off Western Express Highway,
Bandra (East),
Mumbai-400051
Also at:-
3-11, GIDC,
Vapi, 396195,
Gujarat.
Also at:-
26-28, Indra Palace,
Block H, Connaught Place,
New Delhi-110001
...........Complainant
Versus
M/s. Dayal Beej Co.
Through its proprietor,
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain,
Station Bajaria, Swai Madhopur,
Rajasthan-322001
....................Accused
Date of Institution : 05.12.2019
Offence Punishable Under Section : U/s 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881
Plea of Accused : Not guilty
Date of presentation : 26-11-2019
Date of decision : 28.07.2025
Final Order: : Acquittal
Argued by: : Sh. Shubham Kumar, Ld. Counsel for the
complainant.
: Sh. A.K. Soni, Ld. Counsel for the accused.
CC No. 18977/2019 UPL Ltd. Vs. M/s. Dayal Beej Co. page no. 1 of 15 VANSHIKA
MEHTA
Digitally signed by
VANSHIKA MEHTA
Date: 2025.07.28
16:31:16 +0530
JUDGMENT
“If we do not maintain justice, justice will not maintain us.” – Francis Bacon
INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL MATRIX
1. Accused is produced before the court to stand trial for the offence punishable u/s 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“Act” or “NI Act“). He was summoned by this
court to face the trial vide order dated 16.03.2021.
2. Tersely put, it is the case of the complainant that the complainant is a reputed
company engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of agrochemical products. The
accused is the sole proprietor of M/s Dayal Beej Co. and had approached the complainant to
obtain a non-exclusive dealership for the supply of its agrochemical products. Pursuant to a
duly executed dealership agreement, the complainant supplied goods from time to time,
maintaining a running account. In discharge of the outstanding legal liability, the accused
issued a cheque dated 18.07.2019 bearing no. 576000 for an amount of Rs. 22,38,943/- drawn
on State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Sawai Madhapur. The cheque was presented by the
complainant at its banker, but was dishonoured with the remarks “Refer to Drawer” vide
return memo dated 26.09.2019. Thereafter, a legal demand notice dated 14.10.2019 was
issued and duly served upon the accused on 19.10.2019. Despite service/deemed service of
the legal notice, the accused failed to make payment within the stipulated period. Hence, the
complainant has filed the present complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881, within the prescribed limitation period.
3. The accused was summoned vide order dated 16.03.2021, and on 03.03.2023, notice
was framed against the accused under Section 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed
trial. The accused denied having signed the cheque in question and further denied that the
handwriting of the particulars on the cheque was his. He also submitted that he never issued
the impugned cheque to the complainant, and that the cheque neither bears his signature nor
has been filled in by him.
Digitally
signed by
VANSHIKA
VANSHIKA MEHTA
MEHTA Date:
2025.07.28
16:31:20
+0530
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EVIDENCE LED BY THE COMPLAINANT
4. The complainant in order to prove its case, examined Complainant as CW-1 examined
in its evidence led before the court on 20.10.2023. CW-1 tendered in evidence by way of
affidavit Ex. CW-1/A and relied upon the following documents:-
a) The cheque in question (Ex. CW-1/2), b) Dishonour memo (Ex. CW-1/3), c) Legal notice (Ex. CW-1/4), d) Postal receipts and tracking report (Ex. CW-1/5 and 6), e) Invoices (Ex. CW1/8 Colly), f) Ledger (Ex. CW1/9), g) Authorization letter (Ex. CW1/1). h) Tax Invoice (Ex. CW1/8 (Colly)), i). Ledger of company (Ex. CW1/9), j). Letter of Authority in my favour (Ex. CW1/10 (OSR)).
4.1. Upon his cross-examination, complainant CW-1, inter alia, stated that he was
authorized to appear in the present matter on 26.10.2020. He admitted that the authorization
document Ex. CW1/1 does not specifically mention that he is authorized to depose on behalf
of the complainant in the present case. He further admitted that Ex. CW1/1 bears the
signature of one Mr. Sandeep Deshmukh, but does not state anywhere that Mr. Sandeep
Deshmukh is a director of the Complainant Company. He also admitted that no document has
been placed on record showing that Mr. Sandeep Deshmukh was authorized to empower
CW-1 through Ex. CW1/1. He reiterated that the said document does not contain any specific
authorization to depose. CW-1 stated that the business relationship between the Complainant
and the Accused began in 2009. Upon perusal of the ledger Ex. CW1/9, CW-1 deposed that
the last transaction between the parties took place on 31.07.2018. He confirmed that the
invoices on record, Ex. CW1/8 (Colly), pertain to the year 2018. He denied the suggestion
that the Accused had cleared the invoices raised till 31.07.2018 and submitted that payments
were to be made invoice-wise, within the due dates mentioned therein. He expressed
unawareness regarding whether any cheque was obtained from the Accused as security prior
VANSHIKA
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to the commencement of business. He admitted that payments from the Accused were
received through cheque and RTGS and acknowledged specific payments of Rs. 10,000/- on
20.07.2018, Rs. 90,000/- on 30.07.2018, and Rs. 60,000/- on 31.07.2018 against the invoices
in Ex. CW1/8. He stated that he is unaware if the Accused made any cheque payments to the
Complainant other than the present disputed cheque. He admitted that the cheque in question
was not filled in his presence, and as per the Complainant’s records, it was received duly
filled from the Accused. He further confirmed that the cheque was dishonoured with the
remark “Refer to Drawer.” CW-1 stated that the Accused was informed of the dishonour
prior to issuance of the legal demand notice, though he was unable to specify the mode of
such communication.
4.2. When confronted with the suggestion that cheques bearing nos. 576001, 576002,
576004, and 576005 from the same cheque book were used in 2017 for NEFT/RTGS to other
beneficiaries, and that the present cheque bearing no. 576000 is dated 18.07.2019, CW-1
responded that according to the Complainant Company’s record, the cheque in question was
handed over by the Accused to a company employee at the Accused’s shop in 2019. He
admitted that the said employee has not been cited as a witness in the present proceedings and
stated that cheques are generally received by the company in a duly filled condition. He
denied the suggestion that the cheque in question was stolen by a company employee from
the Accused’s shop in 2019. He further denied the suggestions that the cheque does not bear
the signature of the Accused, that the signature was forged, or that the cheque was never
issued in discharge of any liability. He also denied that all payments had been made by
RTGS/NEFT and that the cheque was never handed over to the Complainant. Lastly, he
denied suggestions that he is not authorized to depose in the present matter, or that he is
deposing falsely and mechanically without reference to the Complainant’s records.
STATEMENT OF THE ACCUSED
5. Thereafter, on 06.06.2024, the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
read with Section 281 Cr.P.C., was recorded, wherein the accused stated that it is correct he
was appointed as the exclusive dealer of the products of the complainant company. It is also
correct that he had received goods from the complainant. However, the accused categorically
VANSHIKA
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denied having issued any cheque in favour of the complainant. The cheque in question,
marked as Ex. CW1/2, does not bear the accused’s signatures. He is unaware as to how the
said cheque came into the possession of the complainant and submits that the same may have
been stolen. Ex. CW1/3 is admitted to be a matter of record. The accused further stated that
he did not receive any legal demand notice. However, the address mentioned in the said
notice belongs to him. The accused asserts that all payments due to the complainant have
been duly made through RTGS and other lawful banking channels, and no cheque was ever
issued by him in favour of the complainant. In this regard, the accused has also lodged a
police complaint against the complainant regarding the theft of the said cheque, at Police
Station Sawai Madhopur on 21.05.2024.
EVIDENCE LED BY THE DEFENCE
6. The accused was examined as DW-1 on 27.03.2025, DW-1 deposed that he is the sole
proprietor of M/s Dayal Beej Company and had business dealings with the Complainant
Company. He categorically stated that he did not sign the cheque in question, nor did he ever
hand over the said cheque to the Complainant at any point of time. He asserted that all
payments made to the Complainant were through NEFT/RTGS, and no payment was ever
made via cheque. He further deposed that the cheque in question had been stolen from his
shop located at Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan, by an employee of the Complainant Company.
DW-1 stated that he first became aware of the present case when he appeared before this
Hon’ble Court. Upon gaining such knowledge, he made complaints to the police authorities
at Sawai Madhopur, Jaipur, and Bharatpur regarding the theft of the cheque in question. He
also filed a criminal complaint against the Complainant before the Ld. Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan. The certified copy of the said complaint has been
placed on record as Ex. DW1/1 (Colly), running into 10 pages. DW-1 categorically asserted
that the signatures appearing on the cheque in question are forged and do not belong to him.
7. DW-1 has also furnished the copy of FIR bearing no. 0063 dt.
15.02.2025, PS Mantown, Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan. Same is now marked as Mark
DW1/A.
8. During the cross-examination of DW-1, he acknowledged that he had received the
legal notice dated 14.10.2019. He denied the execution of any dealership agreement with the
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Complainant Company and was unable to recall the exact date on which his business
relationship with the Complainant commenced. He stated that the business was on a credit
basis through a running account and all payments were made through NEFT/RTGS. He
admitted to having a continuing liability towards the Complainant Company in respect of the
raised invoices but denied liability to the extent of the cheque in question. He estimated his
liability to be around Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 60,000/- and claimed to have placed on record bank
statements evidencing the same, but upon being shown the court file, admitted that no such
bank statement was on record. When shown Mark CW1/A, and asked who had stolen the
cheque, he replied that he did not know, but stated that it was stolen from his shop. He
admitted that the FIR and the complaint were filed only after the filing of the present case and
denied the suggestion that the same was an afterthought to defeat the Complainant’s claim.
9. DW – 1 could not recall the exact date or month when the criminal complaint Ex.
DW1/1 (Colly) was filed before the Court at Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan, but stated it was
filed in 2024. He admitted that the complaint did not name any specific employee of the
Complainant as responsible for the alleged theft.
10. DW -1 further claimed to have made full payment towards the products purchased,
barring an outstanding amount of approximately Rs. 40,000/-, though he admitted that no
documentary proof of such payments was placed on record. He acknowledged that some
liability always existed towards the Complainant Company. DW-1 categorically denied seal
and signatures on the documents Mark DW1/C-1 (Colly) dated 19.01.2019, 23.05.2019, and
16.07.2020, and ledgers from 01.04.2018 to 31.03.2019.
11. The defence further examined Mr. Tulsi Ram Meena as DW-2, who deposed that he
had brought the relevant summoned record, namely the Account Opening Form and KYC
documents of the concerned account, duly stamped and signed by the Notary, marked as Ex.
DW2/1 (Colly). He also brought the Authority Letter, duly stamped and signed by the Branch
Manager, marked as Ex. DW2/2. The witness, DW – 2 further deposed that, upon
comparison, the signatures on the cheque in question differ from the signatures appended on
Ex. DW2/1 (Colly) at point “X”.
12. During his cross-examination, the DW – 2 stated that the accused, Rakesh Kumar Jain,
had signed at four places on Ex. DW2/1 (Colly), specifically at points X, X1, X2, and X3,
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and that the accused had signed at every necessary place in the said document. The witness
further deposed that, upon comparison of the signatures on the cheque with those at points X,
X1, X2, and X3 in Ex. DW2/1, the signatures appear to be completely different. He stated
that the style of the signatures at the said four points in Ex. DW2/1 is different from the style
of the signatures on the cheque.
13. At this stage, the witness was shown page no.1 and page no.3 of Ex. DW2/1 and was
specifically asked whether the signatures appended on page no.1 are similar to those on page
no.3. The witness admitted that the signatures on page no.3 of Ex. DW2/1 belong to the
accused, Rakesh Kumar Jain.
14. The defence further examined ASI Dharmender Kumar from Police Station Man
Town, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan, as DW-3. He deposed that he had brought the
certified copy of FIR No. 0063/2025, registered under Sections 379, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471,
and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. He stated that the said FIR was registered on the
complaint of the accused, Rakesh Kumar Jain, against the complainant and others, and that
the matter is presently pending investigation. The certified copy of the FIR is marked as Ex.
DW3/1.
15. During his cross-examination, DW-3 stated that the details of the alleged stolen
cheque are mentioned in the FIR from point “Y” to “Y1”. He admitted that the investigation
in the said FIR is still pending and that no final report has been filed as on date.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PARTIES
16. Ld. Counsel for the complainant has argued that the cheques in question was issued
by the accused towards repayment of the loan obtained by him. He further argued that the
accused has admitted his signatures on the cheques in question. He also contended that the
accused has not been able to rebut the presumption of law in favour of the complainant and,
accordingly, is liable to be convicted.
17. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the accused contended that the complainant has failed
to establish a valid and specific authorization in favour of Ms. Shail Mishra (CW-1) to depose
and prosecute the present complaint on behalf of the company. During cross-examination,
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MEHTA Date:
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CW-1 admitted that the authorization Ex. CW-1/1 does not specifically empower her to
depose in the matter, nor does it establish that the signatory of the resolution, Mr. Sandeep
Deshmukh, is a Director of the complainant company. Reliance was placed on the judgments
of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Lalit Narayan Thakkar v. Narendra Gajanan Sharma
and of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. M/s. SMS Asia
Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., where it was categorically held that complaints under Section 138 of the NI
Act must be prosecuted by duly authorized representatives with valid resolutions.
18. It was further argued that the accused never issued the cheque in question Ex. CW-1/2
to the complainant. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused denied his
signatures on the cheque and alleged that the cheque was stolen. He reiterated this position
during his examination as DW-1, stating that a criminal case regarding the theft of the cheque
had been filed against the complainant. The Ld. Counsel for the accused further argued that
DW-2, the concerned bank official, produced the accused’s account opening form and KYC
documents Ex. DW-2/1 (Colly) and stated categorically that the signatures on the cheque in
question differ significantly from the admitted signatures. During cross-examination, he
confirmed that the styles of signatures on the disputed cheque and those on record are entirely
different. The complainant failed to rebut this evidence.
19. It was further argued that the DW-3, a police official, produced the certified copy of
FIR No. 63/2025, registered at the instance of the accused against the complainant regarding
theft and misuse of the cheque. It was submitted that the complainant suppressed material
facts and did not acknowledge the payments made by the accused in 2018, as evident from
the ledger i.e., Ex. CW-1/9. The complainant initially denied these payments but later
admitted to receiving at least one of them. This undermines the complainant’s version and
points to suppression of facts.
ANATOMY OF FACTS AND FINDINGS THEREON
LEGAL JURISPRUDENCE
20. So far so good. Having considered all the submissions, it is apposite to have a quick
glance at relevant position of law. Section 138 of the Act provides as under:
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. —
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Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker
for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank
unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is
insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid
from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed
to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of
this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two
years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless–(a)the cheque has
been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is
drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;(b)the payee or the
holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of
the cheque, [within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank
regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and(c)the drawer of such cheque fails to
make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to
the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said
notice.
Explanation. –For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a
legally enforceable debt or other liability.]
21. It is a well-established principle of law that the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI
Act) provides for two critical presumptions–one under Section 118 and the other under
Section 139.
Section 118 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, until proven otherwise, that every
negotiable instrument has been made or drawn for consideration. This presumption places the
onus on the party challenging the instrument to disprove this presumption of consideration.
Section 139 of the Act further provides that, unless proven otherwise, it shall be presumed
that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of, in whole or in part, any debt or
liability. This creates a strong legal presumption in favor of the complainant, especially in
cases involving dishonored cheques.
APPLICATION OF LAW
22. Applying the aforesaid law at hand to the facts of the case, the accused during framing
of notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C on 03.03.2023 denied having signed the cheque in question and
further denied that the handwriting of the particulars on the cheque was his. Thus, signature
on the cheques is a disputed fact.
VANSHIKA
MEHTA
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A careful examination of the Negotiable Instruments Act‘s provisions, particularly Sections
20, 87, and 139, makes it abundantly evident that whoever signs a cheque and gives it to the
payee is still accountable unless he provides proof to refute the assumption that the cheque
was written to settle a debt or release a liability. In the event that the drawer has properly
signed the cheque, it makes no difference who filled it out. The criminal provisions of
Section 138 would apply if the cheque was otherwise legitimate.1
23. Suffice to say, the presumption qua the existence of legal liability as prescribed u/s
139 of the NI Act is liable to be attracted only when the accused admits the issuance of
cheque whereas in the facts at hand, the accused has categorically denied having signed the
impugned cheque in question and further denied that the handwriting of the particulars on the
cheque was his. In view of the fact that the issuance of the cheque on question is not an
admitted fact, the assumption under Section 139 NI Act is not liable to be attracted.
DISCUSSION OF EVIDENCE
Authorization of CW-1
24. The Ld. Counsel for the accused has vehemently argued that the complainant has
failed to establish a valid and specific authorization in favour of Ms. Shail Mishra (CW-1) to
depose and prosecute the present complaint on behalf of the company.
25. Bare perusal of cross-examination of CW-1 evinces that it is an admitted stance of
CW-1 that the authorization Ex. CW-1/1 does not specifically empower her to depose in the
matter at hand, nor does it establish that the signatory of the resolution, Mr. Sandeep
Deshmukh, is a Director of the complainant company. The defence has placed a reliance on
the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. M/s.
SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. wherein it was held –
In that view, the position that would emerge is that when a company is the payee of
the cheque based on which a complaint is filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act, the
complainant necessarily should be the Company which would be represented by an
employee who is authorized. Primafacie, in such a situation the indication in the
complaint and the sworn statement (either orally or by affidavit) to the effect that the
1
Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983.
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complainant (Company) is represented by an authorized person who has knowledge,
would be sufficient. The employment of the terms “specific assertion as to the
knowledge of the power of attorney holder” and such assertion about knowledge
should be “said explicitly” as stated in A.C. Narayanan (supra) cannot be understood
to mean that the assertion should be in any particular manner, much less only in the
manner understood by the accused in the case. All that is necessary is to demonstrate
before the learned Magistrate that the complaint filed is in the name of the “payee”
and if the person who is prosecuting the complaint is different from the payee, the
authorisation therefor and that the contents of the complaint are within his knowledge.
When, the complainant/payee is a company, an authorized employee can represent the
company. Such averment and prima facie material is sufficient for the learned
Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process. If at all, there is any serious dispute
with regard to the person prosecuting the complaint not being authorized or if it is to
be demonstrated that the person who filed the complaint has no knowledge of the
transaction and, as such that person could not have instituted and prosecuted the
complaint, it would be open for the accused to dispute the position and establish the
same during the course of the trial.
26. It has been duly brought on record that CW-1 was not specifically authorized to
depose in the present matter. The letter of authority i.e., Ex. CW1/1 neither mentions such
specific authorization nor establishes that the signatory of the said letter is a competent
official. The complainant has not placed on record any Board Resolution or other document
establishing such authority.
27. Once CW-1 categorically admitted that there is no document on record authorizing
Mr. Sandeep to execute the letter of authority (Ex. CW1/1), the onus to prove the validity of
the said letter shifted to the complainant. However, no evidence has been adduced in this
regard.
28. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Apex Court, in TRL Krosaki
Refractories Ltd. v. SMS Asia Pvt. Ltd. [(2022) SCC OnLine SC 172], emphasized the
necessity of valid authorization to initiate and prosecute a complaint under Section 138 of the
NI Act.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the foundational competence of CW-1 to depose
is in serious doubt.
Issuance and Validity of Cheque
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30. The accused submits that he does not owe any legally enforceable liability to the
complainant. As per Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act), there exists a
statutory presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that it was issued for the
discharge of a debt or liability. However, in the present case, since the accused has
specifically denied both the execution and the signature on the cheque, and the foundational
facts necessary to invoke the presumption have not been established, the presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act is not attracted.
31. Consequently, the initial evidential burden to prove that the cheque bears the
signature of the accused remains on the complainant, in accordance with Section 101 of the
Indian Evidence Act (IEA), which stipulates that the burden of proof lies on the party who
asserts the existence of a fact. Until such foundational fact is established, the statutory
presumption cannot operate in favour of the complainant.
32. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the complainant has not adduced any evidence
to prove the signature of the accused. However, the accused has examined himself as DW-1
and has categorically stated that he did not sign the cheque in question, nor did he ever hand
over the said cheque to the complainant at any point in time. He asserted that all payments
made to the complainant were through NEFT/RTGS, and no payment was ever made via
cheque. He further deposed that the cheque in question had been stolen from his shop located
at Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan, by an employee of the complainant company.
33. The accused has categorically denied the issuance of the cheque. He has alleged theft
and forgery and has examined DW-2 and DW-3 to support his plea. DW-2 deposed that he
had brought the relevant summoned record, namely the Account Opening Form and KYC
documents of the concerned account, duly stamped and signed by the Notary, marked as Ex.
DW2/1 (Colly). The witness further deposed that, upon comparison, the signatures on the
cheque in question differ from the signatures appended on Ex. DW2/1 (Colly) at point “X”.
34. At this stage, it is important to examine who qualifies as an expert witness. Section 45
of the Indian Evidence Act is reproduced hereunder for better understanding:
45. Opinions of experts.–When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of
foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger
impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign
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law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions,
are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts.
35. In view of the above definition, it is evident that a bank witness is not an expert
witness. Hence, any opinion of the bank witness as to whether the signatures on the cheque in
question differ from those appended on Ex. DW2/1 (Colly) at point “X” is of no evidentiary
relevance.
36. However, the Court under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act has the power to
compare signatures. A quick glance at Section 73 of the IEA reveals:
73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved.–In
order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal is that of the person by whom it
purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or
proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person
may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing
or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct
any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling
the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures
alleged to have been written by such person.
37. Needless to say, Section 73 empowers the Court to compare writings with specimen
or admitted documents. The phrase “admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court” in
Section 73 contemplates that the specimen document taken for comparison must be
undisputed, and all parties to the dispute must admit the specimen signature or writing. In
case one party refuses to admit or disputes the specimen document, it is incumbent upon the
Court to first satisfy itself that the signature or writing on the specimen document has been
proved to be that of the person concerned, and only then proceed with the comparison with
the disputed document.
38. In the facts at hand, the signatures of the accused on the Account Opening Form and
KYC documents, marked as Ex. DW2/1 (Colly), are undisputed.
39. Though it would be unsafe and improper to decide an issue regarding disputed
handwriting, signatures, fingerprints, etc., solely on the basis of conclusions arrived at by the
Court through comparison under Section 73 of the IEA, in cases where there is other
supporting evidence pointing to such conclusions, it is well within the ambit of the Court’s
power to decide the case on the basis of the exercise undertaken by it in that regard as well.
VANSHIKA
CC No. 18977/2019 UPL Ltd. Vs. M/s. Dayal Beej Co. page no. 13 of 15 MEHTA
Digitally signed
by VANSHIKA
MEHTA
Date: 2025.07.28
16:31:54 +0530
40. Accordingly, upon comparison of the impugned signature on the cheque with the
signatures on the Account Opening Form and KYC documents, duly stamped and signed by
the Notary and marked as Ex. DW2/1 (Colly), it can be deduced that the signatures on the
cheque in question differ from those appended on Ex. DW2/1 (Colly) at point “X”.
41. Further, the complainant has failed to produce any expert opinion.
42. The defence raised by the accused is further fortified by DW-3, who brought the
certified copy of the FIR, marked as Ex. DW3/1, which was registered on the complaint of
the accused against the complainant regarding the alleged stolen cheque.
43. While Section 139 of the NI Act presumes issuance of the cheque in discharge of a
liability, this presumption is rebuttable. For the sake of repetition, the said presumption under
Section 139 of the NI Act is not applicable in the present facts. However, even if the said
presumption is assumed to exist for the sake of argument, the accused, by establishing a
mismatch in signatures through Ex. DW2/1 (Colly), lodging of FIR (Ex. DW3/1), and his
plausible denial of issuance of the cheque, has successfully discharged the burden of rebuttal.
The complainant has failed to reinforce its case with cogent evidence in rebuttal.
DECISION
44. It is axiomatic that the degree of proof expected from the accused is not as rigorous
as that of the complainant. He could discharge his onus by making dents in the case of the
complainant. Therefore, once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court
that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/ liability in the manner pleaded
in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to the
complainant and the presumption ‘disappears’ and does not haunt the accused any longer.2
45. This court is not oblivious of the fact that there exists a statutory presumption in
favour of the complainant regarding existence of liability, however, it is well settled that such
presumption is rebuttable in nature. Merely because the cheque was issued from an account
maintained by the accused or that the accused admits signature on the cheque, would not
invite culpability under Section 138 of the NI Act.
2
Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, AIR 2019 SC 1983.
VANSHIKA
CC No. 18977/2019 UPL Ltd. Vs. M/s. Dayal Beej Co. page no. 14 of 15 MEHTA
Digitally signed by
VANSHIKA
MEHTA
Date: 2025.07.28
16:31:56 +0530
46. Upon comprehensive consideration of the evidence, the accused has been able to
create a dent in the complainant’s story and has further raised strong suspicion about the case
put forth by the complainant. The accused has demonstrated, on the preponderance of
probabilities, that he owes no debt or liability towards the complainant.
47. Accordingly, in view of the above observations and principles of law, I am of the
considered opinion that the accused has rebutted the presumption in favor of the complainant
and has raised a probable defense. The complainant has not been able to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt against the accused, and accordingly, the accused deserves to be
acquitted.
48. Accordingly, this court hereby acquits the accused Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain for the
offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in respect of cheque in
question.
PRONOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 28.07.2025
Digitally
signed by
VANSHIKA
Present judgment consists of 15 pages and each page bears my initials. VANSHIKA MEHTA
MEHTA Date:
2025.07.28
16:32:00
+0530(VANSHIKA MEHTA)
JMFC (NI ACT)-04
PHC/ New Delhi/28.07.2025CC No. 18977/2019 UPL Ltd. Vs. M/s. Dayal Beej Co. page no. 15 of 15